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ABSTRACT 
 
The main aim of this interdisciplinary research is to develop a socio-technical and 
institutional framework for implementing the Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) paradigm by analysing how water resources can be managed in response to 
anthropogenic drivers (e.g. population/economic growth) and environmental pressures 
(e.g. climate change) within an evolving institutional set-up. Implementation of the 
Framework has focussed on Iran, and Lake Urmia basin as a case study, which involved 
a significant element of action research based upon stakeholder participation.  
Lack of implementation of concepts such as IWRM has been attributed to the gap 
between technical outcomes and policy decisions. To achieve an integrated synthesis for 
this interdisciplinary study, the integrated methodological framework has used four 
analytical components based on the IWRM concept: (1) Driver-Pressure-State-Impact 
Response (DPSIR); (2) Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD); (3) Integrated 
Socio-technical Assessment (ISTA) using modelling and Multi criteria Decision-Making 
(MCDA) tools; and (4) Ethics to assess water allocation decision outcomes in multitier 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs).   
Results from the case study show that the non-structural responses (legislations, 
new administrations etc.) adopted since 2003 have not guaranteed the implementation of 
sustainable water allocation outcomes in river basins including Lake Urmia basin. Water 
allocation has become highly political and caused polarisation in opinions and multiple 
perspectives among stakeholders underlined by diverging discourses on climate change, 
water and land development and irrigation water use efficiency. The participatory water 
allocation decision reached for Lake Urmia Basin, which included an allocation to 
sustain the hydrological and ecological functions of the Lake, has been re-evaluated by 
analysing historical climatic and hydrologic data. The outcome suggests that water 
availability in the basin is less than that adopted by the stakeholders based on trend 
analysis within the existing discourse. Therefore, the thesis demonstrates a mechanism 
for adaptive water allocation and demand management under an uncertain future climate 
which is represented through rainfall scenarios generated using a stochastic rainfall 
 iv 
model. It is concluded that the participatory process has enhanced the efficacy of the 
water governance system, but the effectiveness of water allocation will be compromised 
unless an adaptive water allocation approach is implemented, and basin-wide water use 
efficiency measures are taken.  
It is recommended that modern day water and land governance has to take into 
account the ethical and cultural aspects of the community to form an alliance for 
sustainable resource use; thus, an Ethical legal framework for community-based land 
and water governance has been proposed.  The overall integrated methodological 
approach provides an innovative analytical framework to understand the discursive 
deliberations in a complex Social-Ecological system heightened by (1) scientific 
uncertainty over climate variability and change; and (2) dynamic institutional 
transformation and evolution. 
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Chapter I. Water Resources Management: Issues of Concern 
 
1.1 An overview  
With increasing human population coupled with expanding economic activities and 
improved living standards, the world’s freshwater resources are under increasing pressure. The 
competition and often conflict 1over the limited freshwater resources leads to mismanagement 
of the precious resource (e.g. Tamas, 2003). In addition, water pollution is inherently 
connected with human activities as a water resource often acts as a medium for transporting 
domestic, agricultural and industrial waste, thus degrading its potential as a resource. 
The above problems are aggravated by shortcomings in the management of water. 
Fractional (sectoral) approaches to water resources management have dominated and still 
prevail, especially in the developing world; as a result, fragmented and uncoordinated 
development and management of the resource is a real practice. The overall problem is caused 
by inadequate legal legislation (governance) and institutional set-ups as well as increased 
demand for the finite amount of the water resources. Hence, the need for a new integrated and 
holistic approach to water management has been widely recognised to achieve sustainability of 
the water resources system (e.g. GWP, 2000). 
The concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), Figure1.1, was 
envisaged by the International Water Resources Association nearly 4 decades ago (Braga 
2001), and IWRM now constitutes an emerging global norm (Swatuk, 2005).  
 
Figure 1.1: IWRM approach (After GWP, 2000). 
                                                 
1 Conflicts can be inter and intra state tensions and disputes and do not imply waging wars.  A list of water 
conflicts can be found in this website http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/. 
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IWRM came to prominence in 2000 by the effort of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) 
which defines IWRM as: 
a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystem”(GWP, 2000; 
p.22) 
On this basis, the IWRM paradigm is a holistic, river-basin oriented approach2 with the 
following aims: (i) water-use efficiencies, (ii) equity of access, (iii) balance of competing uses, 
(iv) environmental sustainability, and (v) participation of all stakeholders. The definition also 
suggests that IWRM is a process, which “is not a goal in itself. It is a means to an end, or 
rather it is a process of balancing and making trade-offs between different goals in an 
informed way”(Jønch-Clausenand Fugl, 2001). 
The institutional implementation of the IWRM paradigm within the trianglular model 
of sustainability (Khan, 1995) has three components (Figure 1.2): 
· Enabling environment: good governance, adequate policies etc; 
· Management instruments: water  allocation modelling, economic tools etc 
· Institutional roles: capacity building, level of actions etc. 
 
Figure 1.2: Sustainability triangle and IWRM implementation approach (GWP, 2000). 
 
Iran, which has a semi-arid/arid climate and is part of West Asia and North Africa 
(WANA) region (Figure 1.3), experiences many challenges in moving towards sustainable 
water resources management.  Sustainable water resources system are “those designed and 
                                                 
2 This is not in the definition but implied in its application 
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managed to fully contribute to the objectives of society, now and in the future, while 
maintaining their ecological, environmental and hydrological integrity” (ASCE, 1998). A 
survey of 54 water managers conducted by the author during 2007-8 reveals that there is a 
need for a holistic and integrated approach to water management (Table 1.1). The managers 
were asked to list the five most important issues in the water sector (Source: Appendices A1). 
Table1.1 presents a summary of the broad definition of issues of concern in Iran's water sector.  
Based on the many challenges indicated, there has been a move towards adopting the IWRM 
paradigm in Iran.  
 
Figure 1.3: Iran within WANA region in dark blue (Source: www.wanaforum.org). 
 
In the following sections of this chapter, the rationale, aim, objectives and scope of the 
research are outlined.  
 
1.2 Rationale of the research: Research gaps and questions 
In recent years, there has been a great deal of interest in how to implement IWRM and 
in why it has not been implemented since its introduction some 40 years ago. Van der Zaag 
(2005) argues that IWRM is not just a buzzword but is a relevant, yet elusive and fuzzy 
concept. Wide-scale implementation has been limited. Many scholars and researchers (e.g 
Brown, 2005; Amjad, 2003) have concluded that  there is a need for institutional change and 
reform underpinned by capacity building interventions targeted at enabling a learning culture 
that values integration and  a participatory approach. Therefore, the question remains as to 
what intervention pathway is required to achieve the IWRM concept.  
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Physical Environmental 
ü the temporal and spatial variation of water availability; water scarcity; limited resources 
ü problems of droughts  and floods  and the impact of climatic variations on water resources 
ü inter-basin water transfer schemes 
ü excessive and unbalanced agricultural use and consumption of surface and groundwater resources including 
irrigation supply 
ü domination of traditional farming with low water use efficiency; 
ü depletion /over-exploitation of groundwater resources 
ü impact of pollution on freshwater resources/source pollution and river water quality issues 
ü pollution of water resources and water quality issues; degradation of lakes and wetlands and natural habitats 
ü lack of precise information on the quality-quantity of the existing water resources; lack of accurate hydrological  
data; incomparability of information and data at different levels of management; lack of adequate information and 
data for managerial decision making in many basins; 
Socio-economic 
ü population growth; accelerated urban population growth and lack of urban planning 
ü urbanisation, industrialisation and economic growth 
ü illegal use of wells and abstraction from groundwater resources 
ü inadequate social awareness about role of water for life and the environment;  
ü lack of public concern and knowledge about limited water resources 
ü lack of valuation of water as an economic good: in another word: no economic perspective on the value of water 
ü regional (development) challenges and political influence; lack of consideration for sustainable development 
ü limited financial resources for water projects 
ü Gender issues: lack of representation of women at planning stage of water resources development 
ü Health related problems  
Institutional  
ü Lack of conflict resolution management for trans-boundary waters and provincial water allocation   
ü lack of administrative integration 
ü Insufficient , inadequate and ambiguous  laws, legislations and guidelines; lack of compliance with water laws; 
weakness of legal guarantees  to implement law;  
ü lack of implementation mechanisms in water resources planning;  
ü provincial management instead of river basin management 
ü duplication of decision centres 
ü lack of system approach in water resources management 
ü inadequate /unclear inter-provincial water allocation practices; no clear allocation strategy for inter-provincial 
water shares 
ü lack of community capacity building; lack of stakeholder participation in decision making 
ü lack of consideration to demand management 
ü Weakness of non-structural approaches (consumption management, demand management…) 
ü Introduction of short term policies without consideration for technical principles in water uses by politicians 
ü No river basin authority 
ü Sectoral approach 
Based on analysis of 54 questionnaires collected during 2007-8 (Source: Appendix A1) 
Table 1.1: Issues map for Iran's water sector. 
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A report by the fourth World Water Forum (WWF, 2006)3, entitled: Implementing 
Integrated Water Resources Management: the Inclusion of IWRM in National Plans, reviews 
the progress made by countries in some 6 regional categories. According to two different 
statistical surveys by the Japan Water Forum (JWF) and the GWP, up to 28% have made good 
progress but some 28% are in their initial stages of implementing IWRM. They make some 
key recommendations for future work on IWRM, which are centred on five themes: (1) 
institutional and legal framework, (2)stakeholder participation, (3)socio-economic, 
(4)capacity-building and (5)environmental sustainability. More recently, UN-Water (2008) 
completed a survey showing an improvement of IWRM planning process at national level but 
much more efforts are required to implement the plans at local levels and in Asia generally, 
the institutional reforms are advanced but there are problems with institutional cooperation 
and coordination. The fifth World Water Forum, which was held in Istanbul in 2009, 
confirmed the importance of the institutional and cultural dimensions of water resources 
management (WWDR, 2009). 
Read-in to this, the neglect of the institutional dimension in water resources 
management has created a huge barrier to implementing IWRM. Water resources management 
requires a radical reorientation and an effective dialogue between decision makers, 
stakeholders and engineers/academics (Falkenmark et al, 2004). However, the challenge is 
how this radical reorientation can be made operational on the ground, and how to design and 
use institutional reforms, potential interactions with other incentives/disincentives at the 
operational level and the effect they may ultimately demonstrate in practice. Institutional 
transformations are not a common occurrence (Cowie and Borrett, 2005), so the question is: 
what are the prerequisites for institutional change? And what constitutes change? 
Biswas (2004), in reassessing the IWRM paradigm, concludes that there is a need for 
“an objective, impartial and non-dogmatic assessment of the applicability of IWRM”. Can a 
single paradigm be applicable to every climatic conditions, every cultural, economic and 
social settings? “…can it be applicable……to Islamic customs?”(Biswas, 2004). Is there a 
need for an evolving paradigm to make the concept implementable? How can we have local 
solutions using a global concept? Iran has a strong Islamic tradition as a Constitutional 
democratic Islamic Republic. For example, what is the institutional role of Islamic principles 
in implementing IWRM based on sustainability criteria? How can sustainable policies emerge 
                                                 
3 This report came out at the start of the PhD project providing an insight into research gaps in implementing the 
IWRM paradigm. 
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from the moral and ethical values of Islam, bearing in mind that institutional, ethical and 
cultural aspects have been recognised as important elements of IWRM (e.g. WWDR, 2009). 
Strengthening institutional aspects by having and implementing adequate policies, 
laws, regulations and administrations are vital for the implementation of an integrated 
approach to water management. This is known as good governance. The World Bank (2007) 
asserts that Middle East and North African (MENA) countries have appreciated the 
importance of good governance in implementing sustainable water management policies in the 
region, which includes Iran. 
Multiple stakeholder participation (social learning process) is crucial to the evolution 
of sustainable river basin management, and an integral part of the IWRM paradigm. Social 
learning theory developed by Bandura (1977) postulates that people can learn from each 
other’s experiences via observation, imitation and modelling or coding the information, which 
guides the actions. Therefore, the question is how to facilitate multi-stakeholder processes and 
social learning. This leads to questions about governance and democracy, which have become 
important global issues as we work towards making sustainable development a reality. 
Research is required on linking technical analytical methods and participation (social learning) 
approaches, (Pahl-Wostl, 2002). For IWRM to be effective, a tripartite alliance between policy 
maker, stakeholder and engineer (scientist) is required (Schulz et al, 2004). Simonovic and 
Bender (1996) conclude that participation is essential because stakeholders have the 
knowledge and experience necessary to formulate effective alternatives. 
IWRM is a wide-ranging concept. The scope of the PhD programme has therefore 
focussed on developing a socio-technical framework for implementing the IWRM paradigm in 
general, and in Iran specifically, by considering the water allocation decision-making using: 
a) a sustainability framework for analysing drivers and pressures associated with water 
management and management options which provides a pathway towards 
implementing the IWRM paradigm 
b) an institutional analysis framework that can be linked to (a) 
c) a case study approach to facilitate participatory decision-making; and 
d) exploring the ethical and cultural spheres to foster good governance 
The PhD programme will address the above questions and hence will contribute to the 
advancement of IWRM theory and practice. 
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1.3  Main Aim 
The main aim of this project is to develop an integrated Socio-technical Framework for 
implementing the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) paradigm in a case study 
approach by analysing how water resources can be managed and adaptively administered in 
response to anthropogenic drivers (e.g. population/economic growth) and environmental 
pressures (e.g. climate change) within the current institutional set-up, and to demonstrate the 
application of the Framework using a case study approach that is based upon stakeholder 
participation (Lake Urmia basin, Iran). 
 
1.4  Objectives  
1. To assess the  applicability of IWRM through a critical analysis of the underlying 
principles, and to assess progress made with implementation (Chapter II).  
2. To develop an integrated methodological framework which can be used to implement 
the IWRM paradigm by integrating the elements of social and technical assessment 
(Chapter III). 
3. To assess the status of progress towards implementing IWRM in Iran (Chapter IV). 
4. To assess the status of water resources planning, management and allocation in the 
Lake Urmia Basin  (Chapter V). 
5. To make an integrated socio-technical assessment of the water resources availability 
for sustainable water allocation management in the Lake Urmia Basin, Iran (Chapter 
VI). 
6. To make a re-assessment of the institutional sustainability of the water allocation 
strategy in Lake Urmia basin. (Chapter VII). 
7. To develop an ethical and cultural framework that can provide a basis for good 
governance based on Islamic principles (Chapter VIII). 
8. To demonstrate the applicability of the overall framework through the Lake Urmia 
case study approach (Chapters VI - VIII). 
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1.5 The structure of the thesis:  
The structure and the scope of the thesis are given in Figure 1.4 which shows relevant 
chapters and methodologies associated with the objectives.  
 
Figure 1.4: The scope and objectives of the thesis with relevant methodological tools used in 
each Chapter denoted by ‘Ch’.  
 
1. To assess the  applicability of IWRM through a critical analysis of the underlying principles, and to 
assess progress made with implementation Ch 2
2. To develop an integrated methodological framework which can be used to implement the IWRM 
paradigm by integrating the elements of social and technical assessment 
3. To assess the status of 
progress towards 
implementing IWRM in Iran 
Ch 3
Ch 4
4. To assess the status of  
water resources planning, 
management and allocation 
in Lake Urmia case study 
Ch 5
5. To make an integrated socio-
technical assessment of the 
water resources availability 
for sustainable water 
allocation management in the 
Lake Urmia Basin, Iran
Ch 6
6. To make a re-assessment of 
institutional sustainability of 
the water allocation strategy 
in Lake Urmia basin
Ch 7
7. To develop an ethical and 
cultural framework that can 
provide a basis for good 
governance based on Islamic 
principles
8. To demonstrate the applicability of the overall framework through the Lake Urmia case study 
approach 
Ch 9
Ch 8
DPSIR analysis
Discourses
Historical perspective
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Discourses
Historical perspective
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Acronyms:
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ChapterII. Sustainable Water Resources Management in the 21
st
 
Century: Concepts, Theories, Issues and Methodologies 
2.1 Introduction  
In Chapter I, the challenges facing the water resources sector worldwide, and in Iran 
in particular, have been outlined. The survey (Table1.1, p.4) showed that lack of 
institutional capacity development in Iran is perceived as one of the main obstacles on the 
road to sustainable water resources management; and this is probably the case in many 
other countries. Despite acknowledging the need for an integrated management approach, 
the implementation of concepts such as IWRM has been slow or non-existent. Therefore, 
Chapter II attempts to assess the progress made and applicability of IWRM through a 
critical review of the underlying governing principles and related concepts such as ethics of 
decision-making and water institutions. The main aim of IWRM is to achieve 
sustainability. Thus, IWRM is reviewed through the lens of sustainability of different 
aspects of the water resources system (WRS). 
IWRM has become a dominant paradigm and actively promoted by national 
governments and international agencies as the basis for sustainable water resources 
management (e.g. Falkenmark and Rockström, 2006; Molle et al, 2008; Merrey, 2008). The 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) has been a driving force behind the internationalisation of 
the concept. However, there has been a lack of implementation of IWRM worldwide 
despite its adoption by national governments around the globe (Biswas, 2004; Merrey, 
2008). According to the Johannesburg Summit in 2002, governments had to have an IWRM 
plan by 2005. In 2003, Iran was the first country in the Middle East region to adopt the 
principles of IWRM through a landmark legal provision and normative plan called ‘Long 
Term Development Strategies for Iran’s Water Resources’ (IWRMC, 2004). In addition to 
legislative measures, several IWRM research studies have been initiated and are on-going.  
Thus, IWRM concept which was conceptualised in the latter half of the 20th century is a 
dominant paradigm but is still relevant in contemporary water resources management 
despite much criticism about its practical applications by e.g. Merrey, 2008; Biswas, 2004 
and van der Zaag, 2005.  
Chapter II is divided into three main parts: first, the governing principles of 
sustainable water resources management will be described; then IWRM is reassessed by 
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considering its (a) conceptual limitations and (b) applicability. The discussion and 
conclusions constitute the final part of this chapter.  
 
2.2 Governing principles: definitions, concepts and issues 
2.2.1 IWRM 
A critical landmark in the history of the development of IWRM was the UN Water 
Conference in Mar Del Plata in 1977 which set the general principles for international and 
national agencies (Amezaga, 2005), and these principles were updated in 1992 in Dublin. 
The Dublin principles1 contributed to the Agenda 21 recommendations (see Chapter 18 of 
UNCED (1992) on freshwater resources) and were adopted at the UN conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, 1992. They provide the basis 
for an integrated approach to water management. 
From its definition (Chapter I: p.2), IWRM considers all the three interacting 
components of a WRS (Figure2.1; Loucks and van Beek, 2005): 
i. Physical (infrastructure and technology) and natural environment; 
ii. Institutional and political (policies, laws, regulations and administrations); and 
iii. Socio-economic. 
Neglecting a particular aspect of the system poses great challenges to the 
sustainable management of this precious resource. Hence, the water resource system is not 
only about the natural system and the infrastructure and technology, but it is inter-related 
with institutional and socio-economic and institutional subsystems as well.GWP (2000) 
acknowledges that there is no unique definition of IWRM. Moreover, GWP (2000) has 
further elaborated on the meaning of ‘management’ and ‘integration’; management 
encompasses both development and management and integration is defined as: 
the art and  science of blending the right proportions of regular interaction and 
interdependent groups of items into a whole. The concept of integrated water resources 
management in contrast to traditional fragmented management is concerned with the 
management of water demand as with its supply (GWP, 2000; p.23) 
 
                                                 
1The 4 Dublin Principles form the basis of modern water management: (1) Freshwater is a finite and 
vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; (2) Water development and 
management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all 
levels; (3) Women play a central part in the provision, management, and safeguarding of water; (4) Water has 
an economic value in all its competing uses, and should be recognised as an economic good. 
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Figure 2.1: The components of WRS (Adapted from Loucks and van Beek, 2005). 
 
The essence of integration is challenging and the process of integration has been 
beset with both technical and conceptual problems. Collaboration, cooperation and 
coordination are terms used to describe partially the meaning of ‘integration’ within the 
context of an integrated management decision-making process. However, Morrison et al 
(2004) suggest that integration means all of the named terms and more. A seven 
dimensional diagnostic framework has been envisaged including strategic, structural, 
procedural, facilitative, functional and methodological integrations (Morrison et al, 2004). 
An integration of water resources may have four characteristics or dimensions as shown in 
Table 2.1. 
In the context of IWRM, the word ‘paradigm’ refers to the idea that IWRM is a 
balancing process that facilitates trade-offs among competing goals and not a goal in itself 
(Jønch-Clausen and Fugl, 2001). This is very important. IWRM plans are not traditional, 
project-oriented ‘Water Master Plans’ but they are strategic ‘dynamic’ plans based on long 
term visions that continuously will be reassessed and evaluated over time (Figure 2.2).  
Politics 
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Figure 2.2: The Cycle for IWRM plans (Source CAP-NET, 2005). 
 
Four dimensions of integration  
(Morrison et al, 2004)) 
Five criteria for sustainability 
(sustainable development  
(Gasparatos et al, 2008) 
 
Interpretations in terms of IWRM 
1- A multi-jurisdictional spatial 
organization 
1- Integration of social, economic, 
environmental and institutional issues 
and their interactions and 
interdependencies;  
 
1-Fulfilling Sustainability criteria using 
sustainability assessment frameworks 
2-Participatory coordination of 
different stakeholders, civil 
societies and actors 
2- Creating a participatory 
environment; empowerment policies; 
2- Stakeholder participation mechanisms 
such as stakeholder platforms; councils, 
forums associations etc.  
Balance of power among stakeholders 
Facilitating bottom up decisions  
3-Collaborative decision- 
making from the participatory 
approach 
3- Predictions of future trends and the 
impact of policies and development 
plans on sustainability;   
4- dealing with uncertainties by taking 
conservative and precautionary 
measures 
3-Using a systems analysis approach 
(policies, scenarios, management options 
(measures) and strategies) and integrated 
assessment tools 
4- Agreement based on 
rationality 
5- To foster ecocentric ethics and  
equity (intergenerational and 
intergenerational); 
4- Supporting the socio-economic welfare of 
people i.e. eradicating poverty; empowering 
women; sustaining the environment 
Table 2.1: Integration and sustainability in terms of IWRM. 
 
2.2.2  Sustainable Development: ecological and environmental sustainability   
The concept of sustainability came into the domain of academia In the 1970s 
(Rogers et al, 2006,p.42). However, Sustainable Development came into prominence after 
the publication of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 
report2 which defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(WCED, 1987: 43). 
                                                 
2Also known as the Brundtland Report named after the former Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland. 
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The word “needs” is used twice in the above sentence and some critics have argued 
that the anthropocentric nature of the Brundtland report is a paradox and accused the author 
of taking a political stance in her approach by putting human needs at the centre of 
Sustainable Development (Barr, 2008). Braga (2001) points out that the explanation of the 
meaning of the term given by WCED (1987) is rather ambiguous and argues that the 
sustainability of natural systems is a measure of how they come into equilibrium during 
naturally occurring changes. However, humans have used these natural resources as if they 
are in ‘infinite supply’ which is a linear approach or “the one- way society” approach 
(Braga, 2001). As given in Chapter I, ASCE (1998) proposes another definition of 
Sustainable Development within the context of river basin approach that not only 
encompasses the “needs’’ or the demands of the current generation but gives an equal if not 
higher importance to the need for demand management. Demand management is an integral 
strategy within river basin approach.  It is argued that the ASCE definition needs to be 
improved to include the political dimension or the institutional sustainability of WRSs.  
In recent decades, there have been many contributions  to the Sustainable 
Development debate (e.g. Barr, 2008; Khan, 1995; Hediger, 2000; Pearce 1988; Pearce et 
al, 1989 among others), notably Khan’s (1995) triangular model of sustainable 
development (social, economic and environmental sustainability) and Giddings et al’s 
(2002) nested sustainability model based on trade-offs among social, ecological and 
economic objectives. Gasparatos et al’s (2008) review on the Sustainable Development 
debate came up with a consensus on five criteria for sustainability which forms the basis of 
a holistic sustainability assessment as given in Table 2.1.ASCE (1998) outlines a number of 
methods to measure sustainability criteria in terms of net welfare of the system with 
reference to three development objectives: efficiency, survivability and sustainability 
including: 
1. weighted criteria indices which consists of a list of criteria which are 
subsequently divided into sub-criteria which capture different aspects of 
the WRS; each are given equal weights and “the sum of numerical values 
given in each sub-criterion is a sustainability index “ (ibid, 51);  
2. statistical indices which are defined as “separate or weighted combination 
of reliability, resilience and vulnerability (RRV) of various economic, 
environmental ecological and social criteria that contribute to 
sustainability ” (ibid, 51);    
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3. reversibility criteria which  uses entropy as a sustainability criterion; and 
4.  robustness criteria by using the economic concept for evaluating 
alternative water resources development plans.  
Among these methods, RRV analysis has been widely used to assess the 
performance of WRSs under the impact of climatic variability and change (e.g. Walsh and 
Kilsby, 2007; Jain and Bhunya, 2008; Kjeldsen and Rosbjerk;2004). 
Worldwide acceptance of Sustainable Development made it necessary to develop 
sustainability assessment frameworks. Guio-Torres (2006) and Waheed et al (2009) have 
reviewed various approaches. Waheed et al (2009) categorises the sustainability assessment 
frameworks into 6 categories (ibid; p.448): 
· Objective-based (e.g., strategic environmental assessment (SEA) 
· Impact-based (e.g., Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Sustainability 
Impact Assessment(SIA), TBL Assessment) 
· Influence-based (e.g., Transport Canada Framework) 
· Process-based or stakeholder-based (e.g., USDOE “Ten Steps to 
Sustainability”) 
· Material flow accounting and Life cycle assessment  
· Linkages-based (e.g., pressure-state-response (PSR), Driving forces-
Pressures-States-Impacts-Responses (DPSIR) 
The main conclusion drawn from the review and comparison of the assessment tools 
is that none of the approaches can fulfil the criteria for holism. The complex nature of 
natural physical, socio-political, economics and institutional issues with ethical dimensions 
present the problem in a way that cannot individually tackle the sustainability assessment 
task (Hashemi and O’Connell, 2011b). They are complementary to each other and a variety 
of tools might be considered, depending on the context of the assessment. Another obvious 
point is that these shortcomings are not disadvantageous to the point of nullifying the 
various approaches, but it is advised that stakeholders should know about these limitations 
and assumptions so to make informed decisions. 
Despite their limitations, linkage based frameworks such as DPSIR have been 
successfully implemented in many sectors (Waheed et al, 2009). There is room for 
improving the conceptual and analytical dimensions of these frameworks. For example, 
Turner et al (1998) call for incorporation of ethics into the DPSIR framework. We will 
discuss this topic further in Chapter III. 
Chapter 2 15 
 
2.2.3  Sustainability and environmental ethics 
Ethics can be defined as a set of beliefs, values and perceptions which have cultural 
and religious dimensions and are a vital element in policy and decision-making situations. 
Ethical principles are frequently ignored in conventional water management (Sohail and 
Cavil, 2006). However, the ethical dimension of decision-making should be acknowledged 
since it empowers a certain group of people to make robust decisions affecting others. 
Lord Selborne (2000) states that the ethics of freshwater use have five elements: (1) 
human dignity (rights); (2) stakeholder participation, (3) equity; (4) sustainability; and (5) 
good governance. The latter is part of an enabling environment to implement the IWRM 
paradigm.  These ethical elements are implicit within the concepts of IWRM and 
Sustainable Development.  
Environmental ethics is defined as “a systematic account of the moral relations 
between human beings and their natural world (Des Jardins, 2001 p. 11). Des Jardins 
(2001) provides a comprehensive review of different environmental ethics based on their 
philosophical foundations. Throughout the history of mankind till today, the 
anthropocentric ethics have dominated with severe environmental consequences resulting 
in environmental degradation and resource depletion as humans are considered to be the 
central fact in the universe (Proops and Wilkinson, 2000). The biocentric ethics considers 
animal rights but fails to recognize ecosystems as a unit. Therefore, a sound environmental 
ethic has to be ecocentric giving full environmental protections but recognises human 
society as an integral part of the ecosystem. 
Armstrong (2009) outlines a ‘water ethic’ in line with Leopold’s (1949) ‘Land 
Ethic’. The proposed water ethic principles is based on the  “rights of the nature” 
(Armstrong, 2009) which emphasises the ecological dimension of water management: 
“ethical water management is thus not just about the allocation of water resources to 
human beings, but to all species, and to all landscape components” (ibid, p.146). 
2.2.4 Socio-political (institutional) dimension of sustainability  
Institutions are considered to be the mould of social life, consisting of interacting 
systems of laws (rules) with inbuilt monitoring and enforcing mechanisms (Campbell, 
2004). The mechanisms are enabled by actors to make decisions regarding water resources 
management (Cowie and Borrett, 2005). Institutions, therefore, are the means of stability in 
society by channelling and regulating conflicts. Therefore, water resources decision-makers 
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need to consider their social responsibilities in achieving sustainable societies (ASCE, 
1998).  
There is no unique definition for the term ‘institution’ (Ostrom 1999, 2005). A 
confusing prospect for non-institutional experts is the varying ways in which institutions 
are analysed based on the conceptual definition of an institution. In an institutional analysis 
process, we must clearly state what is meant by a water institution. Classical 
institutionalists such as Ostrom (1999, 2005) take the view that institutions are the rules 
that organisations (administrative institutions) or actors adhere to but Saleth and Dinar 
(2004) and Bandaragoda (2000) have taken a broader view to consider institutions in terms 
of three main components: policy, law and administration. This is a pragmatic view since 
water administrations cannot exist without the other two and vice versa. Therefore, in any 
institutional analysis of sustainability, the term ‘institution’ has to be clearly defined based 
on the applied analytical framework. 
From comprehensive literature reviews (by e.g. Amezaga, 2005; Hashemi et al, 
2007a,b; Ivey et al, 2006; Cowie and Borrett, 2005), a water resources institution can be a 
mixture of six broad categories: 
1. Vision statements, policies and guidelines and strategies   
2. Laws (which can be formal and informal), rules, regulations and conventions 
operational plans and procedures  
3. Administrative structures (organisations), their bylaws and core values 
4. Political structures and processes (accountability mechanisms) 
5. Economic and financial arrangements e.g. incentive mechanisms 
6. Norms, traditions, practices and customs  
Governance is a term which is widely used in the literature. It is defined by 
UNESCAP3 (undated) as “the process of decision-making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented (or not implemented)”. A further consideration is the need to 
understand that a governmental system is part of a larger governance system and is 
characterised by its sectoral, functional and hierarchical differentiations; these are the 
sources of governance complexity (Blau and Meyer, 1956). Sectoral and functional 
differentiations are the result of government specialization in a discrete policy area and 
usually cause duplication of efforts and fragmentation of responsibility. This is not 
necessarily disadvantageous (Imperial, 1999). 
                                                 
3The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific(UNESCAP) 
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In a world in which water scarcity is a fact of life, water sector institutions need to 
be re-oriented to cater for the needs of changing supply-demand and quantity-quality 
relationships in the emerging realities (Saleth & Dinar, 2004).ASCE (1998) postulates that 
“any process involving change will require that we change our institutions – the rules 
under we function”. As noted by many researchers, water resources institutions are in a 
continuous flux and we need to analyse institutional mechanisms that allow the change to 
occur (ASCE, 1998). But the study of institutional change is in the domain of social and 
political sciences and hence there is a need to link institutional analysis to any sustainability 
assessment of WRS.  
One of the vital characteristics of IWRM is its “strong institutional orientation” 
(Imperial, 2009). Therefore, IWRM concept is consistent with the notion of institutional 
(decision-making) levels (see e.g. ASCE, 1998) i.e. IWRM can interface with three levels 
of institutional interventions: (1) operational (local/basin) level which deals with 
biophysical, environmental, hydrological, ecological and socio-technical aspects of the 
WRS; (2) organisational level which deals with administrative aspects of the WRS; and (3) 
policy level which deals with policy and legal aspects.  
Decisions at a higher level determine the rule sets or institutional arrangements at 
the lower level. However, the actions in the operational level will directly affect the 
distribution of water and land resources and usage in the physical world. By monitoring and 
assessing the distribution of outcomes at the operational level, a process of feedback to 
higher levels is established. Therefore, the processes at each level are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Searle (2005) makes an outstanding contribution to the institution debate as he 
advises those who are involved with the theory of institutions that they should see an 
institution from the first person point of view since the institutional ontology is subjective. 
Searle (2005) believes that you can see the institution through the lens of the participant 
and no external functionalist can understand the situation. You have to be an insider rather 
than an outsider looking into institutional problems. An inner knowledge of institutional 
matters will foster (a) good relationships and partnerships (long term socio-political 
commitments to sustainability concept); (b) socio-political support (financial 
sustainability); and(c) achievable stakeholder participation. 
Institutional analysis is a key theme in this thesis which will be discussed in the next 
sub-section.  
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2.2.5  Policy/decision-making processes  
IWRM uses systems analysis approach (Figure 2.1; Box 2.1) to achieve holistic 
sustainability(e.g. Loucks and van Beek, 2005).A water policy (see Box 2.1 for definition) 
is usually based on water uses. There are different policies for agricultural, domestic, urban, 
industrial, energy and environmental uses of water. Now, on an international platform, 
water policy comes within broader policies on sustainable development, Millennium 
Development Goals, (MDGs) and human development.  
 
Box 2.1: The components of systems analysis approach and their basic definitions (Source: 
Hashemi and O'Connell, 2011b). 
 
The most crucial stage for an issue to become policy is to gain agenda status. 
Framing an issue depends in part upon whether the claims persuade others that “X is a 
social problem or that Y offers the solutions” (Best, 1995). Issues labelled as social or 
public problems get the attention of legislative bodies and hence will gain agenda status. 
Issues that are not perceived as a problem by society will not become a policy. Therefore, it 
must be remembered that policies are made by politicians in response to perceived social 
problems and for the advancement of their own political interests and careers.  
A policy has two goals: the interests of individual wellbeing and the interests of the 
society as a whole. However, these two goals are not the same (Pearce, 2000). In a 
politically correct world, decision-making based on self-interest (the first goal) is 
unacceptable, and so citizens' preferences are accepted. Pearce (2000) asserts that this kind 
of contrast between the preferences is exaggerated and unhelpful. Socially motivated 
preferences are elicited by political means whereas self-interests are well served by the 
·
 Policy: a political (governmental) statement outlining the vision,goals 
and objectives of IWRM plans 
·
 Scenario: a futuristic outlook of development such as assumptions 
under which development occurs; these are exogenous to the water 
system such as population growth or climate change that cannot be 
controlled or determined by the water resources system 
·
 Management option: a measure or an action taken to improve the 
performance of the water system, these measures can be legal, 
institutional, technical, social, economics, ecological.  
·
 Strategy: a collection of management options to be considered under 
different anthropogenic and natural climatic scenarios.     
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economic medium. However, political decision-making is open to the influence of lobby 
groups and political self-interest. 
The policy-making process should ideally be participatory since policy decisions are 
based on societal values as a whole (Stave, 2002). Thus, on this basis, all stakeholders 
should be given a voice and be heard without prejudice and advantage (Hampton, 2004) 
and should be involved in discussing the trade-offs. However, the challenge is that there is 
no clear way to assign and determine the qualitative values (i.e. weights) attributing the 
relative importance of different management options in a Multi-Criteria Decision-making 
Analysis (MCDA) approach to decision making (discussed in Chapter III).  
It is argued that participation provides legitimacy for a given policy (Hendriks, 
2005). Furthermore, people’s evaluation of policies may change as their perception changes 
about issues they value. Therefore, in recent years, far-reaching public policy changes have 
occurred in many countries so that some scholars consider them as shifts in policy 
paradigms (Menahem, 1998). A policy paradigm comprises of a system with two 
components (ideas and standards) that defines policy goals. 
In a dynamic world (climate, technological and resource availability changes), 
policy-makers have to consciously change their assumptions. Financial resources can be an 
important factor.  For example, technological changes affect water sector organisations and 
in response, they have to adapt to these changes in order to survive in a competitive 
financial environment e.g. monetary or market forces (see e.g. Archibugi et al, 1999). So, 
policy-makers tend to use technological assessment tools such as modelling systems to 
legitimise policy decisions which have a great deal of uncertainties. We have to understand 
that the interplay between public policy and legitimacy is a vital component in a policy 
analysis (Hashemi et al, 2007a) and to remember that the primary role of the modelling 
systems is to educate the policy-makers about the nature of the problem and provide 
evidence for a sound decision using the available data and technologies and not to 
legitimize policy (Sharifi, 2003). In Chapter III, more insight is given on institutional and 
policy analysis tools. In the next sub-section we will further discuss the role of technology 
on the sustainability of WRSs. 
2.2.6  Sustainability and the application of modelling systems:  
Sparked by the availability of digital computers, a flurry of watershed modelling 
activity started around the late 1950s. Comprehensive digital modelling was initiated 
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thorough the Stanford Watershed Model, (Crawford and Linsley, 1966)4. In parallel to the 
development of watershed modelling, the wider field of water resources planning and 
management saw the evolution of a range of WRS simulation and optimisation methods 
which dates back to1950s (Keiner, 2004; Jain & Singh, 2003). The ‘Harvard Water 
Program’ (HWP, 1955-1965) was the driving force behind the agenda for water resources 
modelling in the USA and worldwide (e.g. Maass et al, 1962; Loucks et al, 1985; Dzurik, 
2003). HWP’s contribution to water resources planning and management was three fold 
(Reuss, 1989): (1) using computer simulation to design water resource systems; (2) 
developing synthetic or operational hydrology as a means for designing water resource 
systems and (3) the development of multi-objective economic analysis and planning. The 
HWP’s ‘blueprint’ remains a relevant vision to date (Reuss, 2003).  
Due to the sheer number of simulation and optimisation models, it is almost 
impossible to make an inventory of the models. Many researchers have reviewed different 
types of models including Biswas (1974), Loucks et al (1981), OTA (1982), Basson et al 
(1994), Watkins and McKinney (1995), Wurbs (1997, 2005), Boughton and Droop (2003), 
McKinney (2004) and Labadie (2004). 
Based on a comprehensive review, Hashemi and O’Connell (2011a) conclude that 
water resources models have contributed greatly to the advancement of the planning and 
management of water resources and have been recognised as an integral part of the 
decision-making process. Water resources models are used to simulate future demands and 
assess the impact of water resources development plans on the available resource in terms 
of quantity and quality. They can be generally classified as (a) reservoir/river systems or 
river basin (water balance/allocation) models; (b)emergency (Flood/spill) models; (c) water 
Quality models; (d) environmental models; and (e) integrated modelling systems  (i.e. a 
combination of socio-economic, hydrologic, ecologic and hydraulic models) which 
emerged in the 1990s. 
The start of the 1990s brought further technological advancements and the 
proliferation of Personal Computers (PCs) and better MS Windows (Microsoft 
Corporation) environments with even better graphical capabilities. The main characteristics 
of the status of modelling system in the 1990s can be summarised in Box 2.2.The 
increasingly important role of information technology in the development and application 
                                                 
4In this section we concentrate on the role of water resources modelling systems in sustainable management 
of the resource see Hashemi and O’Connell (2011a) for a comprehensive review on the development of 
watershed and hydrological modelling including physically based distributed models.   
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Box 2.2: The main characteristics of the status of 
water resources modelling in the 1990s. 
1. Emergence of a number of comprehensive, distributed, 
and physically based models such as Mike-SHE 
(Refsgaard & Storm, 1995) and SHETRAN (Ewen et al, 
2000) which could be applied to address a wide range of 
environmental and water resources problems.  
2. Linking hydrologic models with water 
quality/ecosystem models 
3. Models gained greater acceptance as tools for water 
resources planning, development, design, operation, and 
management. 
4. Major advances in the field of digital imagery and data 
acquisition techniques (e.g. remote sensing, radar and 
satellite technology) with applications in e.g.  real-time 
flood forecasting, weather forecasting, forecasting of 
seasonal and/or short-term snowmelt, mapping of 
groundwater potential to support the conjunctive use of 
surface water and groundwater; Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) of large-scale water resource projects 
etc. 
5. Use of Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) (e.g. 
Sugumaran et al ,2000) and Digital Terrain Models 
(DTM) and other digital maps of vegetation, soils and 
geology etc in hydrologic modelling systems  
6. Application of  new hydroinformatics data mining tools 
such as artificial neural networks (ANNs) in river 
basin/hydrologic modelling 
7. Improvement of the technology of model calibration and 
use of optimisation techniques and multi-criteria 
analysis techniques for multiple objective evaluations 
8. Emergence of the first generations of integrated systems 
such as NELUP, WaterWare, IQQM, RIBASIM, WEAP 
etc  
 of watershed and water resources system models was encompassed very well by the new 
integrating and cross-disciplinary concept of hydroinformatics formulated by Abbott (1991) 
which embraces hydraulics, 
hydrology, environmental 
engineering, socioeconomic and 
political (institutional) sciences, 
and uses information and 
communication technologies to 
provide evidence for decision-
makers.  
There are many examples 
of integrated modelling systems 
such as MODSIM (Labadie et al, 
1984), IRIS (Salewicz et al, 
1991), NELUP(O’Callaghan, 
1995), WaterWare(Jamieson and 
Fedra, 1996),IQQM (Simons et al, 
1996), AQUATOOL (Andreu et 
al, 1996), WEAP (Raskin et al, 
2001), MIKE SHE river basin 
integrated modeling tool (Graham 
& Butt, 2005), Mike Basin (DHI, 
2003, Ammentorp, 2001) and RIBASIM (WL| Delft Hydraulics, 2005). These exhibit some 
(i.e. not all) of the five desirable features: 
· GIS/graphical user interface and geo-database management system  
· scenario analysis with multi-criteria analysis or statistical techniques for 
strategy evaluation (expert systems) 
· socio-economic assessment tools/indicators 
· institutional assessment tools (e.g. water pricing) 
In 2000, IWRM took the centre stage in both national and international policy 
spheres worldwide. Due to the interdependent nature of the interplay among various WRS 
components, there is an implicit quest for integrated assessment tools. The IWRM concept 
which requires the integration of physical, chemical, biological, environmental, ecological 
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and socio-economic components has helped for the conceptualisation of integrated 
modelling approaches.  
There is a strategic trend towards implementing integrated assessment tools at multi 
resolution, multidisciplinary levels. Major projects around the globe spend a large amount 
of resources on developing modelling systems with the aim of attaining IWRM goals to 
achieve sustainability criteria. Examples include the SAHRA (Semi-Arid Hydrology and 
Riparian Area) initiative (Liu et al, 2008); the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) covering 10 
African counties, the Colorado River  DSS (CRDSS) and EU’s NOSTRUM-DSS which  
aims to support the EU’s policy on stronger stakeholder participation, pro-poor emphasis 
and gender sensitivity. Other examples include WaterStrategyMan (Todini et al, 2006) 
MULINO, (Giupponi et al., 2004) and DANUBIA (Ludwig et al, 2003). 
2.2.7 Sustainability and uncertainty in sustainable decision outcomes  
There are three categories of uncertainties: (i) inherent; (ii) knowledge (e.g. 
scientific, data); and (iii) decision-making uncertainties (Langsdale, 2008; Loucks and van 
Beek, 2005).  
Inherent uncertainty is due to the complexity, dynamic and unpredictable nature of 
ecological and water resource systems processes. One of the lessons that have to be learned 
is that most decision-makers perceive uncertainty to be of the second category (knowledge 
uncertainty) and hence scrutinise scientific outputs ignoring the inherent uncertainty. Thus, 
Langsdale (2008) calls for two important actions: (1) the acknowledgment of the inherent 
uncertainties in the decision/policy-making process and (2) clear communication of 
uncertainty elements in the outputs to the stakeholders. 
Knowledge uncertainty relates to available data or the inadequacies of the 
assumptions made or gaps in the structure of methodological approach. There are four 
knowledge management domains (Steyaert & Jiggins, 2007): (1) the known: these are 
manageable and there is no uncertainty or risks attached to them; (2) the complicated but 
unknown: they are normally very important; e.g. climate change, population growth 
pressures, physical processes affecting evaporation rates, the impact of geometry of pore 
size in preferential flow etc.; (3) the complex, unknowable but partly predictable: most 
model outputs fall into this category; and the chaotic: all natural processes fall into this 
category. 
‘Uncertainty due to lack of data’ is now a cliché in the water resources 
management. The enhancement of data management technology and modelling will not 
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improve the knowledge uncertainty on its own unless collection and data measurements 
techniques are improved too. They are a complement to the data collection process and not 
a substitute to it and scientific observations are needed for better understanding of the 
system problems (Silberstein, 2006). In the case of hydrological data for example, Sutcliffe 
(2004) calls for improving measurement techniques. Therefore, there should be a shift from 
purely technological to a combined technological and data collection techniques approach. 
Shackley and Wynne (1996) also note that knowledge uncertainties can diminish 
the authority of scientific judgements in policy and decision-making process. The scientific 
ambiguity serves both policymakers and scientists: it can be used as an alibi in accounting 
for a lack of policy effectiveness. However this should not affect the importance of 
scientific knowledge in decision-making, as uncertainty is a by-product of analysing 
complex issues (Armitage, 2004). Furthermore, the process will benefit from better 
dialogue between natural and social scientists, water users, environmental regulators and 
the public at large (Ioris, et al, 2008). 
Decision uncertainty is shaped by incoherent goals and objectives and influenced 
by the ethical context of decision-making e.g. customs, culture and belief (Loucks & van 
Beek, 2005). Loucks and van Beek (2005) assert that, in many cultures and legal systems, 
doing nothing is more acceptable than failing after an action. Loucks et al (1985) make an 
intelligent observation about the incremental nature of political decisions. Based on this, 
they suggest that the model solutions should also be incremental as political communities 
are not happy admitting that they were wrong but they might be happy with making small 
changes within a learning process. Therefore, the uncertainty should not be a scapegoat for 
inaction (Cosgrove et al, 2008).  
Scientific arguments are often the basis for public policy debates and the importance 
of science in sound public policy-making cannot be ignored (Montz, 2008). There is a 
strong link between science and the policy-making process (e.g. Montz, 2008; Freehafer, 
2008). Scientific uncertainties normally polarise policy-making decisions and indeed 
provide a hindrance for change or reform. But uncertainty is part of the decision-making 
process i.e. it is fact of life (see e.g. Refsgaard et al, 2007). It is not possible to isolate, 
remove or eliminate uncertainty entirely by further research. However, research can 
improve the uncertainty of know-how and knowledge. 
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2.3  Reassessment of IWRM paradigm 
Many scholars have called for reassessment of the IWRM concept (e.g. Biswas, 
2004; Falkenmark et al, 2004; and Llamas and Martinez-Santos, 2005; Falkenmark and 
Rockström, 2006; Merrey, 2008). Nevertheless, the conceptualization of the IWRM 
paradigm came about at a time when water resources around the world were poorly 
managed. Therefore, most scholars (whom criticise IWRM) also value the importance of 
the concept as a countermeasure to balance conventional water management practices 
which manifest unsustainable development. 
In this section, we discuss the problems with the ‘integration’ aspect of the IWRM 
paradigm and reassess the validity of the concept, bearing in mind its dismal lack of 
implementation success. In the next sub-sections, issues and constraints of implementing 
IWRM are discussed. 
2.3.1 Conceptual constraints 
Problems with scope of IWRM. According to Molle (2006), the river basin concept 
“has been associated with various strands of thinking and sometimes co-opted or mobilised 
by a particular group to strengthen the legitimacy of their agenda". IWRM is a political 
process seeking to entrench democracy through participation and good governance. Hence, 
it should be possible to envisage political boundaries that influence the hydrologic 
boundaries and incorporate an enlarged political map by identifying actors and 
organisations that affect WRS. Therefore, a politicised IWRM is envisaged by moving 
away from a watershed to a “problemshed” perspective (Mollinga , 2008). Merrey (2008 ) 
states the need for “identifying empirically what are the boundaries of a problem and not 
imposing a hydrological boundary”. This means that the scope of IWRM should be 
enlarged and goes beyond hydrological boundaries (i.e. river basins). WWDR (2009) calls 
for dealing with the ‘water box’ dilemma’ by looking for solution outside the ‘water box’ 
with a political decision-making process involving political, civil society and business and 
economic actors. 
The call for politicising IWRM by enlarging the boundary of the watershed (i.e. 
considering ‘problemsheds’) is well founded as IWRM is essentially a political process 
(e.g. Allan, 2003a). But, it is argued that there is a misconception on the philosophical 
nature of IWRM. As stated earlier, IWRM provides interfaces for three decision-making 
levels (policy, organisational and operational levels) which go beyond watershed 
boundaries. The reason why IWRM has been very elusive in terms of being implemented is 
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that it is not a framework; instead it is a romanticised (idealistic) concept. What is required 
is a framework that can translate the IWRM concept into implementable strategies and 
management decisions. It is argued that river basin approach is still valid because it 
represents the operational level within nested decision levels (boundaries) i.e. for our 
analysis; we need to consider the ‘resource unit’ which is affected by our decisions.  
According to Merrey (2008), the wide ranging scope of IWRM “normative 
package” objectives is leading to “indecisions and paralysis”. It is simply not possible to 
achieve all the objectives of IWRM at the same time. For example, the complexity of the 
nature of implementing IWRM is clear as Biswas (2004) lists some 36 issues that should be 
‘integrated’. Therefore, objectives need to be prioritised. However, Merrey (2008) does not 
call to abandon IWRM altogether but asserts that the IWRM normative form should be 
discarded as an unchallenged “religious text” or a blueprint.  
It is argued that IWRM is a high level set of water management principles and so it 
is vague on how to prioritise its wide ranging objectives but a practical implication of 
IWRM by ‘being a process and not a goal in itself’ is that objectives can be prioritised by 
having short term objectives within a long term vision i.e. the long term sustainability of 
water resources systems can be achieved by gradual implementation of IWRM plans. 
Therefore, there is a need to develop ‘good practice’ guidelines on how IWRM is 
implemented.  
Need for paradigm shift. Researchers such as Pahl-Wostl, (2007), Lankford et al 
(2007)and Rivers-Moore and Jewitt (2007) among others, call for incorporation of the idea 
of adaptive management within a “social learning” process. The idea of adaptive 
management originates from the understanding of ecosystems as being adaptive or “self-
organising” to changes in the system (Holling, 1978). It has been introduced to resources 
management for quite some time (Pahl-Wostl , 2007; Jewitt, 2002). The overall approach is 
to combine ‘‘soft’’ subjective perceptions (values, ideology, belief systems) based on 
perspectives or mental models of stakeholders and ‘‘hard’’ factual knowledge from data 
analysis in a participatory group model building process (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Stakeholders 
will learn from each other and make decisions based on their evolving understandings and 
perspectives. People can have multiple non-mutually exclusive value-laden perspectives at 
the same time (Spranger, 1928). Different human perspective models are shown in Table 
2.2. In my opinion, the human face of IWRM can be improved by consideration of 
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perspectives in an implementation framework. We will return to the theme of perspectives 
in Chapter III.  
 
Name of perspectives 
model 
Perspectives’ values and their attributes  
Spranger ‘s (1928) 
Human Perspective 
Theoretical 
general legality,  
value of 
objectivity 
 
Economic 
utilitarian 
ethics  
the value of 
utility 
Aesthetic 
inner form and 
the value of 
proper form and 
harmony 
Political  
desire or will to 
gain political 
status (power) 
Social 
ethics of helpful 
love and loyalty 
and social ties 
Religious 
holiness in 
God 
TOPEA Model plus 
economic (Hall et al. 
2003;  Hall and 
Davis; 2007 and 
Hall, 2008) based on 
Courtney’s (2001) 
TOPEA model   
Technical 
A functional, 
rational and 
ordered 
orientation 
Economic 
Efficiency 
Aesthetic 
The beauty and 
harmony of a 
solution design 
Personal 
Prestige, power 
Organizational 
organisational 
self-interest 
Ethical 
Integrity, 
way 
criticism is 
dealt with 
Table 2.2: Different perspectives models and their main attributes. 
2.3.2 Neglecting parts of the water cycle: omissions in IWRM approach  
One of the main criticisms of IWRM is that it focuses more on the “Blue Water” 
part of the water cycle. Falkenmark (1997) introduced the concept of Blue and Green Water 
to separately account for (a) renewable surface runoff and groundwater resources (Blue 
Water); (b) and soil moisture and water consumed by plants through evapotranspiration 
(Green Water); and (c) return flow or wastewater (Grey Water). Falkenmark et al (2004) 
points to “three omissions” in IWRM approach: i.e. water sources which are not fully 
considered in IWRM plans including Green Water, Grey Water and environmental services 
(ecological functions) of water.  
Need for Evergreen Revolution. From 1960’s, irrigated areas in the world has 
increased exponentially based on extensive use of Blue Water. Expansion of irrigation 
agriculture which is termed as the first “Green Revolution” brought economic prosperity to 
many countries and enhanced food security lifting the threat of hunger from many parts of 
Asia (Falkenmark and Rockström, 2006).The Green Revolution has placed a great pressure 
on the WRS worldwide. Overexploitation of groundwater resources in many parts of the 
world had reached a crisis level (Calder, 2004 and 2005; Falkenmark &Rockström, 2006, 
Falkenmark et al, 2004). Surface water developments have been marred with financial 
difficulty and environmental degradation and political controversies. But according to 
Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2005), despite the problems posed by the Green Revolution, 
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its impact on irrigation policy changes has been minimal and less attention has been drawn 
to irrigational expansions because of the socio-economic gains. 
Expanding Blue Water consumptions (that is mainly irrigation) are not a sustainable 
option in the future. Thus, to deal with this problem, IWRM plans in many developing 
countries including Iran have concentrated on Blue Water. 
Food security and removal of world hunger cannot be addressed without 
considering the full water cycle including Green Water. A new “Evergreen Revolution” is 
required to enhance our understanding of the relationship of land and water and the Green 
Water part of the water cycle i.e. evapotranspiration or total evaporation (Falkenmark et al, 
2004; Falkenmark and Rockström; 2006; Calder, 2005).  However, there are many 
technical and social challenges to initiating the Evergreen Revolution. As, rightly pointed 
out by Jewitt (2006) “good conceptual understanding is prerequisite for integrating Blue 
and Green Water Flows for water resources management”.  
On the social side, the Evergreen Revolution is a difficult proposition to lead and 
control and depends on decision-making at both micro (e.g. farmers) and macro (e.g. 
market forces) levels. Abderrahman (2000) reports a successful case study from Saudi 
Arabia in which Islamic principles were used in water demand management in which 
support for wheat cultivation was reduced to about 25% of the previous level to minimize 
irrigation water use. Hence, cultural aspects of the society need to be considered in any 
policy shifts.  
At the policy (political) level, Calder (2005) argues that many land and water 
polices failed because of the “mismatch between the public and scientific perceptions of the 
biophysical impacts of changing land-use, with policies more often based on ‘land and 
water myths’ than modern science” (Calder, 2005; p.309). Duda (2003) makes a valid point 
that “the land linkage must also be included because land-use decisions often represent 
water-use decisions”. Calder (2005) proposes an Integrated Water and Land Resources 
Management (IWLRM) paradigm as there is an explicit inter-linkage between land and 
water management (Amezaga, 2005). Therefore, it is desirable for IWRM to conceptually 
implicate land use management in water resources planning.   
In technical (hydrological) terms, lumping evaporation and transpiration as one 
parameter (evapotranspiration) is problematic (Jewitt, 2006). To understand the 
transpiration part of the Green Water, physical processes such as the rate of plant water 
uptake in different climates have to be studied so the potential of rain-fed or dryland 
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agriculture (Green Water) can be evaluated in any policy shifts. Modelling techniques will 
have an important role to play here. It has to adjust to the new paradigm’s set of added 
parameters and take an adaptive and innovative modelling strategy. Therefore, the 
Evergreen Revolution entails (a) recognition of land-water nexus and (b) improvement of 
technological solutions to improve productivity and reduce water consumptions in different 
water uses including irrigation agriculture; and consideration for ethical and cultural 
aspects of land and water governance. 
Considering Grey Water. IWRM has been criticised for neglecting the role of  Grey 
Water i.e. return flow from households and industrial wastewater,  return water from 
irrigated land, recycled water from treatment plants in water balance calculations 
(Falkenmark et al, 2004; Falkenmark and Rockström; 2006). Traditionally, IWRM has been 
associated with Blue Water allocation which represents the majority of renewable 
resources. In Iran for example, out of total renewable water resources of 159 BCM, 29 
MCM are return flows (Siadat, 1999) which represent 18.2% of the total amount. Grey 
Water can enhance water availability in water scarcity conditions (e.g. Halalsheh et al, 
2008).  
Using Grey Water is not straight forward to calculate or to use. For example, a 
religious Islamic ruling or ‘fatwa’ was used in Saudi Arabia as part of demand management 
strategy to enhance the acceptability of using treated (recycled) wastewater for non-
drinking purposes such asgreen area irrigation in cities (e.g.Abderrahman, 2000). The 
untreated Grey Water has been used for agriculture in some countries such as Pakistan but 
objections on health ground are made to the use of untreated Grey Water.  Accounting for 
Grey Water is also problematic as return flows from irrigation sites are not usually 
monitored or calculated. There is a degree of evaporation and some of the Grey Water will 
enter the Blue Water cycle by recharging groundwater and entering water bodies such as 
wetlands and rivers. Therefore, Grey Water is somehow covered by Blue Water. Therefore, 
water resources planners find it less attractive to account for Grey Water due to uncertainty 
about estimating it and the prevailing cultural barriers. In addition, recycling or re-use of 
Grey Water not only involves technology, it is energy dependent as well5. Energy is a 
limiting factor in the use of recycled wastewater. It is anticipated that energy policy in the 
Middle East will have a profound impact on water sector (see e.g. Siddiqi and Diaz 
                                                 
5 Water desalination from seas and brackish water cannot be considered as Grey Water or wastewater; it is an 
alternative source of water for semi-arid and arid countries which have access to sea. Again, they are 
extensively energy-dependent.  
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Anadon, 2011). The World Bank (2007) has highlighted the influence of non-water policies 
such as energy policy on the water resources of the region including Iran.   
Streamlining with ecohydrological approach. The good governance principles of 
IWRM seeks to achieve ecological sustainability of the WRS i.e. integrating  water and 
land use governance based on environmental and ecological principles (GWP, 2000).  
However, much of the work has concentrated on river quality and environmental water 
flows6 but this is not sufficient. GWP (2000) acknowledges that more multidisciplinary 
research is required to value ecological functions of water as “valuation of ecosystem costs 
and benefits has not been on the practical water management agenda so far” (ibid, p.58). 
Therefore, paradigms such as ecohydrology might be a useful to enhance the ecological 
credential of IWRM. Zalewski (undated: 1) defines ecohydrology as a“transdisciplinary7 
and applied science” which “uses the understandings of relationships between hydrological 
and biological processes at the catchment scale to achieve water quality improvement, 
biodiversity enhancement and sustainable development”.  
Application of this concept entails three steps (Gouder de Beauregard et al, 2002): 
(1) a comprehensive ecological study of the catchment (climate, soil science, vegetation, 
human occupation), (2) implementation of a water quality catchment modelling system to 
assess the fluxes of pollutants where the outputs of the model will contribute to a land use 
management policy and long term management strategies; and (3) Implementation of 
technologies to restore the ecosystem. In the Lake Urmia case study, we will further 
consider the ecohydrological approach to water allocation decision in Chapter VI.  
2.3.3 Putting more food on the planet: Land-water-food nexus 
The debate over water and food security shows a degree of confusion as there are no 
unique definitions for the above terms and all depends on what ‘threats’ we are looking for. 
One might think of water and food security as the measure of the access and availability of 
water and food to the population.  But it is more than that because the term ‘security’ has 
different connotations depending on the context of the problems. This term implies that we 
need a defensive measure in response to conditions of water scarcity. Therefore, water 
                                                 
6This global trend is perhaps influenced by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) of the European Union 
(EU); about the river quality in European river basins highlighting a North-South divide i.e.this perhaps 
indicates the difference between well-developed industrialised North and the less developed industrializing 
South; (see. e.g. Allan, 2005 about the development of water paradigms).   
7 See e.g. Max-Neef  (2005) as there are philosophical arguments with regards to the meanings of different 
concepts attached to ‘disciplinarity ’ e,g transdisciplinary , interdisciplinary’ and ‘multidisciplinary’. In 
Chapter III, we will explore this further to describe the methodological design.  
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scarcity is one of the main attributes of water security. According to Grey and Sadoff 
(2007), water security involves “harnessing the productive potential of water and limiting 
its destructive impact”.  
National food security has become a distinct agricultural policy in many countries 
which is based on increasing food production through irrigation agriculture (i.e. more Blue 
Water consumption) and better crops (i.e. enhanced technology). This policy is supported 
by UN and international agencies which aim to increase food and social security (alleviate 
hunger and eradicate poverty).  The impact of this policy on water resource systems is to 
allocate more water for irrigation. Therefore, the present world water crisis is essentially a 
food crisis (Green, 2003). Hence, water security will increasingly become an important 
issue in the future. This is because physical water scarcity is partially induced by human 
behaviour8as well as being affected by natural phenomena like droughts. John Parker 
(2011) writing in the Economist on how to feed “9 Billion-people” acknowledges the 
impact of water shortages and Climate change but asks for producing more crop for less 
water by using better technology to achieve food security. He finishes on an optimistic note 
by saying that despite the challenges, “countries from Brazil to Vietnam have shown that, 
given the right technology, sensible policies and a bit of luck, they can transform 
themselves from basket cases to bread baskets”. Parker (2011) implies that policymakers 
have no choice but to deal with growing problem of food security but this can only happen 
through technologically-oriented measures or Evergreen Revolution as stated earlier. Thus, 
to deal with water security we need to consider water-land-food nexus9 (Source: Appendix 
A, Table A.1.6). 
Despite their obvious interdependencies, it is not easy to link water and food policy. 
An innovative concept to link food ‘trade’ and water was coined by Allan (1997): Virtual 
Water ‘trading.’ Allan defines Virtual Water as the water embedded in the production of 
commodities including agricultural products e.g. 1000 litres of water needed to produce a 
kilo of grain is considered to be Virtual Water. Therefore, ‘trading’ food commodities can 
be considered as ‘trading’ Virtual Water (Zeiton et al, 2010). Despite some controversy and 
criticism about the economic and linguistic credibility of the term (e.g. Merrett, 2003), 
Virtual Water can address blind water policy assumption gaps in water scarce countries.  
                                                 
8 There are some empirical evidences that climate change is induced by human lifestyle because of 
greenhouse gas emissions.   
9 This issue of water-land-food nexus was strongly featured at the Amman Workshop in Jordan held by 
WANA Forum in February 2011 (see Appendix A1, Table A1.6.) 
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Virtual Water ‘trading’ in fact is a reality and many countries depend on imports of 
agricultural produce. Iran, as an example of a semi-arid country in the Middle East, 
imported 6 million tons of wheat from 15 countries in 2008 and was expected to import 7.5 
million tons in 2009 as shown in Figure 2.3. The question is why this is not considered in 
agricultural policy and regional developments plans. Therefore, this issue needs greater 
debate in the political and academic arena. 
 
Figure 2.3: Iran's wheat imports in 2008 (Source: Iran Economics, 2009). 
 
One issue to be considered is that many policymakers are uneasy about using the 
terminology because of the political sensitivity. For example, in an interview with Memari 
(2006), advisor to Deputy Minister for Water Resources, Ministry of Energy (MoE), Iran, 
he dismissed the idea of Virtual Water because it encourages more reliance on food imports 
and “derails the production cycle” i.e. it will damage the agricultural sector as one of the 
most important productive economic sectors10. This clearly demonstrates the political 
nature of decision-making about water resources system which has been noticed by many 
researchers (e.g. Allan, 2003a and Merrey, 2008). 
As Virtual Water ‘trade’ is not really ‘virtual’ and happens in reality, it can be 
considered as one of policy tools which is both exogenous and endogenous to the ‘water 
box’as schematically presented in Figure 2.4. Virtual Water ‘trading’ may 
· influence Blue Water by shifting priority from water for food to water for 
drinking or industry 
· shift attention to  Green Water by emphasising on rain-fed agriculture 
                                                 
10 The author experienced similar resentment in WANA workshop on water scarcity in Amman Jordan 
attended by a former advisor to the Late King of Jordan, February 2011 (Appendix A1). 
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· reduce Grey Water by shifting the attention from Blue Water use for 
irrigation agriculture which produces a large sum of  return flow as well as 
reducing industrial wastewater 
· reduce trans-boundary conflicts by affecting water resources developments 
in trans-boundary waters  
Further research is required to assess the long term and short term implications of 
Virtual Water ‘trade’ by not only considering water security at global level but also to 
consider its impact on regional, local and basin level water security. For example, Virtual 
Water ‘trading policy’ might leads to spatially shifting water resources problems. The rich 
Middle East countries are ‘trading’ Virtual Water by purchasing farmlands in Tanzania, 
Kenya, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan and so forth to grow food (e.g. Breisinger et al, 
2010). They import up to 85% of their domestic foodstuff.  Therefore, one thing that is 
missing is the real impact of the Virtual Water concept in water resources planning and 
management; thus it is argued that this may be brought into IWRM plans. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Virtual Water as exogenous and endogenous to the water box which represents 
total water in a system within political boundaries.  
 
2.3.4 The role of cultural and ethical aspects:  
As stated before, a central question in policy appraisal is how to take environmental 
ethics into account in the decision-making process. Moral (value-laden, ethical, religious) 
considerations have been the backbone of environmental agenda (Healy and Shaw, 1994). 
Total Water                       
Grey 
Water
Trans-boundary Water 
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Virtual Water  export
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Notes:
• The water  box shows total water available within a political boundary
• Blue  Water = runoff + subsurface flow + Groundwater 
• Grey Water = Recycled water+ Wastewater+ Return flow
• Dotted arrow indicates that Grey water is not fully available as a resource
• Trans-boundary Water is both exogenous and endogenous to the  water box – it has a lot of 
bearing on Blue Water through water development  and dam building policy
• Virtual Water has  a bearing on the whole  water box and is both exogenous and 
endogenous to the  Water Box 
• Virtual Water influence Blue Water by shifting priority from water for food to water for 
drinking or industry
• Virtual  Water shifts attention to  Green Water by emphasising on rainfed agriculture.
• Virtual Water can reduce Grey Water by shifting the attention from Blue  Water use 
(irrigation agriculture) which produces a large sum of  return flow as well as reducing 
industrial wastewater
Virtual Water  import 
Chapter 2 33 
Also, WWDR, (2009) has acknowledged the role of actors (politicians, civil society and 
business actors) in decision-making; ethics and cultural attributes of the actors play a major 
role in the process. In this sub-section, we consider three aspects: (1) the sustainability of 
land and water resources system by looking at community-based governance approach; (2) 
the universality of IWRM; and (3) the legitimacy issue.    
Community-based governance systems. The decline and the overexploitation of 
common resources such as water resources, fisheries and forests due to population and 
urbanisation growth have prompted Hardin (1968) to posit his theory on the “Tragedy of 
the Commons“. Hardin’s notion of the “Tragedy” prompted Ostrom (2005) to assess the 
role of local communities in managing ‘common pool resources’ including water for 
irrigation. Scholars such as Ostrom (1990, 2005) and Imperial (1999) among others have 
shown empirical evidences that local community have the ability to manage common pool 
resources. To be effective, policies should be relevant to the communities they serve 
otherwise it will not be implemented. Armitage (2004) recalls the failure of a top-down 
approach in policy-making to control population growth and environmental degradation in 
West Africa which was based on national and international policy discourses on resource 
mobilisation mechanisms. The policy has caused the marginalization of local communities 
(disadvantaged resource users) least able to protect their interests and rights. Similarly, 
Kidane-Mariam (2003) notes that the top-down policies adopted by Ethiopia and Ghana 
had little impact on actual population growth and environmental degradation because of the 
lack of implementation strategies at local, regional and national levels. Therefore, any 
successful policy should take into account local knowledge systems on the use of resources 
(Armitage, 2004). 
Local Knowledge (expert) systems stem from practical experiences and cultural and 
ideological heritage. Based on the above assumption, crafting community-based land and 
water (natural resources) management is increasingly popular (Fortmann et al, 2001). The 
reason is that top-down centralised interventions such as the introduction of environmental 
regulations, protected areas, IWRM and so forth have not completely stopped the over 
utilisation of these resources. Therefore, community-based participatory governance 
systems based on local values and belief systems are encouraged. There is a need for 
research that how community based governance principles can be bridged with modern day 
governance systems. This theme will be further explored in Chapter VIII. 
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Universality of IWRM.Biswas’ (2004) questions the universal applicability of the 
IWRM paradigm and asks whether it is applicable under different cultures and religions. 
This question epitomises the IWRM dilemma: as Merrey (2008) noticed, IWRM has been 
promoted by its global advocates like a universal religious text.  The universality question 
is a wrong one in my opinion. The question should be how can we localise IWRM and 
adapt it to diverse social-ecological systems rather than apply it like a prescriptive dogmatic 
doctrine.  
This notion of universality hides the fact that local communities (the society) and its 
core values and ethics have been rather overlooked in the IWRM equation.  IWRM concept 
is ambiguous about its foremost principle of participation which is termed “appropriate 
level of participation” (GWP, 2000; p.17). For example how the principle of economic cost 
recovery matters to communities which have no access the water due to lack of hydraulic 
infrastructure? Without hydraulic infrastructure and well developed institutional set up for 
distribution and allocation of water resources, it is very difficult to implement cost recovery 
principles; thus developing countries (the South) perhaps continue with their “hydraulic 
mission” (Allan, 2005) i.e. go ahead with development plans to build hydraulic 
infrastructure (e.g. Allan, 2003b, Merrey, 2008). 
Water resources governance is influenced by the ideological component of the 
decision-makers (e.g. Denzau and North, 2000). Cultural and ethical aspects (including 
religious beliefs) can have a bearing on water management policies and have an impact on 
the way people perceive water-related issues such as the impact climate change, wasteful 
use of water etc. On the issue of climate change, Daniels and Endfield (2009) argue that the 
actions taken by the decision makers are influenced by their perception of the ‘danger’ of 
climate change. Hence, the cultural context of the climate change issue should not be 
ignored: 
..what people make of climate change, and what they do about it, are complex cultural 
matters, with a matrix of narratives, specific meanings emerging in and from particular 
times and places; they draw attention to a continuing, if troubled, and fractious, history of 
human –environment relations (Daniels and Endfield , 2009; p. 222) 
 
Therefore, lately, there has been a move towards acknowledging ideology as an 
influential aspect of policymaking and decision-making processes and moving away from 
‘rational choice approach’ to common pool resources management.   
Legitimacy. Most religions have the same value-laden perspectives with regard to 
water as the precious resource. Therefore, there is an assumption that religious ethics can 
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assist the implementation of IWRM plans in two ways: increasing environmental awareness 
and improve the legitimacy of the decision-making process. Bearing in mind that 
policymaking is about “a struggle over ideas” and values, high moral grounds are used to 
justify political decision-making especially in the WANA region. There have been some 
attempts to streamline IWRM with religious beliefs11 such as Faruqui et al (2001) whom 
worked on Islamic principles of water management. They have concluded that Islamic 
beliefs are compatible with IWRM and Sustainable Development. Beaumont (2005) 
believes that it certainly includes all the concepts for a sustainable management of water. In 
the case of Christianity for instance, Jenkins (2008) asserts that the mainstream 
environmental ethical discourse overlooks “practical domains” of Christian community 
which could be used “to help reintroduce to public debate these major arenas too often left 
to the invisible hand and other unquestioned logics of salvation”. 
In Iran, for instance, legitimacy is based on the Islamic model which can has two 
dimensions: the first refers to citizens’ (public) support for a policy (the cultural context) 
and the second refers to the fulfilment of the religious criterion of public interest or 
‘musalaha’ as it is called in Islamic principles or ‘Sharia’. Hashemi et al (2007a) have 
illustrated how Islamic environmental ethics is comparable to ecological ethics. However, 
the Muslim world such as most of WANA region like a large part of the world, historically 
suffers from anthropogenic ethics in water management, despite the very explicit ‘green’ 
credential of a religious perspective on the environment. The question is why such 
entrenched beliefs are ignored? The answer may lie in the cultural dimension of the set of 
beliefs. For example, ideas such as ‘basic human needs’ (which is both social and religious) 
and ‘life necessities’ which is both economic and natural can override strongly-held beliefs 
about stewardship for nature (which is religious and ethical). This prioritisation of human 
basic need and its right and integrity forms part of the “meta-belief” that has to be 
considered. It is not enough just to dismiss the ‘needs’ concept, as it was not ignored by the 
WECD’s report (1987) on Sustainable Development. Therefore, there is a need to show 
how common good values and ethics can be used to implement sustainable water resource 
management within the context of societal livelihoods.   
 
 
                                                 
11 I have reviewed Islam since our case study area is Iran and WANA region which have predominately 
Islamic culture.  
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2.3.5 Institutional capacity development: dealing with participation issue    
Institutional capacity development is a corner stone of IWRM. Therefore, in this 
part we deal with one main aspect which is stakeholder participation. Capacity building, 
development or enhancement is a term widely used since the 1980s (e.g. Attari and 
Salehzadeh, 2009) and the term capacity relates to the Sustainable Development concept. 
Alaerts and Kaspersma (2009) provide a review on the definition of capacity and they 
define it as: 
the capability of a society or a community to identify and understand its development 
issues, to act to address these, and to learn from experience and accumulate knowledge for 
the future” (ibid, p.7). 
 
Institutional capacity development can take four main forms which are not mutually 
exclusive (Hashemi and O’Connell, 2009):  
(1) Human resources development e.g. training and education requirements, changes in 
ethics and perceptions, culture, morals and motivation etc. The concept of human 
development is defined by HDR12 (2006) as “first and foremost about allowing 
people to lead a life that they value and enabling them to realise their potential as 
human beings”. To achieve this goal, a visionary framework is set out in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The objectives are to reduce “extreme 
poverty, extending gender equality, and advancing opportunities for health and 
education”.  So this internationally agreed set of time bound goals centres around 
human wellbeing. 
(2) Knowledge capacity development e.g. research, stakeholder participation.  
(3) Organisational capacity development which entails both financial and institutional 
sustainability of water  management ; it includes infrastructure as well as 
administrative change or reform.  
(4) Enabling environment capacity development which includes good governance; 
adequate policies and laws; enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms. 
According to IWRM concept, stakeholder participation ensures the implementation 
of IWRM plans within river basin context since this will increase their acceptability and 
ownership. There are vital roles that they can play as shown in Table 2.3 (Cap-Net, 2008). 
There are different levels of stakeholder involvement and decision-making powers as 
                                                 
12 Human Development Report (UNDP) 
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shown in Figure 2.5 (Delli Perscoli, 2003) which indicates the level of decision-making 
powers associated with the level of involvement. 
 
Table 2.3: Stakeholder roles with reference to river basin management objectives (Source: 
Cap-Net, 2008). 
 
Worldwide, a mixture of participatory mechanisms has been used such as river 
basin councils, water user associations (WUAs), and local water and agriculture 
committees. The main aim of stakeholder participation has been conflict resolution. Albeit 
being a useful platform for dialogue, participation is bigger than conflict resolution.  
With increasing complexity and the involvement different sectors and interests, 
decision-making has become more difficult and hence a participation platform is seen as 
“decision-making body (voluntary or statuary) comprising of different stakeholders” 
(Warner, 2007) which are called Multi-stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). Warner (2007) 
stresses that dialogue has been increasingly recommended in common pool resources such 
as water management based on multifaceted systems approach integrating the interaction 
and relations between (1) quality and quantity’ (2) surface and groundwater’ (3) water and 
land use, (4) water and stakeholders and (5) water institutions (ibid, p.2).     
 
Figure 2.5: The level of participation with reference to the degree of decision-making 
powers ( based on Delli Perscoli, 2003) 
Management 
objectives 
Roles of Stakeholders 
Basin planning Problem identification, priority setting, 
situation analysis, approval.
Water Allocation Advisory, monitoring and reporting, 
decision making.
Pollution control Monitoring, reporting, permitting
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However, this holistic approach requires an unprecedented level of institutional 
cooperation and coordination; as well as posing a great challenge to model complex social 
and ecological systems settings. Furthermore, modelling integrated socio-technical aspects 
are going to be very difficult.  
Mitchell (2007) believes that MSPs are compatible with IWRM if institutional 
design recognises two levels of sub-basin and basin-wide MSPs working and 
communicating in parallel to each other (ibid, 61). Otherwise, IWRM’s strong river basin 
orientation can cause tensions. Participatory governance requires a special attention to the 
enabling environment in terms of capacity development and empowerment and the removal 
of legal obstacles in the way of participation. New laws might be required to facilitate the 
participatory approach. Participation has been linked to good governance and democracy by 
enhancing accountability and transparency of the decision-making and remains one of the 
most important issues in the water and land resources management.     
 
2.4  Discussion and conclusions: towards a socio-technical approach 
Need for a paradigm shift. Based on previous sections, water resources management 
is multi-dimensional (human, society and environment), multilevel (national, regional and 
local), multi-sectoral (energy, food, drinking etc.) and multi-disciplinary (hydrology, 
ecology, law etc).  Implementing sustainable land and water resources management poses 
five main challenges:  
1. How to integrate the complex and overlapping dimensions of WRS?  
2. How to deal with the dynamism of the system?  
3.   How to measure sustainability? 
4. How to deal with various levels of decision-making (institutional levels) and 
ethics and values held by decision-makers? 
5. How to create mechanism for participatory consensus? 
To deal with the above challenges, many scholars have called for a paradigm shift 
towards: 
· Consideration of full water cycle in IWRM i.e. Green Water and Grey 
Water concepts should be considered in IWRM plans (e.g. Falkenmark et al 
(2004), Falkenmark and Rockström (2006)  
· Virtual Water ‘trading’ (e.g. Zeiton et al 2010) can offer real alternative 
policy instruments to deal with water security (and scarcity)   
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· Inter-linkage with land use management (e.g. Calder, 2004, 2005; 
Amezaga, 2005) 
· Adaptive management (e.g. Pahl-Wostl, 2007; 2009, Merrey, 2008)  
· A more politicised IWRM (e.g. Allan, 2003a; Merrey, 2008) 
· Mapping institutional elements beyond hydrological boundaries such as 
influential actors in the decision-making process (e.g. Merrey, 2008) 
· Social learning processes and multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) for 
effective engagement and participation of actors in the IWRM process (e.g. 
Warner, 2007) 
· Greater emphasis on culture and ethics ( e.g. Daniels and Endfield, 2009)  
There are many 'scattered' research efforts at both national and international levels.  
As stated, there are more than 26 UN organisations that deal with water related research 
which necessitates a call for an integrated international strategy for research into IWRM 
that can cater for the required paradigm shift and the change of boundaries of research 
inquiries. 
Need for a methodological framework. IWRM normative package has very little to 
offer on implementation.  Therefore, a methodological framework is needed to evaluate the 
implementation of IWRM. It can be concluded that the main obstacle to implementing 
IWRM is institutional inadequacy (e.g. WWF, 2006; WWDR, 2009). Consequently, the 
neglect of the institutional dimension has created a huge drawback in implementing the 
IWRM paradigm worldwide. Institutional matters were still the most important issue in the 
2009 Istanbul World Water Forum (WWDR, 2009). Lack of implementation has been 
attributed to the gap between policy decisions and technical outcomes. Therefore, there has 
been a move from technical to socio-technical approach.  
Scientific and conceptual inquiries are required to have a greater understanding of 
the physical process of the hydrological cycle as well as the points of interactions with 
ecological, social, economic and institutional dimensions of WRSs. Technological 
advancements have not solved many of the uncertainties in our knowledge systems (e.g. 
assumptions and conceptual models). We need to understand better the inherent 
uncertainties to better manage decision-making uncertainties.  
Researchers as facilitators. In Iran and worldwide, numerous researchers are 
involved in a variety of IWRM research themes but their efforts are dispersed and there is 
lack of communications between different research groups as well as between policy 
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makers and the research communities. A dialogue between the research communities and 
stakeholders is essential to create a platform for a wider dialogue among policy makers, the 
scientific community and the public at large. Researchers can become facilitators in 
difficult public policy debates and create a foundation for participatory decision-making 
processes (Hashemi and O’Connell, 2011b).  
To achieve the objectives of the PhD research, a new integrated socio-technical 
methodological approach has been developed in Chapter III based on combining multiple 
theoretical and analytical components into a single methodological framework to attain a 
linkage between technical science and policymaking. By using this unique analytical 
approach in which technical and non-technical assessment tools are linked, an Integrated 
Socio-technical Assessment Framework can be attained which is described in Chapter III. 
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Chapter III. Integrated Socio-technical Framework: Methodologies and 
Analytical Components  
 
3.1 Introduction:   
Objective 2 of the PhD research (Section 1.4, p.8) aims to develop an Integrated 
Socio-technical Framework by linking the elements of social and technical assessments 
approaches to implement IWRM. With reference to governing principles described in 
Chapter II, five main ingredients are considered with the methodological approach: 
1. The underlying conceptual approach is provided by concepts such as 
IWRM, Sustainable Development and Ethics.  
2. The analytical components are used to deal with technical and socio-
political (institutional) aspects of water resources system (WRS) 
sustainability.  
3. Integrated Socio-technical Assessment tools are applied to provide 
evidences using reliable data about the WRS. 
4. Role of Ethics and community belief systems are considered to (a) frame 
the mental models or perspectives of actors in decision-making process and 
(b) to provide evaluation criteria for  analysis of the decision outcomes. 
5. Multitier Multi-stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are crafted for participatory 
decision-making.    
In Chapter II, it was shown that despite conceptual constraints IWRM is still 
relevant for ever increasing challenges in the water sector (van der Zaag, 2005; Merrey, 
2008).  From the literature review, it is apparent that lack of implementation has been 
attributed to the fact that IWRM is a concept and not a framework. Therefore, it is 
postulated that there is a need to develop an integrated methodological framework for 
IWRM since the normative form of the concept is not implementable.  
To design the methodological framework, two survey questionnaires were used with 
the following objectives:   
1. To sketch an issues map for Iran’s water sector based on perceptions of 
water managers, consultants and policymakers (as described in Chapter I). 
2. To assess the progress made in Iran with respect to the introduction and 
implementation of IWRM (i.e. whether IWRM is relevant to Iran); it is 
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noted that IWRM has been formally adopted in 2003 and this need to be 
further evaluated in Chapter IV). 
3. To provide guidance on choosing a suitable analytical components for the 
proposed Integrated Socio-technical Framework.  
For achieving the objectives 1 and 2, a questionnaire was design based on European 
Commission (2006). Some of the results are given in Table 1.1, Chapter I. A total of 54 
acceptable questionnaires were collected while rejecting incomplete ones.   
Based on the literature review in Chapter II, it seems that that linkage based 
approaches such as Drivers-Pressures-States-Impacts-Responses (DPSIR) have been 
successfully implemented in many sectors since it can study environmental change and 
capture the relationship between the physical environment and the human system 
(e.g.Waheed et al, 2009). Therefore, DPSIR approach is used to evaluate changes in all the 
components of the water resources system (WRS)   
The second questionnaire was based on Saleth and Dinar’s (2004) with an exception 
that a section was added on how IWRM can be implemented within the water sector. The 
questionnaire was translated in close consultation with Dr Jalal Attari my consulting 
supervisor in Iran. It is a 20 page questionnaire on the performance of water sector based on 
Institutional Decomposition and Analysis (IDA) approach in which water institution is 
decomposed as: water policy; water law and water administration. The inter-linkages 
between different components were statistically measured. This survey produced 24 
completed questionnaires from both national and provincial stakeholders providing an 
overall picture of water sector and acted as a validation for the choice of Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) approach (Ostrom, 2005) as a suitable component for the 
proposed Framework. Saleth and Dinar’s IDA approach cannot capture the role of actors in 
participatory decision-making. Therefore, IAD (Ostrom, 2005) was chosen for the proposed 
Integrated Socio-technical Framework.  
In Section 3.2, first, the development of the Integrated Socio-technical Framework 
is described including research design and the overall description of the Framework. 
Secondly, the components of the Framework are outlined in Sections 3.3 to 3.6. Thirdly, 
data collection methods are described in Section3.7. Fourthly, the application of the 
Framework in the thesis is described in Section 3.8 followed by an overview of the thesis in 
Section 3.9.  
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3.2 Research design and development of the Integrated Socio-technical 
Framework 
3.2.1 Multi-strategy research design 
Innovative approach. According to Max-Neef (2005), water is one of the main 
“problematiques” i.e. “problems of global and long term impact”; thus no single discipline 
can adequately deal with such multifaceted problem. Water resources planning, allocation 
and management can be considered as an interdisciplinary endeavour (see Max-Neef, 
2005). In the past, many multidisciplinary teams have failed to produce integrative 
synthesis because the members “ carry out their analyses separately, as seen from the 
perspective of their individual disciplines, the final result being a series of reports pasted 
together, without any integrating synthesis” (ibid, p.6. ) Max Neef (2005) asserts that 
integrative inter-disciplinary approach cannot be achieved by amassing different brains; 
educational capacity development is needed to build a shared vision. Hence, it is argued 
that interdisciplinarity needs to be embraced to synchronise research in the interface of both 
social and physical sciences. An interface is defined as the points of interaction, interplay 
and linkage between technical and social (institutional) analytical components. 
In social sciences, combining qualitative and quantitative research approaches are 
increasing popular within the same project (Robson, 2011). Robson labels this type of 
method as “multi-strategy design research” because it is not only about collecting different 
types of data but it also uses “more than one research strategy” (ibid, p.161). However, as 
cited by Robson (2011) multi-strategy research has been rejected on the ground that the 
quantitative and quantitative paradigms are distinctly different and are not compatible with 
each other. The “incompatibility thesis” have been refuted by Howe (1988) arguing that the 
multi-strategy research approach is beneficial and qualitative and quantitative methods are 
“inseparable” (Robson, 2011, p.162). The author has been convinced by Howe’s argument. 
Although, Robson (2011) describes quantitative and qualitative debate within the realm of 
social sciences data, this research has leapt forward a step further by using quantitative data 
from the physical sciences as well as the mixed strategy social research. Nevertheless, the 
description of multi-strategy (mixed design) research is valid to describe the 
interdisciplinary methodological approach taken in this thesis.  
Turner (2000) highlights some of lessons learned from interdisciplinary research to 
synthesise and communicate policy relevant findings including (ibid, p.459): 
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· To deal with natural science/social science divide there is a need to 
“translate across disciplines the different terminologies and 
methodological approaches”. 
· To deal with information failure, data needs assessments for both natural 
and social sciences are required before the start of the research “in order to 
identify data inconsistencies, limitations or real gaps”. 
· “Naive expectations across the disciplinary divide” are understandable but 
we need to appreciate that the mismatches “reflects the difference between 
functioning of ecological, institutional and societal systems”.    
Striving to be an interdisciplinary PhD work, a “Sequential transformative 
design”(Robson, 2011, p. 165) strategy has been used to develop the Framework. The 
application of the sequential transformative design is to translate the normative form of 
IWRM concept into polices and strategies by assessing the outcomes of interactions of 
stakeholders in the participatory decision-making process using social and technical 
analytical components (Figure 3.1).   
 
Figure 3.1: Sequential transformative design: conceptual research approach for translating 
or transforming the IWRM concept into implementable management options using the 
theoretical Integrated Socio-Technical Assessment Framework. 
 
This research is guided by a theoretical perspective which manifests the Integrated 
Socio-technical Framework. The Framework represents a major innovation in this thesis by 
Concept:
IWRM
Analytical Components  
Assessment tools
Participation Platform 
Outcomes: Responses 
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complementarily combining socio-technical, ethical and socio-political (institutional) 
analytical and assessment components to assess the sustainability of the WRS. 
Meaning of Framework. Before explaining the new Framework, we need (1) to 
understand the meaning of the ‘framework’ and differentiate it from theory and model (see 
e.g. Clement, 2008); and (2) to appreciate the implications (and advantages) of combining 
different analytical components to form the single Integrated Socio-Technical Framework.  
As explained by Clement (2008) “A framework identifies structures and links the 
relevant variables or elements that affect the issue in concern, but does not make any 
predictions” (ibid, p. 33). By comparison, a theory “makes specific assumptions on the 
linkages between variables and outcomes” and a model provides outcomes based on 
assumptions made in the theory and available data (inputs). 
Some might criticise this approach of combining different analytical components 
into a single framework to be “an internally contradictory and messy approach, with a 
limited explanatory capacity” (Clement, 2008, p.40). However, we need to appreciate that 
these components are non-mutually exclusive and there are interfaces between them; hence 
they can be conceptually linked to each other as can be seen in the following sections in 
which the components of the Framework are described. 
Definitions of stakeholders, actors and participants. Stakeholders are defined as 
any individuals or organisations that influence or are influenced by decisions made about 
water resources system. Actors are individuals or organisations which are involved in 
making decisions on water resources planning, allocation and consumption. Participants are 
actors that are either directly involved in policy/decision-making and consultation processes 
through the formation of a participation mechanism such as Multi-stakeholder Platforms 
(MSPs) or participate in the process of social research i.e. surveys, interviews and 
questionnaires  
Flexible research design. Two approaches to flexible research design have been 
considered (Robson, 2011): 
1. The case study approach which is a well-established research strategy 
“where the focus is on the case” and usually involves “multiple methods of 
data collection”. Our case is the water resources system in Lake Urmia but 
we also look into wider characteristics of WRS in Iran since decisions about 
the WRS are centralised.  
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2. An ethnographic study approach which focuses on the cultural, ethical and 
social structure of stakeholders and communities within the WRS. It 
enriches the case study approach by having a better understanding of 
discourses and narratives that shape stakeholders perspectives. The author 
has had multiple positions in addition to being a researcher and has built up 
a close relationship with many of the stakeholders in the field. The author 
has acted as  
a. a facilitator and actor in Multi-Stakeholder Platforms such as 
workshops, seminars, stakeholder and working group meetings;  
b. an advisor to national and international agencies working on the 
Lake Urmia case study;  
c. a researcher as a PhD candidate at the School of Civil Engineering 
and Geosciences, Newcastle University which is partially funded by 
the Ministry of Energy, Iran (the main stakeholder); and 
d. an actor in producing policy briefs for west Asia and North Africa 
(WANA) region through the initiative of WANA Forum based on 
the research results.  
3. Therefore, the case study entailed a large element of ‘real world (applied) 
research comprising linking valuation research and participatory action 
research (Robson,   2011, p.189). The purpose of action research is “to 
influence or change some aspect of whatever is the focus of the research” 
(ibid, p.188). In the context of this PhD work, the real world research is 
concerned with (a) involvement, improvement and broadened understanding 
of the water allocation decision-making process; (b) evaluating the outcome 
of the decisions using analytical components; and(c) studying change where 
there is concern for actions. 
Scientific attitude and ethics of research. Robson (2011) stresses that real world 
enquiry requires a scientific attitude with three ingredients (ibid, p.14): (1) a systematic 
approach is taken to develop a sound methodology with ability to observe, evaluate and 
scrutinise the issues of concern; (b) enquiries are carried out in a sceptical manner; and (3) 
the research ethics are maintained. According to Robson (2011), a scientific ethical attitude 
to research adheres to a code of conduct which “ensures that the interests and concerns of 
those taking part in, or possibly affected by, the research are safeguarded”. In this 
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research, the University’s Code of Conduct has been maintained in dealing with other 
individuals and organisations. Permissions have been taken for the material used in the 
thesis and in no way have I misled or disadvantaged anybody to obtain information. In fact, 
I have been warmly received to engage in almost all of the meetings with formal 
invitations. I have had gain stakeholders’ trust and respect through ethical conduct inside 
and outside the field.  
I have had an influential role as an independent facilitator during water allocation 
negotiations and this was accepted by all the stakeholders involved with little reservations. I 
have been transparent in all my dealings as a facilitator about my discursive position to 
foster a win-win IWRM discourse which is the subject of my thesis.  
Robson (2011) notes that close engagement with stakeholders stimulate some 
researchers to cross the boundary and change the role “to that of advocate”. 
Acknowledging this difficult task, on the one hand, I have preserved the independence of 
this research from any influences from the stakeholders. On the other hand, my PhD 
research programme and statement of interest have been acknowledged and well known to 
stakeholders while co-facilitating workshops, working groups, seminars; conducting 
interviews or collecting questionnaires and other qualitative and quantitative data. 
Discursive position of analysis. IWRM encompasses both the principles of 
Sustainable Development and ethical decision-making concepts and provide the context to 
deal with issues of integration and sustainability aspects of WRS by using systems analysis 
approach as described in Chapter II. IWRM will be carried through the thesis by providing 
the objectives (social, economic, environmental) which feed into the analytical components 
of the proposed Integrated Socio-technical Framework. 
3.2.2 Describing the Framework   
The Integrated Socio-technical Framework which combines FOUR core analytical 
components (Figure 3.2) is a non-predictive representation of structures and links between 
different variables and components that influence the water resources planning and 
allocation system in Iran and the Lake Urmia case study. There is a continuous iterative 
time-based loop in the overall framework:  
1. First, the Drivers-Pressures-States-Impacts-Responses (DPSIR) component 
which is a causal framework is used to provide an understanding of the 
changes that occurred to the various components of the water resources 
system by “describing the interactions between society and the 
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environment” (EEA, 2011). Based on a systems analysis approach, the 
socio-economic, political and climatic Drivers exert Pressures on the WRS 
which leads to changes in the social, economic and environmental States of 
the WRS. After a strategic assessment of the changes (States), the Impacts of 
policies on water resources systems are assessed and the evolution of 
previous Responses in time t-1 are described. In this thesis, DPSIR is used to 
make a strategic multilevel evaluation of the IWRM concept in Iran and the 
Lake Urmia basin (LUB), thus providing a structured overview of water 
resources management in contemporary Iran, (Chapter IV) and LUB 
(Chapter V) for the period of 1909-2008. The IWRM concept provides 
objectives which feed in at both the Drivers and Responses levels.  
2. The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) component is used to 
make an ex post analysis of Responses: 
a. First, ex post analysis of Responses in time t-1is carried out which 
represents a Business as Usual (BAU) scenario. In Chapter V, the 
water allocation process during 1909-2008 has been analysed in the 
context of the case study. 
b. Secondly, in Chapter VI, (a) DPSIR Analysis is extended for period 
2008-2010 to describe the new Drivers and Responses based on 
IWRM and (b) water allocation is made using Integrated Socio-
technical Assessment (ISTA) component (describe in bullet number 
3). Then, in Chapter VII, IAD is used to evaluate the new Responses 
(i.e.in time t) which have been made by actors (stakeholders) to deal 
with the Pressures on the water environment to propose revised 
Responses (e.g. institutional design or reform or an adaptive 
allocation strategy that factors in an environmental allocation). 
3. As mentioned, Integrated Socio-technical Assessment (ISTA) component 
(Chapter VI) describes how actors in MSPs use information or data to make 
their decisions based on a scientific integrated assessment approach using 
modelling and Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) to reach a decision 
on water allocation. The overall ISTA is used to evaluate the Responses 
made by the actors e.g. water allocated to the lake (Chapter VI) and propose 
revised (preferred) Responses as part of the PhD work (Chapter VII). It also 
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evaluates the quality of the evidence (data and information) used in the 
decision-making process (Chapter VI and VI). ISTA comprises of three 
elements: 
a. MCDA used by actors and represents  
i. the simple water allocation model (WAM) using an Excel 
Spreadsheet (Chapter VI); 
ii. the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) procedure used to 
allocate water shares (Chapter VI)  
b. Modelling  
i. by stakeholders using Vensim Dynamic simulation (Chapter 
VI) and 
ii. as  part of the thesis using water balance modelling, 
stochastic modelling and risk based analysis (Chapter VI) 
c. Evaluative Criteria for measuring institutional sustainability which 
are based on Good Governance principles and the Ethics component 
of the Framework (Chapters, V, VI and VII) 
4. The Ethics component:  
a. represents perspectives (or mental models) of actors which have been 
shaped by values and cultural aspects of the community; and have a 
bearing on the decision-making by influencing the exogenous factors 
affecting the IAD component and providing a basis for Evaluative 
Criteria used to reach outcomes (Chapters V, VI, VII)  
b. is further developed based on community values (predominantly 
Islamic) to propose revised Responses to enhance the water and land 
resources governance system (Chapter VIII). 
In Sections 3.3 -3.6, the components of the Framework will be described. 
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Figure 3.2: The Integrated Socio-technical Framework. 
 
3.3 DPSIR component 
The definitions of the D-P-S-I-R elements are given in Box 3.1 (e.g. EEA, 1998, 
1999; Turner et al, 1998). DPSIR is linkage-based sustainability assessment approach (e.g. 
Guio-Torres, 2006; Waheed et al, 2009) which provides a strategic evaluation of the status 
of the water resources system by describing the causal relationship between various 
interacting subsystems. As stated in Chapter II, linkage-based sustainability assessment 
approach have been widely used in general and in particular since it was adopted by many 
international and regional organisations such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) 
for “structuring integrated research program and assessment” (Svarstad et al, 2008) i.e. as 
a method for the State of the Environment (SoE) reporting. Turner et al (1998) 
demonstrated its usefulness in assessing the marine and coastal environments by 
considering the feedbacks between the human system and the coastal and marine system 
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using a function based valuation 
methodology. Many researchers 
have used DPSIR as a framework 
for sustainability indicators in 
many environmental assessments 
(e.g. Walmsley, 2002; Agyemang 
et al, 2007; Borja et al, 2006). 
EEA (1999) acknowledges 
that DPSIR (Figure 3.3) is a 
simplification of a complex and 
dynamic system but nevertheless, 
it deals with dynamism by 
focusing on the “links” between 
DPSIR elements; e.g. EEA (1999) 
states that: 
the relationship between the 
Impacts on humans or eco-
systems and the ‘S’ depends on the carrying capacities and thresholds for these systems. 
Whether society ‘Responds’ to impacts depends on how these impacts are perceived and 
evaluated; and the results of ‘R’ on the ‘D’ depends on the effectiveness of the Response 
(ibid, p.7) 
 
Therefore, DPSIR is increasingly used since it can easily capture the relationship 
between human and non-human impacts on the environments. In addition, the DPSIR 
appraoch has been successfully implemented in developing  integrated modelling systems 
or decision support systems (DSSs) such as the WaterStrategyMan (WSM) DSS (ProGea, 
2004), MULINO DSS (Giupponi et al, 2004).  
EEA (2003) asserts that DPSIR, while providing “good way of structuring thoughts 
on indicators, has its limitations in terms of interpretation”. However, we have to 
appreciate that the DPSIR approach is based on discursive biases and it is not a tool for 
producing impartial evidence as argued by Svarstad et al (2008). The reason is that the 
application of DPSIR will bring out discursive positions based on the discourse implied in 
the application. As stated previously, in this research, the IWRM discourse is used based on 
a win-win discursive position which has some implications for how the DPSIR elements 
are interpreted.  
Box 3.1: DPSIR: definitions (based on e.g. EEA, 
1998, 1999; Turner et al 1998) 
D, the Drivers: root causes on a macro level described 
through scenarios representing alternative futures (e.g. 
climate change and variability, socio-economic etc.) 
P, The Pressures (threats) variables: immediate causes (e.g. 
water demands, water pollutions)  
S, The States: describing physical and measurable 
characteristics and social livelihood systems (e.g. water 
availability) 
I, The Impacts: monitor the long term impacts of change 
defined as changes in states resulting from pressures (e.g. 
environmental degradation) 
R, The Responses: are problem-solving policies, actions or 
investments; an appropriate mix of Structural Options e.g. 
new reservoirs/pipelines etc. and Non-Structural Options e.g. 
legislation, institutional reform, demand management etc. 
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The main criticism centres on the causality aspects of DPSIR and the linearity and 
simplicity of the cause-effect relationship of its components (e.g. Kohsaka, 2010; 
Rounsevell et al, 2010). However, Rounsevell et al (2010) asserts that the notion of 
linearity is confused with “sequential thinking”. They conclude that DPSIR takes into 
account the non -liner behaviour of Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) and the complex 
interdependences of the variables by allowing for positive and negative feedback 
Responses which is explicit in the schema. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The DPSIR component with reference to the water resources system. 
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DPSIR and its modified versions have been widely adopted in many policy relevant 
environmental assessments because of its communication power (Niemeijer and de Groot, 
2008). The DPSIR approach provides applicable management options for policy and 
decision-makers by bridging socio-economic and natural sciences (Karageorgis et al, 2005). 
In this research, DPSIR analysis has been enhanced by combining it with 
institutional analysis and development (IAD) component within the socio-political and 
ethical context of policy and decision-making process interactions. Turner et al (1998) have 
acknowledged that the DPSIR analytical approach “should also be extended to cover 
ethical analysis of inter temporal and inter species choice” i.e. analysis should consider 
“community, social norms and collective preferences” (ibid, p.271). Also, the DPSIR 
component is linked to technical assessment tools such as modelling systems for evaluating 
States (e.g. water availability), Impacts and Responses and is a powerful tool to study the 
development and evolution of policies and institutions (i.e. institutional change) in 
conjunction with the IAD component. Therefore, it is a robust and rigorous approach to 
assess the socio-technical attributes of Social-Ecological Systems (SESs).  
 
3.4 IAD component  
3.4.1 An overview 
Definition of institution. Ostrom (1999, 2005) broadly defines institutions as the 
principles that humans use to organise all form of repetitive and structured interactions 
including those within communities, private associations and governments at all scales 
(ibid, p.3). More specifically institutions are rule sets that direct/constrain actions at 
multiple levels. Each level comprises of situations where choices are made and actions are 
taken in an action arena influenced by a set of exogenous external variables: (1) biophysical 
conditions; (2) community attributes; and (3) rules in use (see next sections). 
Levels of decision-making. The IAD approach is based on rational choice theory1 
and has been described in detail by Ostrom (1999, 2005, 2007; 2010 and 2011). It proposes 
four levels of analysis as shown in Figure 3.4 (Ostrom, 1999): meta-constitutional, 
constitutional, collective choice and operational levels; at each level, rules are prescribed, 
invoked, monitored, applied and enforced which affect how rules are made at the next 
                                                 
1 Ostrom’s Institutional Rational Choice conceives public policies as institutional arrangements or rules so 
policy changes result from action by rational actors in an action arena (see Schlager and Blomquist, 1996) but 
this thesis moves away from rational choice theory as will be described later.  
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level2. The operational level deals with rules that govern how decisions on water and land 
resources management are taken in terms of provision, production, distribution, 
appropriation, assignment and consumption of the resource. Frequently only three levels 
are used.  
 
Figure 3.4: Institutional (decision-making) levels in IAD component, adapted from Ostrom 
(1999). 
The IAD approach is a powerful analytical tool to capture institutional (decision-
making) levels which do not necessarily correspond to administrative levels. For example, 
local communities can establish their own rules which can operate at collective choice or 
even the constitutional levels (see e.g. Clement, 2008). Therefore, it is not a rigid 
framework and can be used in a variety of situations depending on the actors and action 
situations. As noted by Clement (2009) among others, IAD has been extensively developed 
for common pool resources and is one of the most tested and distinguished approaches. It 
has also been applied to an extent to water resources problems e.g. Imperial (2009); Smajgl 
et al (2009); Ostrom (2010); Larson (2006), Maru and LaFlamme (2008). In this research, 
the IAD approach has been used primarily to assess the extent of central government’s 
(national level) recognition of local level basin governance i.e. water allocation decisions 
by Lake Urmia basin stakeholders.  
                                                 
2 In most case studies, three levels are taken excluding meta-constitutional level of analysis.  
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3.4.2 Conceptual unit of institutional analysis  
Focal level of institutional analysis. The aim of the IAD approach is to analyse 
situations of human interaction (Ostrom, 2010). Therefore, the focal point of analysis is the 
concept of an action situation affected by exogenous factors within an action arena as 
shown in Figure 3.5.  
 
Figure 3.5: Action situation and action arena as focal level of institutional analysis (Ostrom, 
2005; p15). 
 
Ostrom (2005, 2011) describes the IAD approach as a cluster of variables or holons 
defined as “nested subsystems of whole units in complex adaptive systems” (Ostrom, 2005).  
The water resources system can be analysed by ‘unpacking’the cluster of variables (holons) 
depending on action situations. The action arena3 is a conceptual unit of institutional 
analysis. This can be as small as a household and as large as a continent. The key to the 
IAD approach is identification of an action situation to focus the analysis on(Ostrom, 
2011). Examples of action situations for the land and water resources system in the Lake 
Urmia basin is given in Table 3.1.   
Decision-making 
analysis levels  
Example of action situations 
Operational  provincial water allocation, sectoral water allocation decisions, land use decisions (irrigation area); water 
charges; developmental plans 
Collective choice  The design of rules governing water allocation; design and implementation of water resources polices and 
WR development projects 
Constitutional choice 
level 
The selection of actors  in collective choice level who will implement and enforce water allocation 
policies with their ToR; definition of water rights; rules governing collective choice decisions 
Table 3.1: Examples of water resources system action situations in Iran and Lake Urmia 
case study 
                                                 
3Ostrom (2011) acknowledges that many have confused the difference between action arena and action 
situation and so the term ‘action arena’ has been removed in her latest paper.  
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The internal structure of an action situation can be described and analysed using 
seven sets of variables (Figure 3.6): the set of actors (participants)(1) are assigned to the 
positions(2) which is assigned to sets of allowable actions(3) and functions to achieve the 
potential outcomes(4) as a result of the degree of control(5) exhibited by the actor and based 
on the available information(6) about actions, outcomes and their linkages (i.e. evidence) 
and the Costs and benefits(7) assigned to actions and outcomes (used as an incentive 
measure).   
 
Figure 3.6: The internal structure of an action situation (Source: Ostrom, 2005). 
 
The actors (participants or stakeholders) in an action situation can be an individual, 
a group of individuals such as a community or an organisation (institution). There are four 
characteristics of the actors that have to be considered by the analyst (Ostrom, 2011): 
· The belief and value systems they use to evaluate the outcomes ; 
· the resources at their disposal to make the decisions 
· the level of information they possess  and their ability to process the 
information 
· the way they are going to choose a strategy (a selection of management 
options) based on their “mental heuristics (Clement, 2008)” 
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3.4.3 Biophysical and material conditions 
Ostrom (2005) explains the attributes of the biophysical variables in terms of how 
the attributes of the biophysical world affect what actions are physically possible and what 
effect a set of  rules in use4will have on the resource use based on available types of goods 
(resources) (ibid, p.22). V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom (1977) identify four types of goods: Toll, 
private, public and common pool. Ostrom (2005) uses two criteria to assess the biophysical 
conditions which are: subtractability of use and difficulty to exclude other users. This 
typology of resource use is based on common pool resources (CPR) literature and was 
influenced by Hardin’s notion of “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). CPRs are both less 
difficult to exclude others and have a high subtractability of use5 (Schagler, 2007). 
Based on the current legislations, the land and water property regime in Iran does 
not fit the classification made by V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom. Ostrom considers natural 
resources systems in the broadest sense to be CPRs. However, in Iran the State 
(government) owns certain types of CPR which are named as public state property goods. 
Iranian legislation implicitly acknowledges private ownership of groundwater from private 
wells but tries to restrict their use or even charge a price for their use. Therefore, the 
property regime in not well defined in the water legislations in Iran. But, in general, water 
is considered as a common property. 
3.4.4 Community attributes: role of belief systems 
Actors or participants can be individuals or representative of organisations which 
display a degree of aggregate behaviour i.e. they follow organisations’ strategy and interest.  
A community is an array of actors e.g. users, decision-makers, researchers, stakeholders 
etc. Due to heterogeneity of the social fabric of the community, there is going to be a 
varying degree of common understanding about the action situation. In this analysis, the 
attributes of the community are articulated by analysing the mental models (perspectives) 
of the actors which represent the community in question. There are some examples which 
can be considered:  
· level  of trust between different provinces and national and regional  levels  
                                                 
4Ostrom distinguishes between rules in use which can be formal or informal and rules in form which have not 
been enforced despite being formal rules.  
5 For limited water resources, subtractability means that if someone uses a unit of resource it will not be 
available for others (e.g. Schagler, 2007); for instance, if an upstream user is withdrawing water from a river 
stream, then the water is not available for downstream users.  
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· level of homogeneity in the preferences and priorities of the regions in terms of 
water resources planning and allocation  compared to the national priorities 
·  the allocation of basic assets among the regions 
· the dominant economic models in the regions  
· the influence of the political system on the decision-making 
3.4.5 Linking rules in use to action situations 
Ostrom (2005) has based her ‘rules’ concept on Black’s (1962) understanding of the 
word ‘rule’ to denote the meaning of rule in terms of (ibid, p.17): 
· regulations which are effectively legislations made by constitutional and 
judicial lawmakers; 
· strategies i.e. instruction rules adopted by participants as plan of actions  
· norms which are ethical codes of practice; and 
· principles which describes a law used in everyday language.  
Rules can be formal or informal. Informal rules are rules practiced with regard to an 
action situation and include customary rules as well unauthorised rules in use such as 
informal and unauthorised abstraction rules for water resources. In this analysis, we 
concentrate on legislative and policy (normative) rules. 
In the IAD approach, rules are linked to the action situations (Ostrom, 2005, 2011). 
As described earlier, an action situation has seven components and so it is reasonable for 
these components to be governed by seven types of rules as shown in Figure 3.7 (Ostrom 
and Crawford, 2005): 
1. Boundary rules control who can leave or enter the positions; 
2. Position rules denote  a set of positions and how many actors hold each one; 
3. Choice rules regulate which actions are bestowed upon an actor in a 
position; 
4. Information rules refer to how information is communicated across or 
among actors and what can be shared or kept from the actors; 
5. Scope rules affect the outcomes;  
6. Aggregation rules specify how a decision-making process is made e.g. 
whether a decision is based on consensus or majority rule etc.  
7. Payoff rules regulates how benefits and costs are distributed in the 
community of actors 
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Figure 3.7: Conceptualisation of rules linked to components of an action situation. (Source: 
Ostrom, 2005, 2011). 
 
3.5 Integrated Socio-Technical Assessment for sustainable water allocation 
The ISTA component has three main parts: 
1. Modelling and MCDA elements are used by the stakeholders in making 
water allocation decisions which will be described in Chapter VI.  
2. Water balance and stochastic rainfall modelling and risk-based assessment 
tools are used to assess the decisions made in (1). The ISTA component 
complements IAD analysis: Larson (2006) criticises the IAD approach for 
being evaluations (ex-post) rather than assessments (ex-ante).  Nevertheless, 
the ISTA component can provide risk-based ex-ante assessment for future 
climate and water abstractions scenarios using stochastic modelling for 
proposal on revised Responses i.e. adaptive water allocation governance.  
3. Evaluative Criteria used to assess the institutional sustainability of the water 
allocation process and stakeholder participation arrangements in Chapters V 
(pre- participatory water allocation) and VII (Post-participatory water 
allocation).  
The methodological approaches of part (1) will be briefly described in this section 
However; more elaboration about (1) and a full description of (2) are given in Chapter VI, 
Section 6.4. This is because parts (1) and (2) are based on the stakeholder consultation and 
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participation process and without introducing and describing the contextual setting of the 
case study, it is inappropriate to describe the methodology. Part (3) is described in this 
section.  
3.5.1 Modelling and Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) for water 
resources allocation 
A generalised schema of the participatory water allocation process cycle is shown in 
Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8: Water allocation cycle based on the ISTA component. 
 
Water allocation in Iran is based on a legal requirement pertaining to the use of 
modelling and assessment tools. It can be seen that the ISTA component of the Framework 
has a profound role in the decision-making process but the role of MCDA and modelling is 
limited to stages 4-8 as shown in the cycle. Usually, the actual decision is made by actors at 
a higher level in the multitier MSPs (see e.g. Buchholz et al, 2009).  
Expectations from MCDA. MCDA methods have been used in many resource 
sectors including water and environment (e.g. Hajkowicz and Higgins, 2008), forestry and 
land management (e.g. Ananda and Herath, 2009) energy (e.g. Pohekar and Ramachandran, 
2004) and so forth. Figueira et al (2005) edited a book in which 70 MCDA software 
packages have been reviewed by Weistroffer et al (2005). Drawing from an extensive 
reviews by many researchers (e.g. Hayashi, 2000; Pohekar and Ramachandran, 2004; Roy, 
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2005; Hajkowicz and Higgins, 2008; Ananda and Herath, 2009), it can be seen that MCDA 
methods have a great deal of theoretical limitations and conceptual constraints in 
sustainability assessments. However, Munda (2005) believes that the MCDA approach can 
deal adequately with “sustainability conflicts at both micro and macro levels of analysis”.  
Problems of participation. Sustainable Development (and of course IWRM), call 
for far greater public participation in policy issues. The scientific community are no longer 
dealing with only decision-makers but they have a far reaching responsibility towards the 
society (Munda, 2005). This dominant paradigm of participation puts a formidable 
challenge to the scientists involved in the MCDA process as they are ethically accountable 
to critically scrutinise inputs by the actors (Munda, 2005). Therefore, the power 
relationship between different actors in the multi-criteria participation process is crucial. 
There are powerful actors who might try to influence the decision-making process. Thus, 
participatory MCDA is not just a scientific endeavour but it is also a social learning process 
(see Chapter II). Therefore, knowledge of actors and their values and judgements are 
necessary to ensure the scientific credibility of the process. Munda (2005) concludes that 
other social research methods such as institutional analysis can be used to map “social 
actors” to avoid pitfalls in decision-making. We also have to acknowledge that focus 
groups and MSPs are not fully representative of all the stakeholders. Nevertheless, they 
provide a platform to make “better’’ and more accountable and transparent decisions 
fostering democratic reconstruction of the society. 
Since the 1960s, the subject of Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) has been 
producing a phenomenal number of theories and applications (Roy, 2005) but there are no 
clear guidelines of how to choose a particular method. Therefore, some practitioners may 
use methods based on their expertise and judgments. However, “Both analysts and 
stakeholders need to be informed about the underlying assumptions of the tools used 
(Gasparatos, et al, 2008)”.To choose a method, we need to understand the factors 
influencing the outcomes of an MCDA application. Munda (2005) provides some “good 
practice” guideline on factors affecting the result of MCDA exercise; these are (1) quality 
of the information available; (2) information about why indicators are chosen by the actors 
and whose interests are taken into account i.e. transparency; (3) direction of each indicator 
(i.e. positive or negative influence); (4) weights of the indicators which reflect their 
importance; and (5) ranking method used. 
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In the case study, MCDA has been used; the methodological approach for MCDA 
method chosen by the actors will be outlined in Chapter VI, Section 6.3. ExpertChoice 
software (Saaty, 2005) which is based on the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) procedure 
has been used as part of the MCDA.  
3.5.2 Modelling  
With increasing pressure on limited water resources due to population growth and 
greater demand, there is a need for modelling approach to simulate future demand and 
assess the impact of water resources development plans on the available resource in terms 
of quantity and quality. Modelling systems have been recognised to help with the decision-
making process and their use is now an integral part of planning and management of water 
resources. From an extensive literature review in Chapter II, it can be concluded that 
modelling systems are indispensible tools in modern water resources planning and 
management. As described in Chapter II, there is no doubt that the modelling approach has 
contributed greatly to the advancement of the planning and management of water resources. 
The main aim of a modelling system is to provide information or ‘evidence’ for a sound 
decision using the available data and technologies. 
Generally, there are two kinds of modelling approach: simulation and optimisation 
which are often used conjunctively as described in Chapter II. Wurbs (1997) listed a 
number of generalized water resources simulation models in seven categories: watershed, 
river hydraulics, river and reservoir water quality, reservoir/river system operation 
groundwater, water distribution system hydraulics and demand forecasting models. 
Increasingly, sophisticated hydrological models became integrated into the water resources 
field. Many multi-reservoir modelling systems have been reviewed by Labadie (2004). 
In Iran, there is an explicit requirement to use system dynamic simulation modelling 
in the water allocation process as shown in Figure 3.8. Vensim is a “visual modelling tool 
that allows you to conceptualise, document, simulate, analyse, and optimize models of 
dynamic systems …..” and “provides a simple and flexible way of building simulation 
models from causal loop or stock and flow diagrams (Ventana Systems, 2007). Thus, the 
modelling component consists of 
· VENSIM system dynamic software (Ventana Systems, 2007)  
·  a water balance model of Lake Urmia in Excel Spreadsheet 
· the Expert Choice software which is AHP/MCDA software as water 
allocation model (Saaty, 2005).  
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The methodology will be fully described in Chapter VI, Section 6.3.  
3.5.3 Evaluative Criteria: institutional sustainability  
General criteria. Evaluative criteria are used to assess the performance of the water 
resources planning and allocation governance and hence it is a vital part of the ISTA 
component. The choice of these criteria depends on the requirement of the analyst and 
hence they are flexible. Ostrom (2005) provides a set of general criteria including  
· economic efficiency,  
· equity,  
· adaptability,  
· resilience and robustness,  
· accountability, 
· conformance to general morality, and  
· the need for trade-offs. Ostrom (2005 p.67) asserts that trade-offs are “often 
necessary in using performance criteria as a basis for selecting from 
alternative institutional arrangements” 
The base assumption is that any change in institutional arrangements will influence 
these criteria i.e. a new or revised institutional arrangements can increase (or decrease) 
these criteria (Clement, 2008). 
Design Principles. Ostrom (2005) describes in detail eight design principles and 
asserts that they are not blueprints (ibid, p.257) but they characterise “long-enduring 
institutions for governing sustainable resources” and are a measure of their robustness and 
ability to “adapt and learn so as to be robust to the many social, economic and ecological 
disturbances that occur over time”.  Cox et al (2009) analysed over 100 studies and 
confirmed the validity of the design principles and have made some adjustments which 
have been adopted by Ostrom (2011). A brief description of the design principles are as 
follows (Cox et al, 2009; Ostrom (2005, 2011): 
1. Clearly Defined and Locally Understood Boundaries: 
a. User boundaries separating legitimate users from non-users 
b. Resource boundaries separating specific resources from larger SESs 
2. Proportional Equivalence between Benefits and Costs: 
a. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation and provision 
rules are congruent with local social and environmental conditions 
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b. Appropriation and Provision: Appropriation rules are congruent with 
provision rules; the distribution of costs is proportional to the 
distribution of benefits. 
3. Collective Choice arrangements (or decision level rules): local people 
should be able to participate in modifying the rules 
4. Monitoring is done by accountable and independent monitors at two level:  
a. the allocations and provisions levels of users and 
b. the biophysical condition of the resource. 
5. Graduated Sanctions: unauthorised uses (i.e. those who break the rules) are 
likely to face graduated sanctions.   
6. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: conflicts have to be timely resolved at 
local arena using affordable methods.   
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: the government should lift restrictions on 
local users to make their own rules.   
8. Nested Enterprises: planning, allocations, provisions, monitoring, 
enforcements, conflict resolutions are organised by multi-layered nested 
enterprises.   
 
3.6 Ethics component: framing the issues in the decision-making process 
As stated in Chapter II, there has been a call to embrace Ethics in water resources 
management and therefore, this is an integral part of the Integrated Socio-Technical 
Framework. In this research, the Ethics component has three functions: 
· Ethics is part of the community attributes and constitute the actors’ belief 
systems which factor in cultural, ideological and religious values. The 
mental models are shaped into perspectives based on perception of actors 
about the reality and the exogenous factors such as discourses and 
narratives behind the discourses. The cultural context of ethics relates to 
the environment in which decision-making takes place. 
· Ethical principles can be used as a basis for Evaluative Criteria in the 
ISTA component (as described earlier).  
· In a case study approach, the role of predominantly Islamic Ethics is 
considered to revive the concept of traditional community-based land and 
water governance in the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) region and 
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the way to present revised Responses for Lake the Urmia Case study. A 
new Ethical framework developed in Chapter VIII provides a proposal for 
good governance of land and water resources.   
In the following sub-sections, the remaining functional elements of the Ethics 
component are described. 
3.6.1 Perceptions vs. perspectives  
Perceptions have been studied as part of psychology in terms of cognitive and 
attitudinal aspects. Perception is the conviction of actors about reality and truth. For 
example, our perception of climate change risk has three main components:   
1. emotional (feelings): e.g. our fears about future uncertainty over climate 
change 
2. attitudes (action and behaviour): e.g. our attitudes towards climate change 
adaptation measures;  and  
3. cognitive (intellectual and mental): e.g. our belief about what is happening 
in reality.  
Perspectives are an informal representation of actors’ emotions, attitudes and 
cognitive understanding about the truth i.e. the mental models of actors showing some sort 
of belief that might be “primitive” (Oppenheimer, 2006). Oppenheimer states that belief is 
 “the mental state or function of cognising reality… [Quoting from James, 1890] a sort of 
feeling more allied to the emotions than to anything else. The true opposites of belief, 
psychologically considered, are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief  
Oppenheimer  (2006) notes that previous “primitive beliefs” are transformed into 
advanced and developed beliefs because of our inquiry and subsequent understanding that 
“become dominant in human functioning, rather than to completely replace previous 
primitive beliefs’’. Mankind exhibits residual perceptions and can have deep rooted beliefs 
affected by value and cultural dimensions. 
In this research, perspectives are mental models of actors involved in the decision-
making process; they have an important role and can have inputs into both analytical and 
conceptual components of the Integrated Socio-technical Framework by measuring cultural 
and ethical influences on policy-making decisions. Therefore, perspectives are considered 
as part of evidence or input information within the Framework. 
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3.6.2 Add-on (optional) application of Ethics component: bridging the gap  
between tradition and modern day land and water governance system  
As part of Objective 6 of the research outlined in Chapter I, Chapter VIII aims to 
assess the role of the Islamic belief system in attaining good governance for the land and 
water resources system by developing an Ethical legal framework.  
As demonstrated, the role of belief systems in decision-making is very important. 
Religion is considered to be part of a meta-belief (e.g. Hall, 2008). Most religions have the 
same value-laden perspectives with regard to water and land. Researchers such as Faruqi et 
al (2001) and Jenkins (2008) have attempted to use religious environmental ethics as a basis 
for IWRM and Sustainable Development. In Chapter II, lack of good governance was 
highlighted as one of the major stumbling blocks in implementing the IWRM paradigm. 
Therefore, the assumption is that participation at community level can provide a basis for 
good governance: community participation ensures sustainable use of the resources and an 
ethical and cultural component for the legal framework will provide the required 
sustainability perspective. This off course depends on how the the community places a 
value on allocating water to the environment, particularly if water is scarce due to 
Pressures. In this thesis we will not make an analysis of the proposed Ethical legal 
framework. Therefore, this hypothesis must be tested in future research. 
Environmental degradation as a result of unsustainable water use in the farming and 
agriculture sector and, in a wider context, the depletion of land and water resources have 
led many to re-consider policy options in Response to the Pressures driven by socio-
political and climatic Drivers. The rationale for the optional Ethical legal framework is 
based on four assumptions: (1) stopping over-exploitation of natural resources cannot be 
achieved without the involvement of local communities and consideration for their cultural 
and belief systems; (2) there is an explicit relationship and strong inter-linkage between 
land and water management bearing in mind water governance traditionally has been 
subordinate of land rights (Wilkinson, 1990); (3) traditional practices, knowledge systems 
and institutions can offer an interface and platform for establishing a community based 
approach to natural resources management for sustainable use and (4) Islamic ethics and 
legal theory can provide a coherent set of principles for community-based natural resources 
governance in the WANA region.  
It has to be emphasised that this dissertation is not debating or promoting any 
religious theological discourse i.e. it is not a theological thesis, but like any other ethical 
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discourses, the potential of Islamic environmental ethics is demonstrated in contemporary 
land and water management.  
Chapter VIII is an attempt to bridge the gap between tradition and modern day 
governance of land and water resources. It uses the concept of Hima to develop an Ethical 
legal framework. Hima is defined as a Community-based Natural Resources6 Management, 
(CBNRM) system based on community ethics which are predominately Islamic. The 
applicability of the Ethical legal framework in the context of the Iranian case study will not 
be assessed but is taken as a proposal for further research. The Work has also contributed to 
formulate a policy brief on Hima governance system for WANA Forum which was founded 
in 2009 for an initial period of 5 years with the aim of becoming a platform for new 
regional thinking based on shared values and common good (Figure 3.9). The Forum 
maintains that it is apolitical, non-partisan and an independent platform for dialogue. The 
dialogue centres on the formation of a regional perspective on water and land resources 
governance; a policy brief contribution has also been provided on super-national (inter-
State) governance mechanisms for cooperation to deal with water scarcity in the region 
(WANA,2011).  The proposed legal framework is used as a basis for a Global Hima 
Initiative which is at proposal stage. The platform to carry forward the work is provided by 
WANA Forum and some other partners.   
                                                 
6 Natural resources imply both land and water resources.  
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Figure 3.9: Timeline of the WANA Forum Process (Source: www.wanaforum.org) 
 
3.7 Data collection methods 
3.7.1 The methods  
The term ‘data’ is used with different contexts in the social and physical sciences 
and hence we must appreciate the controversy of using the term ‘data’ in defining data in 
the context of the thesis. In physical sciences, data is considered to be quantitative 
(numerical) which can be raw (i.e. direct measurements), experimental (i.e. outputs of an 
experiment), simulated (i.e. outputs of models) or processed (i.e. analysed). Aerial 
photographs, satellite images and maps are also considered as spatial data in remote sensing 
and geographical information system (GIS) and modelling applications. The word 
information and data is sometime used in a confused manner. However, information is 
considered to be a higher level of data abstraction. For example data about rainfall trend 
will inform us about climatic veracity. Once the information is verified by our mental 
patterns it becomes knowledge which is the highest level of abstraction.  
In social sciences, there is a controversy about what kind of data is used depending 
on philosophical and ideological schools. As described earlier, social sciences use two 
types of research methods: quantitative and qualitative (e.g. Robson, 2011); thus broadly 
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speaking, we can have quantitative and qualitative data. We have to appreciate that the 
quantitative data in social sciences is used in a different context compared to the physical 
sciences. In social sciences, quantitative data is the basis for scientific facts according to 
quantitative research paradigm which is closely related to positivism.  So, quantitative data 
is used to understand a social phenomenon using statistical tools to establish causal 
relationship between variables under study; thus social quantitative data is defined as 
statistical quantitative data in this research.   
To implement the multidisciplinary objectives outlined in Chapter I which has 
elements of both social and physical sciences, the context for data collection encompasses a 
broader definition to be able to understand the physical subsystem of the water resources 
system as well as the policymaking processes within the institutional and socio-economic 
subsystems (referring to Figure 2.1, Chapter II). Thus, multiple methods are required to 
collect data based on both social and physical sciences to accommodate the data needs of 
the thesis. The thesis uses elements of qualitative and quantitative data within the realm of 
real world research (e.g. Robson, 2011) and quantitative data as well as information or 
knowledge in the context of physical sciences. Therefore, some element of social 
quantitative data is used in addition to predominately physical data which represent the 
baseline data.  
Various data collection techniques have been used including (Robson, 2011): 
1. Quantitative data comprises of  
a. quantitative physical data  which is defined as baseline data from 
various sources including: 
i. Internet-based databases including national and international 
agencies online databases such as FAO, the World Bank, 
World Water Council, UNDP, different Iranian Ministries 
including Energy, Environment, State and Agriculture and so 
forth;  
ii. Data from desktop study using electronic journals and 
databases provided by Newcastle University Library  
iii. Secondary data is defined as data which is collected and 
compiled by different research; consulting and departmental 
organisations. For Lake Urmia case study, secondary data 
consists of more than 6000 pages of project reports which 
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have been reviewed by the author to produce a synthesis 
report for the Water and Agriculture Working Group 
(WAWG). The document was adopted by the stakeholders as 
the basis for decision-making. It is referenced as Hashemi 
(2008) in the thesis. 
iv. Lake Urmia case study baseline data was mainly obtained 
through a participation process. There was a mismatch 
between national databases of Ministry of Energy (MoE) and 
Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (MoAJ) and their provincial 
representatives (Regional Water Companies, RWC, and 
Agricultural Jihad Organisations, AJOs). In general, there 
was a level of mistrust. This has created some confusion and 
frustration for both sides. Also, there is a low level of 
information exchange between provinces and between 
different departments within a province. No field 
measurements or reconstructions of the data were made. 
Stakeholders provided baseline data during Working Group 
meetings. This has ensured data ownership and acceptance 
and reduced some uncertainty. However, there have been 
some question marks on the quality of the data; therefore it 
went through a verification process during the meetings. The 
baseline data is referenced as MoE (2010b). 
b. Statistical quantitative data based on survey questionnaires. 
2. Qualitative surveys using non-probability purposive sampling7 (ibid, 275): 
many interviews and 78 fully completed questionnaires were obtained using: 
a.  Formal (structured) and informal (unstructured) interviews of water 
sector experts during 2008-2011 during meetings with stakeholders; 
a large number of meetings have been held which involved 
discussion about the case study. Notes were taken during these 
meeting with the prior knowledge of the participants.  
                                                 
7 Robson (2011, p. 275) states that “the principle of selection in purposive sampling is the researchers 
judgment as to typicality or interest”.  The reason this approach was chosen is that the author had 
unprecedented access to key stakeholders and so, data collected from these stakeholders is very authentic and 
relevant to participatory decision-making.  
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b. Forums: one forum was arranged with agricultural experts in 2008.  
c. Capacity development training workshops: Three events were 
organised by the author; these were held for governmental 
departments. 
d. Policy proposal workshops: the author has gained a better 
understanding of water scarcity issues on a regional scale by sharing 
preliminary results with experts and policymakers in the WANA 
Forum network. The author attended several workshops held by the 
WANA Forum in Amman, Jordan (twice) and Istanbul, Turkey.  
3. Secondary data analysis including  
a.  Content analysis of documents: Media (newspapers) and internet 
resources about major governmental organisations have been 
monitored to understand the underlining perspectives held by policy-
makers and decision-makers. References are provided when directly 
used in the thesis. 
4. Observation methods: the author has been an observer in many meetings: 
a. Working Group meetings: some 50 hours of video and audio tapes 
were recorded with prior knowledge to observe the participants 
(actors and stakeholders) in the decision-making process providing  
perspectives, narratives, and discourses associated with the action 
situation; and  
b. Informative missions during field work: meetings with experts and 
managers of the key national (Tehran-based) and provincial 
departmental ministries and organisations. Evidence from this 
category has been assigned to the respected organisation e.g. 
Ministry of Energy; thus the persons who provided the evidence  are 
not mentioned by name as this is not culturally seen appropriate to 
personalise public issues . As an advisor and facilitator, the persons 
gave the evidence to the author to position themselves in the 
negotiations and hence they intended to be used and quoted.   
c. Consultation workshops organised as stakeholder meetings  
d. Drought Risk Management workshop involving almost all the major 
60 stakeholders from national and provincial organisations. 
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Details of the data collection sources and fieldwork are given in Appendix A1. 
 
3.7.2 Non-English language References, names and terms in Chapter VIII 
Many original works by early, medieval8 and late Islamic scholars (7th to 19th 
century) on various Islamic sciences have been used in Chapter VIII; however, either recent 
reprints or new references by contemporary writers have been used based on these original 
works in three languages: Arabic, English and Persian. Preference has been given to works 
either translated or written in English. The references which are not in English have been 
indicated in the references sections. No particular guideline has been used in translating 
Arabic or Persian names for the references that did not appear in English at all.  The 
simplest form of translation has been used based only on the primary English alphabets. 
Islamic terminologies are shown in italic. Some of the terms have entered the English 
dictionary and are widely used. The translations of some of the foreign language works are 
the author’s own work. The prefix ‘Al’ in Arabic is commonly used for names e.g. Al-
Karaji (1966). In the References Section, this prefix has been ignored in listing the 
references; thus Al-Karaji is listed under letter ‘k’ authors.  
 
3.8 Application of the Framework: modifying DPSIR-IAD components 
3.8.1  Introduction 
The adopted research design moves away from multidisciplinarity to 
interdisciplinarity by working in the interface of physical and social sciences. The 
Framework uses the DPSIR component as a platform for socio-technical analysis. The 
Outcomes of the DPSIR strategic assessment i.e. the Responses are then analysed using the 
IAD and ISTA components.  
IAD component is the engine or the ‘motherboard’ which provides the linkages or 
points of interaction for different components of the Framework including the individual D-
P-S-I-R components. IAD provides the focal level for the analysis. To elaborate further, the 
original conceptualisation of the IAD focal level analysis developed by Ostrom (2005) is 
modified to become a focal level of integrated socio-technical analysis. Using Ostrom’s 
terminology, we need to “unpack” the IAD within the Framework i.e. how different 
components are linked to provide a robust assessment and evaluation of water allocation 
                                                 
8 The term medieval might have a negative connotation;  with regards to Islamic science and philosophy; the 
medieval period was a golden age for Islamic thinking.  
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decision outcomes. We will return to this theme later. First, the IAD component itself has 
to be modified to incorporate power issues.  
3.8.2  Politicising IWRM through politicising IAD  
Both IWRM and IAD approaches had been criticised for inadequate handling of 
power issues9 and political interests within the institutional design or “Crafting of 
institutions” (Clement, 2009). Our point of entry is the notion of politicising the IAD 
approach which is postulated by Clement (2009). As part of a PhD research project based at 
Newcastle University, she added discourses (and narratives) and socio-political context to 
the list of the exogenous factors in Figure 3.5. 
The rational choice theory does not recognise the role of ideas (values, beliefs) in 
the policy analysis and instead focuses on “the behaviour of intendedly rational individuals 
motivated by material self-interest” (Sabatier, 1999; p.8). Power-centred approaches (such 
as political ecology and decentralisation studies) will provide some useful insight into the 
question of power within an institutional and social contexture. But as Clement (2009) 
noted, power-centred approaches have lacked a rigorous conceptual framework and hence it 
is argued that institutional analysis or IAD should be used as the core institutional  
analytical tool in the Integrated Socio-technical Framework but reconciled with the 
discourses and narratives (or stories) behind the discourses that shape actors’ beliefs and 
mental models. Therefore, a power-based discourse analysis will be used within a political 
and economic context at three levels: local/basin, provincial (regional) and national levels 
In addition to the contextual use of discourses in the institutional analysis, societal 
values and culture are taken into consideration by incorporating the Ethics component to 
provide perspectives or mental models of actors shaped by the discourses. Ethics, which 
form parts of the community attributes, are usually overlooked in the analysis. We will 
explore this theme further in Chapter VIII.  
3.8.3 Incorporating socio-political variables 
Discourses, narratives (stories) and arguments (i.e. linguistic parameters) have been 
central to policy analysis and they emphasise the need for participatory decision-making 
involving all the three main domains: citizens (or civil society), analysts (e.g. researchers) 
and decision-makers (actors). Discourses, narratives and arguments  play an important role 
                                                 
9 The ‘Integration’ (I) and the ‘Management’ (M) including water allocation aspects of IWRM are essentially 
part of a political process. Therefore, attributes of politics has to be considered in the implementation 
approach.  
Chapter 3 
 
74 
in public policy debates on environmental and natural resources issues (Hajer and Versteeg, 
2005; Clement, 2008; Roe, 1994).  
In terms of IWRM, a water policy can be defined as a well-developed political 
perspective with three elements: (i) a political statement of vision; (ii) goals and objectives 
which will govern (iii) the implementation plans. This definition is adopted bearing in mind 
various definitions have been put forward for public policy. Fischer (2003) noted that 
defining public policy is not as straightforward as expected. According to Fischer (2003), 
since Laswell founded the field of policy science in the 1950s, there has been a shift from 
“technocratic orientation” towards recognising ideas and beliefs in policy analysis in the 
1980s onwards10. Fisher asserts that the technocratic form “geared more to managerial 
practices than to the facilitation of democratic government (ibid, p.4)”. This brand of 
science was based on Positivist Empiricism which separated facts and values. In the 
process, decision-making is based on rationality. This empirical approach has neglected the 
socio-political variables. Fischer notes that there has been appreciation of the importance of 
the social context including normative story-telling (narratives) about policy problems 
(ibid, p.12). 
Discourse is defined as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through 
which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and 
reproduced through an identifiable set of practices (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005).  
Discourse is defined according to two schools:11Foucaultian12 and Habermasian13. 
The latter refers to the communicative rationality of the discourse with a goal “to supply 
communication model of action” (Fischer, 2003). According to Fischer, Foucault focuses 
on the functionality of discourse within historical context i.e. how people has been shaped 
by discourses rather than how people construct the reality through discourses (ibid, p. 37). 
In the analysis, we consider discourses in the Foucaultian sense (Chapters IV-VII).  
There are two essential elements to the discursive policy approach: language and 
power. The knowledge embedded in discourses is “transformed into discursive formations 
                                                 
10 This is a reference to the point that is made by e.g. Fischer (2003) that self-interest models cannot explain 
major social and political changes or understand religious and ideological worldviews held by political 
leaders; in fact it is established from a body of research work that social and demographic characteristics and 
ideological orientations provided a better explanation.   (ibid, p.26) 
11 The philosophical arguments about the two schools are beyond this dissertation; what we are interested in is 
the way discourse is defined.  
12 After French philosopher Paul-Michel Foucault (1926-1984) which discussed discourses within the context 
of power structures and hence its link to critical theorists.  
13 After the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1929-) 
Chapter 3 
 
75 
(that is) disciplines such as science, law and so forth” (ibid, p. 38). As Hajer and Versteeg 
(2005) stated, discourse analysis can be regarded to be part of the social constructionists’ 
tradition in the social sciences (ibid, p.176) which asserts that multiple “socially 
constructed” realities can exist and we can gain knowledge about the real world through 
inductive methods. Clement (2008) asserts that discourse analysis is not in contradiction 
with institutional analysis (see Section 3.4): 
Indeed it is in accordance with sociological institutionalism arguments that discover 
conferring power to institutions by reinforcing or undermining their credibility. In return, 
institutions influence discourses as the latter depend on the institutional practices in which 
they are embedded (ibid; p.38)  
Narratives behind discourses. Policy narratives are stories, scenarios and 
arguments on which policies are based (e.g. Roe, 1994). Stories commonly used in 
describing and analysing policy issues are a force in themselves and must be considered 
explicitly in assessing policy issues. In this approach, our use of “narratives” is limited as 
will be explained later.  
Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) has come about because of the limited capacity of 
conventional methods to deal with highly complex and polarised issues as well as financial 
and time constraints. Roe (1994), who proposed the NPA approach, notes that policies 
resist change or modification even in the presence of “contradicting empirical data”. This 
is because they continue to override and stabilise the assumptions for decision making in 
the face of high uncertainty (which is different from risk or ignorance), complexity (which 
is about issues’ internal intricacy or their interdependence with other policy issues) and 
polarization (i.e. concentration of groups around extremes in the issue). There is a lack of 
knowledge about what really matters in terms of complexity and polarization. In other 
words, many policy issues have become so uncertain, complex and polarised that their 
empirical, political, legal and administrative merits are unknown and not agreed upon. 
Therefore, the only thing left is to examine and analyse different stories which policy 
makers and their critics use to articulate arguments and make sense of the three elements of 
a policy issue.  
The NPA procedure proposed by Roe (1994), which is a dynamic and powerful tool 
in assessing very complex and uncertain situations, can help us to understand loops in the 
narratives or stories told by the participants e.g. it will help us to unblock the deadlock over 
the controversial reallocation of water resources. The procedure is outlined in Figure 3.10. 
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In this research, Roe’s (1994) concept is only used to provide a structured approach to 
establish the problems or “Problem Statements” (PSs) and their causal relationship and thus 
demonstrating how uncertain or how complex the issues are (Chapter VII) and to see how 
an alternative narrative policy is formed (i.e. steps 1-2 of Figure 3.10): 
· The dominant narratives behind discourses are obtained 
· Alternatives policy narratives or counter-stories are established.  
This will enable us to understand better how arguments are articulated within a 
participatory decision-making process. 
3.8.4 Integrating synthesis 
Unlike multidisciplinary research, the thesis aims to achieve interdisciplinarity by 
producing an “integrating synthesis” (Max-Neef, 2005) of the assessments. Therefore, we 
have to overcome language barriers between physical and social sciences. It is not desirable 
to omit well-established terminologies used by different component but it is reasonable that 
they can be conceptualised as to be complementary to each other. For example, socio-
political context which is considered as part of the exogenous factors in the modified IAD 
component is extended to be the basis of DPSIR analysis using discourse analysis tool to 
broaden our understanding of the water resources governance in Iran and Lake Urmia case 
study. Hence we need to redefine the focal (conceptual) point of analysis which is larger in 
scope to visualise how different components of the Framework interface with each other. 
Therefore, the original conceptual focal point for institutional analysis is broadened as 
described in the next sub-section.  
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Figure 3.10: Narrative Policy Analysis (NPA) procedure (Adapted from Roe, 1994). 
 
3.8.5 Contextual setting: a conceptual unit of analysis 
The integrated synthesis of the assessments is presented within a contextual setting 
which is our conceptual unit of analysis describing the attributes of the water resources 
system that are relatively unchanged including: 
· The geopolitical characteristics of the action arena  
· Actors (as described earlier) 
· Community attributes (as described earlier) 
· Socio-economic conditions 
· Biophysical, and materials conditions as an element of the IAD component 
(Figure 3.5) are enhanced to include not only institutional attributes but also 
ecological, hydrological and hydraulic attributes of the water resources 
system which will be discussed in the next sub-section.  
In this study, three action arenas were considered. 
· In Chapter IV, a geographic setting (i.e. Iran) was considered to describe 
the national water resources planning and management process.  
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·  In Chapter V, a multi-tier action arena is considered: national level and 
provincial level organisations (actors) involved in the water allocation 
process. This represents the business as usual (BAU) process i.e. the 
sectoral water management and allocation action situation.  
· In Chapter VI and VII, Lake Urmia basin is the geographic action arena but 
a new institutional set up has been designed to facilitate stakeholder 
participation. Multitier Multi-stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) have been in 
place. The platforms were designed through stakeholder consultation; 
although the author attended most of the workshops, but was not directly 
involved in the institutional design.      
There are three types of MSP models (Verhallen et al, 2007): (1) a scientific rational 
model comprised of experts using socio-technical assessment tools to come with the “one 
best way solution” using distributive negotiations and lobbying techniques; (2) A 
communicative social learning model guided by values in an open access adaptive process 
using integrative negotiations and skilled discussions and arguments; and (3)  a mixed-
mode model comprised of  invited major stakeholders who are guided by both values and 
scientific facts to present a consensus on a coherent set of better solutions using an 
integrated methodological approach.  The crafted multi-tier MSP used in the case study is 
mainly based on a modified scientific rational model by choosing experts from invited or 
selected national and local actors.  
3.8.6 Overcoming language barrier: re-defining biophysical conditions  
As stated before, the linguistic barriers have to be appreciated in combining 
technical and social components. Perhaps one of the obstacles in using IAD in water 
resources assessment is the problem in understanding the socio-political language used in 
the IAD literature. Ostrom (2007) has omitted the use of the term ‘action situation’ in her 
attempt to elaborate the role of ecological variables in an action situation by describing how 
Interaction-Outcomes pathway is affected in Social-Ecological Systems (SESs). In her 
latest writings, Ostrom (2011) has recognised that action situations are affected not only by 
institutional (social science) variables such as rules in use but by an array of socio-technical 
variables relating to the ecological system that have not been unpacked.  
Using a taxonomical approach, Ostrom and her colleagues are developing the SES 
framework i.e. it is evolving. Ostrom (2011) describes the SES framework with reference to 
Figure 3.11 as follows: 
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…one can think of Actors interacting in Action Situations generating Interactions and 
Outcomes [i.e. Responses]that are affected by and affect a Resource System, Resource 
Units, Governance System, which then affect and are affected by Social, Economic, and 
Political Settings and Related Ecosystems (ibid, p.22) 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Action situations embedded in broader Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) 
(Source: Ostrom, 2011). 
 
Basurto and Ostrom (2009) and Ostrom (2009, 2011) have identified several 
variables in the four holons within the action situation: Resource System, Resource Units, 
Resource Governance and Actors as shown in Figure. 3.11 which represents the “highest 
tier of variables” (which exists in all the SESs) which “can be unpacked multiple times 
when one is trying to analyse specific questions related to SESs in the field” (Ostrom, 
2007). The second tier variables are given in Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.12: Second-tier variables of a SES (Source, Ostrom, 2011). 
 
Therefore, it is argued that it is reasonable to include the ecological, hydrological 
and socio-economic attributes together with the biophysical and materials conditions 
described earlier. Also, it is argued that Ostrom’s description of biophysical conditions can 
be enhanced by the contribution made by the DPSIR analysis.  For example, referring back 
to the issue of subtractability of use, Hardin (1968)  noticed that the main aspect of 
common pool resources strategy is overpopulation which is one of the main socio-
economic Pressures caused by population growth which in turn is one of the main Drivers 
(the D of the DPSIR component) of a resource system. It can be seen that the rate of 
subtractability of use depends on Drivers such as population growth. Therefore, DPSIR 
sustainability analysis complements IAD by describing Drivers and Pressures affecting the 
Interactions-Outcomes pathway in water allocation action situation in the SES.  
 
 
 
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
S1- Economic development.  S2- Demographic trends.  S3- Political stability.
S4- Government resource policies.  S5- Market incentives.  S6- Media organization.
Resource Systems (RS) Governance Systems (GS)
RS1- Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish)
RS2- Clarity of system boundaries
RS3- Size of resource system
RS4- Human-constructed facilities
RS5- Productivity of system
RS6- Equilibrium properties
RS7- Predictability of system dynamics
RS8- Storage characteristics
RS9- Location
GS1- Government organizations
GS2- Nongovernment organizations
GS3- Network structure
GS4- Property-rights systems
GS5- Operational rules
GS6- Collective-choice rules
GS7- Constitutional rules
GS8- Monitoring and sanctioning rules
Resource Services and Units (RSU) Actors (A)
RU1- Resource unit mobility
RU2- Growth or replacement rate
RU3- Interaction among resource units
RU4- Economic value
RU5- Number of units
RU6- Distinctive characteristics
RU7- Spatial and temporal distribution
A1- Number of actors
A2- Socioeconomic attributes of actors
A3- History of use
A4- Location
A5- Leadership/entrepreneurship
A6- Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital
A7- Knowledge of SES/mental models
A8- Importance of resource (dependence)
A9- Technology used
Action Situations: Interactions (I) → Outcomes (O)
I1- Harvesting levels
I2- Information sharing
I3- Deliberation processes
I4- Conflicts
I5- Investment activities
I6- Lobbying activities
I7- Self-organizing activities
I8- Networking activities
I9- Monitoring activities
O1- Social performance measures 
(e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability, 
sustainability)
O2- Ecological performance measures 
(e.g., overharvested, resilience, biodiversity, 
sustainability)
O3- Externalities to other SESs
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1- Climate patterns.  ECO2- Pollution patterns.  ECO3- Flows into and out of focal SES.
Second-Tier Variables of a SES (Source: Ostrom , 2011)
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3.8.7 Interfacing the components of the Framework   
The interface between the four analytical components of the Framework is shown in 
Figure 3.13. This is achieved by considering the Interaction-Outcome pathway in the action 
situation. With reference to Figure 3.13:   
 
Figure 3.13: Conceptual unit of analysis: the interfaces and points of interaction between 
the four components of the Integrated Socio-technical Framework. 
 
· the DPSIR analysis (Chapters IV and V) complements the IAD analysis by 
better mapping the ecological, hydrological and environmental elements in 
the analysis and feeds into the IAD component. This will provide an 
enhanced understanding of the water resources system and the decision-
making process operating in multitier MSPs. It provides Responses in time 
t-1 (Rt-1) which represent the evolutions of rules in use and administrative 
institutions. Therefore, the Rt-1component is a measure of institutional 
change. Additionally, the D-P-S-I elements represent a multi-level 
assessment of changes in biophysical conditions and socio-political and 
economic attributes of the action situation for a particular action arena in the 
IAD approach. Some of Responses in time t-1 represents rules in use. In this 
research, since we are assessing water allocation and planning governance, 
then we are only concerned with operational level decision-making level.  
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The rules in use will be assessed according to design principles and rule 
typology analysis as described.  
· IAD makes an ex-post analysis of water allocation decisions and earlier 
rules in use i.e. Responses at time ( t-1) by using results from the ISTA 
(Chapter VI ) as the basis for analysing, designing and integrating 
institutional reforms as part of proposed Responses (Chapter VII) 
· ISTA component provides two types of analysis of the Interactions-
Outcomes pathway: (1) analysis based on MCDA and system dynamic 
modelling to allocate water using the water allocation model; and (2) 
Evaluative Criteria which is a theoretical analysis based on good governance 
principles i.e. it provides  (a) the evidence (i.e. information) for the decision-
making and (b) the Evaluative Criteria for institutional sustainability of the 
Outcomes or Responses (i.e. costs and benefits associated with the 
Outcomes).  
· The Ethics component feeds into the IAD, capturing mental models of the 
actors as well as providing Evaluative Criteria which sets a benchmark for 
institutional sustainability in the ISTA component. 
 
3.9 A guided tour of the thesis  
The scope of the research and its aim and objectives is outlined in Chapter I. The 
aim of the PhD thesis is to develop an Integrated Socio-technical Framework for IWRM by 
linking social and physical sciences using a case study approach.  
Chapter II is a critical state of the art review on the theories, concepts, and 
methodologies of sustainable water resources management in the 21st century. Different 
aspects of sustainability are reviewed followed by a reassessment of the governing 
principles of water resources management. 
Chapter III presents an Integrated Socio-technical Framework to achieve the 
objectives of the research. The Framework has four core analytical components which 
represent the innovation of the PhD work:  
· Drivers-Pressures-Impacts-States-Responses (DPSIR) sustainability 
assessment component 
· Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) component 
· Integrated Socio-Technical Assessment (ISTA) component  
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·  Ethics Component  
Chapter IV provide a historic analysis of the evolution of water resources 
management in Iran, viewed within the DPSIR analytical component. The DPSIR analysis 
outlines the Drivers which create Pressures on the water resource system during the modern 
history of Iran (1906-2003). DPSIR analysis is used to assess the progress made with 
respect to the introduction and implementation of IWRM plan in Iran. The impact of water 
resources policies and plans and the States of the Social-Ecological systems are assessed. 
DPSIR analysis provides a wider national outlook which has a strong bearing on the Lake 
Urmia basin case study.  
With reference to Chapter IV, Chapter V focuses on the Lake Urmia case study to 
deal with water allocation conflicts in the basin. In the first part, a detailed DPSIR analysis 
is done to understand the physical, biological, ecological, socio-economic and institutional 
attributes of the Lake Urmia water resources system. Within DPSIR, historical analysis of 
institutional reforms (Responses) is made for the period 1909-2008. Then, the IAD 
component is applied to make an ex-post analysis of rules in use (earlier Responses) to deal 
with the Drivers and Pressures on the water resources system as described earlier in 
Chapter IV and the first part of Chapter V. Both IAD and DPSIR analysis are enriched by 
using the power-based approaches. Narratives behind discourses and discourse analysis are 
used as tools to understand the power relationship within the socio-political context of the 
water allocation process for the period mentioned. Throughout the thesis, discourses which 
shape the perspectives of actors are analysed to have a better understanding of the socio-
political and cultural context of water resources management in the Lake Urmia basin.  
Chapter VI is comprised of two parts: the first part describes a stakeholder 
participation process in which actors have used the ISTA component of the Framework to 
make water allocation decisions at basin level. The Ethics component provides a 
benchmark to the ISTA component by providing Evaluative Criteria for sustainability. It 
also has a bearing on the mental models and perspectives of the actors involved in the 
decision-making process. 
System dynamic modelling and Multi-criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) are used 
to allocate water to provinces within the basin on multitier Multi-Stakeholder Platforms 
(MSPs). Further modelling techniques are applied to evaluate the technical sustainability of 
the water allocation decisions using water balance modelling, stochastic rainfall modelling 
and risk based analysis in part two of Chapter VI. 
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The outcome of the ISTA analysis in Chapter VI forms the basis of an institutional 
analysis using the IAD component in Chapter VII to propose revised Responses based on 
an adaptive water resources allocation strategy. The ISTA component is also used to 
analyse the performance of the water resources system under different futuristic climatic 
water allocation scenarios. 
In Chapter VIII, the principles of community based natural resources (CBNR) 
governance in the WANA region are developed based on predominately Islamic culture and 
ethics to foster sustainable resource use and livelihood management within the context of 
conservation and environmental protection. An Ethical legal framework for CBNR 
governance is proposed. The implication of the use of the proposed Ethical legal for the 
Lake Urmia case study is outlined.   
Finally, after revisiting the Objectives of the thesis, lessons learned, the applicability 
of the PhD work, conclusions and recommendations for further work are described in 
Chapter IX.  
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Chapter IV. Towards Sustainable land and Water Management in Iran: 
DPSIR Assessment  
 
4.1 Introduction  
The concept of IWRM is not new to Iran. As stated previously, since the mid-1990s, 
the IWRM concept has been deliberated in public policy debates in Iran, and in 1999, the 
first inter-sectoral Directive was introduced. In 2003, IWRM was formally adopted. 
Therefore, the objectives of this chapter are (a) to describe the progress made in Iran in 
implementing the IWRM paradigm and (b) to define the boundary of issues and conflicts 
with reference to water allocation in Iranian river basins. 
Therefore, Chapter IV is structured as follows: first, it describes the methodological 
approach to achieve the mentioned objectives (Section 4.2); then it presents the contextual 
setting (Section 4.3) followed by the DPSIR assessment at national level within the socio-
political context is described in Section 4.4. Finally, the discussion and conclusions are 
given in Sections 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. 
 
4.2 Methodological approach 
4.2.1 Data collection 
With reference to section 3.7 (Chapter III) and Appendix A1, data used in Chapter 
IV include: 
· quantitative baseline data (i.e. hydrologic, hydraulic, climatic and socio-
economic data): 
o online databases and printed surveys of international organisations 
such as FAO Statistical Yearbook, the World Bank, various United 
Nations agencies etc. 
o a survey of official online databases and printed surveys of different 
ministries such as Ministry of Energy (MoE), Ministry of 
Agricultural Jihad (MoAJ), Iran Statistical Centre (ISC) and 
provincial state organizations etc.  
o secondary data analysis such as research reports and journal 
publications on Iran (online and printed format) 
· qualitative data including questionnaire survey, formal interviews, 
observational data from stakeholder meetings or workshops. 
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4.2.1  The analytical approach 
With reference to Section 3.8 in Chapter III, the data has been analysed in the 
following steps: 
1. With reference to Section 3.8, the contextual setting is described in Section 
4.3 
2. In Section 4.4, DPSIR component is used as the core analytical approach to 
capture the hydrological, ecological, socio-economic, political and 
institutional factors which influenced the development of water resources 
governance in Iran. The DPSIR analysis is enhanced by the historical 
analysis of the development of the Responses (and subsequently Drivers) in 
the form of evolution of rules in use (mainly legislations) within a socio-
political context i.e. discourse analysis is used to highlight dominant 
discourses which are relevant to water resources planning in Iran.  
3. To reflect the water resources system’s dynamism, DPSIR analysis focuses 
on the links between DPSIR elements; thus, it does not take a rigid 
taxonomical approach. The analytical results are presented illustrating the 
inter-linkages among the DPSIR elements. By showing the interplay and the 
dynamic nature of the DPSIR elements, the integrating synthesis is 
achieved.  
 
4.3  Contextual setting:  
4.3.1 Action arena, action situation and major actors 
The action situation is water resources planning for the period of 1909-2007.  
Iran is divided into 30 provinces (Figure 4.1) which are administered by governors 
(appointed by the central government). Water resources planning and management (i.e. 
action situation) is the sole responsibility of  MoE which uses the 1982 Fair Water 
Distribution (FWD) Act to manage water resources.  The administrative structure of MoE 
has three levels of decision-making. (1) Policy level is administered by the Deputy Minister 
for Water Resources and Water and Wastewater (WRWW). Deputy Minister has 6 deputies 
responsible for 6 Directorates including the Office of Macro Planning for WRWW which 
has a Water Resources Group responsible for river basin planning. (2) The implementation 
of polices are administered by Iran Water Resources Management Company (IWRMC); 
which has an Water Planning Bureau which has a technical Committee dealing with water 
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allocation applications. (3) At the operational level, Regional Water Companies (RWCs) 
are the executive arm of the IWRMC.  
However, the MoAJ is also a major player in the planning process as 92% of the 
water is used for agriculture and is responsible for managing the agricultural water sector 
and irrigation and drainage networks. The role of Department of Environment (DoE ) has 
become more important since the introduction of the 1974 Environmental Protection Act 
and, recently, the 1998 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act which requires EIA 
for all major projects. The Strategic Planning Directorate at the office of the President 
(formally known as Planning and Management Organisation) is responsible for 5 Year 
Development Plans (FYDP) which set the developmental goals and fiscal (material 
conditions) needs of the FYDPs. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local 
communities have no input into the top-down policy-making and planning process. 
However, the Members of Parliament (MPs) have been lobbying on behalf of their 
constituents (especially farmers) during the passage of FYDP in the parliament. In Chapter 
V, I will return to the theme of actors with greater detail.  
4.3.2 Community attributes 
Iran is a multi-ethnic and religious society (Figure 4.2). There are 49 languages in 
Iran (Moqimi, 2006; p.21). However, Persian (Farsi) is the official language of the country 
(Article 15 of the Constitution). Bilingualism has posed serious ethno-political and cultural 
problems (Khadivi and Kalantari, 2010). The majority religion is Shiite Islam which is the 
official religion and the Constitution is based on Shiite doctrine but recognising the civil 
rights of Sunnis and other religions (Articles 12, 13 and 14). The Constitution states all 
citizens are equal irrespective of their ethnic background. 
Sunnis are mainly in the border regions and are the majority among Kurds, Baluch 
and Turkmen. There is a small minority of Christians (mainly Armenian) and Jews. Also, a 
small community of Iran's ancient religion (Zoroastrian) has survived. It is worth 
mentioning that there are ethnic and religious tensions and conflicts but they constitute a 
smaller factor than socio-economic and political aspects. Full implementation of the 
Constitution is lagging in many areas such as environmental protection (Article 50) and 
privatisation and economic efficiency (Article 44) and so forth. 
Based on the questionnaire survey (Appendix A1) the main community attributes 
are: (1) inter-basin water transfers plans have caused tensions between various RWCs and 
Governor’s Offices demanding more water allocations quota for their province; 
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(2)incomparability of information and data at different levels of management i.e. lack of 
trust and exchange of data between different national and inter-provincial organisations; (3) 
inadequate social awareness about role of water for life and the environment; and 
(4)political influence and imbalance of power among actors.  
4.3.3 Biophysical and materials conditions: socio-economic, political, 
ecological, hydrological and hydraulic attributes 
Iran's population was estimated to be nearly 75 million people in 2010; the 2006 
census put the population at nearly 71 million people (SCI, 2010). Population growth has 
accompanied urbanisation as more than 68% of the population lives in cities (World 
Bank/WDI, 2010); there are some seven mega-cities in Iran with a population over 1 
million people (Ardakanian, 2005: P. 98). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Geopolitical map of Iran. 
Iran has 0.36% of the world’s freshwater resources whereas about 1% of the world’s 
population lives in Iran (IWRMC, 2005).Annual precipitation is characterised by both 
temporal and spatial variations ranging between 50 mm in central Kavir Desert to 2275 mm 
in Caspian Sea river basins, and with an overall annual average of about228 mm (FAO, 
2009)1. Iran has total renewable water resources of 130 BCM (Table4.1). Iran's hot summer 
                                                 
1 There are different figures for average annual rainfall e.g. Almasvandi (2010) states it 247 mm based on 
1969-2009 dataset 
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climate means that almost 66% of the precipitation is evaporated before reaching the land.  
The amount of return flow is 29 BCM (Siadat, 1999).   
92 % of the 93.3 BCM water use is consumed by the agricultural sector (Figure 
4.3). Environmental water requirements are only met through unregulated and overflow 
waters (IWRMC, 2005). Groundwater is the main source of agricultural water use which is 
estimated at about 70% considering illegal and informal abstractions.   
The 1982 FWD Act states that water is a common pool property and belongs to the 
state. However, much of groundwater is owned and controlled by private well owners. The 
1982 Act controls the use of groundwater resources by issuing Water Allocation Permits.  
There are illegal and informal abstractions in addition to the quotas in both surface and 
groundwater resources. Much of the surface water is used through traditional water rights 
(abstraction from rivers which is about 50% of the total). Regulated water from dams is 
considered to be a State owned public property. 
Resources  billion (109) cubic meters (BCM) 
Precipitation  400 
Evapotranspiration 270 
Renewable Surface water 92 
Renewable Groundwater 38 
Overlap between surface water and groundwater 18.1 (Source,FAO, 2009) 
Total renewable resources 130 
Return flow  29 
Table 4.1: Iran's water balance (Source: MRC (2007) based on 2006 statistics). 
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Figure 4.2: Iran's ethno-religious distribution (Public domain map). 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Annual sectoral water use in 2007 all in MCM (Source: FAO, 2009). 
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The sanitation sector is underdeveloped as only 25% of the urban population and 
only1% in rural areas have access to full 
sanitation services (Mahmoudi, 2006; Hashemi et 
al, 2007b). Many cities are without treatment 
plants due to lack of infrastructure, technology 
and financial constraints and; otherwise some 
98% have access to safe drinking water (Hashemi 
and O'Connell, 2009)  
Nearly a half of Iran's total land area is 
covered by deserts, wastelands, mountain ranges 
and rangelands (Chapin Metz, 1987).Table4.2 
provides major land uses together with 
agricultural and rural demographic information. 
Out of more than 23 million in rural areas, about 
16.5 million people are involved in agriculture. 
However, there are some 6.5 million people who are only economically active in rural areas 
but who live in urban areas. This shows a great deal of migration to the cities. Iran is ranked 
5th in the world in terms of irrigated land area and there are major irrigation schemes in 
operation including Lake Urmia, Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Central basins.  
    
4.4  A national outlook for the water resources sector in Iran 
4.4.1 Introduction  
The application of the DPSIR component within the socio-political context to 
analyse the evolution of the water sector in Iran is shown in Figure 4.4. The analysis is for 
the period 1909-2007.  
Iran's water resources system has been affected by major driving forces including: 
population growth, urbanisation, climatic variability and change, land use and agricultural 
self-sufficiency and modernisation policies as well as short term developmental plans. 
These drivers have placed a remarkable pressure on the water resources system.  
The demand for water has increased due to rapid population growth and some sectors have 
experienced water shortage. Iran is approaching water stress conditions. The climatic 
variability of arid-semi arid Iran has necessitated the implementation of many development 
projects and irrigation networks to provide food security and self-sufficiency as well as an 
Land use 1000 ha 
Irrigated land  8,856 
Arable land 16,869 
Permanent crop 1,680 
Pastures  29,524 
Land area 162,855 
 
Agriculture and 
Rural Demography 
million people 
Total agricultural 
Population  
16.583 
Economically active 
people in agriculture  
6.526 
Rural population  23.191 
Table 4.2: Iran's land use and 
agricultural and rural demography in 
2007 (Source: FAO, 2009). 
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adaptation policy to droughts.  The rapid economic growth and developments have brought 
better living standards (Zekavat, 1997) but they have caused environmental degradation and 
loss of biodiversity in many rivers and wetlands (Bahrainy, 2003).In this section, the results 
of the assessment are presented and analysed. 
 
Figure 4.4: Results of the DPSIR assessment at national level, 1909-2007. 
 
4.4.2.  Driving forces (Drivers) 
Population growth and migration. The first nationwide population census was 
carried out in 1956 (Bharier, 1968). Prior to this date, only estimated population values 
were available. Gilbar (1979) states that Iran was regarded as the most populated country in 
the MENA region in the mid-19th century and according to Lambton (1998) the population 
was estimated to be 9 million people in 19002.  
There has been an almost three-fold increase in population since 1956. Much of the 
population lives in urban centres and there are 7 mega-cities. Thus, there are 2main 
characteristics of the increase in population: (1) a faster rate of growth in urban areas, and 
                                                 
2Bharier (1968) estimates population to be 9.9 million.   
Driving Forces 
Responses
Structural
ü Inter-basin water transfers and dam-buildings
ü Large investments in developmental projects
Non-structural 
ü1906 Civil Code (water rights, well ownership etc)
ü1929 Qanat Law
ü1943 Act of Establishment of Independent Irrigation Agency (Bongah)
ü1959 Water Resources Blueprint 
ü1962 Act of Establishment of Ministry of Water and Power
ü1968 Nationalisation  of Water resources Act 
ü1971 Act of Establishment of Ministry of Energy
ü1974 Environmental Protection Act
ü1982 Fair Water Distribution Act
ü1990 Establishment of  Urban Water and Wastewater Companies 
ü1997 Environmental Impact Assessment Act
ü1998 Establishment of  Rural Water and Wastewater Companies 
ü1999 Inter-sectoral Water Resources Directive
ü2001 Act of Establishment of  Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (merging Agriculture and Construction  Jihad Ministries)
ü2003 Water Allocation Directive (WAD)
ü2003  Water Resources Long Term Strategies 
Impacts StatePressures 
Ø Population growth and 
Migration
Ø Climate variability/change 
scenarios
Ø Land tenure use/policy 
land reforms
Ø Short term Development 
policies and plans
Ø Poverty eradication policy
q Increasing 
urbanization 
q Increasing water 
demands in all 
sectors,  
qWater quality: 
Water source 
pollutions
q Increase of 
irrigation lands
q Increased 
groundwater 
abstraction  
vBetter living standards in cities  and 
villages 
vWater availability: water stress
v Increased reservoir storage capacity 
vObserved changes in land use  
including increased urban centres 
and irrigated area and loss of 
pastures
vEnvironmental and ecological 
degradation: loss of biodiversity in 
many rivers and water bodies
vHigher human development index
vEnhanced water and sanitation facilities 
vPhysical: water shortage; pollution of 
water sources
vGroundwater over-exploitation; negative 
recharge  
vSalinsation of irrigated lands (water 
logging)
v expansion of urban slums
v Institutional: financial problems in the 
water supply and wastewater sector; 
conflicts over river basin water allocation 
shares from dam projects (provincial and 
cross cultural tensions) 
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(2) immigration from rural to urban areas in search of employment which resulted in 
enlargement of existing cities and the creation of new ones.  
The introduction of a Family Planning Program (i.e. birth control policy) during 
1966-1979 (see e.g. Abbasi-Shavazi, 2002) did not have a lasting impact on the rate of 
population growth showing an increasing trend (Figure 4.5). The Program was suspended 
after the 1979 Islamic Revolution but it was started in late 1980s and proven to be one of 
the effective factors affecting the downward trend in population growth rate. There has 
been a mismatch between the total population growth and rate of urban population growth. 
Table 4.3 shows a huge increase in urban population due to migration. Between 1990 and 
2008, the annual growth rate of urban population is 2.6% which is much greater than the 
average annual population growth rate of 1.6% for the same period; whereas rural areas had 
a negative growth rate of -0.3% (World Bank/WDI, 2010). Earlier projections of the 
population of Iran reaching 100 million by 2025 has been revised to 80.2 million 
(Table4.3).   
 
Year Population Notes  
1900 9,000,000* * estimated (Lambton, 1998) 
1956 18,954,704 Nationwide census (NC) 
1966 25,788,722 NC 
1976 33,708,744 NC 
1986 49,445,010 NC 
1991 55,837,163  
1996 60,055,488 NC 
2006 70,495,782 NC 
2010 74,733,230** ** estimated (SCI, 2010) 
2025 80,200,000 *** revised projection (SCI, 2007) 
2050 100,200,000 *** projected (SCI, 2007) 
   
Urban areas (source World bank/WDI, 2010) 
   
Year  Population (millions)  % of total population 
1990 30.6 56 
2008 49.3 68 
Table 4.3: Iran’s population (Source: SCI (2010) unless stated). 
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Figure 4.5: Population growth for the period1956-2010(SCI, 2010) and population growth 
rate (1960-2009) (World Bank /WDI, 2010). 
 
Climate variability/change. As a semi-arid and arid country, Iran is characterised 
by high climatic variably; thus historically experienced low spells of rainfall or 
meteorological droughts which have affected natural runoff i.e. caused hydrological 
droughts. Droughts usually have longer terms impacts including (1) socioeconomic 
(immigration, poverty famine) and (2) agricultural (i.e. shortage of foods) impacts3.  
By the late 1990s, a new discourse emerged based on the climate change discourse. 
The experts of the Water Planning Bureau at IWRMC have started to doubt the 
sustainability of the development plans and supply-oriented Water Master Plans4.  Climate 
change discourse centred on the downward trends of the precipitation based on linear 
regression approach in the 15 years since 1995(Figure 4.6) as can be noticed in Figure 4.6, 
the linear regression variance is not statistically significant at all. The time series used 
(1969-2009) is too short to provide conclusive evidence in a meaningful trend analysis. But 
most water managers started to belief that climate change is already happening due to 
successive droughts and increasing trends in flood events in the last 50 years (MoE, 
2010a)5. However, no conclusive evidence has been presented despite some attempts to 
study climate change. 
                                                 
3
For example there was “recurrence of famine in Tehran in 1860, 1870, 1872, and 1896”  due to food 
shortages and related to mismanagement of the economy and climatic factors (EttehadiehNezam-Mafi, 1993) 
4We will introduce this later under the Pressures sub-section. 
5  Recently, the perception held by many ordinary  people is that we have less rainfall and certainly less 
snowfalls compared to the 1960s (from author’s experience).  
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Figure 4.6: Trends in precipitations and climatic variability during 1969-2009 based on 
MoE (2010a) discourse on climate change. 
 
In the 1990s, research on climate change and droughts started; for example as cited 
by DoE (2003), Khalili et al (1990) completed a pioneering work to understand the impact 
of climate change on water resources in Iran. In June 1992, Iran joined the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Earth Summit and ratified 
the Convention in 1996. The 4th FYDP (1999-2004) did not explicitly link climate change 
to water resources but it recognised that Iran should be part of the Kyoto Protocol of the 
3rdConference of the Parties (COP) meeting of the UNFCCC which was attended by Iran in 
1997. The drive to join the Kyoto Protocol prompted the national project on climate change 
at DoE producing the Initial National Communication to UNFCCC6 in 2003 (DoE, 2003). 
The report was an example of inter-sectoral cooperation between various ministries in the 
era of the reformist government of President Khatami and was an achievement of the first 
woman Vice President, Dr Massouma Ebtekar, Head of the DoE.   
DoE (2003) outlines the status of the environment, greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
inventory, mitigation policies, vulnerability and adaptation assessments and proposed 
strategies to address the issue of climate change. Results from a Runoff Assessment Model 
(RAM) applied to all the river basins obtained by Fahmi7 (1999) are also cited in the report 
indicating that a rise in temperature (as a result of emissions of GHGs) will have an impact 
on runoff regimes; for example, the snowmelt season will be brought forward due to the 
                                                 
6 This project was led by Dr Taqi Ebtekar the first Director of DoE after the 1979 Revolution and the father of 
Mrs Ebtekar, Head of DoE.   
7Dr Hedayat Fahmi was Head of Research Committee at the Office of Planning at IWRM at the time and now 
has moved to MoE, the Office of Macro Planning as Manger of Water Resources Group. He represented Iran 
on climate change issues.   
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rise in temperature; the flood regime will change in many watersheds (higher flood index) 
and there will be a shift in rainfall and snowfall seasons as well (DoE, 2003). 
The study used 6 (3 emission and 3 climate sensitivity) scenarios using selective 
combinations of two global circulation models (HadCM2 and ECHAM4). The temperature 
and precipitation changes were predicted using MAGICC 8 software for different 
combinations of scenarios, climate sensitivities and CO2 rate of emissions up to 2100. 
However, the climate change modelling was primitive as acknowledged by the writers 
whom asserted that more precise scenarios should have been used as well as recommending 
the use of regional/local general circulation models (GCMs) and more spatially improved 
GCMs. Nevertheless, the DoE report (DoE, 2003) enhanced the acceptability of the climate 
change discourse within policymaking circles but it provides rather inconclusive and 
confusing remarks about temperature and precipitation changes and asks for better and 
more detailed analysis.  
DoE (2003) provides an assessment of vulnerabilities and adaptation measures for 
the main economic sectors such as agriculture which represents more than a fifth of the 
GDP. For example, DoE (2003) shows the vulnerability of the agricultural sector to 
climatic variability and the question of food security (self-sufficiency policy) by stating the 
loss of 3.6 million tons of wheat production of during the 1998-99 droughts.  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s Second Assessment Report 
(IPCC, 1997) has acknowledged “the importance of adaptation in the climate change 
question”; however, there are differences within most countries to how to adapt to climate 
change (Smithers and Smit, 1997). Therefore, DoE (2003) asks for an adaptive 
management strategy to deal with this pressing Driver. To deal with climate change, a 
range of management options should be taken; for example deficit irrigation9 has been 
shown to increase water use efficiency (e.g. Mushtaq and Moghaddasi (2011). Climate 
change adaptation policy requires an adaptive governance system which recognises 
“institutional flexibility and diversity which is the ability to create local institutions that can 
respond to location-specific needs rather than needing to fit cleanly within nationally or 
regionally defined frameworks”; in addition  building infrastructures should accommodate 
                                                 
8 For more information See website http://www.cgd.ucar.edu/cas/wigley/magicc/  which states that “MAGICC 
consists of a suite of coupled gas-cycle, climate and ice-melt models integrated into a single software 
package.” 
9Based on a literature review, Mushtaq and Moghaddasi(2011) define deficit irrigation as a practice of 
deliberate under-irrigation of a crop or deliberate stressing of crops to influence yield and profit 
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“uncertainty, variability, and change, while avoiding path dependencies” (Moench, 2010; 
p.977). 
Land tenure/use policy. Despite climatic aridity, most Iranians policymakers in the 
last 100 years perceive that Iran can accommodate more agricultural developments and can 
achieve food self-sufficiency given the right technological means i.e. water is not seen as a 
limiting factor.  Therefore, irrigation policy has been instrumental as a major Driver.  
Data from Table 4.6 show a net loss of nearly 16.5 million ha of pastures to other 
land covers in Iran between 1995 and 2007.  Irrigated area has increased by 21% between 
1996 and 2007. A substantial increase in the permanent crop cover has occurred: from 1.13 
million ha to 1.68 million ha; an increase of 48%. 
 
Table 4.4: Land use change in Iran, 1987-2007 (Source: FAO, 2009). 
 
One of the major drivers of land use change has been the1962-71 Land Reform 
which was part of Pahlavi's White Revolution (Pahlavi, 1998). Hasan Arsenjani (1922-
1969), the architect of the Land Reform, was a "brilliant and erratic" leading Iranian 
politician who was a regular visitor to the Shah in the 1950s (Cottam, 1999)10. He 
masterminded the populist reform but was mistrusted by the Shah and was dismissed in 
1963 and was sent to Italy to serve as Iranian ambassador. By the end of 1978 some 3.5 
million acres were distributed to the peasants to channel support for the monarchy. 
                                                 
10An authentic translation is available in Farsi which has been referenced here. The English edition was 
published in 1979 by University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Year/ Arable area 
(x 10**3 ha) 
Permanent crop 
(x 10**3 ha) 
Pastures 
(x 10**3 ha) 
Irrigated area 
(x 10**3 ha) 
1987 15,400 1,130   
1992 16,969 1,318   
1995 17,388 1,320 45,500  
1996    7,308 
1997 16,502 1,330   
2000 14,924 1,360 46,600  
2001    7,868 
2002 16,029 1,415   
2005    8,574 
2006    8,715 
2007 16,029 1,680 29,524 8,856 
     
Percentage change  
 
10% increase 48% increase 35% decrease 21% increase 
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However, this has politicised the peasantry and hence is regarded as one of the main 
reasons for the 1979 Revolution. It seems that the Shah thought that the development plans 
were vehicles for implementing the 1966 Cultural Policy outlined by Behnam (1973) and a 
stride towards modern Iran. 
Scholars have asserted that the Land Reform were marked with failure due to 
poverty, water shortages as a consequence of lack of necessary infrastructure (Walton, 
1980) and inappropriate water governance(Farman-Farmaian& Farman-Farmaian, 2002)11. 
The Land Reform dismantled the feudal land management system and degraded the 
agricultural sector and caused the migration of rural communities to urban centres; hence it 
caused economic imbalance (Engineer12, 1980). 
Post Revolution Land Reform in 1979-80 was led by a radical movement within the 
new Islamic Republic headed by Reza Esfahani, Deputy Agriculture Minister for Land 
Affairs. He tried to redistribute the agricultural land with the aim of empowering the 
'oppressed'. Esfahani’s zealous efforts resulted in a Program bearing his name: the Reza 
Esfahani1980 Land Reform. McLachlan (1988) provides a scholarly analysis of this 
Program describing it as "little short of a disaster (ibid, p.221)". The post Revolution 
agrarian reform had the following characteristics : (1) geographically sporadic as it mostly 
affected Kurdish populated regions i.e. Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan;(2) 
large land owner institutions were created such as Bonyad-e- Mostaz'afan (The Foundation 
of the Oppressed) owning some 100,000 ha of land and major dairy industries; in total 
some 850,000 ha were distributed among those so called ‘oppressed’ people on temporary 
Farming Contracts (Eslahi et al, 2002); (3) the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)did not have 
the sole responsibility for the Program because the Ministry of Jihad-e- Sazandegi 
(MJS)which was linked to the Guards (Pasdaran) of Islamic Revolution Militia was in 
charge of rural regeneration and were effectively in control; (4) the Program was halted and 
the Council of Guardians produced a legal verdict that the new Land Reform is illegitimate 
as it transgresses ownership rights and limits the size of private ownership (Eslahi et al, 
                                                 
11
The book ‘Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince, was published in English by Random House, New 
York in 1997. The authors belong to one of the most influential political families in Iran until the 1979 
Revolution.  
12Ali Ashghar Engineer, is an Indian reformist-writer and activist focusing on collectivism advocating 
communal harmony and a culture of peace and non-violence (Source: Wikipedia website: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asghar_Ali_Engineer) 
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2002) and (5) the majority of land confiscated was given back to the owners and many 
rulings of the Courts of The Islamic Revolutions were overturned13.  
The MJS and MoAJ were not on good terms. The MJS was established in 1983 and 
lead by Bejan Namdar Zanganeh who later became Minister of Energy (1988-1997). In 
2001, MoA and MJS were amalgamated to form the MoAJ. Traditionally, the MoAJ 
ministers are appointed from former MJS members. They also provided many ministerial 
ranks to other sectors including petrochemical and energy.  
The agricultural modernisation policy and land use policy on irrigation have placed 
a great deal of pressure on groundwater resources. Groundwater development plans started 
in 1945 with the introduction of deep wells to replace traditional qanats and new 
technologies in irrigation. This is a legacy of sectoral land use and water governance 
system. We will come back to the theme of Pressures from groundwater developments in 
the next section. 
Short term development planning. One of the main discourses centres on the belief 
that we need to harness more surface water development plans as a measure (i) to adapt to 
the droughts conditions14; (ii) to produce clean hydropower energy and (iii) to achieve food 
security. However, despite concerns for climate change and the emergence of a new 
discourse, the water resources development plans are underway unabated as an adaption 
policy for climate change too. It has been shown that infrastructure buffers the impacts of 
climatic variability on the economic outputs (Halsnaes and Traerup, 2009). 
Based on the questionnaire survey (Appendix A1), many participants felt that 
building more dams fosters superficial expectations about alleviation of climate change 
risks; creates new water rights for farmers in downstream and has generated a great deal of 
tensions among provinces sharing a rivers basin. 
The idea of short term development planning is not new. For example, colonial 
development planning was enacted at the time of Chamberlain in 1895 (Abbott, 1971) with 
the purpose of solving unemployment in the UK by having limited development spending 
in the colonial territories. Later, the 1929 Colonial Development Act and the 1940 Colonial 
Development & Welfare Act were introduced, and in 1947, the Colonial (Commonwealth) 
Development Corporation was established (Cowen, 1984).  
                                                 
13 The author has witnessed that many noble families such as Ardalan, Sanandaji, Kamangar in Kurdistan and 
Kermanshah provinces have regained their lands.  
14This is perhaps a case in semi-arid/arid regions e.g. E. Strobl and R.O. Strobl (2011) states that adaption to 
drought is the main reason for building dams in Africa 
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Iran was not inspired by the British or the Russian ‘Communist’ neighbours’ 
(formerly USSR) on the idea of short term development planning. Instead, the emergence 
of the World Bank in the 1950s as an important agency has been very influential in surface 
water development planning (dams and irrigation networks) in Iran.  
In 1946 the Planning Committee was active and with the aid of the Overseas 
Consultants Inc. (McLachlan, 1986), the first Seven Year Development Plan (SYDP) was 
enacted in 1948. At the time of Imperial Iran, 2 SYDPs and 3 Five Year Development Plans 
(FYDPs) were completed during which major dams were built and these has been reviewed 
by Beaumont (1974). Massive dam building and water supply and irrigation networks were 
built as a result of these plans. After enacting five Plans i.e. 3 FYDPs and 2 SYDP, the 
proposed fourth FYDP (i.e. the 6th Plan) did not see the light of day as the monarchy was 
overthrown by the new Islamic Revolution in 1979 (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).  
The plans lacked both long term vision and strategy. The First Five Year Development 
Plan (i.e. the 3rd Plan) concentrated on planning to irrigate the Khuzestan lowlands and 
build hydropower plants (Beaumont, 1974)and so 5000 million Iranian Riyals (IRR) were 
allocated for the projects. The actual dam construction started in the Second Development 
Plan as 4 major dams were built. There was a policy shift in both the Third and the Fourth 
Development Plans to concentrate on existing irrigation networks and water supply 
schemes for the growing urban populations respectively (Beaumont, 1974).  The Fifth Plan 
concentrated on consolidating the existing water structure, and13 major dams, 17 major 
diversion dams and 17 large irrigation schemes were built as a result. 
 Iraq invaded Iran soon after the 1979 Revolution (22 Sep 1980). The longest 
conventional war in the 20th century continued until August 1988 which brought much 
devastation to both countries. During this period, no FYDPs were employed (MoE, 2003). 
Agricultural developments were hindered by the war and ideological wrangling about land 
ownership and a multiplicity of institutional responsibilities in the management of the land 
resources. The imposed war was partially responsible for this mismanagement. After the 
imposed war, the past legacy of development planning continued. The post-war 
reconstruction was led by Zanganeh from the MJS who headed the MoE from 1988 and 
brought with him MJS's zeal for hard work. 
A massive reconstruction programme started with the 1stpost-RevolutionFYDP 
(1989-1993) which was characterised by the sheer number of development projects which 
were very difficult to manage due to the lack of a holistic approach and any sort of 
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integrated approach to river basin management. Hence, the percentage of completed water 
resources and irrigation networks was small compared with the 3rd and 4th FYDPs. 
 
Figure 4.7: Percentages of water resources development in each period corresponding to 
FYDPs. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Irrigated land development downstream of dams in each period corresponding 
to FYDPs. 
 
The overall policy was shaped by President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani (1989-97) which 
believed in liberalisation of the market. Rafsanjani's market economy lacked political 
reforms and openness; hence his plans were not popular with the public.  
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In 1997, the Reformist Movement led by Muhamad Khatami (1997-2005) won a 
landslide victory which was repeated in 2001.A dawn of reform had started. He promoted 
the 'Dialogue between Civilisations' and started a programme of social and political 
reforms. The 3rdFYDPsaw the culmination of earlier projects: nearly 24.5% of completed 
dam projects (Figure 4.7) and 26% of total irrigation networks (Figure 4.8) were completed 
during this time This pace had slowed down in the 4th FYDP which saw the completion of 
72 dams with a total regulated volume of 4.7 BCM and the development of 320, 033 ha of 
irrigated networks. Owing to these developmental drives, Iran is now ranked 5th in the 
world in the dam building industry.  
The development plans were also affected by economic growth or decline in the 
respective periods and the rather erratic fluctuation of economic indicators such as rate of 
growth and rate of inflation (Figure4.9). The financial sustainability of the projects has 
been affected by the economic factors and hence it is very difficult to assess their economic 
impact or performance.
 
 
Figure 4.9: 1960-2005 fluctuations in inflation and growth rates (Source: MRC, 2008) . 
 Poverty eradication policy has been an official aim of successive Iranian 
governments in modern times. Since the 1906 Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th 
century, social reform and poverty eradication have been on the political agenda and part of 
demands for social justice as an attribute of the community’s Islamic ethical principle.  
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 According to the World Bank ( 2001), Iran has made considerable progress with 
poverty eradication; the percentage of people below the poverty line 15has fallen 
significantly  from 47%  in  1978  to  15.5%" in 1995 which  has further fallen to 6.21%  in 
2002 (MPO/UN, 2004) . However, here are different ways of measuring the poverty line. 
Hence, there are different statistics; for example, based on the 2002 data, some of the 
researchers put the number of people below poverty line at about 20% of the population 
(e.g. Mehrgan and Nessabian, 2010). This means that poverty is an important issue to the 
policy-makers. The government policy in the 3rd FYDP was to reduce it to 7%, and this 
goal has been reached as mentioned.  
 Land Reform and water and agricultural development plans have been seen as a 
means to achieve economic prosperity. Poverty is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and 
hence cannot be eradicated with only economic plans. Access to education, health service, 
drinking water and sanitation, political empowerment and employment are among the key 
factors that affect the degree of poverty. 
4.4.2.  Pressures   
Increased water demand. Population growth as a high level Driver has induced 
other Drivers such as land use policy, short term development plans, energy policy on 
hydropower and irrigation politics which have led to increasing pressure on the water 
resources by increasing demands in all the sectors.  
Jamab (1998; 2007) state that 
· the demand for water has increased from 83 BCM in 1995 to 93.3 BCM in 
2004; 
· the agricultural water withdrawal increased from 76 (91.2% of total 
withdrawals) to 86 BCM (92.18% of total withdrawals);and  
· there has been a 21% increase in the irrigated land area during this period.   
Total annual water use based on 2007 survey is given in Table 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15Poverty line is defined as income of US $2 per day. There are criticisms about this simplistic monetary 
indicator but it is widely used as a target indicator and very practical to measure.   
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Freshwater No conventional water source  
Total  water use 
Surface water Groundwater  Total % of 
total 
water use 
Desalination  % of 
total 
water 
use 
Reused 
treated 
wastewater 
Reused 
agricultural 
drainage water 
40, 000 53, 100 93,100 99.8 200 0.2 - - 93,300 
Table 4.5:  Total annual water use (all in MCM) (Sources: FAO, 2009; Jamab, 2007; MoE, 
2010a) 
There is scattered and inaccessible information on water demands before 1975. To 
make strategic assessments, comprehensive Water Master Plans were initially 
commissioned in 1969 by Plan and Budget Organisation for making projections on water 
demands and potential water resource development capacity in Iranian basins. Later the 
initiative was adopted by MoE and produced the first Water Master Plan in 1975 and since 
then the Plans have been updated by Jamab Consulting Company in 1991 (based on 1983 
baseline date); 1996 (based on 1993 baseline data), and 1998 (based on 1994 data). Jamab 
(1998) was a first attempt to foster basin-wide water resources planning and development 
process in LUB. However, the demand-driven Water Master Plans do not recognise 
systems analysis approach or IWRM and is mainly based on assessment of the technical 
aspects of river basin planning. Also, Management and Planning Organisation 
commissioned Jamab (2007) to produce an adapting Master Plan for Arid/semi-arid 
Climate of Iran which lacks holistic planning approach. 
Groundwater over-exploitation. Officially, 59.9 % of the 2004 water demand of 
93.3 BCM is met from groundwater resources (FAO, 2009). More than 120,000 illegal 
wells are in operation, which accounts for an excess withdrawal of 5 BCM/year i.e. an 
additional 5.4% is utilised (Almasvandi, 2010). Almasvandi16 (2010) states that more than 
70% of water demands utilise groundwater resources (mainly private wells). The 
phenomenal increase in the utilisation rate is due to the introduction of deep wells after 
1945(Figure4.10); before that date, groundwater utilisation was through qanats and springs 
(Vali-Khodjeni, 1995). This level of utilisation has depleted groundwater resources and 
there has been a drop in the water table of between 12 and 67 m as depicted in Table 4.6 
(Motagh et al 2008). Motagh et al (2008) assert that there is a great deal of land subsistence 
due to falling water tables of varying degrees in Iran's main plains (Table 4.7). The 
                                                 
16 Managing Director of IWRMC at the time; illegal or informal abstraction information is not given but this  
rare information was provided during a keynote speech at a conference which was picked up by Iran News 
Agency, IRNA  
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numbers of groundwater structures (wells, qanats and springs) have increased (Figure 
4.10), but the discharge per structure has lowered by up to 50% which indicates depletion 
of groundwater resources (Figure 4.11). 
Year Wells Springs Alluvial 
qanats 
Total discharge, BCM 
Alluvial Hardrock Alluvial Hardrock   Alluvial Hardrock Total 
No. Q No. Q No. Q No. Q No. Q 
1994 365,711 40.5 unknown 0.2 5,290 1.1 37,300 12.75 31,521 9.4 51 12.95 63.95 
2001 435,729 42.9 1064 1064 4,067 0.92 43,588 12.8 32,163 7.9 51.7 13.3 65.0 
 No Q, BCM No Q, BCM No Q Q, BCM  
2007 624,833 48.9 124,443 22.9 37,197 7.4 79.2 
Table 4.6: Groundwater exploitation, 1994-2001 (Main source: Jamab, 2007). 
 
Region Period Decrease in water table (m) Rate of land subsistence 
cm/year 
Tehran area  (Varamin Plain) Since 1990s  ~13 19-23 
Rafsanjan Plain (central Iran) 1971-2001 ~15 ~50 
Valleys of Mashhad and Kashmar In the last 4 decades  15-64 ~27-30 
Zarand-Kerman Plain Since 1990s ~27 ~ 25 
Yazd Since 1970s ~12 ~9.4 
Table 4.7: Groundwater over-exploitation in parts of the Iranian plains (Source: Motagh et 
al 2008 from InSAR-derived subsidence maps). 
 
 
Figure 4.10:Shows discharges from different groundwater resources (1973-2004): (a) Left 
axis shows total groundwater discharges and abstraction from wells; (b) right axis 
illustrates natural spring and qanats flows and abstractions. 
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Figure 4.11: Annual rate of cumulative change of discharge per structure (1973-2005).  
Pressures from pollutions. The land use policy was based on self-sufficiency and 
food security has exerted pressure on the environment. The excessive water demand in 
agriculture has posed a serious problem with land quality. There are over 1,000,000 ha of 
irrigated lands which are water-logged (source: FAO, 2009). As a result of water-logging, 
30% of irrigated lands have been affected by salinisation (Siadat, 1999); which have led to 
low irrigation efficiencies. Nearly 20% of the renewable resources are coming back into the 
system as return flows with much lower qualities. Sewage and untreated urban and 
industrial effluents enters rivers and streams and hence groundwater and surface water 
resources pollution and degradation put huge Pressures on the water resources system. 
Environmental services. The economic prosperity and overall higher living 
standards has placed huge pressure on the environment sector.  Water allocation for the 
environment is not given any priority. This places a huge pressure on inland waters such as 
rivers as well as wetlands. Irrigation water efficiency is seen as the key to reducing the 
percentage of water use in agricultural sector for environmental purposed. But IWRMC 
(2005) predicts that water demands in 2021 will increase to 123,000 MCM; an increase of 
30,000 MCM. The net increase in agricultural water use will be from 86,000 to 106,000 
MCM. Hence, the reduction of agricultural water use in % terms is rather misleading. In 
real terms, the saved water might not return to the environment. In fact, IWRMC (2005) 
predict that it is expected to officially allocate5% of the total renewable resources to the 
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environment (Figure4.12). This clearly shows that the future demands are not sustainable 
and there is a need for IWRM type of Responses i.e. more emphasis on demand 
management rather than build and supply perspective to deal with the environmental 
requirements of the water resources system. 
 
Figure4.12: Predicted future water demands in 2021(IWRMC, 2005) 
 
4.4.3. States/Impacts  
Better living standards but poverty looms. Iran has moved up 10 places in the 
Human Development Index HDI17 ranking during the last 20 years and is now ranked 70th 
in the world (HDR, 2010). Despite stagnation in the income and a fall in the GDP, Iran has 
experienced good health and education indicators as reported by HDR (2010). Since 1990, 
water supply and sanitation have improved in rural and urban areas (IWRMC, 2005), and 
now more than 98% and 87% have access to safe drinking water in urban and rural areas, 
respectively. Low cost interventions have helped the non-income part of HDI to improve, 
but the income complement has not improved as such and so the poverty eradication policy 
has not been as successful due to inflationary and other factors; as mentioned before, some 
researchers suggest that up to20% of the population are living below the poverty line. 
The status of environmental services. Valuing Ecosystem Services is not an easy 
task since much of environmental damage is traded off against economic benefits and 
                                                 
17 HDI is a multi-dimensional index which reflects the wellbeing of the society and aggregate income and 
non-income based indicators. 
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reflected in the economic indicators such as GDP (World Bank, 2004). In 2000, the UN 
started the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)18 to “assess the consequences of 
ecosystem change for human well-being and the scientific basis for action needed to 
enhance the conservation and sustainable use of those systems and their contribution to 
human well-being." (MA, 2005). The Word Bank (2005) produced a report on Iran which 
was a valuable attempt at highlighting the cost of environmental damage.   
It is noted that industrial, hospital and municipal wastes are directly discharged into 
many rivers. Increased irrigation activities have caused groundwater and surface water 
resources pollution and degradation. World Bank (2005) notes that many watersheds lack 
proper land use or watershed management and so there are a great deal of soil erosion and 
sedimentation of dams. World Bank (2005) asserts that deforestation and poor land use 
management can contribute to increasing flood events. The number of floods has already 
increased from 192 events in 1950s to 1,341events in 1990s (World Bank, 2005)19. World 
Bank (2005) has estimated that the total environmental cost due to the degradation of water 
and land services represents 2.82 and 1.7 % of the GDP respectively. Land resources costs 
are due to cropland salinisation, rangeland degradation, wetland loss, and floods. For 
example in 1975, 16 of the 90 million ha of rangeland were considered to be in a poor state 
compared with 43.4 million ha in 2003. 
Water stress. Water scarcity (shortage) in Iran (and the MENA region) is multi-
dimensional. A World Bank Report (2007) highlights three factors influencing levels of 
scarcity including 
a. Lack of physical resource. 
b. Lack of organisational capacity and 
c. Governance deficiencies (transparency and decision-making)  
Physical resource scarcity. Water shortage in Iran is both a spatial and temporal 
phenomenon. Iran is approaching water stress level20 (i.e.1700 m3/capita): per capita 
renewable water resources are~1900 m3/capita (MoE, 2010a). In 1956, annual renewable 
water availability was 7000 m3/capita. By 2001, this figure had reached 2000 m3/capita. It 
is expected to reach 1300 m3/capita in year 2021(IWRMC, 2005; MoE, 2010a). 
                                                 
18 MA is used and not MEA as one might expect.  
19 As stated by MoE (2010a) in earlier parts as parts of the climate change discourse.   
20
Falkenmark’s water stress index (resource per population per year) is a measure of scarcity of a country; 
based on a threshold of 1700 m3/inhabitant/year as the requirement for sustaining the needs of population in 
all the sectors (see e.g. Falkenmark, Lundqvist and Widstrand, 1989)  
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Self-sufficiency policy on cereal production such as wheat has been adopted since 
the Pahlavi era but it became a real objective of the Islamic Republic and this policy has 
had a tremendous impact on the state of water resources as noted by Faramarzi et al (2009). 
Wheat self-sufficiency was achieved in 2005. But three years later, as shown in Figure 2.2 
(Chapter II, Section 2.3.4), Iran needed to import wheat during the 2008 season to 
compensate for the shortage in production.  
However, official strategy on Virtual Water ‘trade’21 (e.g. Zeitoun et al ,2010) has 
been opposed by policymakers despite empirical evidence (e.g. Memari22, 2006; Chapter 
II). The perception is that any official Virtual Water strategy will encourage import trades 
which will be governed by globalisation forces such as international trade patterns. Memari 
(2006) draws a geo-cultural mental model (North- South and West -East divide) that 
Iranians who come from water scarce regions i.e. mainly East, Central and southern parts of 
Iran) are very sensitive to water scarcity and are "interested in utilising and harnessing 
water [resources] …..They are interested in holding water in reservoirs rather than 
allowing it to flow [naturally] away [outside the region]"23. Accordingly, Northern and 
Western Iran have not such sensitivities since they have plenty of water. Based on this 
analogy, since major policymaking centres in Iran lie in the arid regions (Central region e.g. 
Tehran, Semnan; Eastern region e.g. Khurasan; and Southern region e.g. Yazd and 
Esfahan),the cultural perceptions and discourses of these regions dominate public policy 
decisions i.e. they favour dam building.  
Lack of organisational capacity. The perception of water sector performance by 
Iranian water managers is given in Figure4.13. (Source: survey questionnaires, Appendix 
A1). More than 82% of the participants believe that the water sector performance is 
average, below average or unsatisfactory.  
                                                 
21 The issue of Virtual Water trading is dealt with in Chapter II.   
22 Advisor to Deputy Minister for Water Resources, He is a poet and a speech writer for ministerial ranks in 
MoE. As a cultural figure, he has a web of influence within the ranks and orders at the MoE. He is fluent in 
English, French and Arabic. His first degree was in Irrigation in 1953. Then he obtained an MSc degree in 
1974. 
23 Many experts and policymakers consider natural flowing water and low efficiency water use to be ‘wasted 
water’; this perspective is based on pure engineering utilitarian culture. 
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Figure 4.13: Perceptions of participants about overall water resources management 
performance (Source: Survey Questionnaires, Appendix A1) 
 
The organisational capacity to manage water resources is limited since most of the 
efforts and investments have been placed on developing surface water whereas most of the 
consumption in the agricultural sector is from groundwater resources which are 
predominately privately -owned and managed by farmers (Figure 4.14). Memari (2006) 
suggests that there is a need for a new comprehensive water law24, an integrated water 
policy and planning and water rights regime to overcome the organisational deficiency. The 
real question is whether IWRM can be implemented in Iran considering the state of the 
water resources system? The process of IWRM was initiated in the late 1990s and a few 
scattered projects were undertaken in various river basins. 26% of the participants had no 
idea about how IWRM plan is moving forward in Iran (Figure 4.15) (Survey 
Questionnaires, Appendix A1). 40% accepted the current management approach as 
integrated. Therefore, only 34% (a minority) asked for a change of approach. Bearing in 
mind that 83% the participants were from provincial departments, this shows that the 
IWRM policy has not filtered down the organisational channel. Furthermore, 50% of 
participants indicated that the very little consultation process took place for these new 
polices on IWRM which was formulated through smaller circles of experts and academics 
at national level; additionally there is no clear national strategy to implement IWRM 
                                                 
24Comprehensive Water Law Project was initiated in 1999 and lingered on with no consensus until it was 
dropped because of differences between MoE and MoAJ. The author was involved in reviewing the 9 th 
version during 2007-8 and worked with the projects as an independent researcher.   
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(Figure 4.16). Therefore, institutional capacity development is needed to harmonise 
national and local level policy implementation strategies. IWRM should not be seen as a 
blueprint enforced by top-down approach as it was perceived by many participants because 
they were not involved in the process or at least 50 % of them.   
 
 
Figure 4.14: Schema showing agricultural water ownership and management (Memari, 
2006; interview) 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Perception of inter-sectoral co-ordination to implementing IWRM in Iran 
(Source: Survey questionnaires, Appendix A1) 
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Figure 4.16: Perception of level of participatory approach in IWRM planning in Iran 
(Source: Survey questionnaires, Appendix A1) 
 
Governance deficiencies. Earthtrends (2003) has narrated governance indices based 
on criteria set by the Freedom House 25"that advocates for American-style leadership in 
international affairs" and have understandably given Iran a very low rating in terms of 
freedom 6 out of 7 for 2 criteria political rights (PR) and civil liberties  (CL) where 7 is the 
worst case. The methodology is based on a list of questions that measure different aspects 
of CL and evaluated by a group of “in-house and consultant regional experts and scholars” 
(Freedom House, 2010). These are highly biased and subjective indices based on a list of 
questions that is and cannot be a good measure of good governance in Iran. However, they 
partially reflect contemporary governance issues. Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
developed by the World Bank/WGI (2010) are based on perception data and measure six 
categories of good governance since 1996 as tabulated in Table 4.8 which shows a mixture 
of improved and worsening indicators; it shows that Iran has improved in Control of 
Corruption and Rule of Law indicators.  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Based in New York, Freedom House is an advocacy organization close to the US government; it was 
established in 1941 to fight the Nazis and later was involved in anti-communist propaganda.   
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Table 4.8: Change in good governance indicators for Iran from 1996 to 2009 (World 
Bank/WGI, 2010) 
 
Participants show a large degree of dissatisfaction with water sector governance and 
there are calls for the introduction of new laws and capacity development. Areas such as 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of law have been 
highlighted. 89% of the participants  emphasised the need to strengthen the current 
governance set up and for new ‘enforceable’ legislative measures as indicated in Figure 
4.17 (Source: survey questionnaire; Appendix A1).  
 
Figure 4.17: Perception of the need for institutional reforms (Source: Survey 
questionnaires, Appendix A1) 
 
Water storage capacity has increased from 14.6 BCM in 1979 to 30.4 BCM in 
2010; a total of 588 dams are in operation (see Table4.9). However, the volume of reservoir 
storage behind the dams has been fluctuating and sometimes they are less than 50% full. 
Climatic variability and the resulting droughts or dry spells have resulted in these dams 
operating under their capacity. Also, another feature is that many dams lack primary 
yes 
89% 
no 
3% 
don’t know 
4% 
not answered  
4% 
Q: Do you think that there is a need for new policies and laws to 
manage water resources? 
Indicators 1996 
Rank 
 
2009 Rank 
Voice and Accountability 
-1.3492238 11 -1.486247382 8 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence -0.63080443 24 1.518201658 8 
Government Effectiveness  -0.64752027 29 -0.742798693 26 
Regulatory Quality  -1.64474609 6 -1.737524811 3 
Rule of Law (RL) -1.17095084 13 -0.900895771 20 
Control of Corruption (CC).  -1.0686678 13 -0.829989113 22 
Notes: 
Ranks are based on 1-99 where 1 is the worst 
Indicators value between -2.5- 2.5 where 2.5 is highest (best) 
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irrigations networks beside secondary and tertiary networks. Due to the arid climate, a 
considerable amount of water is evaporated from the reservoirs which amount to 1.22 
BCM/year (FAO, 2009). There are massive water transfer projects such as Sirvan-
Garmasiri project which entails 400 km of tunnelling and a large number of diversion and 
storage dams. The whole system has high vulnerability to both system failure and climatic 
variability and change (Hashemi, 2008a).  
 
 
Development Plan periods 
No. of dams Regulated volume,  
MCM 
Irrigated land, ha 
Pahlavi Era    
Pre-development planning  24 12 190 
1st SYDP: 1948-1954 1 0 0 
2nd SYDP: 1955-1962 5 5915 307,240 
3rd FYDP:1963-1967 4 307 31,800 
4th FYDP: 1968-1973 7 3587 379,371 
5th FYDP: 1974-1979* 4 4370 140,872 
Subtotal Pahlavi era 45 14,191 859,483 
Dawn of Islamic Republic in 1979    
Iran-Iraq war: 1980-1988 113 1486 168,162 
1st FYDP: 1989-1993 75 762 56,833 
2nd FYDP: 1994-1999 157 2007 203,289 
3rd FYDP: 2000-2004 126 7492 571,436 
4th FYDP: 2005-2010 72 4690 320,033 
Subtotal after 1979  543 16,437 1,319,753 
Total  588 30,628 2,179,236 
* 2 dams completed in 1979 which were ready just after the revolution so 1979 is added to this era.  
Table 4.9: Water resources development (dams and irrigated area) 1948-2010 representing 
the Pressures by the short term development plans (Source: IWRMC, 2009/2011). 
 
 
4.4.4.  Responses: 
In this section, past Responses are analysed to understand the institutional evolution 
of water resources planning and management providing an overview of the institutional 
performance.  
Responses under uncertainty. As discussed earlier, 9 ‘Development Plans’ have 
been implemented since 1948. In the process, the water industry has become a subject of 
national pride by fulfilling the ambitions of the political domain through engineering 
progress. But,  as a result of these developmental drives, many challenges appeared in the 
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water resources sector  including: entering a water stress phase; depletion of groundwater 
resources; pollution of surface waters; an increased gap between  demand and supply 
leading to the rise of social conflicts according to MoE (2010a). 
From ancient history of Iran, the need for irrigation was based on an economic 
perspective for more revenue to the state coffers from agricultural produce (see e.g. 
Ravandi, 1975). This has been accompanied by the need for developing water distribution 
systems such as qanat groundwater system and canals for irrigation. The historical legacy is 
mixed with the new discourse on climate change. So, the need for more development is not 
only to deal with economic security but it is about water and food security. The perception 
is that the vulnerability to climate change can be offset by harnessing the renewable surface 
water resources. The complex hydraulic systems need an integrated management approach 
and hence, there is a great interest in the ‘M’ component of the IWRM concept based on 
risk assessments. 
In the next part of this section, I present the historical development of Non-
structural Response i.e. the evolution of rules in use and changes in perspectives among 
major actors in water sector26. 
Monarchy era 1909-1979.  During the early monarchy era, the 1906 Civic Code 
established private water and land rights. The first water law was the 1929 Qanat Law. In 
1943, the Independent Irrigation Agency ‘Bongah’ was established to allow for a central 
planning and management of water and land resources. New dams and irrigation networks 
were established and hence the state officially tried to control surface water provisions. 
More importantly, traditional groundwater management systems such as qanats were 
neglected and drilling for private and public deep wells started in the mid-1940s. 
The 1959 Water Resources Blueprint paved the way for the development plans. 
During the 2nd SYDP, in 1962, the Bongah became part of the Ministry of Water and Power 
(MoWP). Regional and provincial water authorities were established during this period to 
oversee the modernisation efforts.  
In order to implement the plans, Muhammad Reza Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ and Land 
Reform accompanied important water sector legislation such as the creation of Ministry of 
Water and Power (1962) and the1968 Nationalisation of Water Resources Act (Beaumont, 
1974) which was the basis of the 1982 Fair Water Distribution Act which has remained as 
                                                 
26 The historical evolutions of Ministry of Energy and water legislations were described by Memari (2006) in 
his interview. Later the transcript was corroborated with official publicly accessible information. 
Chapter 4 
 
116 
the most important water law in Iran. MoWP expanded and changed its name to Ministry of 
Energy (MoE) in 1971. 
 The first conservation law was the Game Law which was enacted in 1956 to 
establish the Game Council. This law was proven to be difficult to implement due to the 
socio-political climate of the time (Firouz et al, 1970). In 1967, the Game and Fish Council 
was established with broader responsibilities including creating protected areas and national 
parks. In 1971, the Game and Fish Council was upgraded to a ministry within the office of 
the Prime Minister, namely the Department of Environment (DoE). Eskandar Firouz27,one 
of the leading charismatic environmentalists, became DoE’s first director.  
 Firouz was a major actor in the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human 
Environment and was elected as one of the 26 vice-presidents of the Conference (Gowdy 
Wygant, 2004) and later became the vice president of the IUCN. He was instrumental in 
enacting the 1974 Environmental Protection Act which has remained an important 
legislation to date.  
Earlier in 1971, Firouz organised a Convention on wetlands held in the Caspian seaside 
resort of Ramsar. 18 countries signed the Convention which was named the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands and was adopted officially in 1975. In line with Shah's grandeur 
vision, Firouz initiated one of the most expensive Pardisan28 Ecoparks (1973-1978).   
Despite the dominance of the oil economy and the decline of agriculture, landmark 
policies and laws were introduced in the 1970s: in 1974 the Environmental Protection Act 
was adopted. The Department of the Environment became more significant during this 
period. In addition, Iran signed international conventions and protocols such as 1948 
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources in 1974. Firouz was 
able to establish a more institutionally powerful DoE by the late 1970s.   
Post Revolution, 1979- 2008.This period can be divided into 5 main phases as 
follows: 
1979-80: Political instability. The new Constitution was enacted despite chaotic 
socio-political, security and economic conditions.   Articles 44, 45 and 50 of the 
Constitution deal with privatisations, water rights and the environment, respectively. The 
latter is credited to Taqi Ebtekar who became Director of DoE towards the end of 1979. 
                                                 
27 Prince Firouz (b.1926-) is a grandson of former Iranian Shahensha 'King of Kings’ of the previous Qajar 
Dynasty, an alumni of Yale University and is known as the father of Iran's Environmentalism.   
28 Farsi word for Paradise 
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1980-1988: The Imposed War. During the period 1980 - 1988, some 27 thematic 
water laws were passed (Memari, 2006). Notably, an important piece of legislation was 
adopted in 1982:  the Fair Water Distribution Act.  This Act was an attempt to officially 
control groundwater resources as 99% of groundwater is controlled by private land owners 
either by shared customary rights in the case of qanats or privately owned wells. The 
owners were offered ‘Water Allocation Permits’ or ‘Licences’.   
1989-1997: Reconstruction period. Since the late 1980s, the trend was to break up 
regional water authorities into provincial water authorities and now there are 33 companies 
in the 30 provinces29. This was to create a provincial base for the reconstruction drive 
guided by the FYDPs. Another important land mark was the Bill for the Establishment of 
Water and Wastewater Companies for urban areas (1990) and rural areas (1998). The aim is 
to completely “privatise” all the companies (owned by the state); at present, they operate 
privately under the auspices of the Mother State Companies: Iran Water Resources 
Company (IWRMC) and Iran National Water and Wastewater Company (INWWC). These 
companies are not economically viable and make cumulative losses and are financed by the 
central treasury. The economic value of water is not appreciated. Water is traded at a small 
fraction of its full cost. 
By 1997, Iran had signed over 24 major international conventions related to the 
environment, and Water Master Plans for all the rivers basins were completed (Jamab, 
1998) which was an important water resources study. 
1998-2008: Reform period. Legal reforms were initiated in the late 1990s and the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act was enacted in 1998. Large projects are 
required to have proper EIA studies. The institutional and political fragmentation of the 
agricultural sector was evident from the post Revolution Land Reform series of events as 
described earlier. For example, MJS exercised more power in the rural areas and did not 
cooperate with MoA; many of their works overlapped. Thus, from 1987 onwards, there was 
a call to merge MSJ with MoAJ to create a new Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (MoAJ). 
Finally, The Bill to create MoAJ was enacted in 2001.  
MoE has officially adopted the IWRM concept in 2003 (IWRMC, 2004) with 
emphasis on a holistic, integrated approach to water management which were inspired by a 
new understanding of the Constitution dealing with the environment. Furthermore, Article 
                                                 
29 The 31st province was created at the start of 2011; Alborz province which was part of Greater Tehran, 
taking Karaj as its capital.  
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17 of the fourth 5 Year (2004-2009) Development Plan (FYDP) asserts the principles of 
IWRM and sustainable development based on a river basin approach (MPO, 2005). It refers 
to water as playing a ‘central’ role in development of the country and appreciates the 
economic and environmental value of water. Thus, there is a movement in the right 
direction by having better polices and acknowledging the link between water resources 
management and sustainability. The green credential of the 4th FYDP was enhanced by 
Article 67 which explicitly asks for drafting and implementing an ecological management 
plan for Lake Urmia and other wetlands.  
Table 4.10 shows some important legislation which paved the way for the 
introduction of IWRM in Iran. The introduction of the 2003 Water Allocation Directive 
provides a detailed procedure for river basin planning and sustainable water allocation 
decisions. The directive asserts that the water allocation policy is based on dynamic 
simulation of water resources availability at river basin level. 
.  
Legislations  Year  Articles 
Approved Polices of the Expediency 
Council 
2000 6 
Principles of the Water Resources 
Management  
2000 28 
3rd 5 Year Socio-economic Development 
Plan (1999-2003): Section 3 
1999 6 
IWRMC Mother Holding’s Articles of 
Association (Public Company) 
2003 33 
Water Allocation Directive 2003  
Long Term Strategies for the 
Development of Iran’s Water Resources 
(IWRM Plan) 
2003 18 
Law of Promotion of Investment in Water 
Projects in Iran  
2003 15 
4th 5 Year Socio-economic Development 
Plan (FYDP) (2004-2009): 
 
2004 23 
Table  4.10: The reform of the water sector through legislations (1999-2004). 
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4.5 Discussion 
Iran has made tremendous progress in terms of living standards and, since 1948, 
with the exception of the Imposed War (1980-88), has embarked on massive reconstruction 
and modernisation development projects in the water resources and agriculture sectors. Iran 
holds the fifth position in dam building and size of irrigated area in the world. The 
anthropogenic and demographic dynamics have been Drivers for change and relative 
prosperity. Contemporary Iran has been moulded into a highly urbanised consumer society; 
the rural regeneration has occurred but with less population and less importance.  
Incomes from oil provide 75% of the budget. This rentier economy (i.e. based on 
selling oil) has shown erratic fluctuations as economic and inflation growth rates have been 
unpredictable, showing the influence of oil price instability on the economy. As coined by 
McLachlan (1988), Iran can be described as “the neglected garden” since agriculture has 
been neglected and Iran moved from an agro-economy to an oil economy. The irony is that 
the promotion of agriculture and agro-society has been part of the psychic and mentality of 
Iranian policy makers: that ‘Iran can attain food self-sufficiency’ has been entrenched even 
in the 1979 Constitution30. 
The DPSIR analysis at the national level has shown that, as a result of the historical 
economic growth Drivers, there are great pressures on the water resources both in terms of 
quality and quantity. Environmental degradations have accompanied better economic living 
standards. Informal and unauthorised abstraction for agricultural use has become an 
important common practice and account for nearly 11% of the total water use (nearly 10 
BCM) of groundwater and about 50% of the surface waters. The use of water cannot be 
easily policed. Also, despite building many dams, the associated irrigation and drainage 
networks have lagged behind and many dams lack even primary irrigation networks and are 
thus rendered useless. 
Lack of consideration for environmental concerns has been noticed. The 1974 
Environmental Protection Act has not been updated and clearly, this cannot satisfy the 
environmental sector. A major shift occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s where the 
question of sustainability was highlighted, but the war-torn Iran embarked on more 
developments, and since 1989, has implemented four more FYDPs.  
                                                 
30 Article 3, Clause 13 states “the attainment of self-sufficiency in scientific, technological, industrial, 
agricultural, and military domains, and other similar spheres”.  
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Fast institutional changes have occurred in the water sector. Since 1943, the state 
has been trying to control water resources planning and allocation. The institutional 
changes have been dramatic and progressive but have failed to completely tackle private 
water rights and enforce water laws. The institutional changes have been the result of an ad-
hoc approach. The evolving nature of water sector institutions shows that institutional 
equilibrium has not been reached. As previously stated, 89% of the senior water managers 
expressed the view that there is a need for institutional reform.  
Emergence of climate change discourse. Since the 1990s, Iranian policymakers 
have been aware of climatic change as a major driver and so embarked on a policy of 
executing basin-wide planning exercises. Water allocation has been a source of conflicts 
between different provinces. So, MoE has been trying to implement the 2003 Water 
Allocation Directive (WAD) which is based basin-wide planning. The idea has not been 
welcomed at provincial level.  We will come back to this issue in Chapter V (Lake Urmia 
case study).  Since 2003, WAD has been promoted by MoE’s Water Policy and Allocation 
Commission (WPAC). MoE has embarked on an institutional capacity building programme 
to train water companies on the river basin planning.  
 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
Paradigm shift. Senior managers and experts in the Office of Macro Planning at 
MoE have come to the conclusion that dam-building as a Response to the Drivers in years 
gone by, has created unsustainable Pressures on the resources, as has happened in many 
other countries; hence the need for revised Responses based on IWRM principles and there 
should be a reassessment of development plans (Appendix A1, Tables A1.1-A.1.4). 
However, these decisions are solely political and the socio-political Pressure such as 
lobbying MPs, provincial Governors and farmers have created a two tier discourse within 
MoE: a regional development discourse is favoured by Regional Water Companies and 
IWRMC and the IWRM discourse is strongly advocated by some sections of MoE. 
Therefore, the non-structural Responses (legislations, new administrations and rules etc.) 
have not guaranteed the implementation of sustainable polices adopted since 1999 due to 
disparity in priorities among major actors; political influences, lack of institutional capacity 
development and so forth.   
Water allocation planning and allocation are mainly political and hence, there 
should be both lateral and vertical capacity buildings. MPs and provincial governors hold a 
Chapter 4 
 
121 
great deal of influence in terms of provincial development objectives which are based on 
political boundaries and not the river basin approach. Therefore, MoE has recognised that 
water resources planning and allocation is one of the major challenging issues. Internal 
conflicts and different perspectives within MoE at governance level have caused the 
‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) to continue in terms of water planning and allocation. Also, the 
implementation of the 2003 WAD has been hampered by the ‘build (dams) and provide’ 
lobby which has been (and remains) a strong thread of thinking among policymakers within 
MoE. Lack of information about abstraction from rivers and streams and data uncertainty 
and lack of cooperation between provincial water companies have led to a lull in the 
progress of enforcing the 2003 WAD.    
Emergence ofcentralised groundwater resources governance. There has been 
some success with regards to control of groundwater resources. The 1982 Act required well 
owners to register their wells to provide them with Permits. However, this controlling 
measure has been marred with over subscription of permits which has caused a great deal 
of problems.  
Groundwater resources are literally managed by farmers and well owners (Memari, 
2006). MoE’s policy has been to bring some order to surface water management through 
the enactment of 1982 Act. MoE overlooked groundwater and concentrated on controlling 
surface water by investing in dam-building and irrigation network projects. 90% of the 
investments has gone towards the projects (MoAJ, 2008); but in the process they have 
created more water rights, much tension among upstream and downstream stakeholders and 
lost some control to socio-political forces. In Lake Urmia for example, 27% more 
abstractions are taken from the rivers informally (MoE, 2010b). In fact, there is no formal 
water allocation for dams in Lake Urmia basin with more than 60 dam-building projects 
(Appendix A1; Table A1.4). MoE has failed to implement IWRM in its first phase of 
introduction (1999-2008). Institutional reforms are not sufficient unless there are water use 
efficiency strategies as well as capacity development. Build and supply approach will lead 
to disaster.  
MoAJ has become a giant ministry with a wide-ranging mandate (from farming to 
building small dams). It is like a dinosaur that cannot locate its prey. The MJS cloud is still 
hanging over it and perhaps it has not reached an institutional equilibrium.   
There is a consensus that there is a need for a better institutional design to cater for 
complex governance systems which exists within multilevel smaller nested agricultural 
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enterprises. A community-based participatory water resources management approach has 
been advocated by most of the participants in Lake Urmia basin (LUB) based on the social 
research conducted as described in Appendix A1.  
In chapter V, LUB has been taken as a case study to make an integrated assessment 
of water allocation decisions at basin level since water allocation is central to the 
implementation of IWRM. LUB is a suitable case study for the following reasons (not an 
exhaustive list): 
· Lake Urmia is one of the 6 main river basins of greatest importance in Iran (Figure 
4.18). The Lake itself is considered to be one of the “most important and valuable 
ecosystems in Iran” (WRI, 2005) and had been declared as a National Park, Ramsar 
Site (since 1971) and UNESCO31 Biosphere Reserve (since 1976). In addition, the 
Lake is surrounded by equally internationally important freshwater satellite 
wetlands including Ramsar sites. Although, the basin is only 3% of the total area of 
Iran, it contains more than 7% of the total available freshwater resources. Therefore, 
it is of vital importance within the water resources management and planning 
strategies. 
· In the last 10 years, there have been more than three major national and 
international projects with the aim of implementing IWRM. Article 67 of the 4th 
FYDP (2005-2010) specifies to implement a participatory project to formulate an 
ecosystem management plan based on IWRM paradigm for Lake Urmia basin; 
therefore, there was a window of opportunity for the author to get involved in the 
formulation and implementation of the IWRM plan.  
· It provides a classic case study for common pool resources management in which 
water allocation among different interests is central in the implementation plan. The 
Lake itself is a salt lake similar to the Aral Sea in the neighbouring countries of 
Middle Asia which has almost dried up (98%). 
· The basin is situated within three provinces and so it can be considered as a trans-
boundary water allocation case study with cross-cultural conflicts. 
  
                                                 
31United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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Figure 4.18: Major river basins in Iran (Courtesy of WRI, 2005). 
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Chapter V. Towards Sustainable Water Allocation Decisions in  
Lake Urmia Basin (LUB):  
 
 
5.1 Introduction: a historical context towards IWRM in Lake Urmia Basin  
 
Start of IWRM initiatives. Lake Urmia basin has been an interest to the Iranian 
policy/decision-makers since it has nearly 7% of Iran’s water resources. A massive 
programme of dam-building and irrigation networks have started in late 1960s. However, a 
growing attention has been on Lake Urmia that has shrunk with falling water levels since 
1995. So, Lake Urmia has been registered on the political agenda since 2000.  In late 1990s 
onwards, several multidisciplinary joint projects were initiated with international partners 
including:  
· 1994-2002: a joint Dutch-Iranian and the World Bank venture  which was 
part of the  Environmental Component  of the IIP (EC-IIP) to evaluate and 
design land and water resources development programme of 4 sub-basins in 
LUB (1994-2002) (Yekom, 2002); and 
· 1998-2005: the IWRM for Lake Urmia project (WRI, 2005).  
Emergence of a socio-economic Driver. The 4th FYDP (2005-10) explicitly asks 
for drafting and implementing an ecological management plan for Lake Urmia indicating 
the main boundary and position rules: 
Ecological management plan in sensitive ecosystems, especially in Orumiye
1
 Lake will be 
prepared and implemented. Executive By-law of this Article will be prepared by the 
Environment Protection Organization
2
 in cooperation with the Management and 
PlanningOrganisations, and Ministries of Energy and Agriculture Jihad, and shall receive 
approval of the Council of Ministers.  (MPO, 2005 p.106) 
                                                 
1The spelling for Urmia used by MPO (2005) is kept. 
2 This is DoE; MPO (2005) uses this term in translations 
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Evolvement of Participation mechanisms. In line with the above ruling, in 
February 2005, DoE on behalf of the government signed an agreement with the 
UNDP/GEF to conduct a 7 year project named as Conservation of Iranian Wetlands 
Project, CIWP (Figure5.1). The IWRM project proved to be a “strong catalyst for the 
approval, design and execution of this GEF project” (WRI, 2005). 
 
Figure 5.1: Timeline of CIWP’s workplan (Source: CIWP, 2010; Photo by author). 
 
Both IWRM for LUB Project and CIWP are a continuation of the EC-IIP (Yekom, 
2002) which proposed an ecosystem management plan and an implementation action plan. 
This was the first attempt to make Lake Urmia the central theme of the studies as previous 
studies mainly concentrated on water and agricultural developmental potentials. 
Window of opportunity. In 2006 (start of the PhD work), the author was introduced 
to the CIWP3. The CIWP had a slow start as it coincided with the inauguration of a new 
President; it almost collapsed and the project’s team were released from their duties during 
2006-2007. In early 2007, the CIWP was given a new mandate and has been led by a new 
National Manager, Dr Ali Nazaridoust4 who has just ended his PhD thesis on the subject of 
                                                 
3 This was facilitated by a distinguished scholar, Dr Jalal Attari, former graduate from Imperial College, 
University of London and Project Manager of the IWRM for LUB Project and deputy Chancellor of Water 
Research Institute (WRI), MoE, who accepted to become the author’s PhD consulting supervisor in Iran as 
part of Newcastle University regulations for combined PhD degrees.  
4 At that time, Nazaridoust was also an environmental expert at MoE. 
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ecological water requirement of Lake Urmia. In 2007, the author was invited to attend 
various workshops and seminars (Appendix A1) as an observer and independent researcher. 
In 2007, CIWP initiated a consultation exercise to allow for the interaction of stakeholders 
from the three provinces under a new management. The CIWP invited the author to most of 
the stakeholder meetings. LUB was established as the new action arena. 
Formations of Multi-stakeholder Platforms. In 2008, after several stakeholder 
consultations, an important step towards implementing IWRM in LUB was taken as a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by all the stakeholders; adopting an 
Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP)5. In Chapter IV, we have witnessed that Iran has 
moved towards river basin planning and management within the legal context of the 2003 
Water Allocation Directive (WAD). At national level, there is a consensus that the status 
quo is not sustainable; hence there has been a call for implementing IWRM. The 2003 
WAD requires water allocation to be made based on river basin level rather than the 
geopolitical boundaries i.e. provinces. But as noticed, a top-down approach of management 
still prevails.  
The objectives of this chapter are: 
· To make a DPSIR analysis to assess the progress made with respect to 
implementing IWRM in LUB for the pre 2008 (MoU) period  
· To employ IAD to make an institutional analysis to analyse the 
sustainability of water allocation governance for the same period by 
analysing the efficacy of water allocation rules in use mainly legislations at 
three levels of decision-making. 
In the next section, the methodological approach to achieve the above objectives is 
described. 
 
5.2 Methodology: data collection and analysis 
Data collection. With reference to Chapter III and Appendix A1, the same data 
collection methods are used as described in Chapter IV, Section 4.2.1. The baseline data 
and information in this chapter is based on a synthesis of a considerable amount of 
secondary data which was obtained during the stakeholder meetings (workshops, working 
groups, seminars etc.) and provided by the stakeholders, carried out by Hashemi (2008). 
                                                 
5 The ceremony was held in Urmia city on the 20th of October.  
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We will return to this theme in Chapter VI. Any data or information used is accordingly 
referenced in the text.  
Analytical approach. With reference to Section 3.8 in Chapter III, the Integrated 
Socio-technical Framework is applied as follows: 
· Similar to Section 4.3 (Chapter IV), the contextual setting is described in 
Section 5.3. 
· Having projected a national outlook of the WRS in Iran in Chapter IV, the 
DPSIR component is used to map different aspects of the WRS at Lake 
Urmia basin level by repeating steps 1-3 used in Section 4.2.2. This captures 
the changes occurred to the WRS of LUB during 1909-2008. It also provides 
the development of the water resources allocation governance system at 
different decision levels (Section 5.4). 
· In Section 5.5, the efficacy of the major legislations on water resources 
allocations assessed by for a transitional period from the start of IWRM 
initiative to the signing of the MoU i.e. 2003- 2008 Using the IAD 
component. This represents the analysis of water allocation for ‘Business As 
Usual’ scenario. The efficacy of these Responses is measured by the level of 
their implementation 
· The combined DPSIR-IAD assessments at national level will have a direct 
bearing on the provincial action situation; hence, Chapter IV is a prerequisite 
reference for this chapter; thus the results and arguments presented in 
Chapter IV will not be repeated in Chapter V. However, Chapter V attempts 
to highlight the relevant specific characteristics of the Social-Ecological 
Systems at local level (i.e. at Lake Urmia basin level). 
Finally, discussions and conclusions are given in Sections 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.   
 
5.3 Contextual setting 
5.3.1 Pre MoU Action arena and action situation 
The action arena is Lake Urmia Basin (LUB) which is located in NW of Iran 
between 44°-07´ and 47°-53´ eastern longitude and 35°-40´ to 38°-30´ northern latitude has 
an area totalling 51,876km2 is situated in the west of Iran covering 3 provinces: West 
Azerbaijan (WA), East Azerbaijan (EA) and Kurdistan Provinces. Around 500 km2 of the 
basin is located in Turkey (Figure 5.2). LUB covers the northern slopes of Mount Zagros 
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and the eastern slopes of the mountain ranges between Iran and Turkey with arid-semi arid 
climatic conditions.  It can be classified as an endorheic (closed) drainage catchment and 
Lake Urmia (LU) acts as a sink.LU has a surface area of about 5,100 km2 and is surrounded 
by equally internationally important freshwater wetlands including Ramsar sites mainly in 
the southern part. The area around Lake Urmia is a National Park or a protected area and 
considered as an “ecological zone” (Yekom, 2002). The action situation which is provincial 
water allocation is described in Section 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.2:  Map of Lake Urmia basin showing the political boundaries of the provinces 
situated within LUB and water resources hydraulic infrastructure. 
 
5.3.2 Actors  
Key actors are given in Figure5.3. MoE is responsible for water allocation as 
recognised by the 1982 Fair Water Distribution (FWD) Act. MoE is bestowed with 
decision-making powers for the water resources planning process which ends up in water 
allocation policy. The 2003 WAD provides specific action plan for the allocation process.   
Several other national and provincial political institutions have played a major role 
in water allocation process. These include, MoAJ, DoE, the Majlis (MPs), Presidential 
Office and provincial governors. Based on the qualitative data i.e. questionnaires and 
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interviews and stakeholder meeting (Appendix A1, Tables A1.1- A1.4), the political 
leverage on the MoE is fourfold: (1) the Majlis has powers to approve developmental 
priorities and budgets and controls water price which is set every year by an Act of 
Parliament; (2) provincial politicians together with local MPs have been a source for 
lobbying for greater water resources development and greater allocation; (3) MoAJ has 
pursued a demand driven policy and have been actively building small water supply 
dams6and hence in effect bestowed with water allocation powers; (4) Presidential By-laws 
for development of provincial water resources and irrigation projects have placed a pressure 
to give more allocation. Council of Ministers and its subcommittee, the Supreme Water 
Council7 has watered down the MoE’s decision- making powers.  
At provincial level, MoE is represented by the regional water companies (RWCs). 
Water allocation is made at the national level but provincial conflicts are sorted out atthe 
provincial Water and Agricultural Commission which is a subcommittee under the 
Provincial Economic and Production Working Group of the Planning Bureau at the 
Governor’s Office. The Commission can make recommendations to be approved in the 
Provincial Planning Council 
At local level, farmers are by large the main actors and they are not involved in the 
formal water allocation process. Provincial agricultural Jihad organisations (AJOs) 
represent their interests and conflicts can be resolved in the Water and Agriculture 
Commission. District organisations of the governmental departments are the first point of 
contact of water users. Initial individual applications have to be first approved by the 
district (i.e. county level) departmental organisations.  
Independent consulting engineering firms such as Mahab Ghods (a subsidiary of 
MoE), Jamab, Yekom and Pandam Consulting Engineers and over 50 public research 
institutes such as MoE’s Water Research Institute (WRI) have been involved in collecting 
baseline data and information and analytical results on all aspects of water resources 
planning and future water demands as well as management of the resources in Lake Urmia 
basin. But water allocation process has not been the focus of their studies. Jamab (1998) 
presents the Water Master Plan for the basin but it does not include inter-provincial or 
provincial water allocation strategy.   
 
                                                 
6 Small dams have a capacity of less than 5 MCM.  
7Sometimes it is called High Water Council; it has no policy/decision-making powers according to Memari 
(2006) and hence it is seen as ineffective extra administrative layer by some stakeholders. 
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5.3.3  Biophysical and material conditions: socio-economic, political, ecological, 
hydrological and hydraulic attributes   
Average annual rainfall is 329.6 mm based on 1969-2010 period (Figure5.4). Much 
of the precipitation (20.3 BCM) is evaporated and about 6.9 MCM is captured in surface 
runoff which is the potential surface water for the whole basin according to Jamab, (1998) 
and MoE, (2010b). 
 
Note: This figure only shows the spatial distribution and not the level of influence and importance of actors 
Figure 5.3: Major actors  
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There is about 2 BCM of potential groundwater resources and are mainly in the eastern part 
of the basin. Groundwater abstractions are mainly through privately owned wells. There are 
unauthorised wells operating but the legal wells have Water Allocation Permits8. 
 
Season Fall Winter Spring Summer year 
Precipitation 26.5 32.3 38.4 2.8 100 
Table  5.1: Seasonal distribution of the precipitation in the Lake Urmia basin (%) 
(WRI, 2005).  
 
 
Figure  5.4: Average precipitation in LUB and corresponding annual average lake levels, 
1969-2009 (Source MoE, 2010b). 
 
There are 17 permanent rivers, 12 seasonal rivers and 39 flood routes which 
terminate at LU (Hashemi, 2008) as shown in Figure 5.1.In the last decade, lake levels have 
dropped (Figure 5.3) and the lake area has reduced by nearly 46% to 2700 km2 (Jabbari, 
2011).LU is very sensitive to the surface inflows as only receives a small amount of 
groundwater discharge (up to 210 MCM). Much of water inflow into the lake is from 
southern rivers. The rivers' runoff flows vary in time and space due to temporal and 
seasonal variation in precipitation as given in Table 5.1. The hydraulic system consists of 
37 dams including 6 major storage dams with 1680 MCM capacity in WA and EA. 
Kurdistan has no existing dam in operation.  
Evaporation from Lake Urmia is the most difficult hydrological parameter to 
quantify: only point estimations can be made. WRI (2005) suggests establishing 4 new 
evapometric stations to better the estimation. WRI (2005) makes a good attempt to quantify 
                                                 
8 No official data is accessible; we will return to this theme later. 
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this parameter and provides a creditable value. It uses satellite images to validate the results 
by considering a wet year (1993-4) and a dry year (1999-2000). The long term average 
evaporation from Lake Urmia is estimated to be around 1180mm. MoE (2010) provides a 
higher estimate of 1272 mm/year for 1967-2007.  Average annual temperature for the basin 
is around 9.4 °C.  
Yekom (2002) have identified 12 land use categories from the 1990 satellite images 
and based on 1994 "Comprehensive studies for agricultural development" and FAO 
classifications, land forms were identified. The land use is shown in Figure5.5. Irrigation 
farming constitutes more than 7% of the total area; based on information given by actors 
(Appendix A1, Table A1.4), there are total of 463,000 ha of irrigated lands in all the 
provinces (see Box 5.1).   
The dominant economic model is mainly agricultural with a degree of industrial 
(mainly in EA) and tourism (WA) (Table5.2).  
Province % Provincial RDP Output Dominant 
Agriculture Industry Economic model
EA 11.4 33 Industrial
Kurdistan 18.2 12.3 Agricultural 
WA 18.9 18.8 Agro- industrial
Source: calculations by author based on SCI (2007)  National Accounts  
Table 5.2: Proportion of provincial Regional Domestic Product (RDP)9 outputs for 
economic sectors showing dominant economic models for each province. 
 
5.3.4 Community attributes  
LUB is both multi-ethnic and multi-religion. Turks and Kurds are the main ethnic 
groups. They belong mainly to Shiite and Sunni Islam. But there are Armenian and 
Assyrian Christians as well. Total population of the basin is estimated to be 5.9 million 
people in 2010 mainly living in urban centres. 
Referring to in Chapter IV and qualitative data (questionnaires survey, interviews 
and stakeholder meetings) described in Appendix A1, community attributes which apply to 
provincial and national actors can be described as follows:  
· a low level of common understanding about water resources planning and allocation 
i.e. the presence of different perspectives among the stakeholders 
                                                 
9 RDP is the regional version of the GDP; this economic indicator is based on provincial boundary.  
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· low level of homogeneity in the preferences and priorities among national 
stakeholders and the same is true among the provinces of the basin in terms of water 
resources planning and allocation (later described  as shown in Box5.1) 
· lack of trust between different provinces and national and provincial levels e.g. lack 
of flow of information among stakeholders 
· there are disparity or inequality of basic assets among the provinces (e.g. disparity 
in RDP or distribution water resources and so forth) 
· the economic paradigms of the provinces are different (Table 5.2) 
· local political influence has an important bearing on the dynamics decision-making 
by the actors  
This has created an environment of tension and high level of mistrust with 
conflicting priorities due to heterogeneity of the social fabric of the community.  
 
Figure 5.5: Land use in LUB (Source: Yekom, 2002). 
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5.4 DPSIR assessment for Lake Urmia basin 
5.4.1  Introduction  
The DPSIR assessment results are given in Figure 5.6 and each of the components 
are described in the following sub-sections. Given the centralised management of water 
resources allocation, the DPSIR analysis in this section complements the DPSIR results in 
Chapter IV. 
 
Figure 5.6: DPSIR analysis at LUB level. 
 
5.4.2.  Drivers (Driving forces) 
I938 Administrative Divisions (AD)Act was a turning point in establishing a form 
of local government in modern Iran replacing the princedom divisions governed by the 
1909 AD Act. These administrative divisions have been changing due to modified 
legislations namely the 1960 and 1983 AD Acts. The old princedom divisions were 
changed to provinces or 'ustans'. Administrative divisions are driven by political objectives 
and depend on (i) demographic trends (population based), (ii) ease of communications and 
transport and (iii) economic considerations.  By gaining town or city status, the urban 
institutions will gain much greater financial and political influence as the town of the city 
Driving Forces 
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Non structural
ü1983 Definitions and Directive of Administrative Divisions Act
üEstablishment of Governorates and local government 
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abstractions (Illegal surface and 
groundwater abstraction)
q Increase of irrigation lands
q Water quality: Water source 
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v Reduce rate of inflow into the 
lake
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v Groundwater over-exploitation in 
some aquifers
v Increased percentage of irrigated 
area, 
v Decrease in pastures and wetland 
area 
v Increase use of fertilizers and 
pesticides and discharge into 
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v Decreased inflow into LU
v Sanitation discharge into rivers 
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Ø Significant fall in the population of the 
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to the drop of the number of migratory 
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Ø Regional economical imbalance 
Ø Unsustainable development
Ø LU hyper-salination
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will be included in formal development and fiscal planning. So, urbanism10 is a major 
driving force in local politics. 
Cottom (1999) believes that nationalism did not have a strong base among the Azeri 
and Kurdish minorities of Iran but the ethnic and cultural identities remain very strong 
especially among the Kurds. Thus, both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan have a turbulent 
historical past. In the aftermath of World War II, local dissidences from central rule were 
registered with the inauguration of the short lived Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish 
Mahabad Republic which were crushed by the Imperial Army of the Shah in 1949. Despite 
having comparatively small publicity, the 1945-8 Azerbaijan crisis was an important event 
in modern world history: as Hess (1974) noted, it was the start of the 'Cold War' between 
USSR and USA. 
Internal boundary changes show a degree of political instability (Ahmadipour and 
Mansorian, 2006). The political instability is perhaps due to complex ethno-religious 
distribution which makes the idea of integrated Iran postulated by Reza Shah Pahlavi 
(1887-1944) a very difficult aim to achieve. The cost of this integration has been multi-
dimensional including environmental degradation and unsustainable water resources 
developments. Much of developmental projects have not performed well due to the 
disparity created by the administrative divisions due to imbalance of power distribution 
(Farzanegan, 2001). As a result, different economic paradigms have evolved (Table 5.2) 
EA is more industrialised compared with WA and Kurdistan. The latter is less developed 
compared with both EA and WA.  
Population growth has been phenomenal since 1976 (Table 5.3). Yekom (2002) has 
made a detailed analysis of the demographic trends in LUB. They suggest that rural 
communities are in decline despite vast agricultural developments. However, in areas such 
as Mahabad sub basin, rural communities have increased (WRI, 2005)11 and so this sort of 
generalisation is misleading to an extent. Also, the definition of ' city' or 'town has changed 
with the passage of time (see e.g., Fanni, 2006). The AD Act now requires a city to have a 
municipality. But previously, a city was considered to have a population of 5000 people. In 
recent times, it seems that MPs and Presidential Candidates have used AD Act for their 
convenience and has been included in manifestos of MPs.  
                                                 
10 Urban way of life provides access to a wider socioeconomic and political sphere- traditionally; rural areas 
are associated with peasantry and non-political community.  
11 This module of the project was carried out by Pandam Consulting Engineers under the heading water for 
environment; thus Pandam prefers to be cited as (Pandam, 2005).  
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Table 5.3: Population trends in LUB.  
Climate variability/droughts. Much of the discussion in Chapter IV about climate 
variability and change is applicable here but at provincial level, greater reference is given to 
droughts. Partly, this is because droughts attract central treasury funds as part of the 
'Emergency and Crisis Management' package. The official position of MoE is based on 
attribution analysis made for year 2000 which was a severe drought year (this will be 
described in chapter VI) which suggests that in year 2000, 67% of the Lake's decline is due 
to droughts, 27% to recent developments (i.e. abstractions) and 5% as a direct impact of 
dams (Namjo12, 2009; MoE, 2010b). As shown in Figure 5.7, the rainfall series for 1969-
1994 exhibits an upward trend whereas downward trends are observed for 1995-2010. 
Therefore, trend analysis might be inappropriate approach to formulate an understanding of 
the hydrologic and climatic regime of Lake Urmia basin which shows a large degree of 
variability. We will return to this theme in Chapter VI.  
Despite this concern and MoE's strong environmental inclinations since late 1990s, 
water resources planning have been sectoral in approach and pro-development. The change 
of attitude (i.e. considering climate change in planning matters) by MoE is marred by the 
question of the uncertainty about data (mainly hydrological data) resulting in the 
polarisation of opinions on both sides of the argument (see e.g. Roe, 1994). There is a 
discrepancy between MoE and IWRMC’s database mainly due to a disagreement between 
MoE and IWRMC about the feasibility of some of the proposed development plans as well 
as some of the small dam projects are funded through provincial budgets and may not be 
listed on the MoE database. It is interesting to note that none of the dams have Water 
Allocation Permits.  
                                                 
12Majid Namjo is the current Minister for Energy. 
Year Population Cumulative 
Rural Urban Total increase %
1976 1,440,731 1,223,338 2,664,069 0.0
1986 1,565,892 1,565,892 3,131,784 17.6
1996 1,607,845 2,750,724 4,358,569 63.6
2002* - - 4,800,000 80.2
2010** - - 5,900,000 121.5
Notes 
*estimated  
** provided by provincial stakeholders in 2010 
Source Yekom (2002)
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Figure 5.7: Precipitation trends for 1969-1994 and 1995-2010 periods based on MoE 
discourse on climate change (Source MoE, 2010b)  
 
MoE is trying to use the climate change discourse (see Chapter IV) to resist 
additional provincial water resources development applications as demonstrated by 
Namjo13 (2009) who wrote to the Governor of EA that the current demands for more dam 
building are not tenable mainly due to the climate change. However, RWCs have taken a 
provincial perspective and implicitly have been on the side of MPs and governors to “get a 
better deal
14
” for the provinces (Source: Questionnaire survey, Appendix A1). The 
differences between MoE and RWCs priorities have been detrimental in terms of 
implementing effective water resources planning and allocation.  So, despite introducing 
Responses such as the 2003 Water Allocation Directive (WAD) (as described in Chapter 
IV), no integrated planning and allocation has been made15.   
FYDPs. In 1970, the first major dam came into operation in LUB i.e. Mahabad dam 
which is situated in a city that bears the name of the Kurdish Republic led by Qazi 
Muhammad. 40 years later, there are 37 dams in operation in WA and EA (Figure 5.8). 
Kurdistan and WA has been less fortunate in the “hydraulic mission”16 as they were 
embroiled in the Kurdish autonomy movement after the demise of Shah. The political 
instability was further heightened by the Imposed War17 (1980-88). On the other hand, EA 
was able to capitalise on low exchange rates and went on a development spree according to 
                                                 
13 He is Deputy Minister of Energy for WRWW. 
14 I.e. to get more water allocation for the province.  
15 Responses such as legislation will be analysed in Section 5.5. 
16 This terms used by Allan (2005) to describe a demand driven water management paradigm involving 
building hydraulic infrastructure as described in Chapter II and will be discussed further in Chapter VII.  
17 Iraq-Iran war is known as the 1st Gulf War. It is commonly agreed that Iraq started the war and so in Iran is 
known as the Imposed War (1980-88).  
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some Kurdish politicians (Table A1.4, 2010). This perspective is very strong in Kurdistan 
and WA. However, WA has now taken over EA in terms of its development drive but have 
an extensive program to catch up. 12 dams are under construction with 1235 MCM 
regulated capacity (IWRMC, 2011). FYDPs drive the infrastructure building programme 
and hence remain the most important legal framework with respect to water resources 
planning and development.  
 
Figure 5.8: Number of existing dams (red line) and new modern irrigation network area 
(blue line) for the period 1969-2010:showing a rapid growth in the number of dams but 
irrigation networks has lagged behind; the graph is misleading to suggest that over one 1 
nearly 80,000 ha of land was developed; this perhaps shows the capacity for Mahabad dam 
which came to operation in 1970; therefore the green line (drawn by the author) is 
postulated to show a realistic representation of irrigation development: the expansion began 
after the Imposed War specially after the 2nd FYDP. 
 
Pro development arguments have won since water sector performance is judged by 
the level of achieving FYDPs i.e. how many dams have been completed.  In addition, there 
is a tremendous political lobbying by provincial governors and MPs to provide economic 
incentives to their constituents.  
Land use policy. The politics of irrigation and “hydraulic mission” (Allan, 2005) 
have dominated the policy sphere in LUB but with not much physical success (see Figure 
5.8). Water resources planning have emphasised securing more water for agriculture but 
irrigation and drainage network constructions have lagged behind dam-building. There are 
many dams without even primary networks.  The land use policy on the other hand, has 
resulted in loss of wetland area, increase in reservoir (dam) area and loss of rangelands.  
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5.4.3.  Pressures   
Urbanisation explosion. The rate of urbanisations has been fast and Tabriz is 
considered to be the 4th mega city18 in Iran.  A 500% increase in urban land use in the 
sensitive ecological zone around LU for the period 1990-2000 (Yekom, 2000) is a clear 
pressure indicator. Inter-provincial conflicts have risen as a result of the increased 
urbanisation and population growth.  For example, Tabriz mega city (capital of EA) has a 
population of over 1.2 million people. Tabriz's water supply is secured for WA's Zarinarud 
dam which receives much of its water from Kurdistan. However, Tabriz is suffering from 
water shortage and hence a second water transfer line is underway from WA (Sorkhab, 
2010). But this has been opposed by the WA Governor. The project has been delayed 
because foreign finance has not been found and there has been resistance from WA to the 
proposed plans.  
WA sells water to EA despite lack of formal water trading rules. The present 
agreement to deliver water to Tabriz can be regarded as water trading between provinces. 
In informal interview meetings with both EA and WA stakeholders, the idea was not 
paradoxically popular (Appendix A1, Table A1.5).The implication is that they have to buy 
from Kurdistan. Nevertheless, participants from Kurdistan thought that there is a clear need 
to establish water trading rules or legislation to ensure equitable use of the resource and 
reduce the provincial conflicts. 
Increased demand. Hashemi (2008) reviewed much of the recent secondary data on 
water demands (e.g. Yekom, 2002, 2005; WRI, 2005 and Jamab, 2007) but there is lack of 
adequate information about water demands. However, they all agree that most of water 
demands come from the agricultural sector i.e. 94% compared to 5.6% for drinking and 
0.4% for industry. Water use efficiency in irrigation is very low (less than 30%) (Table 
5.4). 
Agricultural water use is virtually uncontrolled: 87% come from groundwater 
resources owned by mainly private well owners and most of surface water is abstracted by 
traditional water rights. However, drinking supply is a cause of heightening future conflicts 
as in the Tabriz case.  
                                                 
18 Mega city means a population of more than 1 million people 
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Urban 
waste
Agriculture Drinking Industry Total (Tons)
SW GW SW GW SW GW SW GW
4022 313.117 44.057 4379 957 451.5 36.4 116.18 16.85 10.25 1010.5 677.68 986,799
note:
GW: Groundwater, SW: Surface water
Agriculture Drinking Industry Total
Water demand, MCM Return Flows, MCM,
Table  5.4: Water demand based on Year 2001 and return flows (Jamab, 2007). 
As stated, MoE (2010b) has found that 27% of abstractions are due to new mainly 
agricultural development based on trend method analysis. Unfortunately, there is no clear 
statistical data of consumptions to be able to draw an accurate trend. Nevertheless, the 
increases in demands have been noticed in all the sectors. Most of the major national 
studies (Yekom, 2002, WRI, 2005, Jamab, 2007) have estimated water demands for the 
basin with different methodological approach and periods.  
To deal with increased demands, MoE is using the climate change discourse based 
on several main narratives: 
1. risks due to climate change and drastic climatic variability in the basin; 
2. agricultural water demand has to be re-assessed in the re-allocation process; 
3. “water for  environment” should be emphasised; for example, Lake Urmia 
have not featured in Water Master Plans; and 
4. resources are limited: i.e. we cannot allocate water based on average 
conditions or normal conditions because of the climatic  variability and 
change 
However, policymakers have not been able to formulate real solutions to the 
problem underlined in the above discourse. Irrigation efficiency has been postulated as a 
way to save more water for the environment but in practice, farmers tend to use extra water 
to irrigate more land; and in fact the land policy has favoured this option. It is interesting to 
note that lower irrigation efficiency has meant that the return flow has been ‘beneficial’ as 
inflows into LU. Without the return flows, LU would be in serious problems.  
Localised groundwater overexploitation and pollution. Groundwater resources 
supply 45% of the total demand; of which 87% is used for agriculture (WRI, 2005). Most 
of the aquifers are in normal conditions have a prospect of further development by about 
150 MCM according to WRI (2005). However, several northern and eastern aquifers suffer 
from continuous lowering and negative recharge as shown in Table 5.5. Nearly more than 
65% of the abstractions return to the system with much less quality and hence put pressures 
on the WRS.  
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Aquifer area Province 
Average annual 
groundwater 
lowering (m) 
Unit 
Hydrograph 
duration (year) 
General condition of water table 
Salmas WA -1 7 Continuous lowering 
Ajabshir EA -0.4 13 Continuous lowering 
Tabriz EA -0.1 12 Negative recharge  
Azarshahr EA -0.1 10 Negative recharge 
Bilverdi-
Duzozan 
EA -0.4 5 Continuous lowering 
Sufian-
Shabestar 
EA 0.45 8 Continuous lowering 
Tessuj EA 1.4 7 Continuous lowering 
Table 5.5: Major aquifers with negative groundwater recharge and continuous water table 
lowering (Source: WRI, 2005). 
 
Return flow and wastewater from settlements (urban and rural) agricultural, 
drainage and industrial sites (Table 5.4) are increasingly an important component of water 
resources management in LUB. They form a large portion of the basin’s water cycle. There 
is consensus that in future, these return flows constitute a large segment of the renewable 
water resources with an increasing role; hence, there is a need to include this factor in the 
strategic planning and integrated management of the water resources.  
A third of the agricultural water demand and more than 2/3 of the water supply, 
sanitation, industrial and mining sectors return to the system and in many cases cause 
environmental degradation of the water resources (Jamab, 2007). 
WRI (2005) notes that the amount of water required for sustainable management of 
the satellite wetlands (e.g. about 15 MCM for Mahabad sub basin) is negligible and can be 
obtained from return flow without impairing agricultural developments and irrigations 
schemes. However, this is not true for the survival of the Lake. In the case of the Lake, 
abstracted water reduces inflow into the Lake and hence has a direct impact of the 
sustainability of its biodiversity and environment. 
Land use change in the urban, industrial and farming sectors have been a source of 
pressure on water resources system. For example, some of the pressures to the satellite 
wetlands are (WRI, 2005 based on Pandam, 2005): (1) conversion of the wetland habitat 
into cultivated land, (2) increased pollution from agricultural fertilisers and pesticides 
causing eutrophication and degradation of the water quality, (3), disturbance of wetland 
wildlife and (4) overgrazing in the basin. For example the trends in land use changes in the 
ecological zone during 1990-2000 (Yekom, 2002) are shown in Table 5.6. 
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Table5.6:  Land use/land covers change of the Ecological Zone, 1990-2000 (Yekom, 2002). 
 
5.4.4.  States/Impacts:  
Lake Urmia (LU)’s physical and biochemical indicators. Lake Urmia is situated at 
the extreme downstream of all the river watersheds in the basin. Therefore, the lake itself is 
a good indicator for both the State of the ecosystem and the Impact of the water resources 
planning and abstraction. Since mid-1990s, two major droughts were experienced (1999-
2001 and 2007). LU's water level drops started in 1995 which coincided with the 
introduction of 2 dams. The droughts have heightened the water shortage problem and 
some fear that LU will slowly be desiccated. Another Aral Sea is looming in Iran's most 
celebrated and historic lake. The State of the LUB ecosystem and the Impact on the water 
resources system is shown in Figure 5.9 which simplifies a complex set of dynamic and 
complex interactions within the ecological, geological and hydrological dimensions of the 
system. 
Land use/land cover 
Area (ha) Area (ha) Area changed 
(ha) 1990-2000 
% change 1990-2000 
1990 2000 
Irrigated land 116870 128220 11350 9.7 
Orchard and tree sets 46060 47420 1360 3 
Mixed agriculture/orchards 14730 23140 8410 57.1 
Mixed range/dry farming 37760 38420 660 1.7 
Rangeland
1
 233170 123290 -109880 -47.1 
Salt land/salt flat
2
 115320 231540 116220 100.8 
reservoirs/fishponds and 
artificial wetlands
3
 
2470 8880 6410 359.5 
Lake Urmia 523940 483300 -40640 -7.8 
Others 2890 15200 12060 426 
Total  1093210 1099410     
Notes: 
   
  
¹ The trend of changes was not determined due to the lack of information   
² The area of rangeland and salt lands and their corresponding changes during 1990-2000 are 
for the northeast of the Ecological Zone 
  
  
³ Wetlands in the Mahabad and Gadar chai sub basins which were completely desiccated out equal to 2085 ha 
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Williams (2002) highlights five major human induced factors affecting (usually 
with an adverse impact) salt lakes as follows (Table 5.7): (1) surface inflow diversions 
which will affect both the physical (volume, water level) and chemical (salinity) 
characteristics of the salt lakes - permanent salt lakes are more inclined to be affected by 
surface inflow diversions as well as catchment activities; (2) catchment activities such as 
(a) secondary (or anthropogenic) salinisation caused by leaching of salt deposits in the 
catchment of the salt lakes; (b) soil erosion, (c) groundwater pumping and (d) urban 
development; (3) salt-mining mostly affects dry lakes; (4) pollution especially from 
wastewater and agriculture and (5) anthropogenically-induced climatic and atmospheric 
changes as climate models predict that the aridity of arid regions will increase. This means 
that the temporary salt lakes will be drier for longer periods and permanent lakes will 
become smaller and saltier (Williams, 2002). Based on these five factors, LU is compared 
to Aral Sea, which is a permanent salt lake on the brink of extinction (Table 5.7). LU has a 
striking similarity with the Aral Sea as most of the water use is in the agriculture sector. 
Increase storage capacity. Permanent lakes, such as Aral Sea and Lake Urmia, have 
been affected by the diversion of surface water (by dams) mainly for agriculture. In the last 
10 years, surface water diversion has affected the salt concentration and water balance of 
the Lake. For a decade, inflow into LU has been in the order of a tenth of the average long-
term inflow. The precipitation in the basin has been on a downward trend. The salinity has 
increased, which has caused the demise of the only organism in the Lake; namely Artimea. 
Many birds, such as pelicans and flamingo, have lost their habitat and so the Lake is on its 
death-bed, if the current situation persists. 
The physiochemical characteristics of the Lake Urmia Lake are vital indicators to 
assess the environmental, ecological status of the Lake. With regard to quality of the lake 
water, past works have looked into 4 parameters: 
1. Sedimentation in the Lake via inflowing rivers 
2. The Electric Conductivity (EC)  
3. The Total Dissolved Solid (TDS) rate 
4. The dissolved  salt (NaCl) (since this is an important factor for Artima's 
reproduction-the only living organism in the Lake together with some green 
and blue alga) 
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Figure 5.9: The dynamics of the States/Impacts inter-linkage for LUB.  
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Table 5.7: Human Impacts on Lake Urmia compared to Aral Sea. 
 
The last 3 parameters are basically measures of Lake's salinity. The origin of the 
salinity is well discussed by WRI (1995) which has been reflected in all the studies 
including Yekom (2002, 2005,). According to researchers, LU has a history of 500 
thousand years and the present Lake is 35-40 thousand years old. The ultra-saturated 
condition had prevailed since 8-9 thousand years ago. There are two issues with important 
consequences: (1) LU has a natural depth (cavity) without any exits for sediments and 
dissolved particles. Therefore, after evaporation, all the solids are left behind; and (2) the 
sediment loads mix with salt particles to form 90 m deep muddy layers at the bottom of the 
Lake. Hence, it is concluded that the main source of salinity is from surface water inflows 
into the lake.  
Various consulting engineers and IWRMC reports indicate that the amount of 
annual sediment inflow into the Lake is estimated as 5.3 million tonnes of which 40% is 
conveyed by Aji Chai River, EA. The completion of many dam building projects is going 
to affect the level of sedimentation into the Lake and will reduce sharply the amount of 
sediments entering the Lake [off course it will reduce the amount of inflow as well]. EC is 
the most common indictor used to establish the salinity of a water body. Due to a large drop 
in the Lake's water level, EC of the Lake has risen sharply. EC depends on internal ionic 
movements of the dissolved salt but it is a function of surrounding temperature as well 
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since temperature will affect molecular movements. The Average EC in the past 36 years 
(1967-2004) has been estimated as 382,740 μm/ cm by Yekom (2005). 
In the index period of 1966-2002, the average TDS has been 267 g/l according to 
WRI (2005) study at the average water level. A value of 222.6 g/l is given for an index 
period of 1993-2004 by the Yekom (2005). The maximum TDS of 362g/l was recorded in 
February 2002.  A recent TDS of 338 g/l was recorded in January 2008. This is above the 
tolerance level of Artemia production. According to some reports as sited by Yekom (2002) 
and Nazaridoust (2006), the Artemia cysts are unable to hatch when the NaCl (salt) 
concentration is above 250g/l. Therefore; the ecological requirement (discussed in Chapter 
VI) for salt level is 240 g/l. 
The annual rate of salt inflow into the lake is estimated to be 2.2 million tons (WRI, 
2005 and Yekom, 2005); some 54% (1.2 million tons) is from Aji Chie River. It is 
estimated that 4.8 billion tons of salts are dissolved in the Lake. This is 2800 times more 
than the annual inflow of salts via surface flows. There is a direct linear relationship 
between the TDS value and the EC (Nazaridoust, 2006). With reduction in Lake's water 
level, there is a corresponding increase in EC value of the Lake which is an indication of 
the salinity of the Lake's water content.   
Water quality dose not consist only of salinity related parameters as discussed 
above. Additional water pollution indicators need to be considered in any assessment of the 
quality of the Lake. Therefore, these indicators are important and paramount in the 
application of IWRM and attainment of environmental sustainability criteria in the 
management of the lake.  At present, it is unfortunate that there is no baseline data on 
pollution indicators which is a major information gaps with regard to water quality of LU. 
5.4.5.  Responses  
In Section 4.4.4 in Chapter IV, the main Responses and policy options were 
discussed and are not repeated here. Therefore, this section is complimentary to the 
discussion in the named section. 
Emergence of new governance system. The modern state required new 
administrative divisions to move away from Princedoms (Ayalat) and small States 
(Welayat) systems. So the Constitutional Revolution (1905-9) started the process. Figure 
5.10 shows the evolution of a new governance system with reference to LUB. However, as 
shown in Figure 5.10, the development of water administration has lagged behind the 
Chapter 5 
 
147 
political administrations. This shows that the new governance system did not include water 
planning and allocation management.  
Formal water planning administration came into existence in 1943 with the 
establishment of the Independent Irrigation Agency (the Bongah). This was an attempt to 
manage the water resources planning process. With reference to Figure 5.10 it can be 
deduced that  
· There has been a mismatch between the establishment of political administrational 
and water administration.  
· Water resources planning have gone through 4 phases. The administrative evolution 
has been driven by 1959 Water Resources Blueprint which envisaged a programme 
of water (dams) and land (irrigation) development. The Development Council and 
Plan and Budget Organisation were responsible for these plans initially and so the 
Bongah was established to oversee the developments. Hence, administrative 
changes were born based on political considerations outside the water resources 
domain.   
 
Figure 5.10:  The timeline for the development of provincial administrative divisions and 
respective water administrations with reference to water resources planning and allocation. 
 
· The drastic disparity and mismatch is illustrated by the development of water 
management institutions in LUB. East and West Azerbaijan provinces were 
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Regional Water Company (KRWC) was established in 2006. Therefore, in past, 
Kurdistan has not been considered to be a major player in LUB. This current tension 
between Kurdistan and WA water allocations to Kurdistan from existing Zarinarud 
dam has a historical dimension. Despite supplying more than 85% of the dam's 
water, Kurdistan has a small share of the allocation. 
· It can be said that both Azerbaijanis and Kurdistan share a turbulent history and so 
has been influenced by non-water policies. For example, in 1980, Western 
Development Company which was based in Kurdistan was moved to Kermanshah 
under the name of Western Regional Water Company (WRWC) "due to political 
situations and a Decree by the Supreme Revolutionary Council"
19.   
· After the revolution, administrative changes continued to be motivated by the old 
Pahlavi vision of modernisation and development until late 1990s when the 
concepts such as IWRM and sustainable development were adopted in national 
policy and legislations. However, opinions and perspectives within MoE have been 
without consensus. The political drive for decentralisation and privatisations has not 
been reflected in water administrative change. 
·  In 2004, some of the remaining regional water companies were broken into 
provincial companies. WRWC was dismantled to form 5 provincial companies 
including Kurdistan Regional Water Company (KRWC). So, a dual policy has been 
pursed: IWRM and the concept of river basin as a unit at national level in 
conjunction with provincial water management at regional level. This related to 
power relationship between governors and the regional water companies:  on the 
one hand, regional companies such as WRWC were not accountable to provincial 
officials i.e. they had a larger jurisdiction than the political boundary of a province 
and felt more powerful. On the other hand, provincial representatives of  regional 
companies did not have the ranking status as director general enjoyed by other 
governmental departments; thus in the case of WRWC, Kurdistan's local 
representative as well as Hamadan, Ilam and Lorestan wanted to gain more power 
and independence from Kermanshah-based WRWC. Kurdistan has felt that there 
has been a degree of discriminations in terms of water resources planning and 
allocation due to their downgraded status. Hence, the discourse is that the new 
KWRC is in a better place to take care of the province's interest. According to this 
                                                 
19 This is mentioned in the website of KRWC.  
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Box 5.1:  Regional agriculture 
development plans 
 
· Kurdistan: currently have 
19,000 ha irrigated area; future 
plans: orchards: 20,000ha, 
irrigated lands: 40,000 ha   
· WA: currently have 189,200ha 
irrigated area; future plans: 
orchards: 40,000ha, irrigated 
lands: 162,600 ha   
· EA: currently have 265,000 ha 
irrigated area; future plans: an 
increase of 3.5% (9300 ha per 
year) in the last 7 years. 
Source: Appendix A1, Table A1.4 
notion, home-grown (local) mangers are more accountable and act more 
responsibly. This discourse has been encouraged by political manifestos which 
promised local rule and managers in the provinces e.g. this issue was part of the 
2009 Presidential Manifesto20. 
The non-structural response in the water sector has been partially based on the 
needs to carry out the structural response programme but the geopolitical factors have 
played a major role in shaping the institutional set up.  Administrative divisions are 
unavoidable due to population growth and economic realities but they should take a holistic 
approach by considering environmental, transportation, tourism, agriculture, energy and 
water demands, commerce and security aspects within the macroeconomic planning and 
development strategy (Farzanegan, 2001).  
The structural Response has been based on agrarian policy of food security and 
more irrigated area (described in Chapter IV). As 
noted earlier, most of the large dams have been built 
or under construction. The dam building in LUB has 
been marred with financial difficulties and hence the 
progress made by some projects is under par. 
Agricultural development plans for the provinces are 
based on increasing more irrigated land (Box 5.1). 
EA is leading the provinces and in the last 7 years an 
average of 9300 ha has been developed each year. 
WA is planning to develop a further 202,000 ha and 
this requires nearly 4000 MCM of surface water. 
Kurdistan is lagging behind and has no dams in operation and no irrigation and drainage 
network in place. It seeks to develop a further 60,000 ha. IWRMC (2011) recognised that 
by year 2016, irrigation networks will be around 324,000 ha after the completion of the 12 
dams.  
There are many important questions to be considered: (1) are there adequate water 
resources for these expansion plans? (2) Are these plans within the framework of 
agricultural sustainability and IWRM? (3) What criteria have been used in these plans? (4) 
What are the impact of climate changes and other anthropogenic drivers? (5) Can LU and 
                                                 
20 Section 2.8 of the 9th Government Plans available on http://www2.irna.ir/occasion/dolat9/index.htm 
 
Chapter 5 
 
150 
the satellite wetlands survive after implementing these plans? Lake Urmia has entered a 
very critical stage; its demise is a distinct possibility as graphically shown in Figures 5.11 
and 5.12; the lake has shrunk to half of its size. None of the stakeholders could have a clear 
answer to the above questions which indicates that the plans did not consider the IWRM 
and sustainability approaches. Thus, the sustainability of these plans is doubtful. Therefore, 
revised Responses are required to deal with the imbalance created by the “hydraulic 
mission” in LUB. 
 
Figure 5.11: Farming at the Coast of the LU; up to 7 km coastal retreat is shown (25 May 
2009, Mahabad-Urmia Motorway; photo by Mukhtar Hashemi). 
 
New rules. Referring to Section4.4.4, there are two main legislations in water 
planning, management and allocation including  
· The 1982 FWD Act which aims to empower MoE to become 'the guardian' 
of both groundwater and surface waters and 
· The2003 WAD which has given responsibility to Water Policy and 
Allocation Commission (WPAC) at MoE to make allocation decisions based 
on simulation and modelling of the water resources at basin or sub-basin 
level. It requires legally using system dynamic modelling and this in itself is 
an innovation. We will return to this theme in Chapter VI. 
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Before year 2003, water allocation was based on proposal applications by regional 
companies indirectly to the commission via the Planning and Development Deputy Office, 
IWRMC. Hence the 2003 WAD aims to reverse the provincial perspective to water needs 
(or demands) and to have a river basin approach.  
In reality many decisions have been made about dam buildings in the WPAC 
without upholding the 2003 WAD. Some have ignored the commission altogether by 
building dams without any allocation decisions.  Therefore, much customary rules in use 
have prevailed and RWCs have not been able to implement the formal rules. There are 
three important elements: (1) unauthorised abstractions of both groundwater and surface 
waters have been rife; (2) according to the WPAC "no dams in LUB have formal Water 
Allocation Permits (WAPs)" (Appendix A1, Table A1.4) and (3) groundwater overdraft has 
continued and RWCs have not been able to cap the consumption of legal permit holders. 
The institutional set up has failed to sustainably manage water resources in LUB; e.g. MoE 
has been unable to manage water resources during the LU crisis and the sharp drop in its 
levels (Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Lake Urmia coastal retreat (Photo by Mukhtar Hashemi). 
Concluding remarks. The DPSIR analysis in Section 5.4 shows that despite 
introducing the 2003 WAD, MoE has failed to implement a sustainable water allocation 
strategy in LUB. In the next section, an institutional analysis is made to better understand 
the process of water allocation in the period from 2003 till the period leading up to the 
MoU agreement in 2008 in the path towards IWRM.  
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5.5 Institutional analysis: The efficacy of the Responses on water allocation 
decisions for the period 2003-2008 
5.5.1.  Introduction  
With reference to Figure 3.13 (Chapter III, p.82), the focal level of water allocation 
decision analysis is at multitier action arena and action situations; Figure 5.13 shows the 
focal point of analysis used to make an assessment that why water allocation institutions 
failed to implement the IWRM paradigm after its introduction.  
 
Figure 5.13: Conceptual focal point of analysis. 
 
Earlier parts of Chapters IV and V (as indicated on Figure 5.13) providea detailed 
account of the characteristics of the national and provincial attributes using combined 
DPSIR-IAD approach.  In this analysis, we concentrate on the rules in useusing IAD 
analytical approach. First, the rules in use in described in Section 5.5.2 and then their 
vertical integration in multi-level decision-making are outlined.(Section 5.5.3) Water 
allocation interactions in pre 2008 period is evaluated (Section 5.5.4) followed by an 
assessment of the efficacy of the rules in use at constitutional, collective choice and 
operational decision-making levels in Section 5.5.5.  
5.5.2 Rules in use   
The main rules in use are given in Figure 5.14. Before 1943, there was no specific 
water allocation law. Customary water rights existed and users freely used water resources. 
In 1909, The Civic Code introduced laws governing property rights which included well 
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and qanat (groundwater rights) ownership. The first water law came in 1929, the Qanat 
Law which again was an attempt to control the use of qanats. The Civic Code was updated 
in 1989 and is still in force. 
In 1943, the Bill for the establishment of the Irrigation Bongah was established to 
control the use of surface water resources and to bring in some sort of order to a 
disorganised water sector. However, water allocation was based on property (land) rights 
with no implicit reference to centralised allocation process. The dominant perspective had 
strong economic and institutional (political) dimensions. The FYDPs were a driving force 
towards both economic reconstruction and institutional (organisational) change. Laws were 
brought in as a result of this economic and political perspective.  
In 1968, The Nationalisation of Water Act was a first major step to have a central 
control over water allocation. This allowed water charging for distribution of water 
(drinking and industrial as well as irrigation). The water charges were nominal. Provincial 
water companies were established in mid 1960s but they did not have a control over water 
allocation.  However, informal rules were prevalent and water allocation was based on 
riparian rights. Major dams were built and this meant that agricultural corporations were 
formed to sell water for irrigation. Water allocation for newly built irrigation networks and 
agro-businesses in the 1970s was enforced centrally. But, this represented a small 
percentage of water abstraction.  
Formal Water allocation rule was specified by the 1982 FWD Act. Since 1983, 
there has been an attempt to control water allocation by the central authorities. 
Accordingly, MoE is responsible for water allocation to each sector and province. Intra-
sectoral allocation will be made by each sectoral institution; for example agricultural water 
quota will be given to MoAJ to allocate for its sector. However, all water abstraction 
permits should be obtained from MoE. The 1982 Act specifies priories for water allocation 
in the following ranking order: drinking, industrial, agriculture and environment. In 1990, 
the Bill for creating water and wastewater companies was passed and gave these companies 
the power to obtain water quota and then distribute to the households and industrial 
customers. The Majlis produces a Water Charging Bill every year and controls highly 
subsidized water prices. In 1998, the Bill for establishing rural water and wastewater 
companies were passed but lacked any real financial investments to make inroads in the 
rural area. However, this attempted to control water allocation in rural area by tagging a 
subsidised price to water supply in rural areas. In this period, MoE gradually fastened its 
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control over water allocation but the main problem remained to be groundwater resources 
which were mostly owned by private well owners. The wells are provided with Water 
Allocation Permits. However, there are considerable number of unauthorised wells in 
addition to informal or unauthorised abstractions from unregulated rivers and streams as 
well. Information about unauthorised wells is not public and RWCs sometimes hide this 
information from MoE (Appendix A1, Table A1.5) 
In 2000, the Bill for establishment of MoAJ created some confusion about the role 
of MoAJ in agricultural water allocation. Article 11 asks for an inter-sectoral cooperation 
and agreement between MoE and MoAJ for agricultural water demand, supply, utilisation 
and distribution. In the meantime, MoAJ and AJOs had built small supply dams and 
petitioned MoE and RWCs for the required water under the legal umbrella of the 
Agricultural Water, Water Supply, Reservoirs and Irrigation Network Directive. MoAJ 
was supposed to create water user associations (WUA) in which the users, RWCs and AJOs 
have a stake of 25%, 24% and 23% respectively. This rule has not been materialised. 
Instead, RWCs established a limited number of WUAs which were 100% owned by the 
RWCs. 
2003 Water Allocation Directive. Article 11 of the MoAJ Bill, was very vague and 
had produced tensions between MoAJ and MoE and their provincial subsidiaries. The 2003 
Directive have moved from economic perspective to an environmental and physical 
resources perspective. The 2003 Directive is based on river basin planning and allocation. 
IWRM became the national policy and so, water allocation was supposed to follow the 
IWRM principles. It requires the use of modelling tools to simulate the whole basin in 
order to come up with water allocation strategy. However, the Directive fails to recognize 
the provincial and inter-provincial water allocation conflicts and hence, the application of 
the Directive has been limited so far.  
Informal rules. In parallel to the formal set of formal rules, informal rules operate 
in the form of 
· a communal set of traditional water rights including groundwater resources 
from private wells as well as traditional river stream rights ; 
· unplanned water abstractions21 and 
· unauthorised abstractions  
                                                 
21 For example due to sectoral and provincial planning, some of the water abstractions are not within formal 
planning framework 
Chapter 5 
 
155 
Informal rules are important in two ways: firstly, as there are no effective provincial 
and inter-provincial water allocation rules, informal rules are widely applied in the basin; 
and secondly, the formal rules have been used to legalise informal or unauthorised 
abstractions by issuing permits creating water rights for the users. Hence, any new water 
allocation process involves highly sensitive issue of re-allocating the existing water 
abstractions by the water users. This is a classic example of upstream and downstream 
conflict. 
5.5.3. The vertical integration of action situation and rules in use  
Based on IAD component described in Chapter III, the interactions of rules in use 
and action situations at multiple decision and analysis levels are shown in Figure 5.15. We 
have to remember that the water allocation process is entwined with broader sets of rules 
which are related to wider action situations such as planning process, utilisation of water 
resources and so forth.  
Water allocation decision outcomes which occur at the operational level action 
situation not only monitored and sanctioned by collective choice rules but will be affected 
by the attributes of the community and the biophysical world.  Furthermore, the collective 
choice rules are monitored and sanctioned by the Constitutional level rules. Water users 
such as farmers have created informal rules which are based on customary laws, informal 
water rights and sometimes unauthorised abstraction rules. These rules are not recognised 
but decision-makers are aware of them. However, in most occasions, they are unable to 
change these rules.  
The “nesting of rules” (as termed by Ostrom, 2005) in LUB is complicated by the 
fact that water allocation outcomes which is an operational decision is made at national, 
provincial and local levels and hence poses a serious challenge and is a source of conflict. 
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Figure  5.14: Rules in use. 
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Allocation Code (WAC) was enacted in 2008 which is beyond the scope of this part of the 
analysis (see Chapter VI). It took five years to issue the 2008 Code for the 2003 WAD.  
 
Figure 5.15: Vertical integration of rules in use: level of analysis and outcomes (Ostrom, 
1999, p.60; 2005, p.59). 
 
5.5.4. Interactions: Water allocation practice in LUB pre MoU period 
Water allocation before 2003.Legal entities such as individuals and private 
companies (industrial, agricultural and drinking) had to make applications to the district 
(county) representatives of RWCs. Using water allocation priority policy, the application 
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was approved given that the necessary documents and technical reports were submitted. 
Ownership and property documents were the most important documents. This allocation 
would have been in line with the quota given to each province. In this analysis, we will not 
concentrate on individual water allocation; instead, provincial bulk surface water allocation 
process is discussed. 
Groundwater resources in LUB are mainly controlled by private landowners of 
wells and qanats and hence, the 1982 FWD Act was an attempt to control groundwater 
resources. Initially, private individuals and companies were offered a Water Allocation 
Permit (WAP) without any strict criteria to encourage owners to register their share. The 
wells did not have volumetric devices to monitor the implementations of the WAPs which 
are oversubscribed. According to the participants (Appendix A1), there are many non-
permit owners which use groundwater resources. Basically, there is no policing mechanism 
towards implementation of groundwater allocations.   
Provincial’ bulk’ shares were determined according to water resources planning 
and allocation proposals which were prepared separately by different economic sectors in 
the province. RWCs made application to the Water Planning Bureau of the IWRMC. After 
appraisal of the proposal by the technical committee it was sent to the WPAC for final 
approval. Some of stakeholders (participants) were highly critical of the decisions made by 
WPAC which according to them was biased and highly political (Appendix A1, Tables 
A1.1- A1.3). However, due to inter-provincial conflicts, not much decision was made by 
the Commission. But this did not stop provinces to ask for water allocation through their 
water and agriculture plans. Some of these projects were provincial projects with provincial 
Credit Orders and so did not need MoE’s approval. Some of these projects later become 
national projects and were entitled to national Credit Orders.  
EA was more successful than the other two to attract Credit Orders for their national 
and provincial projects with Kurdistan being least fortunate. Kurdistan did not have an 
independent RWC and was part of the Western Regional Water Company based in the 
neighbouring province of Kermanshah. According to some participants (Appendix A1, 
Table A1.5), a high level of mistrust between WAPC and RWCs was created. IWRMC’s 
Water Planning Bureau also felt unease about the role of WPAC and the manner it dealt 
with the backlogs of proposals which were with no decisions. Some of the stakeholders felt 
that these projects “should be closed and finished” or “if water allocation was not possible, 
WPAC should formally reject them” (Source: ibid). These tensions between two MoE 
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subsidiary organisations have not hindered the will of the provinces to ask for more and 
many proposals were sent. Water for environment was only met through unregulated river 
flows. There was no formal consideration for environmental water allocation. 
Local provincial water allocation was controlled by Water Allocation Departments 
of the RWCs. First, provincial water resources plan was approved according to the 
guidelines and the codes based on the rules in use and then allocation was made according 
to the plan. Any conflicts of interest between different sectors were resolved in the 
provincial Water and Agriculture Commissions 
This period is characterised by lack of inter-provincial co-ordination in water 
planning in LUB and each province tried to attract more projects with varying success to 
have more bargaining power at a later date. Informal water abstractions (pumping from 
rivers and streams, unauthorised wells etc.) were exercised in LUB. According to some 
participants from Kurdistan, WA had exercised less control over the informal abstractions. 
Local MPs and provincial governors (and district governors) were considered to be the 
most influential players in “supporting the informal abstraction due to socio-economic 
considerations” (Source: ibid).  
Water allocation for period 2003-2008. The pre 2003 procedure has continued 
despite the new requirement for a basin wide IWRM assessment made by the 2003 
Directive. IWRMC’s Planning directorate has approved many provincial projects to be 
approved by the WPAC.  The Commission has reluctantly approved dam building planning 
projects but did not issue any Water Allocation Permits. Many provincial projects have 
easily obtained Credit Orders without the need for MoE approval so provinces have built 
the infrastructure. Effectively, water allocation was not considered in these plans.  
MoAJ 2003 Directive on small projects was a main driver for building small water 
supply and irrigation networks under the management of AJOs. The Annual Budget Law 
had financed such small projects and so there was a clear source of funding for these 
projects which had an informal water allocation arrangement. Participants have stated 
MoE’s unease about this sort of planning which was an added burden on the RWCs 
(Source: ibid). MoAJ felt that building large dams are not suitable for agriculture and 
hence, these projects were “value for money” and less damaging to the environment 
(Appendix A1, Table A1.3). On the other hand, MoE felt that a comprehensive basin wide 
water resources planning is needed as mentioned in the 2003 WAD (Source: ibid). The 
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political wrangling between MoE and MoAJ continued while provincial RWCs and AJOs 
were on good terms to attract more development funds for their respective provinces.  
To conclude, the outcomes of this analysis can be summarised as follows: 
· Emergence of new rules on water allocation and 
· The inability of MoE to fully implement the rules e.g. 1982 FWD Act and 
2003 WAD based on IWRM after six years of experience and deliberations 
In the next sub-section, we will analyse the main rules in use affecting the 
Interaction-Outcome pathway: (a) based on taxonomical framework for rules; and (b) 
design principles which are described in Chapter III.  
5.5.5. Need for revised Responses:  
Need for comprehensive water law. The 1982 FWD Act (Table 5.8) was an 
important piece of legislation with water resources allocation rules. Prior to this water 
allocation rules were scattered and incomplete. However, the Act has several shortcomings. 
In this section, the Act is analysed based on Ostrom’s (2005) classification of rules as 
followings: 
1. Boundary and position rules: Article 21 (Chapter IV) explicitly states that MoE is 
‘solely’
22 responsible for water allocation decisions as the main position rule. Water 
rights were exclusively given to the State but the law implicitly acknowledges 
private water entitlements ‘haqabe’23 and water users ‘abbaran’24. Haqaba is 
defined as a ‘consumption right’ which has to be rational25. The Act tries to avoid 
the word of private water entitlements. But, it mentions that these rights are only 
transferable with the transfer of lands. Chapter II extends the boundary rule to 
encompass groundwater entitlements and provide a deadline for owners to register 
and gain WAPs based on ‘rational consumption’. However, Article 21 does not 
specify how to apply for water entitlements and hence the 2003 WAD was to 
provide procedural instruction for water allocation. There are numerous Bylaws, 
Directives and Codes and Nota Bene to help the implementation of the Act. 
2. Choice and scope rules: there are numerous choice and scope rules with regard to 
issuance of Water Allocation Permits (WAPs) including consumers should control 
                                                 
22 The Farsi words indicates an exclusive right for MoE 
23 The Farsi word is combination of words ‘right’ and ‘water’ to form right to water and could mean access as 
well as ownership 
24 The Farsi term is ‘water takers’ 
25 The Farsi term for rational, could mean reasonable and wise consumption as well. The author has chosen 
the word rational which is based on reasons and wise mode of actions.    
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demand and stop excessive use as well as their responsibility for not polluting the 
sources. Choice rules deal with actual water allocation rules and the Act has no 
provision for the environment. But, the Act mentioned several situations where it 
can issue WAPs such as if there is un-used public water; or water from treatment 
plants etc. Much of the choice rules are about issuing Permits to the users and less 
about the criteria of water allocation.  The scope rule (water allocation outcome) is 
vaguely defined as ‘rational (reasonable) right’ of use has no upper limit and hence 
it cannot be enforced.   
3. Payoff rules are included in Chapter VII with 10 clauses which deal with ‘damage 
caused to water system structures and unauthorised abstraction or violation of other 
water consumers with up to 3 months imprisonment. Pricing water is discussed in 
Chapter V but the Act does not recognise full water costs and the water charges are 
to be approved by the Supreme Economic Council. The over usage is not permitted 
but no limits have been set and the penalty is not clear.  
Chapters  Articles Bylaws, Directives 
and Codes 
I. Ownership and water rights 
II. Groundwater 
III. Surface waters 
IV. Duties and responsibilities 
including water allocation clause 
V. Water Charges 
VI. Protection and maintenance of 
Public water structures 
VII. Penalties  
2 
15 
3 
12 
2 
8 
 
10 
4 
9 
3 
7 
4 
1 
 
2 
Total  52 30 
Table 5.8: the contents of the 1982 Fairwater Distribution Act 
4. Information rules which refer to the regulations about communication between 
MoE and the applicants are ambiguous and based on voluntary exchange of 
information. In case of pollution for example, the users have to report this to the 
DoE. The Act specifies that agricultural water consumptions will be decided on 
information provided by MoAJ or groundwater abstractions rate is based on 
‘provided information on water resources etc. In another clause it refers to the right 
of MoE to conduct water resources studies and collect information.  
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5. Aggregation Rules to the decision making process. The 1982 Act does not have a 
clear aggregation rule on how for example data information are coordinated that 
lead to consensual perspective on data validity. As there is lack of trust among 
actors, the situation has worsened. There are no rules for concurrence of other actors 
(e.g. MoAJ) to MoE decisions.  
Based on the above assessment, it is argued that in order to implement IWRM, the 
main water law has to be streamlined with other legislations. It is not enough just to 
introduce new rules while the main legislations are in use and there is a far greater 
precedence for its application than newly ‘untested’ rules which are ambiguous.  
2003 WAD: need for procedural guidelines. As mentioned before, WPAC was 
frustrated for the lack of cooperation of RWCs and IWRMC to implement the 2003 WAD. 
There was a degree of resistance to change and off course; there were conflicts between 
WPAC and Water Planning Bureau of IWRMC on procedural matters. The 2003 WAD for 
example, did not have any procedural and operational guidelines and hence it was not 
favoured by water managers. 
IWRMC believed that WPAC should be concerned with policy and governance 
issues (Appendix A1, Tables A1.1- A1.3). However, national actors (MoE, Majlis etc.) had 
shared a dominant perspective that water allocation decisions (an operational level rule) 
should be made at national level and not the basin level based on national interests 
discourse (e.g. MRC, 1995; Memari, 2006). This is in contradiction with IWRM which 
fosters decisions at “lowest local level possible” (GWP, 2000). RWCs continued to use 
1982 FWD Act as the main law and they were not obliged to use 2003 WAD. WPAC was 
frustrated by not receiving support from RWCs.  
Using the design principles (Ostrom, 2005, p.259), an analysis is made based on 
stakeholder perceptions in addition to the outcomes of water allocation process in the LUB. 
Principle 1: clearly defined boundaries. Unlike post 1999 legislations and policy 
documents, the 1982 Act does not specify river basins as a unit for water resources 
planning and management. In the post 1999,  a new set of rules were created at 
constitutional and collective choice levels (such as the 2003 WAD,  2003 Long Term 
Strategies and so forth) which made the1982 Act an out-dated piece of legislation but still 
in force. This means that RWCs would legally follow the 1982 Act approach. The interface 
between province and river basins are not clear. All the provinces in LUB have Trans- 
boundary river basins and hence this unclear boundary rule makes the decisions more 
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difficult. So each province did not have any water allocation quota and so the projects were 
either stopped or went ahead irrespective of water allocation.  
Principle 2: proportional equivalence between costs and benefits. The cost of new 
rules did not feature in the assessment of benefits and costs to the community in question. 
This was due to (1) lack of information and (2) lack of time and funds to have an IWRM 
study of LUB. Provincial stakeholders could not recognise the cost or benefits of the 
government polices to their communities. There is a question of fairness and equity and 
many felt that the system is unfair and unjust especially from Kurdistan and WA points of 
view (Source: ibid).  
Principle 3: collective choice arrangements. Ostrom (2005) asserts that many who 
are affected by the constitutional and collective choice level rules should be able to 
participate in modifying the rules. However, water users were not involved through any 
consultations. These rules were made and modified through a consultation including only 
MoE and RWCs.  
Principle 4: monitoring. Generally, stakeholders have acknowledged that there are 
low enforcement and executive powers to enforce the rules at the operational level (Source: 
questionnaire survey, Appendix A1). There is no basin wide monitoring program and the 
provinces zealously guard their ‘local interests’ rather than swaying towards national 
interest discourse put forward by MoE.  
Principle 5: graduated sanctioning. The sanctions and penalties for non-
compliance are not specified in the 2003 WAD. They are mainly normative type of rules 
and hence, the enforcement is not easy. 
Principle 6: conflicts resolutions. Taking up the river basin approach by MoE 
heightened conflicts between provinces as they were trying to gain more benefits from this 
new approach. The provincial communities generally felt that it is a one way traffic and 
they are not listened too if a conflict arises from WPAC decision. Hence, a conflict 
resolution mechanism has to be incorporated to bridge the gap between provincial 
stakeholders and the WPAC.   
Principle 7: minimal recognition of rights to organise: Referring to Ostrom’s 
notions of the right of users to devise their own institution and their long term tenure rights, 
the new rules lack such rights. In fact, the whole aim of the 1982 Act and the 2003 WAD is 
to define a rigid and rigorous water allocation rules and the users have the right to consume 
only. There is no provision for local level management or participation. The decisions are 
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made by the experts appointed by MoE. In the case of conflicts, courts can give a legal 
ruling and normally very few people win against the state in the courts. However, in 
practice, the balance of power has been towards the users as MoE was not able to fully 
implement the mentioned legislations due to socio-political pressures. 
Principle 8: nested enterprises. In explaining the advantage of smaller nested 
enterprises in larger organisation, Ostrom (2005) advocate the robustness of polycentric 
systems. This will blend local knowledge with scientific information and allow for more 
efficient governance systems. Most of the stakeholders are working within the nested 
systems of both government and the water sector. The stakeholders felt that there is a need 
for streamlining rules within the complex multilevel sectoral governance systems (Source: 
ibid). The 2003 WAD is not going to encourage the formation of polycentric systems of 
governance for water allocation.  
The design principles analysis shows that water allocation system in LUB was not 
robust and the informal local rules of water allocation have dominated the operational 
action arena. Due to the decision uncertainties, the provincial water and agriculture 
development plans remained a major Driving force in the face of pro IWRM rules and 
policies at national level.  
 
5.6 Discussions: Business as Usual (BAU) is not sustainable 
Local Drivers. Geopolitical factors and administrative divisions have played a 
major part in water resource planning and some regional disparity is seen in the country as 
well as provincial inequality at the LUB level. The Administrative Divisions Acts have 
been influential on the scope and scale of the developments and have caused political and 
ethno religious tensions. Administrative changes have taken place without consideration of 
the impact on the water resources system. The reform of AD Act is required to cater for the 
eco-hydrological and environmental dimensions of water resource planning and allocation. 
Environmental aspects have not been a top priority in LUB. The environmental 
catastrophe of LU had a political repercussion and LU gained an agenda status on national 
level (see Chapter II on policymaking aspects). Although, provincial concerns about LU 
have been registered but the “hydraulic mission” and call for more developments have been 
unabated.  
The DPSIR analysis has shown that most of the pressure comes from the 
agricultural sector in terms of increased agricultural demand driven by land use policy and 
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politics of irrigation. The developmental discourse is dominant and has had far reaching 
consequence on environmental degradations in terms of poorer water quality of rivers and 
loss of wetland area as well as a huge drop in Lake Urmia’s water level. Informal (and 
unauthorised) abstraction has become an important norm with virtually no monitoring 
system. Thus, a better institutional design is needed to cater for complex governance 
systems which exist within multilevel smaller nested farming enterprises.   
The institutional analysis has shown that the formal rules (1982 Act, 2003 WAD) 
have not been implemented in LUB due to several important factors including: 
· Lack of cooperation between RWC and MoE on the one hand and MoE and 
IWRMC on the other hand i.e. internal conflicts within water resources 
organisations.  
· Lack of mechanism to bridge the gap between recent laws and established 
water allocation practices (pre 2003 era).  
· Lack of capacity building to institutionalise the new rules in RWCs. 
· Lack of inter-provincial cooperation in terms of water planning. 
· The impact of non-water legislations such as FYDPs and provincial. 
Development Directives on water resources planning i.e. FYDP is project 
driven plan and is different from IWRM Plans. 
 
5.7 Concluding remarks: a new Response based on IWRM  
“Officially, participation is encouraged but in practice stones are thrown in the way” 
A quote by an NGO participant 
 
It can be concluded that the integrated DPSIR-IAD analysis has shown that the 
present institutional set up has failed because it could not deal properly with an increased 
water demand from agricultural sector. There is a need for re-orientation of LUB water 
sector institutions so that it can deal with the pressures exerted on the system. However, 
any institutional design should consider the informal rules in use which have been long 
practiced in LUB and so a participatory water allocation process is recommended. We will 
return to this theme in Chapter VII.  
Emergence of new water management paradigm. As described in Section 5.1, the 
4th FYDP (Article 67) initiated a move towards implementing an integrated ecosystem 
management plan for Lake Urmia. The Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP) was agreed by 
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the stakeholders through the MoU on Lake Urmia management. Due to the Lake’s 
predicament, there was a national outcry to save the lake and to implement the EMP. It can 
be claimed that Iran is moving towards a new water management paradigm. We will return 
to this theme in Chapter VII. 
Earlier, in November 2007, a new institutional design was undertaken by creating 
several working groups on water resources and agricultural management, biodiversity and 
public awareness issues. New boundary and position rules were created in terms of water 
allocation decisions. Initially, water and agriculture were separated but they were put 
together because of the inter-linkage between the two issues, the groups were merged. The 
first meeting of the new Water and Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) meeting was 
conducted in November 2007 as two separate meetings in Urmia city. A stakeholder 
participation platform was created. Position rules about the membership of the WAWG 
were drafted by the CWIP team. Membership was restricted to representatives of the main 
provincial (RWCs, AJOs, EPOs) and national (WPAC, IWRMC) stakeholders. Kurdistan 
stakeholders were not involved in this stage. CWIP was aware of the need of the 
participation of Kurdistan Province in the WAWG. However, Kurdistan Governor’s office 
was not aware of the importance of the issue and KRWC was slow to react to the invitation. 
Meanwhile, the preparation was underway to draft the EMP through a consultation process 
comprising of several workshops attended by the provincial stakeholders, national and 
international consultants including the author. On the 20th of October 2008, the MoU was 
signed. Later, in November 2008, the report by Hashemi (2008) and the final draft of the 
EMP were presented to the stakeholders to be approved and start the water allocation 
process which will be described in the next chapter.  
In March 2009, the author officially became the IWRM National Consultant for 
CIWP to facilitate the agreement on water allocation through the formation of the WAWG. 
Terms of Reference (ToR) for the above position rule is given in Appendix A2.  
Next in Chapter VI, the new participatory approach to water allocation based on a 
new institutional design will be discussed and the technical merits of water allocations 
decisions are assessed using the Integrated Socio-technical Assessment (ISTA) component. 
A reassessment of the institutional set up is made in Chapter VII.  
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Chapter VI. Integrated Socio-technical Assessment (ISTA) for 
Sustainable Water Allocation in Lake Urmia Basin 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter V, Lake Urmia (LU) has been experiencing a fall in its 
level without recovering ever since the1999-2001 drought and has been shrinking at an 
alarming rate; at the end of 2010, the lake level was more than 4 m below its annual 
long term average. Policymakers and, in particular, the Ministry of Energy (MoE) have 
been searching for a window f opportunity to make a reassessment of the development 
plans. But faced with immense socio-political and climatic challenges (Drivers), MoE 
was unable to implement its national flagship polices on IWRM and river basin 
planning.  LU’s predicament ironically has been helpful in the quest for sustainable 
water allocation. The 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between all the 
stakeholders endorses an IWRM-based Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP) in which 
Lake Urmia is a central theme in the water planning and allocation process.  
Based on the MoU, multitier Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) were 
established by the government to implement the Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP) 
by agreeing on a water allocation strategy for all the provinces, while also allocating 
water to Lake Urmia. The MSP comprised of the Water and Agriculture Working Group 
(WAWG), the membership of which was drawn from the major stakeholder 
organizations and selected NGOs. The first part of this chapter (part (1)) describes the 
stakeholder interaction process, consisting of a mix of meetings and technical 
Campaign for LU water rights 
(Design: unknown, source: internet)
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assessments) that led to the water allocations required by the EMP. Therefore, Chapter 
VI has three main objectives: 
1. To describe the new contextual setting for decision-making at Lake 
Urmia basin level; this is described in Section 6.3. The new institutional 
design in the form of multitier Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) and 
associated actors is described. 
2. To extend the DPSIR analysis in Chapter V to cover  the period 2008-
2010;this is described in Section 6.4 to include major IWRM-based 
Responses (R); The D-P-S-I elements have been dealt with in Chapters 
IV and V. 
3. By using the ISTA component of the Integrated Socio-technical 
Framework comprising of two main elements, the analysis was carried 
out by  
a. the actors to make water allocation decisions which is outlined in 
Section 6.5 (part (1); and  
b. the author to assess the sustainability of the water allocation 
decisions using water balance, stochastic rainfall and water 
allocation modelling as shown in Figure 6.1 (part (2):Sections 6.6 
– 6.9). 
4. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.10 
In the next section, the methodological approach employed to achieve the above 
objectives is outlined.   
 
6.2 Methodological Approach 
6.2.1. Unpacking the ISTA component  
With reference to Figure 6.1, the ISTA component comprises of two main 
assessments: 
1. The analysis in part (1) is based on the 2008 Water Allocation Code 
(WAC) which specifies procedures for water allocation. This consist of 
11 steps as fully shown in Figure 6.1 with 4 main phases: 
a. selection of actors and data analysis (steps 1-3); 
b. water resources simulation using system dynamic and water 
balance modelling; 
c. use of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) tools to express 
stakeholder preferences; and 
d. decision-making based on the trade-offs in the MCDA process. 
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Figure 6.1: Data analysis, modelling and MCDA, with reference to the ISTA component 
of the Integrated Socio-technical Framework. 
 
2. Risk based assessment to evaluate the sustainability of water allocation 
decisions in part (2). Part (2) will be fully explained in Section 6.6. 
It must be recognised that the steps described in Figure 6.1 were not carried out 
in a strict order which reflects a real world action arena. For example, data analysis 
1. Selection of  
actors to 
involve in MSP
2. Agreement on 
possible Responses  
(Management 
options/measures) 
5. criteria 
selection 
8. Sensitivity 
analysis
3. Data collection and 
agreement on 
available water using 
Detrending Method
6. Weighting 
criteria 
4. Building water balance model and dynamic simulation model 
7. Water 
Allocation 
Model 
11. Monitoring / Re-
evaluation
9. Proposal on water 
allocation by WAWG 
Selection of 
actors &  
data analysis
Modelling
MCDM 
Methods
Multitier 
Decisions 
10. Decision on water 
allocation by NEC
Analysis by Actors based on 2008 Water  Allocation Code (WAC )
Analysis by author/ analyst: Water Balance Simulations  
Using 
regression 
analysis of  
Historical 
data  
Validation of Water 
Balance Model 
(WBM)
Using  ARMA Model 
and Monte Carlo 
simulation to 
generate multiple 
series of rainfall 
Stochastic Rainfall 
Modelling for 
present and future 
climates  
Simulation of WBM 
Using sliding scale 
reductions of 
abstractions 
Adaptive Water 
Allocation Model
Risk Based Assessment
Notes:
Dotted lines/boxes indicate feedback
ARMA Autoregressive moving average 
MCDA Multii-criteria Decision Analysis 
NEC National Executive Council for the management of Lake Urmia basin
WBM Water Balance Model 
WAWG Water and Agriculture Working Group 
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continued until the last meeting of the stakeholders and beyond; the MCDA process 
started before the completion of simulation model construction. Therefore, the 
dynamism of the process is reflected in this part of the chapter.  The process is outlined 
as follows: 
1. Step 3: Data collection is described next in Section 6.2.3. 
2. Step 1: Contextual setting is described in Section 6.3. 
3. Step 2: The strategy (i.e. management options)  which is represented by 
Responses is outlined in Section 6.4 
4. Steps 3 and 5, which involve choosing baseline data as a basis for water 
allocation criteria are described in Section 6.5.1 
5. Step 6: the weighting of criteria for water allocation using the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) MCDA approach is outlined in Section 6.5.2. 
6. Steps 4, 7,8, and 9: technical support for water allocation using water 
balance modelling and system dynamic simulation (Section 6.5.3) 
7. Step 10: finalising the water allocation decision by the National 
Executive Council (NEC) is outlined in Section 6.5.4. 
8. Step 11: no reassessment of the allocations was made by the actors; 
however, assessments in part (2) are a contribution towards re-evaluating 
the water allocation outcome decisions.   
6.2.2 Data collection 
Data collection methods are given in Chapter III. Data collection was the most 
contentious part of a complex process and agreement on data continued well after the 
provisional decision on allocations was made. In this chapter, the main data used is 
baseline data which was the basis of the water allocation criteria. Baseline data 
collection went through two main stages: secondary data analysis which was carried out 
by the author on behalf of the stakeholders to provide an independent synthesis of the 
available water resources i.e. no new data was produced. This will be described later. 
The baseline data needed for the MCDA included: 
· socio-economic data (population, Regional Domestic Product 
(RDP),etc.) 
· water resources data (e.g. potential natural surface runoff; water demands 
and supply; water abstractions; inflow into the lake etc.) and  
· climatic data (e.g. precipitation, evaporation etc.); all the data were 
provided by the stakeholders and agreed during the water allocation 
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process. The data was also scrutinised during the participatory decision-
making. 
Groundwater resources were not considered in the allocation process for two 
reasons: (1) groundwater discharge to Lake Urmia is about 190 MCM/year which 
represents a small percentage of total inflow into the lake; and (2) it is extremely 
controversial since there is an overlap between groundwater and surface water and 
groundwater is not directly managed by the MoE as abstraction rights are mostly held 
by private tenants. This is a major gap that has to be dealt with in the future and we will 
come to this theme in Chapters VII and IX. 
Synthesis report based on secondary data. At the start of the participatory 
process, it was evident that there was no baseline databank which was endorsed by all 
the actors. There was a clear ownership problem. Thus, a critical review of secondary 
data was commissioned by the actors; the author was chosen to appraise the available 
data and produce the synthesis report which is an independent review of major studies 
made on the Lake Urmia basin. Hashemi (2008) evaluated the status of the water 
resources in the basin and the water budget of the Lake itself based on the 
studies/projects carried out by national and international agencies and organisations. 
Through this synthesis, the knowledge and data uncertainty were dealt with. This 
synthesis report was used as the main reference for making strategic decisions in the 
basin by all the stakeholders and the members of various Working Groups formed as a 
result of consultation exercises during the early stages of the project. 
The independent review by Hashemi (2008) was presented to the stakeholders in 
the last consultation workshop in 2008. Hashemi (2008) tried to address three main 
issues. First, during the consultation period, there was no consensus about even basic 
data e.g. average annual rainfall for the basin; thus, facts and figures needed to be 
synthesised in a coherent manner. Secondly, water for ecosystems (satellite wetlands 
and LU) is not specified in the Fair Water Distribution Act (1982) and so water rights 
for the ecosystem including LU and other satellite wetlands needed to be specified. Past 
works since the1960s1 neither focus on LU nor contain any water balance modelling of 
the lake. They were either (a) Feasibility Studies carried out in the 1960s- 1980s as parts 
of agricultural, irrigation, dam building or highway development projects including 
valuable information about water resources and water quality, or (b) demand driven 
Comprehensive Water Master Plans (described in Chapter IV) which do not recognise 
                                                 
1They are mainly consultancy reports commissioned by ministries and governmental institutions but they 
are not necessarily ‘owned’by them. 
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IWRM and are mainly based on assessment of the technical aspects of river basin 
planning. A brief summary of Hashemi’s (2008) synthesis is provided here. 
In the late 1990s, multi-disciplinary projects based on the river basin paradigm 
started as summarised in Table 6.1. Yekom (2002) was the first project to highlight the 
environmental issues in the basin; there, certain management action plans were 
proposed to deal with institutional, hydrological and ecological requirements in the 
basin.  
 
Reference  
 
Description 
 
ISTA tools 
 
Yakom (2002)  
1995-2002: EC-IIP project conducted baseline studies of the natural, human and 
institutional environment of the Lake Urmia basin, as well as making a large 
number of recommendations for future research, monitoring and sustainable 
management of the Basin 
Socio-technical assessment 
but no modelling was used  
WRI (2005)  2002-2005: It consists of four modules: IWRM (with integrated modelling system); 
water for food, water for ecosystems and Cross cutting module (capacity building).  
RIBASIM, HYMOS and 
GIS software 
Nazaridoust 
(2006)  
2002-2006: PhD thesis entitled “A Methodological Framework, Guidelines and 
DSS Model to Calculate the Minimal Ecosystem Water Requirements for Lake 
Urmia” 
Ecohydrological approach 
Regression modelling  
Yekom (2005)  2003-2005: 9 volumes of reports by Yekom Consulting Engineers: The 
Environmental Impact Assessment and study (quality and quantity) of the 
Development Projects in the LUB. Commissioned by WARWC 
Used the work done by 
Nazaridoust (2006); water 
balance modelling; 
droughts assessment  
On-going 
projects 
 
Timeline 
 
Reference 
 
Description 
Modelling used 
 
MoE (2010b) 
2005-2012: Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project (CIWP) to prepare and 
implement an ecosystem management plan for LUB. This PhD‘s work is based on 
this project.  
Vensim dynamic 
simulation; AHP and 
Expert choice (Multi-
criteria software) 
MoE(2011) 2008-2012:MoE’s Updating the Water Master Plan project (IWRM approach) 
carried out by Mahab Ghodss Consulting Engineers. Draft report has been 
produced in 2011 
 
A DSS to be developed  
Table 6.1: Past and on-going multi-disciplinary research studies in LUB. 
 
There is a lot of overlapping and repetitive reporting which makes the analysis 
rather tedious. The data comes from the most reliable sources since these reports were 
commissioned by ministries and related organisations and the consultancy firms had 
good connections to produce these reports and carry out these major studies. Despite all 
these, there are major information gaps, and much work was needed to organise a 
databank for the basin. 
Yekom (2005) contains a rather detailed analysis of the hydrological data. Using 
results from Nazaridoust (2006), the study comes up with the concept of a minimum 
ecological water requirement of Lake Urmia, providing a first insight into one of the 
elusive pieces of data needed for the water allocation process. We will return to this 
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theme later. Hashemi (2008) highlighted this data in the synthesis report as most of the 
actors were not aware of Lake Urmia’s water requirement.  
Major research gaps identified in the Yekom (2002) study were followed upby 
the other multidisciplinary projects as shown in Table 6.2. One great advantage of the 
multidisciplinary projects has been that a lot of information gaps have been covered: 
new hydrological, climatic and institutional data have been collected and recorded. It 
makes the Lake Urmia basin one of the best-studied catchments in Iran. There is a 
historic link between the projects which can be considered complimentary to each other; 
they also show continuity in the research agenda in the basin which is both unique and 
advantageous. The Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project (CIWP) can be considered 
to be the continuation and culmination of the international projects as the main aim of 
these projects was to achieve sustainability and ecological balance in the whole basin.  
No. Recommendation made by Yekom (2002) 
Works corresponding to the recommendations 
1 Water resources developments in the 
basin combined with the drought period 
have had a remarkable effect on water 
level and lake surface area. A detailed 
study of the water budget in the basin is 
therefore needed.  
Yekom (2005) Volume 2: Water Budget of the Lake; 
WRI 2005: water resources planning modelling including the 
water balance of the lake 
Nazaridoust (2006): ecological water requirement of the lake 
2 A detailed study on microclimatic 
changes and the effect of the Lake in 
climatic moderation is recommended. 
Yekom (2005)  
Volume 5: The Impact of Microclimatic (local Climate) 
changes on the Surface Area of the Lake and vice versa: 
effect of  the Lake on temperature and humidity 
Volume 4: Impacts of Droughts on the Condition of the 
Lake: drought analysis with respect to water inflow into the 
lake and Lake's water level. 
3 Hydrometric stations should be installed 
at the outfall of tributaries near the Lake, 
to provide an accurate estimate of the 
inflows to the Lake. 
Yekom (2005) Volume 1: Calculation of Inflow into the 
Lake; 
WRI (2005): water balance of the Lake 
4 Extensive agriculture is undertaken in 
the coastal areas around the Lake. The 
amount and quality of withdrawal water 
and the return flow to the Lake should 
be monitored. 
Yekom (2005) Volume 1: Calculation of Inflow into the 
Lake 
5 Installation of a water quality-
monitoring network (surface and 
groundwater) near the Lake is essential 
for future monitoring. 
Yekom (2005) Volume 1: Calculation of Inflow into the 
Lake (Water Quality section). 
6 An assessment of saltwater intrusion 
into coastal aquifers should be made and 
appropriate measures, such as artificial 
recharge undertaken. 
WRI (2005) Module 1 Basic Studies Report, section 4 
Groundwater Resources 
7 Since the condition of the Lake is too 
critical from hydrological point of view 
and consequently from biological point 
of view, it is strongly recommended to 
make a comprehensive study of long 
term consequences of water resources 
projects throughout the Lake Urmia 
Basin. 
Yekom (2005) Volume 7: The Impact of Water Resources 
Developments in the Basin on the Lake 
WRI: RIBASIM Modelling approach 
Table 6.2: Follow up of major research gaps which were identified by Yekom (2002), 
WRI (2005) and Yekom (2005). 
 
Qualitative and observational data. Most of the meetings were documented by 
audio and video recordings with the knowledge of the participants in addition to 
minutes of the meetings (MoM) which the author took the lead in recording. These 
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types of data are used to provide the socio-political context for the ISTA component.  
Full details are given in Appendix A1.  
 
6.3 Contextual setting 
The attributes of the Social- Ecological system of Lake Urmia basin has been 
described in Section 5.3 (Chapter V); thus, we only consider here the action arena and 
the actors involved in the participatory decision-making.  
The Action arena is the same as in Chapter V with a difference that new 
multitier Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) has been established for the management 
of LUB including the National Executive Council (NEC), the Regional Council (RC) 
and Water and Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) as shown in Figure 6.2.  
The MSPs paved the way for a participatory decision-making process at the 
basin level.  WAWG is an advisory platform helping the Regional Council (RC) to 
facilitate agreements on proposals to be approved by the policy-making NEC. This 
institutional design did not work in practice as RC was dormant, and so the Working 
Group (i.e. WAWG) decisions were presented to the NEC via CIWP acting on behalf of 
Department of Environment (DoE).  
Actors. The actors for each of the Working Group, Regional Council and 
National Executive Council (NEC) are given in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. In this 
Chapter, the focus is on the Working Group actors whom have been involved in the 
water allocation process (steps 1-9) as given in Figure 6.1. The participants have been 
appointed as representatives of major governmental departments primarily representing 
wider respective provincial and national interests, but they were mandated to make a 
socio-technical judgement on water allocation in Lake Urmia . 
From the outset, provincial representatives formed a united front in the 
discussion i.e. coalitions were formed based on political borders e.g. Kurdistan 
representatives formed a coalition of governmental departments, becoming an actor 
with one voice. Deputy Governorates for Development and Planning were behind 
‘gluing’ the antagonistic provincial organisations to safeguard provincial interests. 
Kurdistan’s dominant perspective has been that they have lost because of being 
upstream to trans-boundary watersheds. Hence, the Kurdistan Regional Water Company 
(KRWC) played an active role in the negotiations based on scientific and political 
arguments. WA and EA were more relaxed since their shares of the surface water 
consumption are about 90% of the total abstraction. 
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Figure 6.2: Action arena: multitier MSPs in LUB. 
 
The RC Secretariat was unofficially established by the West Azerbaijan 
Environmental Protection Organisation (WAEPO) in October 2009 as a floating unit; 
the extra tasks have been bestowed upon employees of the WAEPO with limited 
resources. The RC became irrelevant as the time went by. In 2010, the RC Secretariat 
was officially appointed by the WA governor but no budget or resources have been 
allocated to it as yet (Jabbari, 2011).  
National Executive  Council (NEC) for 
Sustainable Management of LUB 
Chairperson: First Vice President 
Main Members:
Vice Presidents for  (1)Planning and Strategic Monitoring, (2) Executive
Minister of Energy
Minister of Agricultural Jihad
Home office Minister
Minister of Housing and Urban Planning 
EA Governor
WA Governor
Kurdistan Governor  
Convener: Head of DoE 
and Vice President
 Water and Agriculture Working Group
(WAWG)
WPA Commission representative 
MoAJ Representative
Representatives from Provincial governmental departments, RWC, AJOs, EPOs, 
Selected NGOs 
Regional Council did not convene until after the water allocation 
decision outcome
Regional Council (RC) for Sustainable 
Management of Lake Uremia
(Permanent Secretariat in WA)
WA Governor
EA Governor
WA Governors
From each province: 
Deputy governors of Planning and Development
Managing Director, RWC,
Director General of AGO
Director General of EPO
In addition: representatives from other governmental departments such as  
Pastoral and Natural Resources Organization,  Cultural heritage and 
Tourism Organisation
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Figure 6.3: Main actors in the action arena, showing the levels they operated at and the 
linkages between them. 
 
With the exception of selected NGOs, no local civil society actors were involved 
in the negotiations. We will discuss this important theme in Chapter VII. CIWP offices 
in WA and EA had a very limited role. There was no CIWP office in Kurdistan; thus the 
author has been representing CIWP in Kurdistan. This informal position rule was 
Outcome: provincial/sectoral water allocation
Basin Level 
NATIONAL 
LEVEL 
DoE 
Council of 
Ministers including 
MoE, MoAJ etc
National Executive Council  (NEC)for 
the Sustainable Management of LUB
Actors
Conservation of Iranian 
Wetlands Project  
(CIWP)
Provincial Water 
and Agriculture 
Commisions
Presidential Office: First Vice 
President Office
Commission for 
Infrastructure Affairs 
Provincial 
Infrastructure 
Working Group
Regional Counicl (RC) 
for Sustainable 
Management of LUB
Lake Urmia Water 
and Agricultre 
Working Group 
(WAWG)
RWCs and other departmental 
organisations 
District  AJO‘s, WWC‘s, EPOs
Water Users: Farmars, Industries and Drinking  
Provincial  
Level
WAEPO: 
Regional 
Secretatiate 
Management of 
LUB
Governor‘s 
Office 
Local  Level 
Provincial 
CIWP 
Office 
Dotted lines indicate informal or time bound or occasional or lobbying relationships
Selected 
NGOs
Provincial 
Members of Majlis
(Parliament) 
High Water 
Council
Notes: (a) figure only shows the spatial distribution of actors and does not represent the level of influence or 
importance of actors; (b) dotted lines indicate informal or time bound or occasional or lobbying relationship  
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sanctioned by CIWP and was endorsed by Kurdistan stakeholders who tried to put 
across their arguments and narratives. On many occasions, the author was invited to 
attend Kurdistan Water and Agriculture Commission meetings.  
Table 6.3 summarises the roles and positions of the main national and provincial 
actors in the water allocation process. CIWP tried to maintain its role as a facilitator, 
but, due to negotiation deadlocks, it became an important game-changer which was 
respected by the provincial stakeholders. The author was given a mandate by the CIWP 
to facilitate the proceedings as described in Appendix A2. The agendas of the WAWG 
meetings were initially drafted by the author as the national consultant for the CIWP, 
and then they were reviewed and sanctioned by the CIWP team.  
 
Actors Role and position 
National  
CIWP: Conservation of Iranian 
Wetlands Project  
Played an important role as facilitator in the water allocation 
process from consultation stage to implementation  
Energy Group, Office of the 1st 
Vice President  
Responsible for preparing budgets and financial package for 
implementation of the agreement on the allocations; a major 
player in getting the final agreement 
DoE: Department of 
Environment, Office of Head of 
DoE, Vice President   
Represented by CIWP which carried out its work under the 
auspices of  DoE 
MoE: Ministry of Energy 
represented by Water Policy and 
Allocation Commission (WPAC) 
 WPAC set the rules for analysis by the actors to make a 
decision according to the 2008 Water Allocation Code  
IWRMC: Iran Water Resources 
Management Company 
Represented by various departments including the Water 
Planning Office and the newly established  Office of River 
Basins; they participated in the process mainly to support the 
process and to clarify some operational ambiguities about 
water resources planning and allocation 
MoAJ Ministry of Agricultural 
Jihad  
MoAJ participated through the Office of Water and Land to 
confirm baseline data on potential irrigation areas for each 
province 
Provincial : each province was represented by four main stakeholders;  
Provincial Governor’s Office Represented by the Office of Planning and Office of 
Development; Except for Kurdistan, the other two provinces 
did not have an active role in the WAWG meetings  
RWCs: Regional Water 
Companies  
They led the negotiations for most of the time 
AJOs: Agricultural Jihad 
Organisations  
They also actively participated in the negotiations 
EPOs: Environmental Protection 
Organisations  
The EPOs were not active in the later stages since the LU’s 
minimum ecological water requirement was approved by law  
NGOs A few NGOs participated but had a very limited role 
Note: For the provincial organizations, the acronyms used were K for Kurdistan, EA for East Azerbaijan  and 
WA for West Azerbaijan; thus, the  West Azerbaijan Agricultural Jihad Organisations is denoted as WAAJO 
Table 6.3: Permanent actors in the WAWG meetings. 
 
The relationship between CIWP and national actors was not so comfortable i.e. 
there was a difference in perspective. Nevertheless, CIWP had the support of the Vice-
President’s office which was crucial for its saliency in the process. The Water Policy 
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and Allocation Commission (WPAC) and Iran Water Resources Management Company 
(IWRMC) represented MoE as a national stakeholder. IWRMC was represented by 
three departments: the Baseline Data Bureau, the Water Planning Bureau and the Office 
of River Basins. The Office of River Basins was newly established to coordinate river 
basin activities but did not have an established ‘institutional charter’ or ‘Code of 
Conduct’ as it has been evolving from the new policy on river basin management. 
Therefore, the Water Planning Bureau continued to take responsibility for water 
allocation and planning at provincial level and there has been no basin level planning as 
yet. Also, no unified position was held by the IWRMC departments and so there was no 
uniformity in their perspectives.  There was also a degree of rivalry and mistrust among 
these departments. However, they acted positively in the negotiations and left the 
provinces to take the lead in the negotiations.   
The Water Policy and Allocation Commission (WPAC) had a bigger stake and 
has traditionally been the game-changer. The allocation was made according to the 
procedures drawn up by the Commission: the 2008 WAC as will be described in the 
next section.  
NEC is a mini- Council of Ministers comprising of several ministries (including 
Energy, Agricultural Jihad, Home and Housing and Urbanisation) and the three 
provincial governors.  
 
6.4 DPSIR assessment   
6.4.1 Drivers 
The main Driver has been the2008 EMP which was the outcome of numerous 
seminars and workshops and provides a vision and a goal with four main objectives; 
priority actions for each of the objectives were also set. Objective 2 of the EMP is on 
sustainable management of water resources and land use (Box 6.1).The methodological 
approach was to prepare a sustainable water allocation target in LUB. The 25year vision 
states that: 
Lake Urmia will have adequate water to sustain an attractive landscape and rich 
biodiversity where people and local communities can make wise use of its resources, 
and will enhance cooperation between the involved provincial organizations (DoE, 
2008) 
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Box 6.1: EMP clauses relevant to water allocation  
 
Objective 2: Sustainable management of water 
resources and land use 
Aim (goal) (long term e.g. 25 year vision): is to save 
the lake  
Purpose (Priority Issues): water supply to the lake 
& wetlands 
Target: 
Long Term: inflows to maintain water supply to the 
Lake and satellite wetlands: water level at 1274 m 
amsl 
Short Term: increase river flow (inflows) by 3% each 
year 
Suggested Indicator by the author: a measurable 
indicator is needed to verify whether the target has 
been met–in this case an indicator could be 
measurements of river flows (and inflow into the LU)  
Priority actions (Management Options) for water 
Supply to Lake Urmia and satellite wetlands  
Priority 1: Prepare an agreed plan for allocating the 
water resources of the basin to the three provinces 
and the Lake, taking into account required 
environmental flows for the rivers and satellite 
wetlands  
Priority 2: Prepare provincial Master Development 
Plans for water and land resources based on an 
ecosystem approach and taking into account the 
available water for each province resulting from 
action 1. 
Priority 3: Determine an agreed range of Lake water 
level fluctuation - how to deal with dry years 
Priority 4: Investigate feasibility for water diversion 
from neighbouring catchments and evaluate 
environmental impacts  
Priority 5: Investigate feasibility of measures to 
reduce excess evaporation from the Lake (i.e. 
segregation of the very shallow parts of the Lake in 
dry years), and evaluate environmental impacts 
 
 
Based on the above vision, 
the 2008 EMP specifies a strategy 
comprising of five action priorities 
(management options) to deal with 
the pressures outlined in the DPSIR 
assessment (Chapter V). The 
strategy was agreed during the 2008 
Tabriz IWRM Workshop (see next 
section, Figure 6.6) by the 
stakeholders as shown in Box 6.1; 
the prime priority was to agree on a 
water allocation plan for the basin. 
Priority 1 of the strategy deals with 
preparing a water allocation plan 
based on IWRM with consideration 
for socio-economic and 
environmental conditions. Based on 
the consultation process, a simple 
water allocation model was agreed 
as a starting point for the water 
allocation process based on a 
MCDM approach. Provisionally, 
several criteria were chosen as 
shown in Table 6.4. The provisional 
allocation criteria were: total area, 
population, regional domestic product (RDP), existing withdrawals and average supply 
(surface runoff). 
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Table 6.4: Provisional template for water allocation baseline data and criteria agreed by 
stakeholders (DoE, 2008); based on secondary data analysis, Hashemi (2008) reported 
that there is about 7 BCM potential surface water in the basin; the minimum lake 
requirement is 3 BCM. 
 
6.4.2 Response 1:Ecohydrological approach to determine minimum 
ecological water requirement for Lake Urmia 
The concept of a minimum ecological water requirement for Lake Urmia came 
about due to MoE’s quest to understand the lake’s water needs. There has been no 
formal water allocation for Lake Urmia as historically it received direct precipitation 
over the lake and the surplus water (unregulated) from river tributaries. The concept was 
investigated by Yekom (2005) based on Nazaridoust’s (2006) PhD thesis which 
employed a risk analysis and regression modelling approach based on the water balance 
of Lake Urmia by considering ecological and hydrological (water quality and quantity) 
indicators.  
Lake Urmia has a small biota with a simple food chain; Artemia, which is the 
only primary consumer, feed on green algae and provide nutrition for flamingos 
(Abbaspour and Nazaridoust, 2007). Therefore, Artemia plays an important role in the 
food chain and can be a good ecological indicator. Artemia is sensitive to the level of 
salinity and, in particular, sodium chloride and hence, salinity was chosen as the water 
quality indicator. Then, the water quality was related to a water quantity indicator, lake 
level and the relationship between lake level and change in salinity shown in Figure 6.4 
was described by the following equation: 
 
Elv(Eco)= (1.657E-10)×NaCl(Eco)
2
-(1.012E-4) × NaCl(Eco) + (1288.83 ) (6.1) 
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where Elv(Eco)is the ecological elevation or lake level and NaCl(Eco) is the optimal salt 
concentration i.e. 240 g/l. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The relationship between Lake level and salinity (quantity and quality 
indicators; Abbaspour and Nazaridoust, 2007). 
 
Based on an extensive literature review, Abbaspour and Nazaridoust (2007) 
concluded that the optimal salinity for normal reproduction of Artemia is 240 g/l.  
Hence, using equation 6.1, the ecological lake level was estimated to be 1274.1 m asl. 
Using a volume -surface area -lake level (VAL) relationship, the ecological surface area 
(AEco) was calculated as 4652.2 km
2 using the following equation 
 (km2)    (6.2)
 
 
In order to find the water requirement to maintain the ecological lake level, 
Abbaspour and Nazaridoust (2007) simulated the water balance of the lake for the 
historical period 1966-2004 using the following water balance model(WBM): 
 
DS= I + A(PL – E)          (6.3) 
 
where DS is monthly change in storage, PL is monthly rainfall over the lake in mm, I is 
the monthly inflow into the lake in MCM, E is monthly evaporation in mm and A is 
area in km2.  
Constant values for E (960 mm/year) and PL (296 mm/year) were assumed to 
simulate the water balance and to calculate the minimum ecological water requirement 
needed to sustain the ecological and hydrological (quantity and quality) functioning of 
the lake; this was estimated as 3086 MCM or approximately 3100 MCM/year. Yekom 
(2005) states that considering ecological lake level as a benchmark serves two important 
functions: (1) the salt marshlands in the southern part of the lake will be filled with 
El=(1.657E-10)*NaCl2-(1.012E-4)*NaCl+(1288.83)
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water (Figure 6.5) and (2) the important islands will be surrounded with water which 
provide sanctuary for endangered red deer species on these islands; otherwise, they 
would be threatened by hunters as shown in Figure 6.6.   
 
Figure 6.5: Satellite image showing how, at elevation 1274.1,m,  the southern salt 
marshes will be filled with water. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Satellite Images showing that the Eslami Islands are surrounded with water 
at elevation 1274.1 masl (Yekom, 2005) 
 
6.4.3  Response 2: 2008 Water Allocation Code (WAC) 
Water allocation has been a source of conflict in all the Iranian basins and so 
MoE’s dominant perspective has been that a water resources modelling system can help 
the process. In 2008, a new Water Allocation Code (WAC) was enacted containing a 
comprehensive procedure for water allocation in the river basins based on an evidence-
based approach that specifies that “evidences should be documented”. But the WAC 
does not endorse participatory decision-making. The water allocation process in the 
Mark for 
1274.1 m asl 
(red line) 
Salt marshes due 
to lake level drop 
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Working Group is governed by both the 2008 WAC and the Ecosystem Management 
Plan (EMP). The 2008 WAC procedures were described earlier in Section 6.2.  
6.4.4 Response 3: establishment of MSPs 
Guided by the 2008 Water Allocation Code (WAC) and the 2008 EMP, Water 
and Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) meetings were convened to reach a decision 
on water allocation as shown in Figure 6.7.  
With reference to the procedure (1-9 steps) outlined in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.7 
shows the main achievements in each of the meetings which will be described in the 
next section. The meetings took place during a period from November 2007 to July 
2010.  The water allocation decision was finalised at a higher MSP i.e. National 
Executive Council (NEC) which will be described in Section 6.5.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Water allocation process progression in the WAWG meetings (Photo courtesy of 
WARWC). 
 
6.4.5 Response4: formal Lake Urmia water rights  
As shown in Figure 6.8, the concept of a minimum water requirement for Lake 
Urmia gained a legal status in 2010 through a By-law issued by the Council of 
Ministers.  
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Figure 6.8: The timeline of development of the concept of minimum ecological water 
requirement for Lake Urmia as 3100 MCM/year. 
 
With reference to Figure 6.8, two important steps became the entry point to the 
participatory decision-making process. First, the 1st WAWG meeting (Figure 6.7) was 
convened before the formal adoption of the 2008 EMP, as CIWP was aware that more 
preparation was needed for the adoption of the EMP. The participants highlighted two 
important challenges: agreements on (1) baseline data and (2) the water requirement of 
the Lake. Hashemi (2008) prepared the synthesis report in response to a request from 
the first meeting. The report highlighted the findings on the minimum ecological 
requirement of the Lake. The intention was that the report would be endorsed by the 
stakeholders. The stakeholders initially endorsed a simple water allocation model 
(WAM) based on MCDA approach, which in principle recognised LU’s water rights. 
With reservations, they accepted the idea of a minimum ecological water requirement of 
3100 MCM per year to be used as a constraint in the water allocation model (WAM). 
Parallel to the CIWP work at basin level, the MoE and the DoE established a 
‘Joint Committee’ to look into the water requirement of the lake but could not come up 
with a decision. CIWP had to be neutral during the MoE and DoE synergy. After 
attending the 13th MoE/DoE Joint Committee meeting in 2009, it was apparent that the 
Water Policy and Allocation Commission (WPAC) would not accept the figure of 3100 
MCM. The meetings produced great tensions between MoE and DoE; DoE dismissed 
the disagreement on the data among the MoE ‘group’ and asked for the delivery of the 
water to LU as required by law. So CIWP had to detach itself from DoE patronage by 
asserting that it was an independent national project under the umbrella of DoE, and 
thus mended the relationship with the powerful WPAC.  
- 2005  Yekom (2005) produced a report based on a PhD thesis by Nazaridoust 
(2006) 
- 2007  the concept was used in the consultation workshops 
- 2008 Hashemi (2008) highlighted Yekom’s finding which was to be presented at 
the final consulting workshop to be included in the EMP 
 An MoU including the EMP was signed and endorsed by stakeholders,thus 
accepting the concept 
- 2009  the concept was approved by the High Water Council’s technical committee 
through the work of CIWP 
- 2010 Council of Ministers approved the minimum ecological water requirement as 
a By-law.  
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Secondly, CIWP realised that, without formal water rights for the Lake, it was 
very difficult to initiate the basin water allocation process, and there was a need to have 
a legal basis for the decisions made by the Working Group. In 2009, DoE and CIWP put 
the idea of a minimum water requirement to the test at the High2 Water Council (HWC) 
which made a recommendation to the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers 
approved the minimum requirement agreed in 2010 (Figure 6.8). This proved to be very 
effective in galvanising the participatory water allocation process which is described in 
the next section.   
To support the WAWG, CIWP had to act independently from DoE and use the 
institutional mechanisms to continue and push forward the process. The political 
support came from the Office of the First Vice President and its Energy Commission 
Group and the Infrastructure Committee of the Presidential Office. The latter has the 
power to approve budgets and hence had financial leverage as well.   
 
6.5 Participatory Water Allocation Decisions   
6.5.1 Choosing baseline data as a basis for water allocation criteria 
Dealing with uncertainty. It was commonly acknowledged that the available 
data were not very accurate; thus there was (and is) a degree of uncertainty about the 
validity of the hydrological and climatic data. Knowledge (data; scientific such as 
climate change) uncertainty was one of the important issues which was mentioned in 
almost all the meetings and workshops.  There was a need to deal with knowledge 
uncertainty so that it would not become a reason for inaction or lack of action or 
decision-making. Thus, the ownership of the information was of paramount importance. 
Hence, the provincial stakeholders were involved in providing data that they accepted 
and owned and then in compiling a database agreed by all stakeholders based on 
consensus. For example, it took a considerable time to arrive at figures such as the 
amount of potential surface water in each province. The important issue is that the risks 
and uncertainties should be communicated to the stakeholders (Hashemi and O’Connell, 
2011a). Therefore, the data used in this process have been provided and owned by 
stakeholders and considered to be the best data available. 
Rule for facilitating dialogue. CIWP was aware that filling data/information 
gaps by adding interpretations  and elaborations was not a practice envisaged as a 
facilitator of the WAWG meetings because any elaboration or interpretation would 
                                                 
2 In some English texts, the word ‘Supreme Water Council’ is also used.  
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require an extensive dialogue with the provinces; they might disagree with the 
interpretation or the elaboration, leading to conflicts.  
In addition, a new information rule had to be established: one of the challenges 
was to divide the Lake Urmia basin into three pseudo sub-basins in line with provincial 
geopolitical boundaries to obtain baseline data on (1) water resources availability and 
supply; (2) agricultural production and water use and (3) socioeconomic data. The 
problem is that information on (2) and (3) is based on district administrative divisions 
and information on (1) is based on river catchments, of which some are trans-boundary 
catchments. 
Choosing water allocation criteria and constraints. Based on the vision 
outlined in the 2008 EMP, a MCDA approach was recommended. There were some 
guidelines in choosing the possible criteria and constraints: they should be simple and 
measurable and be based on consensus i.e. everyone should accept them in the 
consultation process. Based on long deliberations in the WAWG meetings, participants 
discussed a large number of possible criteria to be used which are summarised in Figure 
6.9.  
Water resources availability and supply. Agreement on hydrologic baseline 
data proved to be very difficult. The reports provided by the provinces were the basic 
facts on the ground and were not considered to be reliable by the WPAC. Before the 2nd 
Working Group meeting in May 2009 in Urmia City, a request was sent that all the 
provinces should send their reports on water and agriculture sectors and the information 
needed for water allocation i.e. to complete Table 6.4. However, despite having sent a 
single format to all the three provinces, they did not exactly follow it in presenting their 
reports. They did not hand in any documentations-just oral presentations. This was 
inconsistent with the aim of the WAWG. Also, the provinces were selective in how to 
present the data. MoE’s perception was that “they may use statistics to suit their case”
3.  
“…part of the reason I think is the fact that they either did not have the information, or 
they did not want to report it”
4.  Provincial stakeholders were very careful about their 
statements and hence there was a perception by WPAC that provinces hid some 
information or would like to engineer some data and statistics. This perception was 
supported by the fact that the provinces failed to produce socio-economic data as well. 
This was outside MoE’s sphere and the governorates were responsible for these data. 
The WPAC was pressing for documentation of the data as a basis for the process 
and was dismissive about the data presented in the meeting. CIWP realised that WPAC 
                                                 
3 This statement is from a mission report to the CIWP 
4personal communication of a CIWP colleague 
Chapter 6 
 
187 
has its own hydrological database but it had not been corroborated with the provincial 
database. On the other hand, provincial stakeholders were conservative in their 
approach as all official documents had to be approved by the provincial authorities and 
the participants did not have that authority.   
The provincial actors disliked the “excessive and aggressive pressure put by 
WPAC”.  The sentiment was that “It seems that WPAC has a veto power” (Appendix 
A1, Table A1.4). CIWP tried to tilt the power balance and reassure the actors that the 
process would not be dominated by WPAC. However, the 2008 WAC specifies that 
“evidences should be documented” and so WPAC was ‘hard to please’ about the sources 
of the data, especially the hydrological data. The ‘documentation rule’ has created 
provincial cooperation and alliances. Any discrepancy would have discredited the 
legitimacy of the evidence. Therefore, actors were cornered into thinking segmentally 
and not in terms of the wider LUB. However, the process was advantageous as the 
hydrologic data was rigorously evaluated.  
A distinct outcome of this rigid requirement of WPAC was that three blocks 
were formed in the WAWG to represent the interests of the three provinces.  Now we 
had three coalitions advocating the interests of their province in the negotiations. Such 
formations have been described by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999) as Advocacy 
Coalitions (this will be described in Chapter VII). As a result, a sectoral integration has 
resulted in the provinces. In Kurdistan, for example, the Kurdistan Province Water and 
Agriculture Commission became a meeting place for the Kurdistan WAWG block; they 
started to make joint decisions and put forward a united front in the WAWG. This form 
of solidarity was perhaps stronger in Kurdistan because of the discourse that Kurdistan 
lags behind WA and EA in implementing the development plans (dams and irrigation 
networks) because of the past political turmoil.   
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Water Allocation Model Criteria/Constraints  
 
 
A. Criteria are factors used in the water allocation model (WAM); their direction is either positive 
(+ve) i.e. a province with a higher value will get more water or negative (-ve) i.e.  a province with 
a higher value will get less water 
 
Criteria and 
constraints / units  
 Direction, Definition and Purpose 
Potential available 
surface water) / 
MCM/year 
(+ve); defined as the amount of water that the province ‘generates’ itself; the idea behind including 
this criterion is that a province has the first right to use its own water 
Potential area for 
irrigation/ 1000 ha 
(+ve);  defined as potential area within LU only that physically and economically can be irrigated; 
the areas should be spatially defined (where) and be supported by a kind of pre-feasibility study  
Regional Domestic 
Product per capita 
(RDP/cap) / Million 
Riyals per capita 
(-ve); defined as RDP in year 2008 according to official national statistics divided by official 
national population statistics; included to express the urgency of a province to support its people to 
develop themselves; only the RDP and population within the LU basin should be taken into 
account; this may require a kind of proportional allocation of basic data (e.g. at district level) 
Population/ no in 
millions  
(+ve); obtained from official national population statistics. only the population within the LU basin 
should be taken into account as above; included to express the requirement of a province to 
support its population’s need for water (drinking, industrial and agricultural water) 
Per capita 
investment in 
water/ 
MRial (price level 
2009) 
(-ve); defined as  replacement value of existing infrastructure for irrigation development (only 
reservoirs, intake structures, first and second level irrigation canals) in 2009 price level divided by 
population (see under population);  included to express the invested capital in the water sector; the 
idea behind this criterion is that provinces will less development should be given more chance to 
develop; only investment for agricultural use to be taken into account 
Consumption per 
capita/ m3 per capita  
(-ve); total water intake per year of a province (for drinking, industrial and agricultural use) for an 
‘average’ year, divided by population; included to  express the present level of use of water and by 
that the level of development of the water system to support the people in their socio-economic 
activities 
 
B. Constraints are the ‘hard’ criteria that have to be taken into account in the allocation between 
the provinces. The ultimate allocation should meet these constraints. There was no consensus on 
how these has to be calculated but they were considered for later modification of the WAM 
 
Constraints / MCM Implementation in the water allocation model  
Existing 
withdrawals 
Present withdrawals under average (meteorological and hydrological conditions) included to make 
sure that the present users will be able to continue their activities 
Upstream rights This was considered as a high level policy constraint. The determination if this constraint is met 
will have to be done by applying a river basin allocation model (WEAP, RIBASIM, etc.) 
Environmental flow 
rivers/ MCM 
This constraint applies to all individual rivers in the province and cannot be aggregated. included 
to ensure a minimum ecological functioning of the rivers; in principle this should include the 
required flow characteristics (minimum flow, flood levels, maximum flow, etc.) at certain points at 
a river and at/during certain time periods; for practical purposes,  this criterion should limit to a 
maximum of 2 flow characteristics; ;the determination if the allocation complies with these 
constraints can only be done by applying a dynamic water allocation model (e.g. WEAP, 
RIBASIM or the VENSIM application  
Water supply to 
satellite wetlands 
included to ensure that there will be sufficient supply of water to the wetlands 
 
Figure 6.9: Water allocation criteria and constraints (Appendix A, Table A1.4). 
 
Detrending Method to estimate potential surface water (natural runoff). The 
2008 WAC specifies the use of the Detrending Method (Box 6.2) to calculate the annual 
average surface runoff which was estimated to be about 6927 MCM. The method was 
applied by the MoE to runoff series from 27 stations in the provinces by removing the 
trend from the inflow and then adding the amount given by the trend line to get natural 
runoff. The use of the method has been illustrated here by applying it to the aggregate 
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annual basin runoff time series (Figure 6.10). Initially, a value of 7400 was obtained 
from the MoE analysis, 
but the final agreement 
was on 6927 MCM. 
This shows that the 
value was not based 
entirely on independent 
assessment but was 
partly a result of 
political manoeuvring.  
Also, this figure was 
almost the same as the 
synthesis report’s value 
(Hashemi, 2008). The 
Detrending Method was 
used primarily to estimate the huge level of abstractions in recent years but there is a 
doubt about the soundness of the approach and many of the actors were not happy about 
using it, but it was dictated by the 2008 Water Allocation Code (WAC).Also, Mahab 
(2011) criticized the method and applied a reduction factor to “minimise the deficiency 
of the Detrending Method”, providing a different result for both the natural runoff and 
the level of abstractions as given in Table 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.10: This is an illustration of how detrending is done: in this figure, an example 
historical series of annual average runoff into Lake Urmia for the period 1969-2009 is 
shown with a trend line in black; the blue line shows the average value of 6255 MCM 
obtained by the Detrending Method for this time series. 
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Box 6.2:  Procedure for Detrending Method (Source: MoE 2008 WAC). 
 
1. choose statistical period for stationary data: in this case 58 years was chosen 
from 1949-50 water year to 2007-8 was chosen; in most cases no data matched 
the period.   
2.  choose hydrometric stations to estimate potential water available for each 
watershed 
3. In Excel, Runoff, R, is plotted against time in years, t for a  period n 
4. A linear Trend Line is drawn in the form of: 
Rt= A*t+ B     where A and B are the coefficients of linear 
regression. 
 
5. Then the A coefficient is used to obtain Natural Runoff, RNt , using the 
formula: 
RNt = Rt + [- (A* t )]       where t= 1, n  
 
6. The upstream abstraction, UA,  is calculated from 
   UA= RNt - Rt  where t= n i.e. the final year of the period 
 
7. Finally, Detrended RNt time series  is obtained from   
 
Detrended RNt = RNt - UA where t= 1, n 
 
8. Potential average surface runoff generated for a given catchment is calculated   
using   
 
Average annual surface water =  åDetrended RNt  / n  (for  t= 1, n) 
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Sector  Consumptions 
MCM 
Province  Natural runoff 
MCM 
Agriculture 2243 Kurdistan 1580 
Drinking  117 WA 3525 
Industry 59 EA 1287 
Total  2419  6392 
     
Table 6.5: Estimation of natural runoff and levels of abstraction by Mahab (2011) 
The main problem with this method is that it does not take into account natural 
variability of hydrological time series and so the basis for using it is considered to be 
flawed. Therefore, there is a need to look into this issue and it will be explored later in 
section 6.7. 
The bickering between the RWCs and WPAC about this important information 
was embarrassing for the MoE group. Agricultural Jihad Organisations (AJOs) were 
asking that the MoE group should come out with figures for the hydrological data and 
water resources abstractions. WPAC tried to sort the information outside the WAWG: 
they arranged bilateral meetings with RWCs as well as a MoE/DoE Joint Working 
Group (JWG). Some of the participants seemed to think that there was a shift of 
attention from WAWG to the DoE/MoE JWG and were waiting for instruction from the 
Commission to initiate the allocation process. The poor wording of the Minutes of the 
13th JWG Meeting indicated that the process was done within “separate negotiated 
meeting with the RWCs”
5
. This ‘behind the closed door’ approach is based on old 
sectoral procedures: RWCs felt that this is their comfort zone. WPAC has effectively 
(may not intentionally) tried to detach RWCs from their commitment to the WAWG 
based on sectoral loyalty of the MoE group (coalition). Eventually, a few bilateral 
meetings were arranged to put the ‘MoE house’ in order and they finally agreed on the 
hydrological and water resources data to be used in the water allocation process. The 
rest of the data was provided by national and provincial participants. All of the 
information is given in Figure 6.11 
                                                 
5 Source is the Minute of the 13th meeting held in MoE in August 2009.  
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Figure 6.11: Template of baseline data  for MCDA used in WBM in Microsoft Excel. 
Despite many efforts to document the data, the water allocation process was 
undertaken under the shadow of uncertainty. There was still a disagreement on the 
potential irrigated land area in each province and so it was decided that MoAJ should 
present the data on behalf of the provinces. The data was presented in the 6th (final) 
meeting by the MoAJ. 
6.5.2: Weighting water allocation criteria using AHP MCDA approach 
As stated in Chapter III, there are numerous MCDA methods that can be used in 
water allocation problems. WPAC recommended the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
(AHP: Box 6.3) which has been widely used in natural resources management and has 
been very popular despite its shortcomings (e.g.Ananda and Herath, 2009).  
Wattage and Mardle (2005) have used AHP to investigate stakeholder 
preferences towards conservation versus development for a wetland in Sri Lanka. They 
have acknowledged that AHP “requires significantly less time and expertise 
requirements from respondents”.  A similar approach is taken by Heck et al (2011) in 
the design of a marine protected area (MPA) using a Multi-stakeholder Platform. They 
found that AHP is useful towards contributing a local vision for MPA planning by 
showing local preferences and opinions. Steiguer et al (2003) have considered the AHP 
to be “a method and planning framework with potential for implementation of 
Integrated Watershed Management” by providing “numerical weights to criteria where 
subjective judgments of either quantitative or qualitative alternatives constitute an 
important part of the decision process”. 
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CONSTRAINTS
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Expert Choice 
software (Saaty, 2005), 
which is based on AHP, 
was used to produce the 
aggregated weights for 
the criteria as shown in 
Table 6.6. Sectoral 
organisations formed 
alliances or coalitions 
based on their provincial 
allegiances in the 
weighting process. Two 
rounds of weightings 
were carried out : 
initially weights for the 
six criteria were assigned 
as given in Table 6.5. 
Then weights were 
assigned based only on 
four criteria, removing investment per capita and consumption per capita from the list 
(Table 6.5); the reason for this will be discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
Criteria 
Weights 
based on 6 criteria 
Weights 
based on 4 criteria 
Potential available surface water 0.182 0.161 
Potential area for irrigation 0.167 0.362 
Regional Domestic Product per capita -0.118 -0.272 
Population 0.101 0.205 
Per capita investment in water -0.27 - 
Consumption per capita -0.161 - 
Total  1.00 1.00 
Table 6.6: Weights applied to the criteria. 
 
6.5.3 Technical support for water allocation using water balance modelling 
and system dynamic simulation 
As already said, the process continued under knowledge uncertainty. The first 
NEC meeting was organised in parallel with the 5th WAWG and there was political 
pressure that a decision should be made in the 6th WAWG meeting ahead of the 2nd NEC 
Box 6.3: Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)  
(Excerpts from Ananda and Herath, 2009; Appendix A; p. 2554). 
The theoretical foundations of AHP were developed by Saaty (1977, 1980). AHP 
aggregates the separate criteria into an integrated criterion (Bouma et al., 2000). When 
applying the AHP, the preferences of the decision elements are compared in a 
pairwise manner with regard to the element preceding them in the hierarchy. If two 
criteria are of equal importance, a value of 1 is given in the comparison, whereas a 
value of 9 indicates the absolute importance of one criterion over the other. The 
difference between two adjacent scores may not be highly distinct, however. 
Pairwise comparison data can be analysed using either regression analysis or an 
eigenvalue technique. In the eigenvalue technique, the reciprocal matrices of pairwise 
comparisons are constructed. The right eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of matrix 
A (Eq. (1)) constitutes the estimation of relative importance of attributes. The pairwise 
comparisons made by the respondents can be synthesised into pairwise comparison 
matrices, which take the following form: 
A= 
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
nnn
n
n
aa
aa
aa
....
........
....
....
1
221
111
     (1) 
whereaij represents the pairwise comparisons rating for attributes i and j. 
 
Given the reciprocal property, only n (n−1)/2 actual pairwise comparisons are needed 
for an n×n comparison matrix. Saaty (1977) proposed the right eigenvector method 
that constructs the vector of priority weights and facilitates testing for inconsistency. 
In the case of perfect consistency, 
AW = nW       (2) 
where A is the n×n comparison matrix and W=(w1, w2, … wn)
T. 
 
Saaty (1977) proposed the following definition: 
AW = λmaxW (3)      
  
whereλmax is the maximum eigenvalue (Perron root) of matrix A. 
 
Saaty (1977, 1980) proved that the largest eigenvalue λmaxis always greater than or 
equal to n (number of rows or columns). 
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meeting. The participants (actors) had to make some difficult decisions about the 
modelling approach. 
Agreement on minimum ecological water requirement. The 2008 WAC 
requires system dynamic modelling for river basin allocation. Between 2003 and 2008, 
WPAC consolidated its know-how on the use of Vensim® system dynamic simulation 
software described in Chapter III (Ventana Systems, 2007) by preparing a prototype 
model for LUB. As a visual modelling tool, Vensim simulates the water balance (as in 
eq. 6.3) based on a feedback system or causal loop i.e. stock and flow diagrams. It 
allows visualisation of how changes in the parameters will affect the water balance 
simulation. The water balance model was implemented in Microsoft Excel and linked to 
the Vensim software as an input of data (MoE, 2010 b). The purpose of the simulation 
was to determine the amount of required inflow into the lake to maintain the ecological 
lake level of 1274.1 m asl.  
The simulated results from the Vensim model indicated that, to keep the lake 
level at 1274.1 (minimum ecological lake level), an average annual inflow of 3900 
MCM is required. This is higher than the minimum requirement predicted by 
Abbaspour and Nazaridoust (2007) which amounts to 3100 MCM. Initially, WPAC was 
not open about its Vensim Model for LUB. The author tried to encourage WPAC to 
share its results by allowing two representatives from each province to see how the 
model was built. This suggestion was not accepted and hence, everybody prepared for a 
heated negotiation ahead in the culminating 6th WAWG meeting to be held in Sanandaj 
(Kurdistan).  
As stated, MoE accepted the figure of 3100 MCM at the High Water Council 
and did not block it becoming a legal requirement. But WPAC was adamant about 
presenting its case at the 6th WAWG meeting. Unlike Abbaspour and Nazaridoust 
(2007) which used a fixed evaporation rate, MoE (2010) used monthly estimates of 
evaporation and precipitation over the Lake. The result seemed to be more realistic than 
Yekom’s (2005) but this method also involved a great deal of uncertainty about how 
evaporation and lake area have been estimated; hence, it is not as accurate as claimed by 
WPAC.  
At the 6th Working Group meeting, WPAC presented the simulation result (3900 
MCM needed by the lake) but it was rejected by all the other actors. They decided to 
use 3100 MCM as a constraint in the water allocation model (WAM). WPAC also did 
not accept the 3100 MCM and indeed recommended 3900 MCM. After long 
negotiations, it was agreed that, since 3100 MCM is a legal requirement, this value 
should be used for now and the final decision should be taken by the National Executive 
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Council (NEC). The gamble did not pay off for WPAC even after an emotional appeal. 
Other actors were not involved in building the Vensim Model for LU; thus, they easily 
overruled it despite clear evidence from the Vensim simulation. WPAC’s motive will 
become evident in the next step of the process.  
Water allocation shares: scenarios. WPAC had postulated to use two scenarios 
in the WAM model: 
1. WPAC’s favourite option was to use 6 criteria (as in Figure 6.12) with 
two constraints : a minimum lake allocation of 3900 MCM and existing 
abstractions of 2900 MCM; this means there is no water for further 
development  
2. The second best option was to use 6 criteria with two constraints i.e. LU 
water requirement of 3100 and existing abstraction of 2900; this means 
that there is about 817 MCM for further allocation.  
Both options were rejected and opposed as they completely ignored what the 
participants (actors) had agreed in previous meetings. The participants and CIWP 
wanted a re-allocation of the resources; otherwise, WA and EA would be rewarded for 
overstating their demands. The hidden message behind the WPAC position was that the 
basin has reached saturation level and dams under constructions should not be built as 
there is no more water left if the lake is considered as a demand site. WPAC felt 
responsibility for Lake Urmia and therefore wanted to take a precautionary route 
towards the wellbeing of the lake. The Commission made a staunch attempt to bring the 
‘environment’ into decision-making but the other actors had other priorities. WPAC’s 
motive was not purely environmental: the Commission wanted to block extra 
applications by the provinces for more allocation and dam-building projects in the basin 
as well.      
As a facilitator, CIWP overruled the unilateral position held by WPAC. To 
resolve the turmoil, a very delicate balancing act was needed, and so a compromise had 
to be reached. The issue was that, if the existing abstraction was accepted, this would 
indicate that unfair development in the basin was accepted as well as legalising 
unauthorised abstractions, and no consensus could be reached. WPAC agreed to scrap 
this constraint if only two criteria were removed: existing investment in the water sector 
and consumption per capita. After a heated debate, this was agreed, and the simulation 
was made to allocate provincial water shares using four criteria, with 3100 MCM as a 
constraint.  The shares were quite different from the previous simulation. Kurdistan 
which gained a 24% share under 6 criteria now had less than 16% of the total shares. 
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Kurdistan made a passionate appeal that they should get a greater share based on 
their upstream rights and given the historical injustices. The Energy Group (from the 
Vice President Office) played a major role to mediate and exert pressure on the 
negotiators to come to the agreement at the WAWG: “no one is leaving here until a 
decision is reached”. EA happily accepted the results which give them even less 
commitment to the lake. WA was happy for more shares to be given to Kurdistan since 
the water flows downstream to WA and it is not used. Kurdistan was not happy with the 
figure of 16% and expected some 22%. Then, after long negotiations, it was agreed that 
the results should be accepted, but the issue of upstream rights of Kurdistan needed to 
be decided by the NEC.  
The author and Eelco van Beek (International consultant) were asked to revise 
the WAM procedure and to look into Kurdistan’s share. It was concluded that 
ExpertChoice AHP procedure uses binary rules attributing 0 weights to the lowest 
criterion. For example, the Kurdistan population was very small compared to the other 
two provinces (230,000 compared to 2.8 and 2.9 million) and hence increasing the 
Kurdistan population to 1,000,000 would not change the weights. Therefore, AHP 
method can produce an output with a great degree of discrepancy. However, despite this 
inconsistency, AHP was seen by CIWP and MoE as the most appropriate way to 
allocate resources and the allocation shares were agreed (Table 6.7) 
6.5.4 Finalising the water allocation agreement  
The agreement reached at the 6th WAWG meeting was not welcomed or 
sanctioned by higher ranking provincial actors outside the Working Group platform; for 
example, WARWC believed that WA representatives were “misled and conned”6. The 
re-allocation meant new developments should be halted or else future water rights 
would be compromised. Kurdistan was ‘angry’ about WPAC’s attitude towards using 
the AHP approach which produced less than expected shares for Kurdistan. The results 
were presented in the 2nd meeting of NEC and a series of meetings and lobbying has 
followed as shown in Figure 6.12.  
NEC sanctioned the establishment of a Technical Committee to harmonise the 
disagreement that spilled over after the last WAWG meeting. The Committee was a 
mini-WAWG inviting major provincial stakeholders (RWCs and AJOs) to agree on the 
potential irrigated land for each province which was disputed. NEC did not attempt to 
make the decision and invited the provinces to try to sort out their differences.  
Therefore, NEC acted positively to share power with the provinces by maintaining a” 
                                                 
6 Personal communications to the author 
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non-coercive” approach to governance to enhance the effectiveness of the WAWG (see 
e.g. Verhallen et al, 2007).   
Water Allocation Model  
Options 
1 2 3 
MoE’s favorite 
option:   existing 
abstractions as a 
constraint (6 criteria) 
MoE 2nd best proposal: 
Criteria: 6 
Constraints: Existing 
abstraction and lake Urmia 
water rights  
Final agreement: 4 criteria only 
Lake Uremia water right as the 
only constraint  
A- Water Availability  using Vensim simulation software and WBM 
Average Potential 
surface water 
6920 6920 6920 
Lake Urmia water rights  3900 3100 3100 
Existing abstraction  2900 2900 Not applicable  
Total constraints  6800 6000 3100 
Water available for 
allocation 
nil 817 3700 
B. Water Allocation Model Using ExpertChoice software based on AHP approach   
Provinces 
Weighed 
share % 
N
o
 n
e
w
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
 Weighed 
share % 
Share of water 
MCM 
Weighed 
share % 
Share of water 
MCM 
Kurdistan 24 24 196 15.8 585.1 
East Azerbaijan 37.4 37.4 305.5 29.2 1079.2 
West Azerbaijan 38.6 38.6 315.5 55 2035.6 
Total 100 100 817 100 3700 
 
Table 6.7: Results of water availability and WAM showing provincial water shares. 
 
WA wrote a letter to the Deputy Minister for Energy (Karimi, 2010). In the 
letter,  Karimi (2010) asks for re-negotiation based on bilateral arrangement i.e. EA-WA 
and WA-Kurdistan. This offer was not accepted and NEC has decided to implement the 
agreement. On the other hand, the Kurdistan governor wrote to the First Vice President 
and formally accepted the results and asked for immediate allocation of funds to 
implement the plan. The author represented CIWP in its efforts to make Kurdistan 
engage with the participatory decision-making. If the results were overruled, the whole 
process would have been undermined. The AHP allows for inconsistent criteria 
weighting by the actors. Therefore, the actors influenced the weighting by showing 
inconsistency in their preferences and hence affected the allocation results. In real world 
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decisions, inconsistent preferences and ranking are a reality. Therefore, AHP could be 
argued to be an appropriate method for participatory MCDA processes.    
 
Figure 6.12: The timeline of NEC meetings to approve the water allocation decisions 
(some of the Photos by Jabbari, 2011). 
 
6.5.5 Concluding remarks: fixed water allocation is not realistic 
Political will. The controversy over the LU water allocation was complex and 
the manipulation of data and knowledge to suit negotiating positions caused a great deal 
of polarisation of opinions. Political support for CIWP and its shared vision with 
WPAC by accepting its rules have contributed to a successful conclusion of provincial 
water allocation shares. Without establishing formal water rights for the LU, it was 
difficult to allocate water to it. The institutional sustainability of the water allocation 
governance will be described in Chapter VII but it is necessary to appreciate that the 
5 May 2010 1st NEC Meeting: setting the rules for decision-making on LU
- Assessment of the challenges and opportunities with regard to LU; presenting 
management options and strategies ; setting rules for the 2nd NEC meeting
7 June 2010 2nd NEC Meeting: how to implement the 2010 NEC Bylaw
- examining  the process of how to implement the 2008 By-law on LUB; reviewing  
and prioritizing project 
9 June 2010 1st Technical Committee  Meeting: Operational aspects of EMP
- Assessment and approval of  EMP
- Finalising and Approval of LU water right (3100 MCM); 
- Detailed assessment and approval of the projects 
12 June 2010 2nd Technical Committee  setting Meeting: rules for water allocation process
- Approval of the projects 
- Agreement on  the process of  provincial water allocation 
19 July 2010 3rd Technical Committee  Meeting: approval of water allocation shares 
- Approval of water allocation shares 
- Approval of 73 MCM  water rights  for satellite wetlands
12 Oct 2010 3rd NEC Meeting: Provisional agreement on water allocations 
- Assessment and  provisional approval of water shares pending further 
investigations
- Approval of projects 
30 Oct 2010 4th Technical Committee Meeting: Reassessment of water allocation decisions
- Reassessment of  provincial water allocation decisions 
- Reassessment of water allocation criteria including upstream rights
23 July  2011 4th NEC and RC Joint Meeting: Finalising water allocation shares
- Announcement of water allocation decisions 
- Formally establishing the RC 
Acronyms:
EMP Ecosystem Management Plan; LUB Lake Urmia Basin;  MCM Million Cubic Meters; NEC National Executive Council; 
RC Regional Council 
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provincial administrative divisions as a geopolitical Driving force (described in Chapter 
V) was an important factor in the final decision made by the NEC. Water allocation to 
Lake Urmia was a resounding success for the environmental movement in Iran. 
However, the implication of this decision has to be evaluated and it is not as simple as it 
is portrayed in the simple water allocation template (Table 6.4).  
Uncertainty. Changes in the state of Lake Urmia have been dramatic and visual. 
Also, it has been politically sensitive because it registered on the national agenda. More 
recently, social networks and sport events such as football matches have been an avenue 
to express urban dissatisfaction. Press and media have compared this situation to that of 
the Aral Sea in Middle Asia which has been reduced by 98% of its size. The 
environmental discourse is getting stronger. But water availability lies at the heart of the 
matter; hydrology and, of course, climate are the determining factors. The strong 
environmental discourse has been undermined by lack of accurate, acceptable data and 
this has caused polarisation of opinions and confusion about what action plans should 
be taken forward. Although the significance of the threatening changes that have 
occurred were recognised by the participants (actors), it is still rather difficult to attain 
consensus among them regarding the causal relationship between different factors 
affecting the lake. There is a distinct concern about the appropriateness of the 
Detrending Method dictated by the 2008 WAC to calculate water availability.  A trend 
in a natural phenomenon is not unusual in a short record; thus detrending is problematic 
as the effects of natural and human induced effects (e.g. due to the abstraction) are 
difficult to separate. This difficult issue will be dealt with in section 6.7.  
Adaptive water allocation to deal with climatic variability. The outcomes of the 
process can only be valid for average (normal) conditions and it did not consider 
climatic variations which are important characteristics of the climatic system. It is 
strongly argued that this level of allocation to the lake and the users is not sustainable in 
the long-term future as there are many years in which water availability can be below 
the allocated volume. Therefore, it is postulated that there is a need for an adaptive 
water allocation strategy to be able to cater for climatic variability which exerts a strong 
control over the fluctuations in LUB levels. 
Droughts were recognised by the participants as an important issue. Yekom 
(2005) concludes that the cyclical appearance of droughts is normal and should be 
expected every 6 years on average (Table 6.8). Therefore, actors should make a plan for 
the occurrence of drought in the basin. 
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Return period probability Indicator Condition 
6.3 0.1587 SPI<-1 drought 
14.97 0.0668 SPI<-1.5 Intense drought 
44 0.0227 SPI<-2 Extreme drought 
Note: SPI: Standardised Precipitation Index 
Table 6.8: Probability of occurrence and return periods of different drought conditions 
(Yekom, 2005). 
 
The second day of the 6th WAWG meeting was assigned to the first Drought 
Taskforce meeting as part of the Drought Risk Management module of the CIWP. The 
Taskforce was established to design an adaptive water allocation strategy during 
drought conditions. The work will continue as part of next round of negotiations 
through WAWG meetings. The author is involved in an advisory role as will be 
described in Chapter IX.  
Sustainability analysis. Based on the above argument, there is a need to assess 
the reliability of the water resources system, considering the historical data as well as 
possible future changes in climatic and hydrological parameters with reference to Lake 
Urmia. Hence, in the next section, the long term sustainability of LU under different 
climatic and water allocation scenarios is evaluated using a risk based analysis. Based 
on these concluding remarks, the main objectives of the second part of the chapter are as 
follows: 
· To assess the water availability i.e. the natural runoff   
· To make a risk based analysis of the future variability of the lake levels 
under different management scenarios and probabilistic projections of 
annual precipitation representing the next 41 years (2011-2051) 
· To devise an adaptive water allocation strategy by assessing different 
management options 
· To come up with a recommendation for implementation of the 2008 
EMP 
The methodological approach to achieve these objectives is described in the 
following sections.  
 
6.6 Methodological approach  
6.6.1  Assessment of baseline data  
There is a concern about the Detrending Method used to estimate natural runoff. 
The on-going Updating of the Water Master Plan Project obtained a different result (i.e. 
lower values) of annual average runoff using a modified Detrending Method as shown 
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above in Table 6.9 (Mahab, 2011). Therefore, it is paramount that this issue has to be 
considered to make an analysis of the sustainability of the proposed water allocations. 
By using data from MoE (2010b), annual average rainfall and observed runoff 
records are plotted in Figure 6.13 which shows that, for the period 1969-1994,there is an 
upward trend in both records, while, from 1995-2008, there is a downward trend in both 
time series. This shows that (a) an upward trend observed over a short period of record 
may reverse as the record becomes longer and (b) that, when assessing the effects of 
abstractions on a runoff record, this must be done in conjunction with an associated 
rainfall record so that the effect of abstractions can be isolated. Figure 6.13 also 
illustrates that a trend cannot be relied upon as an indicator of future water availability 
and so stochastic modelling should be used which can reproduce this natural climatic 
variability.   
 
Figure 6.13: Trends in rainfall and observed runoff for 1969-1994 and 1995-2008. 
 
The Detrending Method has also been the basis for the climate change discourse in 
which an attribution analysis was made (as stated in Chapter V) to ascribe  
· 67% of the lake level’s decline to droughts and climate change (and of course 
variability); 
· 27% to extra abstraction; and  
· 5% to direct impacts of dam-building. 
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These results were derived for the year 2000, a severe drought year, based on 1967-
2000 data.   
This attribution analysis has been used to shape the climate change discourse by 
MoE based on the argument that, in the last 15 years (i.e. since 1995) there has been a 
downward trend in average annual rainfall as illustrated in Figure 6.13. However, the 
concern is that, when determining natural runoff as described in section 6.5.1, 100% of 
the trend is attributed to abstraction. This ignores completely the climatic fluctuations 
which can appear as trends in short records. Thus, the Detrending Method is highly 
questionable, and so this issue is re-evaluated here as the whole process depends on how 
much water is available for allocation. Therefore, there is a need to evaluate the 
historical water balance of the lake and its climatic drivers to establish the amount of 
natural runoff that is available annually. A stochastic modelling approach which can 
reproduce quasi-cycles and quasi-trends (persistence) in the simulated rainfall data is 
the main driver for the inter-annual fluctuations in natural runoff.   
Baseline data. Most of the data used for this part of the ISTA component is from 
MoE (2010b) i.e. the same data as used by the actors to make the water allocation 
decision so that the analysis in this section is consistent with part (1) of the ISTA 
framework. The data were scrutinised and agreed during the process where the water 
allocations were agreed. The data analysis approach is summarized in Figure 6.1. Lake 
levels have been recorded on a daily basis since 1966. This daily record was obtained 
from the West Azerbaijan Regional Water Company. The lake level on the 22nd of 
September marks the end of thewater year in Iran. In section 6.6.2, the methodology is 
outlined and the results are presented in Section 6.7- 6.9. 
6.6.2 Components of the methodological framework 
The methodological framework for this part of Chapter VI comprises of the 
following components:  
· In Section 6.7, time series analysis of rainfall and runoff records is used 
to determine natural runoff and abstraction, and lake level analysis is 
used to assess the impact of climate and non-climatic parameters on the 
lake level drop.   
· In section 6.8, a lake water balance model (WBM) for the historic data is 
used to understand the hydrological characteristics of Lake Urmia and 
validate the time series analysis made above. This will also be used as 
the basis for risk based analysis of lake management by simulation of 
future rainfall records using a stochastic approach 
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· Stochastic rainfall models (SRMs) for Lake Urmia basin are built to 
generate rainfall series that reproduce short-term and long-term climatic 
variability (Section 6.8). 
· The water balance model is used in conjunction with the stochastic 
rainfall model to simulate an adaptive water allocation strategy based on 
reduction (scaling) factors (Section 6.9).   
Overall conclusions and recommendations for the ISTA component are 
presented in Section 6.10.  
 
6.7 Time series analysis approach to evaluating regional rainfall and runoff 
trends 
6.7.1 Rainfall and runoff time series analysis. 
First, the MoE discourse is that, since 1995, there has been a change in climate; 
a downward trend in precipitation has been noted. However Robson et al (2000; p. 59) 
note that “climatic variability has a very marked effect on many hydrological series” in 
two ways: (1) it can cause an apparent trend when the length of records are short; i.e. 
any records below 50 years are very difficult to assess; and (2) obscures other changes 
that might affect the trend as they are typically large.  
Secondly, the Detrending Method was not an independent fact and involved a 
great deal of subjective judgement, particularly in assuming that abstraction effects 
started in the beginning of the runoff record. It is noted that Mahab (2011) also does not 
agree with the estimated value of 6927 MCM for natural runoff as well. Therefore, 
trends and fluctuations in runoff need to be analysed in conjunction with those in 
rainfall.  
Recalling the information presented in Chapters IV and V, land reforms in the 
1960s were followed by the introduction of hydraulic structures in the 1970s. Many of 
the dams lagged behind in terms of building irrigation networks. After the 1979 
Revolution, the Imposed War continued until 1988. The first Post Revolution 
Development plan came into action in 1989 and was consolidated in the second and 
third plans. As a result, in the mid 1990s, two major dams came into operation. Since 
then, water consumption has increased dramatically. 
Therefore, the regression is made for the pre-1995 period i.e. 1969-1994 to 
reconstruct the lake levels in the post-1994 period i.e. 1995-2009. Therefore, one of the 
main issues is to establish the relationship between lake level and precipitation and the 
separate impacts of hydrological drought (precipitation deficiency) and abstraction on 
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the decreased lake level. For this analysis, up to date data are needed i.e. up to 2010 to 
be able to analyse the impact of abstractions on the lake levels. 
Reconstruction of lake levels. Firstly, the annual average precipitation series, Pt 
over the catchment area draining to the lake for the period 1969-2010is plotted and 
secondly, the annual lake level increments (in m) are calculating as in equation 6.4: 
 
DYt= Yt – Yt-1         for t= 1, 2, …,  n       (6.4) 
 
where Yt is lake level on 22
nd of  September of each water year, t, DYt is the annual 
change in lake level, and n is 42 years i.e. 1969-2010.Then, the following regressions 
are made for the period 1969-1994: 
· Yt against Pt: 
 
Yt =a + b Pt          (6.5) 
 
· DYt against   Pt 
 
DYt = a’ + b’Pt        (6.6) 
where Pt is precipitation for the period 1969-1994 and a, b  and a’ and b’ are regression 
coefficients. 
Based on the results obtained, Model (6.6) was used to reconstruct levels for 
1969-94 and 1995-2010 to show the effects of abstractions and climate variability. 
Runoff time series analysis. The above procedure was repeated using observed 
runoff or inflow into the lake, It instead of Yt. During years when there are no net 
abstractions i.e. 1969-1994, inflow It is assumed to be equal to natural runoff , Rt i.e.It = 
Rt. Therefore, from the regression of inflow on rainfall Pt, Rt can be reconstructed as in 
equation 6.7: 
Rt = c + d Pt          (6.7) 
where c and d are regression coefficients. Equation 6.7 is used to estimate natural runoff 
for the period 1969-2009. In the presence of abstractions, natural runoff is given by 
equation 6.8:  
Rt =NAt + It         (6.8) 
where NAt is net abstraction i.e. abstractions minus return flow. Then the abstraction is 
given by equation 6.9: 
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NAt = Rt - It         (6.9)  
which is the estimate of the net amount of water abstracted from the catchment.  
Cumulative departures from the mean. To show the effects of sequences of 
consecutive wet and dry years, the cumulative departures from the mean can be 
calculated for the annual rainfall time series according to the following formula:  
CDM= σ ሺ௞௧ୀଵ ௧ܲ െ ܲഥ ሻ t= 1, 2,…n     (6.10) 
where Pt is the annual rainfall in year t and ܲഥ  is the mean rainfall.  
Reliability analysis.  The sensitivity of Lake Urmia’s water resources to new 
water allocation demands can be assessed with a reliability index defined first by 
Hashimoto et al (1982) which describe the failure status of a water resource system by 
measuring the frequency of failure (ASCE, 1998). The reliability index describes the 
performance of a water resources system such as the state of a variable (e.g. lake level, 
minimum ecological water demand etc. ) in terms of failure, F,  i.e. non-satisfactory 
state and non-failure, NF, satisfactory state (Kjeldsen and Rosbjerk;2004). So with 
reference to water supply to the lake, the F state describes the situation where the 
required water demand cannot be met at a given time t and vice versa. Hence, the 
reliability index can be calculated as in equation (6.11) (e.g. Walsh and Kilsby, 2007):  ൌ ቀ୲୭୲ୟ୪୬୳୫ୠୣ୰୭୤୷ୣୟ୰ୱି୬୳୫ୠୣ୰୭୤୷ୣୟ୰ୱ୭୤୊ୱ୲ୟ୲ୣ୲୭୲ୟ୪୬୳୫ୠୣ୰୭୤୷ୣୟ୰ୱ ቁ כ ͳͲͲ   (6.11) 
Given that the minimum long term annual ecological requirement for the lake is 3100 
MCM, the number of years (if any) where it is less than 3100 MCM is identified as the 
F state to calculate the reliability. 
6.7.2 Results 
Cumulative departures from the mean. In Figure 6.13, there is evidence of 
considerable short-term and longer term rainfall fluctuation in the 1969 – 2010 annual 
LU basin rainfall record. To reveal the likely effect of these fluctuations on lake levels, 
the CDM of the rainfall record is plotted in Figure 6.14 where it is evident that the scale 
of fluctuations in the CDM in the last twenty years is larger than for the earlier part of 
the record. This reflects increased climatic variability in the 1999 – 2010 period, which 
results in greater fluctuations in the lake levels as will be seen in the following section. 
There is a possibility that global warming may have influenced the increased variability 
in rainfall observed over the last twenty years. However, long climatic records show 
that there is inherent natural variability in the climate which can produce such 
fluctuations. It is therefore not possible to distinguish any global warming signal in the 
LUB rainfall record from natural climatic variability. However, the possibility of a more 
Chapter 6 
 
205 
variable rainfall regime in the future, with more persistent runs of wet and dry years, 
cannot be ruled out. 
 
Figure 6.14: Cumulative departures from the mean for LU basin annual rainfall (mm) 
(1969-2010).  
 
Lake level reconstruction based on regression analysis. The lake levels were 
reconstructed using the regression model in eq. 6.6 applied to the pre 1995 rainfall 
record. Figure 6.15 shows the impact of climatic variability as well as human impacts 
on Lake Urmia levels. The reconstructed levels match well overall with the observed 
levels, although they do not fit year by year. From 1991- 1995, there is a lake level rise 
which is reproduced very well. Then, there is a steady decline up to 1999, followed by a 
sharp fall continuing to the year 2001. The period 1999-2001 is characterised by a sharp 
reduction in precipitation (Figure 6.13 ). After that, the lake level does not recover 
despite an upward precipitation fluctuation. This shows that drought is not the only 
cause of the fall in lake level since 1995. In 1995, 2 major dams came into operation 
followed by 4 more dams in 2002 and 2006 and the impact of dam-building and 
increased water withdrawals have clearly registered.  
The reconstructed lake levels show increasing divergence from the observed 
levels from 1995, which reflect the accelerated development referred to above. This 
clearly shows that new developments or abstractions have greatly amplified the lake 
level drop. Figure 6.15 suggests that, without abstractions, the lake levels post the high 
1995 level would have returned to the levels observed in the earlier part of the record.  
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Figure 6.15: Observed lake levels (m asl) vs. reconstructed lake levels based on 
regression of annual change in lake level on rainfall (1969-1994).  
 
Estimation of natural runoff and abstraction. The results of the natural runoff 
reconstruction analysis are given in Table 6.9. Natural runoff is estimated to be around 
5000 MCM based on runoff regression on rainfall as shown in Figure 6.16. This result 
suggests that the value obtained by using the Detrending Method i.e. 6927 MCM/year 
highly overestimates the actual natural runoff. Applying the Detrending method to the 
aggregated inflow series for 1969-2009 gave nearly 6300 MCM/year (Figure 6.10) 
 Observed 
runoff  
Predicted 
natural runoff  
Annual average runoff, 1969-2009, MCM 4211 4959 
Average annual runoff for 1995-2009, MCM 2263 4308.0 
Number of years that runoff is less than 3100 MCM for 1969-
2009 
14 6 
Reliability of water resources system, % 66% 85% 
Number of years runoff  less than 3100 MCM for 1995-2009 9 4 
Reliability of water resources system, % 40% 73% 
Estimated abstraction, MCM 2045  
Table 6.9: Results of regression I v. P to estimate natural runoff and level of abstraction 
Table 6.10 shows a breakdown of the each province’s contribution to observed 
LU inflow, and natural inflow estimated by MoE using the Detrending Method. It seems 
that the biggest overestimation error can be attributed to WA where sharper downward 
trends in inflows have been noted, and the estimated natural runoff is double the 
observed inflow. This is partly because of a growth in unauthorised abstractions. 
The original discourse started with a figure of 7400 MCM, then reduced it to 
7200 MCM and finally it was lowered to 6927 MCM; this indicates that there has been 
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some political manoeuvring and so 6927MCM was not only the outcome of an 
independent assessment. 
 
Province LU inflow (MCM) Estimated natural runoff (MCM) 
Kurdistan 1315 1583 
West Azerbaijan 1839 3983 
East Azerbaijan 1022 1361 
Totals 4176 6927 
Table 6.10: Breakdown of LU inflow and estimated natural runoff (MoE, 2010b) by 
province for the period. 
 
From Table 6.9, the best estimate for current abstraction is about 2045 MCM. 
This again is different from MoE’s(2010b) estimate of 2900 MCM.  
 
Figure 6.16: Inflows into Lake Urmia (1969-2009) and the reconstructed natural flow 
using the regression of the pre-1995 inflow record on rainfall. 
 
6.8 Water balance modelling  
6.8.1 Water balance of Lake Urmia 
 The main objective of the water balance model (WBM) is to assess the 
sustainability of the water resources system given the new requirement for allocating 
3100 MCM to Lake Urmia to maintain its ecological and hydrological functions. For a 
sustainable water allocation strategy, lake restoration has to be part of the plan. Hence, 
lake storage has to be maintained above a minimum volume and in wet years it should 
be compensated by allowing more inflow into the Lake, while, in dry years, cutbacks in 
the lake’s and users’ allocations will be necessary.  
The annual water balance model (WBM) of the Lake is given by: 
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)(11 tttttt EPLAISS -++= --       (6.12) 
where  
St = storage volume at the end of year t ( in MCM) 
It = observed runoff (inflow from surrounding catchment) in MCM 
At = average annual lake area at the end of year t in m
2 
PLt = annual average precipitation over the lake year t (in m) 
Et = evaporation from Lake Urmia during year t in m 
 A second model is constructed by replacing It with the natural runoff, Rt: 
)(11 tttttR EPLARSS -++= --      (6.13) 
where Rt is calculated from equation 6.7. Results from both models are plotted and 
compared in Figure 6.17. 
The initial storage was obtained by converting the observed initial water level 
using a parabolic Volume-Area-Level (VAL) relationship obtained by WRI (2005): 
ï
î
ï
í
ì
+-´=
-+-=
28
2
419.3701.94055110970548.5
309046.3014.7790850057395
YYS
YYA
    (6.14) 
where A, S and Y are area (km2), storage (MCM) and elevation (m asl), respectively.  
The VAL curves have an important application in estimating the water balance 
of the lake since there is no bathymetric data which is the most accurate way to find the 
mathematical relationship between the VAL elements (a bathymetric study of Lake 
Urmia should be carried out in the future). WRI (2005) used maps or satellite images 
which cannot necessarily be interpolated to higher or lower elevations. However, the 
above relationship must suffice for the present study. 
Originally, the VAL curves were obtained by studying a range of lake level 
varying between 1273-1280 m.a.s.l. however; the lake level in 2010 was 1271.6 which 
is below the level above which the VAL curves described by eq. 6.14 are valid. The 
measured area for this elevation is known to be 2700 km2 (Jabbari, 2011). Therefore, for 
lower lake levels, a linear relationship was used based on this data point 
Evaporation. As stated in Chapter V, there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
evaporation. Based on past research and MoE (2010b) estimates, the average is between 
1180 and 1272 mm/year. By minimising the sum of the differences between the 
observed and simulated lake volumes over the period 1967-1994, the average 
evaporation rate was calibrated as 1244 mm/year.  
6.8.2    WBM simulations of LU storage using natural and observed runoff 
The WBM simulations of storage (Figure 6.18)correspond well with the 
regression results obtained in Section 6.7.1 for lake levels ; the same overall fluctuations 
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are observed, as well as the same divergence between the lake storage series 
reconstructed from the (reconstructed) natural runoff data and that produced using the 
observed runoff series. However, Figure 6.17 shows that there is a time shift in the 
WBM simulated storage compared to the historical storage series derived from the VAL 
relationship, particularly for the recent period. There is no obvious explanation for this; 
however, it does not significantly affect the results of the analysis or change the overall 
conclusions.  
 
Figure 6.17: Water balance model simulations of Lake Urmia storage for natural and 
observed runoff. 
 
Acknowledging the data uncertainty referred to above, it can be deduced that the 
lake volume in 2009 has reduced since 1968 to about one quarter of its original volume 
(assumed to be 21,000 MCM at the start of the simulation). The storage is now about 
5000 MCM and the equilibrium volume is about 18000 MCM according to Mahab 
(2011). 
6.8.3 Stochastic rainfall model 
In analysing the trends in the historic catchment average rainfall record, it was 
noted that there was an upward trend for the period 1969-1994, and a downward trend 
for the period of 1995-2009 (Figure 6.13). This is evidence for persistence, where runs 
of years that are above or below average occur. Stochastic time series models provide a 
means of simulating such fluctuations using Monte Carlo simulation. 
One of the key issues in modelling climatic and hydrological time series is the 
level of persistence present in a particular historical record. The higher the level of 
persistence, the higher the variability, with the possibility those periods of high and low 
flows can be unusually long, appearing as pseudo-trends in short records. Landwehr and 
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Matalas (1986) assert that hydrologic processes can exhibit a high level of persistence 
i.e. they have “a tendency for high flows to follow high flows or low flows to follow low 
flows (ibid, 239). Short term persistence in data describes any incremental changes 
(increase or decrease) for a short time span whereas “If this span of time is many times 
the time-increment between successive data, especially in yearly data, it is called long-
term persistence” (Panu and Unny, 1980). 
Hurst (1951, 1956) analysed a long record of annual flows for the River Nile and 
characterised long-term persistence /variability in terms of the rescaled range R/S which 
he related to record length n as: 
(R/S) ~ (n/2)h          (6.15) 
where h is termed the Hurst coefficient. The range, R, of cumulative departures from the 
mean is defined as  
Rj = Max Pj– Min Pj         (6.16) 
where Pjare the partial sums given by 
XjXPj
j
i
i -=å
=1
         (6.17) 
and the mean is 
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The standard deviation S given by ܵ ൌ ቀଵ௡σ ሺ పܺഥ௡௜ୀଵ െ ܺ௡ቁଶሻభమ        (6.18) 
To estimate the coefficient h (now called the Hurst Coefficient), Hurst used the 
expression 
 
(R/S) = (n/2)K          
from which  
 
)2/log(
)/log(
n
SR
K =                  (6.19) 
where K is an estimator of the Hurst Coefficient h. 
For a large number of geophysical records, including Nile flows, Hurst found 
that the average value of K was 0.73, with a standard deviation of 0.09. For an 
independent process with no persistence, he showed theoretically that h= 0.50. He 
attributed the discrepancy between this theoretical result and the average value of 0.73 
to long term persistence/variability. The discrepancy between the theoretical value of 
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0.5 and the average value of 0.73 obtained from observed data is known as the Hurst 
phenomenon. 
The variability of River Nile flows and many other long records of runoff 
observed across the world is associated with natural climatic variability whereby 
periods of wet and dry years can be unusually long. It is expected that this variability 
will increase under climate change. Therefore, the aim here is to build a stochastic 
model of rainfall that can be used to explore the sensitivity of Lake Urmia levels to this 
type of variability. 
O’Connell (1971, 1974 a, b) has shown that an ARMA (1,1) model can explain 
the Hurst phenomenon in the behaviour of R/S. Salas et al (1979) postulated that, since 
hydrological data are time dependent, the transient region in R/S with h>0.5 can be 
prolonged to reproduce the Hurst phenomenon. ARMA models have the capability to 
explain the Hurst phenomenon since their “correlation structure dictates the behaviour 
of the rescaled range” (ibid, p.7). Additionally, ARMA models not only have well 
known theoretical properties, but they possess physical foundations in hydrology (Hipel 
and McLeod, 1994; Salas and Smith 1981).   
The autocorrelation function of the ARMA (1,1) model used by O’Connell 
(1971) to reproduce long term persistence is given by: 
 ɏͳ ൌ ሺథିఏሻሺଵିథఏሻଵାఏమିଶథఏሻ         (6.20) 
ρk = Ԅ ρk-1  ,  k = 2, 3,….        
where Ԅ is the parameter of the autoregressive (AR) part; and θ is the parameter 
of the moving average (MA) part. An ARMA (1,1) model for annual precipitation, Xt, 
can be written as (e.g. Hipel and McLeod, 1994): 
(Xt-μx)/σx) = Ԅ ((Xt-1 - μx)/ σx) + σε (εt -θεt-1)      (6.21) 
where Ԅ and θ are model parameters, εt is a noise term that follows a normal 
distribution N (0, 1); σx is the standard deviation and μx is the mean of the rainfall time 
series. 
The generated rainfall is given by 
Xt = μx + zt σx         (6.22) 
where zt is the standardised rainfall given as: 
zt = Ԅ zt-1 + σε (εt –θεt-1)        (6.23) 
where σε is the standard deviation of the noise term given by: 
σε= ට ሺଵିԄమሻଵା஘మିଶԄ஘            (6.24) 
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For a range of selected values of the ARMA (1,1) model parameters, O’Connell 
(1974) derived, through Monte Carlo simulation, expected values of the lag-one 
autocorrelation coefficient ρ1 and the estimate K of the Hurst coefficient for samples of 
size 25, 50 and 100. To build the rainfall model, estimates of ρ1 and K must be 
estimated from the available annual rainfall data. The lag-one autocorrelation 
coefficients ρ1is calculated using  ɏଵൌ σሺ௑೔శభି௑തሻሺ௑೔ି௑തሻσ ሺ௑೔ି௑തሻమ೙೔        (6.25) 
The estimates of ρ1 and K for the 42 years of historical annual LUB rainfall 
series (1969 -2010) are 0.1 and 0.59, respectively. The value of K indicates a low to 
moderate level of persistence. Due to sampling variability, it was not possible to match 
these values exactly with one set of values in the tables produced by O’Connell (1974), 
and so three sets of parameter values were selected to (a) reflect uncertainty in selecting 
the appropriate parameter set and (b) to allow for the possibility of a more variable 
climatic regime in the future due to global warming. As noted earlier, there is some 
evidence of increased variability in the historic record for the period 1990-2010.  
 The first parameter set is for the case where Ԅ and θ are equal, which 
corresponds to an independent process with no persistence. The second set (Ԅ= 0.14 
and θ=0) corresponds to a moderate level of persistence /variability while the third set 
(Ԅ=0.75and θ=0.60) corresponds to a higher level of persistence. The parameters are 
summarised in Table 6.11 
 
Parameters / 
SRM  
Ԅ  θ Level of persistence  
SRM1 0 0 Corresponds to independent case, as a sort of lower bound on the 
persistence level i.e. no persistence  
SRM2 0.14 0 corresponds to a first order autoregressive process with a moderate 
level of persistence 
SRM3 0.75 0.60 this corresponds to a higher level of persistence, as might be 
encountered under climate change 
Table 6.11: ARMA model parameter values used in the stochastic rainfall models 
(SRMs). 
 
100 series of 42 years in length were produced and tabulated using Matlab 
software code based on the following procedure: 
1.  2010 was used as the starting year, so precipitation (X2010) for that year was 
standardized using the mean and standard deviation to give the starting value 
z2010. 
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2. 100 series of 42 years were produced using equations (6.21) and (6.22). 
Validation of stochastic rainfall models. To compare the generated annual 
rainfall series with the historical series, R/S values for all the realisations were 
calculated and compared to the R/S value for the historical data (1969 – 2010). Figure 
6.18 shows histograms of R/S for 100 realisations of 42 years in length. The historic 
value of R/S is 6.1. From the histograms (Figure 6.18), the probability of having a 
higher value of R/S in any future flows series is given in the table drawn in Figure 6.18 
for the three sets of parameters. As expected, the historic value is more likely under the 
case of no persistence (reflecting the low variability/persistence of the early part of the 
rainfall record) and less likely under the higher persistence ARMA (1,1) model but, 
since the expectation is of higher variability/persistence in the future, given the recent 
increase in variability and the possible influence of climate change, the models with 
higher levels of persistence allow for the uncertainty over future climatic variability. 
The three sets of parameters should not be regarded as covering the range of variability 
that might occur in the future in a definitive way, but will illustrate the sensitivity of 
future lake levels to this variability under various management scenarios.   
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Figure 6.18: Validation of the stochastic rainfall models using R/S analysis. 
 
6.9  Towards a sustainable and adaptive water allocation strategy  
6.9.1 Adaptive water allocation model  
 
As stated in Section 6.5, there has been concern about the recent higher 
variability in the rainfall record. There is a lack of knowledge about how climate change 
will influence rainfall variability in the future. In drought years, it will not be possible to 
meet the abstractions requirements and the lake’s requirement of 3100 MCM; thus, 
there will be a need to apply cutbacks to both and to capture how to balance the needs of 
Notes:
line corresponds to the historical data 1969-2010
R/S rescaled range/standard deviation
SMR1 independent case
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SMR3 high level of persistence similar to climate change
R/S for 100  41 year period synthetic data for the period 2010-2051
Mean Min Max
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the abstractions and the needs of the lake in a sustainable way. Therefore, there is a need 
for an adaptive water allocation model since fixed allocations are not realistic. 
The stochastic rainfall model is linked with the water balance model to (a) 
simulate different levels of rainfall variability; (2) capture the sensitivity of lake levels 
to these; and (3) assess the ability to maintain the 3100 LU MCM requirement. The 
water balance model is based on eq. 6.9. The rainfall over the lake is estimated using the 
ratio of direct annual average rainfall over the lake to the catchment rainfall which is 
calculated as 0.75 based on the 1969 – 94 data. They are closely correlated.  
The adaptive water allocation model uses a sliding scale approach based on two 
levels: 
1. a warning (alpha) level: in which user allocation reduction will be initiated 
with a value of alpha in the range of 0<α <1; 
2. a critical (beta) level which entails a further reduction from alpha. This 
should be linked to a drought risk management plan which defines 
‘exceptional circumstances’ under which to apply a beta level reduction 
defined as 0<β<1 and β<α. 
The procedure is as follows: 
1. The WBM is used to simulate a sliding scale reduction of the target abstraction 
rate NA as the lake level approaches the critical level. If the storage drops below 
the warning level e.g. if St < S1, then a reduced level of abstraction NAt is 
determined as 
NANAt a= where 0<α <1.     (6.28) 
2. If  the storage the storage drops below the critical level ie St < S2 ,then 
NANAt b= where 0<β<1 and β<α.    (6.29) 
There are 4 sets of simulations (Table 6.12). In each set, three stochastic rainfall 
models (SRMs) are used with two abstraction rates; thus, there are six simulations for 
each set. Also, four pairs of alpha and beta values (sliding scale reductions) have been 
used as indicated in Table 6.12. 
· Business as Usual (BaU): alpha and beta equal to 1 
· Mild adaptive management option: alpha and beta are equal to 0.9 and 0.8 
respectively 
· Moderate adaptive management option: alpha and beta are equal to 0.8 and 0.6 
respectively  
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· Strong adaptive management option: alpha and beta are equal to 0.75 and 0.5 
respectively 
For long-term sustainability of the lake, the warning level (and corresponding 
storage) was set at 1275 m asl, which is about half way between the long term average 
for the pre 1995 lake level series and the critical level which is set at1274.1 m asl. The 
starting level for all the simulation was 1271.6 m asl which was the level at the end of 
2010.
 
 
A- Business as Usual : alpha= 1, beta=1 
Scenarios  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Current lake level (m 
asl 
1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 
θ 0 0 0.60 0 0 0.60 Ԅ 0 0.14 0.75 0 0.14 0.75 
α 1 1 1 1 1 1 
β 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NA (MCM) 2900 2900 2900 3700 3700 3700 
B- mild adaptive management option: alpha= 0.9, beta=0.8 
Scenarios  7 8 9 10 11 12 
Current lake level (m 
asl) 
1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 
θ 0 0 0.60 0 0 0.60 Ԅ 0 0.14 0.75 0 0.14 0.75 
α 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 
β 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
NA (MCM) 2900 2900 2900 3700 3700 3700 
C-  moderate adaptive management option: alpha= 0.8, beta=0.6 
Scenarios  13 14 15 16 17 18 
Current lake level (m 
asl) 
1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 
θ 0 0 0.60 0 0 0.60 Ԅ 0 0.14 0.75 0 0.14 0.75 
α 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
β 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 
NA (MCM) 2900 2900 2900 3700 3700 3700 
D- Strong management option: alpha= 0.75 beta=0.5 
Scenarios  19 20 21 22 23 24 
Current lake level (m 
asl) 
1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 1271.6 
θ 0 0 0.60 0 0 0.60 Ԅ 0 0.14 0.75 0 0.14 0.75 
Α 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Β 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
NA (MCM) 2900 2900 2900 3700 3700 3700 
Table 6.12: Description of rainfall (climatic driver) and adaptive management scenarios. 
6.9.2 Results  
Four criteria has been used to make the analysis; water for users (abstractions); 
inflow into the lake; lake levels and the reliability of the water resources system to 
maintain the lake level at 1274.1 m asl. The means and percentiles of the average annual 
inflows and abstractions over the 41 year periods for the100 realisations are given in 
Table 6.13. Selected examples are given in the text.  
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BaU scenarios. In the long run, the BaU scenarios are not sustainable. If more 
persistence/variability is realized in the future, then the outlook based on the 3rd and 6th 
scenarios is bleak. Figure 6.19 shows that the reliability of the system in maintaining 
Lake Urmia at 1274.1m asl is almost zero. For example, in Scenario 3, the average lake 
level is below the critical level for 99% of the realisations. These statistics can be 
generalised for other parameters such as the3100 MCM minimum inflow requirement of  
the lake. For example in scenario 3, the average inflow is less than 3100 MCM in 97% 
of realisations. Therefore, it is concluded that fixed water allocations of 3700 and 2900 
MCM will cause the demise of Lake Urmia in the short/medium term. Consequently, 
the decisions reached in Section 6.5 would have to be adjusted to take into account the 
role of climatic variability, and the overestimation of the available natural runoff. 
 
Figure 6.19: Risk analysis for BaU scenarios 3 and 6 with high persistence (SRM3). 
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 Scenario  Water allocation Percentile 
   Max 90 mean 10 Min 
A
- 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
a
s 
U
su
a
l 
 (
a
lp
h
a
, 
b
e
ta
 =
1
) 
1 Lake Urmia 3170.9 2711.3 2326.8 1966.9 1706.3 
Users 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900 
2 Lake Urmia 3314.952 2796.399 2328.488 1935.674 1636.103 
Users 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900 
3 Lake Urmia 3935.5 2892.0 2366.4 1937.2 1404.9 
Users 2900 2900 2900 2900 2900 
4 Lake Urmia 2440.527 2029.328 1692.854 1382.184 1183.666 
Users 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 
5 Lake Urmia 2572.199 2083.573 1699.494 1361.295 1146.216 
Users 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 
6 Lake Urmia 3188.427 2171.56 1731.521 1311.021 931.0843 
Users 3700 3700 3700 3700 3700 
B
- 
a
d
a
p
ti
v
e
: 
a
lp
h
a
=
 0
.9
, 
b
e
ta
=
0
.8
 
7 Lake Urmia 3545.003 3172.199 2786.228 2452.471 2152.968 
Users 2510.976 2426.098 2362.439 2334.146 2320 
8 Lake Urmia 3638.798 3216.347 2775.39 2413.274 2072.225 
Users 2567.561 2435.293 2369.512 2334.146 2320 
9 Lake Urmia 4183.03 3310.111 2805.406 2365.012 1822.043 
Users 2652.439 2490.463 2383.659 2334.146 2320 
10 Lake Urmia 3016.74 2621.011 2270.528 1913.358 1664.543 
Users 3104.39 3006.024 2978.049 2960 2960 
11 Lake Urmia 3104.638 2674.56 2249.782 1884.454 1594.062 
Users 3140.488 3041.22 2987.073 2960 2960 
12 Lake Urmia 3659.01 2774.456 2298.877 1851.151 1363.451 
 Users 3212.683 3068.293 2987.073 2960 2960 
C
-a
d
ap
ti
v
e,
 a
lp
h
a=
 0
.8
, 
b
et
a=
 
0
.6
 
13 Lake Urmia 3785.491 3517.959 3191.645 2911.931 2590.544 
Users 2263.415 2051.22 1923.902 1824.878 1782.439 
14 Lake Urmia 3865.14 3546.587 3164.474 2859.779 2503.644 
Users 2348.293 2095.073 1938.049 1824.878 1782.439 
15 Lake Urmia 4317.42 3575.592 3199.772 2755.986 2251.228 
Users 2518.049 2164.39 1966.341 1839.024 1754.146 
16 Lake Urmia 3785.491 3517.959 3191.645 2911.931 2590.544 
Users 2263.415 2051.22 1923.902 1824.878 1782.439 
17 Lake Urmia 3865.14 3546.587 3164.474 2859.779 2503.644 
Users 2348.293 2095.073 1938.049 1824.878 1782.439 
18 Lake Urmia 3947.791 3247.569 2824.667 2382.329 1869.604 
 Users 2923.902 2580.976 2382.439 2256.098 2220 
D
- 
a
d
a
p
ti
v
e:
 a
lp
h
a
=
 0
.7
5
, 
b
et
a
=
0
.5
 
19 Lake Urmia 3889.689 3660.299 3359.189 3095.834 2812.283 
Users 2157.317 1929.207 1732.927 1591.463 1520.732 
20 Lake Urmia 3967.701 3677.801 3339.233 3047.304 2711.643 
Users 2245.732 1964.573 1768.293 1609.146 1520.732 
21 Lake Urmia 4377.542 3684.073 3351.502 2936.43 2454.099 
Users 2457.927 2035.305 1785.976 1609.146 1538.415 
22 Lake Urmia 3591.201 3375.176 3063.193 2787.153 2495.322 
Users 2481.707 2233.537 2075.61 1940.244 1895.122 
23 Lake Urmia 3619.885 3373.888 3038.331 2750.005 2397.751 
Users 2594.512 2278.659 2098.171 1940.244 1895.122 
24 Lake Urmia 4051.571 3420.282 3045.269 2624.151 2157.692 
Users 2820.122 2368.902 2120.732 1962.805 1850 
Table 6.13: Simulation results for average annual inflows and abstraction over the 
41year periods for 100 realizations. 
 
Adaptive scenarios. Three pairs of sliding scale parameters were chosen to 
simulate the impact of mild, moderate and strong adaptive management options.  
For mild adaptive management (alpha=0.9 and beta=0.8), although the reliability 
of the system has increased compared with BaU scenarios, this level of reduction factor 
favours the users more than the lake, as shown in Table 6.13.If the target abstraction 
rate is increased, more water is given to the users at the expense of  the lake. Therefore, 
in the moderate adaptive model, the target abstraction rate is the determining factor. For 
example, in scenarios 10,11 and 12witha target abstraction rate of 3700 MCM, the lake 
on average receives of the order of 2300 MCM, whereas, for scenarios 7, 8, and 9 with a 
target abstraction rate of 2900, the average inflow increases to 2800 MCM. Therefore, 
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this level of adaptive management will not achieve the long term aim of the Ecosystem 
Management Plan (EMP).  
Generally speaking, the strong adaptive approach has favourably influenced the 
three criteria used for Lake Urmia sustainability: 
· the amount of water inflow into the lake has been greater than 3100 MCM; 
· the lake level has recovered to more desirable levels; 
· The reliability of the system to maintain the lake at 1274.1 masl has increased.  
However, the amount of water available for users has been reduced. For example, for 
Scenario 22 in Figure 6.20, the inflow is above 3100 for about 50% of the realisations 
whereas none of the realisations achieve the target abstraction of 2900 MCM. 
Therefore, there is a need for a trade-off between water allocation to users and to the 
lake.  
 
Figure 6.20: Comparison of lake inflow and users’ allocation for a strong adaptive 
management option and the no persistence rainfall model (SRM1).  
 
Table 6.13 shows that, for the moderate adaptive management option, and a 
target user allocation of 3700 MCM, the average inflow to the lake exceeds 3100 MCM 
except under high variability/persistence (i.e. scenario 18). However, the users receive 
less than 2000 BCM on average. This reflects the fact that, on average, there is just over 
5000 MCM available to be allocated between users and the lake. However as shown in 
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Figure 6.21, it seems that the lake level under this level of abstraction will not recover 
from its current level i.e. the lake level is less than 1274.1 m asl for about 90% of the 
realisations, with this figure increasing for the high level of persistence 
 
Figure 6.21:  Risk analysis of lake levels for the moderate adaptive management option 
at 3700 MCM target level of abstraction and rainfall models SRM1-3. 
 
The simulation of the moderate adaptive management option at the target 
abstraction rate of 2900 MCM is shown in Figure 6.22, and for the no persistence and 
high persistence levels. Generally, the users are expected to be allocated 2000 MCM for 
50 % of the realisations i.e. on average this figure can be used while maintaining the 
lake level at 1274.1 m asl. This is in line with the current abstraction estimated by the 
regression analysis (2045 MCM). This indicates that there is no scope for further water 
resources development in the basin and it has reached a saturation point. Any 
development will heighten the pressure on the lake and will cause it to go into 
permanent decline. 
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Figure 6.22: Risk analysis of moderate adaptive management option under the no 
persistence (scenario 13) and high persistence (scenario 15) rainfall cases (SRM1 and 
SRM3). 
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6.10 Conclusions and recommendations 
The conclusions drawn in Section 6.5.5 for part (1) of this Chapter are not 
repeated here, but the main outcome of the ISTA component is that, although the 
efficacy of the governance system has improved, the effectiveness of the EMP i.e. 
achieving long term sustainability of the lake, is in doubt, considering the agreement on 
the level of water allocation, and what has emerged from part (2) of this chapter on 
overall water availability It seems that both sides of the water allocation equation have 
not been fully considered a basin-wide planning approach that requires rigorous 
hydrological assessments of water availability and potential for water use. The 
implications of the water allocation decisions have not been foreseen by the actors. On 
the one hand, the user water allocation ceiling of 3700 MCM lacks rigorous scientific 
assessment, and on the other hand, the minimum ecological requirement of the lake has 
become a legal right which ignores the hydrological and climatic variability and 
persistence.   
In the first part of this chapter, the overall outcome of the water allocation 
process was that 3100MCM was allocated to Lake Urmia and 3700 MCM to users. This 
was based on the estimate of 6900 MCM for natural average runoff to LU derived using 
the Detrending Method prescribed by the MoE. However, an examination of the use of 
the Detrending Method has revealed that it was based on the highly questionable 
assumption that the downward trend in observed runoff over the 1950 – 2008 (58 years) 
period of record was attributed entirely to abstraction. By establishing a regression 
relationship between runoff and rainfall over the period 1969 – 1995 when the influence 
of abstractions was minimal, average annual natural runoff over the period 1969 – 2010 
was found to be approximately 5000 MCM. The current level of abstraction was 
estimated as approximately 2000 MCM/year, so, based on these figures, there is no 
scope for further development/ abstraction if the lake is to receive its allocation of 
3100MCM. 
Due to climatic variability, fixed allocations cannot be sustained, and so a risk 
analysis of a number of management scenarios was carried out using an ARMA (1,1) to 
generate multiple realizations of future rainfall for different levels of 
persistence/variability. The management scenarios were based on fixed target 
allocations of 3700 MCM and 2900 MCM and an adaptive allocation strategy whereby 
sliding scale reductions to abstractions were made when the lake levels fell below 
warning and critical levels. Mild, moderate and strong levels of reduction were explored 
under different levels of rainfall variability. 
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Overall, the results reflect the overall natural runoff constraint of approximately 
5000 MCM, so the fixed targets of 3700 MCM and 2900 MCM cannot be sustained. If 
the user abstraction increases above the current level of around 2000 MCM, the Lake 
will go into permanent decline. The moderate and strong adaptive options can initiate 
Lake Urmia level recovery but only if the target rate of abstraction is much lower than 
3700 MCM. It was shown that, at the 2900 MCM target rate of abstraction,  the 
moderate management option is effective in delivering the amount of water to the lake 
required to maintain the minimum ecological requirement (3100 MCM) based on the 
vision stated in the EMP which understandably focuses on Lake Urmia’s water 
requirements. However, the average amount of water available to users reflects the 
overall constraint of 5000 MCM for average natural runoff availability. 
However, the actors have chosen to allocate a higher level of abstraction ceiling 
which does not take into account the basin- wide hydrological and climatic conditions. 
Therefore, the following recommendations are made: 
1. A thorough review of the hydrological and climatic baseline data to remove 
much of the uncertainty about the water allocation governance.  
2. Modification of the 2008 Water Allocation Code by (a) by removing the 
Detrending Method in the estimation of the water availability for the basin since 
it produces a highly overestimated value of natural runoff; (b) allowing other 
MCDA approaches other than AHP to minimise the inconsistency about 
weighting water allocation criteria; and (c) using a stochastic approach in the 
water allocation strategy since trend analysis is highly unreliable and cannot 
account for the persistence and variability of rainfall records. 
3. Vensim dynamic simulation has to be calibrated with more sophisticated generic 
water resources modelling systems such as WEAP, Mike Basin or RIBASIM.   
To conclude, it can be said that the ISTA approach highlighted three main issues: (a) 
the need for an independent scientific assessment based on rigorous reliable data; (b) the 
revision of the existing water allocation rules i.e.the 2008 WAC; Although, the 2008 
WAC has introduced basin-wide planning, it has a rigid scientific approach and uses 
highly unreliable methodology in assessing water availability and (c) the outcome of the 
WAC process is unrealistic as it ignores demand management which is the cornerstone 
of IWRM. To redress this, the reassessment calls for an adaptive water allocation 
strategy which is a form of demand management required to achieve long term 
sustainability.  
In Chapter VII, the institutional implications of the results obtained in this chapter 
will be further assessed and further recommendations given.   
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Chapter VII.Re-assessment of Water Allocation Governance in Lake 
Urmia Basin: an Institutional Design 
7.1 Introduction:  
Chapter VI described Lake Urmia’s new governance system as well as re-assessing 
the sustainability and reliability of the water resources system (WRS) to maintain Lake 
Urmia’s minimum ecological status using the Integrated Socio-technical Assessment 
(ISTA) component. Without repeating the arguments and the conclusions, the main 
outcome of the technical assessment is that the participatory process has produced 
unsustainable water allocation outcome decisions because most of the participants in Water 
and Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) meetings failed to provide accurate data and 
information on water availability. It seems that there has been a degree of “data fitting” by 
all sides. Therefore, it is argued that the existing institutional set up has to instigate an 
inbuilt mechanism for independent assessment since we have a viable governance system 
and structure is in place for a re-evaluation process to take place. 
Based on the conclusions in Chapter VI, it is argued that fixed water allocation is 
not just unrealistic but also (1) fosters zealous impractical expectations for water demands 
and (2) hides the realistic outlook of climatic variability and persistence. Hence, it is 
recommended to use an adaptive water allocation strategy which is a form of water demand 
management. In Chapter VII, we reassess the new water resources governance system (i.e. 
multitier MSPs) with the following objectives: 
1. To make an analysis of institutional sustainability the MSPs 
2. To evaluate the implications of adopting the adaptive water allocation  
3. To propose revised Responses based on (1) and (2) 
The methodological approach to achieve the above objectives is outlined in the next 
section.  
 
7.2 Methodological approach 
7.2.1 Data collection and the context of analysis   
This chapter is a cross cutting chapter using results from previous chapters as 
indicated in Figure 7.1 which provides a schema of the focal level of analysis. The 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) approach is used to assess the sustainability 
of the socio-political component of the WRS based on the objectives outlined above. The 
analytical approach is: 
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1. To assess the institutional sustainability of the water allocation decisions by 
evaluating the efficacy (Box 7.1) of the new rules in use at the operational 
level (Section 7.3).  
 
2. To assess the socio-political context of the decision making by 
a. analysing the role of ideological aspects of actors in dominant policy 
discourses (Section 7.4.1); 
b. analysing the narratives behind policy discourses on water resources 
planning and allocation (Section 7.4.2); 
c. analysing the discourses that influenced the water resources 
allocation and management decision-making process (Section 
7.4.3); and 
d. exploring the potential of a new water management paradigm to 
achieve sustainability within the socio-political context (7.4.4). 
3. To revise Responses by proposing how to enhance the new institutional 
design for an adaptive water resources management in LUB e.g. crafting 
new rules to reflect the adaptive water allocation model described in 
Chapter VI (Section 7.5). 
 
7.2.2 Evaluative Criteria    
The Evaluative Criteria has been introduced in Chapter III (Section 3.5.3). Efficacy 
is used as the main criterion for analysing the rules in use. Economic efficiency did not 
appear to have been among the list of concerns in LUB- although the stakeholders 
Box 7.1: Evaluative Criteria:  the three E’s based on Checkland and 
Scholes (1990, p 39). 
 
The rules in use can be judged based on 
· Efficacy (for ‘do the rules work?) which “checks whether the 
means chosen actually work” 
· Efficiency (for’ amount of output divided by amount of 
resources used’) which “considers whether the 
transformations is being carried out with the minimum use of 
resource” 
· Effectiveness ( ‘is the rule in use meeting the longer term 
aim’) which shows that a “transformation  works and used 
minimum resources” 
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mentioned it; they did not attempt to evaluate it in real terms. In addition to efficacy, 
several criteria have been considered:  
a. Equity and justice in terms of water allocation outcome: the question 
of conformance to general morality was a big issue: can those who 
‘cheated the system’ (i.e. EA and lately WA) be rewarded by getting 
more allocation of the resource (i.e. to have greater payoff)? It was 
decided to re-allocate the water resources regardless of existing 
abstractions 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Focal level of analysis in Chapter VII. 
 
b. Accountability and transparency of the participatory decision-making 
process provided the legitimacy of the decisions outcomes 
c. Reliability of the WRS in terms of the degree of ability for lake 
restoration from ISTA analysis 
d. As Ostrom (2005, p.68) notes that it is very difficult to compare the 
performance of alternative institutional arrangements; thus trade-offs 
are often required in using performance criteria. The trade-off 
process used are as follows (a) socio-technical criteria used in the 
MCDA of the ISTA component to allocate water resources using 
multi-criteria water allocation model (WAM) and (b) risk based 
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technical evaluation of the allocation decisions using adaptive WAM 
for different management options and climatic scenarios (i.e. a trade-
off among different criteria used in the allocation model; then the 
allocation was evaluated using the risk-based assessment based on 
water balance and stochastic rainfall modelling).  
In this chapter, we concentrate on the efficacy of the rules in use in addition to the 
above criteria. In Chapters IV, and V, the efficacy of the rules in use was measured in terms 
of the adequacy of their design and the implementability.   
 
7.3 Rules in use: an assessment  
Several new rules have evolved as part of a well organised effort by CIWP and high 
level political support for sustainable water managements in LUB. The new rules have been 
‘inserted’ onto the rules map as shown in yellow in Figure 7.2.  
As the main rules have been described in earlier part of the thesis; we will 
concentrate on the operational decision-making level rules i.e. the 2010 NEC Bylaw on 
implementing the 2008 EMP and the WAWG rules or Terms of Reference (ToR). The 
latter is discussed first.  
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Figure7.2: Post MoU rules in use.
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7.3.1  Crafting new rules for participation  
With reference to the ToR of the author as national IWRM consultant (Appendix 
A2), a capacity development strategy was agreed for facilitating the Working Group 
meetings in consultation with the CIWP. The strategy was centred on the following rules 
(Appendix A1, Table A1.4):  
1. Boundary and scope rules: there was a need to create a basin perspective rather than 
sectoral and provincial approaches to water and land management in the basin. 
Therefore, in order to foster the emergence of a new water management paradigm, 
river basin approach was chosen as a boundary unit for water resources planning 
and allocation. 
2. In addition to the position rule on the author’s role as described earlier, there was an 
emphasis on  
a. a new general position rule based on the new scope and boundary rules was 
established to foster (institutionalise) a basin-wide role for the participants 
so that members of the WAWG are disengaged (detached) from their official 
provincial roles as representatives of different organisations; 
b. national stakeholders were invited to the meetings to enhance the ownership 
of the results and to give MoE assurances that it will act according the 2003 
WAD and the 2008 WAC. This was based on the assumption that the 
success of the WAWG depended on how the WAWG transmits its higher 
decision-making levels since water allocation decision is highly centralised. 
De Jong and Spaans (2009) assert that” an active government is particularly 
needed in the initial stage in which a decision has to be made about the 
creation and design of the trade-off scheme”. As a result, the process was 
‘blessed’ by the MoE. 
3. New information rules were created: (a) a databank to be created i.e. data should be 
shared across the sectors; (b) transparency about the quality of the data i.e. data is 
scrutinised in an open participatory way and (c) uncertainty should be 
communicated to the decision-makers by considering the available facts and figures 
and acknowledge any information inadequacy i.e. to foster the belief that we have 
enough evidence about the water resources in the basin to make sound decisions.  
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4. An aggregation rule was established to adjust the balance of power among actors 
i.e. national and provincial stakeholders were on the same level and  decision to be 
made based on consensus. 
5. An empowerment (scope) rule was used to foster the belief that decisions made at 
the WAWG will be used by decision-makers at higher levels i.e. unlike previous 
projects such as WRI (2005), this is for real and the outcome will be approved by 
the national and provincial decision-makers and implemented accordingly. CWIP 
had an added advantage in the legal sense compared to other national and 
international projects: MoU provided the legal mandate of the Working Group work 
and hence part of the strategy was to “sell” the unique status of CIWP in the water 
allocation process. 
6. Payoff rule was centred on the notion that if the participants fail to reach a decision; 
then the decision is made at a higher level. Therefore, there should be no 
complacency as local problems require local solutions. 
7.  Choice rule to make LU a water demand site: on the onset of the process, it was 
important to emphasise the need to make hard choices and to accept a compromised 
outcome. McShane et al (2011) have demonstrated the difficulty to attain win-win 
outcomes in complex environmental action situations in which socio-economic 
prosperity is a prime objective based on 20 years of empirical research results by 
different researchers. The win-win approach has been rather rare compared with 
trade-offs and ‘hard choices ‘approach which is norm. However, the ethical and 
morality of win-win approach was maintained in terms of making Lake Urmia as a 
priority demand site in the water allocation process.     
Other contextual factors include  improving the democratic nature of the decision-
making or accountability by encouraging self-belief among the stakeholders i.e. there was a 
need for decisions as the problems are well known; hence stakeholders should not be afraid 
of taking responsibilities for their decisions. 
The successful outcome of the WAWG meetings can be attributed to the ability and 
the flexibility to craft new rules at the local level (operational level) by dealing with issues 
related to the participation arrangements such as power relationships among actors.  
7.3.2 2010 NEC By-law: dynamic rule-crafting powers   
The typology of the rules used in the 2010 NEC By-law is given in Table 7.1. There 
are 8 Articles dealing with the issues at the operational level decision-making. 
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LU water rights. The 2010 NEC By-law recognises LU’s water rights of 3100 
MCM which provided a new lifeline for the Working Group bearing in mind that neither 
the Regional Council nor the Working Group are explicitly mentioned in the Bylaw but it 
refers to the Ecosystem Management Plan which refers to both. For the first time ever, 
water allocation in LUB was based on an ecohydrological policy. This in itself is an 
achievement for environmentalism in Iran. 
Lack of aggregation rules. The By-law lacks clear aggregation rules on how 
position and choice rules are evaluated, assessed and agreed upon. Also, the 2008 NEC 
Bylaw takes a top-down approach1 by centralising all the work in the NEC which makes it 
almost impractical: designing, planning and monitoring are bestowed upon the NEC which 
comprises of several ministers and led by the First Vice President.  
 
Article Rule Typology  Description  
1 Boundary Members of NEC are selected (Figure7.1) 
 Position  Actors are assigned to coordinate and implement 2008 EMP  
2 Position DoE will act as a secretariat of the NEC 
3 Position and 
Boundary 
Chairperson can invite any other relevant organisations to attend the meetings  
4 Aggregation Decision-making is by the majority rule;  
 Scope The presidential powers are delegated to the members of the NEC and any ruling can become legally 
binding and issued as a By-Law of Council of Ministers. 
5 Position NEC Terms of reference has been outlined;  
 Choice design and planning of action and implementation plans especially during environmental crisis and 
droughts conditions; 
 Choice and Scope Assessment of management proposals and planning  
 Choice Make sure the supply of 3100 MCM of min ecological of LU and allocate provincial water shares  
 Choice and Scope Monitoring the performance of governorates and organisations on the implementation of the EMP 
 Choice and Scope Allocation of budgets and assessment of project proposals  
6 Scope, Choice and 
Position 
Sets out in detail the responsibilities of each of MoE, MoAJ, DoE and provincial governorates  in 
implementing the 2008 EMP by assigning to them positions to act with a target outcomes  
7 Payoff provinces are given public finances according to their share and role in the 2008 EMP 
8 Position and choice NEC reports each year to the President  
Table7.1: Typology of rules in the 2010 NEC By-law. 
 
This requires a high level of coordination at the collective choice level decision-making to 
make operational decisions such as water allocations. For example, the Vice President (VP) 
is responsible for nearly 40 collective choice level (i.e. policy-making) committees and part 
                                                 
1 In practice, NEC has not exercised its powers and delegated it to WAWG meeting decisions but there is a 
potential to apply the rule in a different way.  
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of the delay for finalising the Sanandaj agreement was due to lack of time and difficulty of 
managing the time of collective choice level actors such as three Vice Presidents and other 
ministers. Therefore, NEC has been interlocked in the governmental web and has become 
ineffective for a long period until the 4th joint meeting.  
Government without coercion. After the Sanandaj (6th WAWG) meeting, NEC had 
a strong mandate to act but it preferred to referring back to the WAWG and establishing a 
technical committee based on smaller WAWG members to finalise the Sanandaj agreement.  
This clearly shows that NEC abstained from top-down approach of the By-law by not did 
forcibly issue a decision on the provincial water shares and looked to establish consensus. . 
Government is needed in the form of political support for the process but with no coercion. 
Polycentricism. To deliver the water to LU requires an unprecedented cooperation 
between multi-level and multi-sectoral institutions; thus it seems that NEC has recognised 
the polycentricism of nested interests in the water allocation process. Since late 1960, 
Elinor and Vincent Ostrom have worked on the idea of polycentric institution as opposed to 
homocentric conception of public administration (Toonen, 2010). The IAD framework is 
used to comprehend institutional diversity in the form analysing and formation of robust 
governance in polycentric institutions (ibid, p.198). As described in Chapter III, Ostrom 
(2011, 2010) which has crafted the idea of Social-Ecological Systems (SESs) Framework 
asserts that actors in the action situation “are not external, but are endogenous to the 
development of ecosystems (Toonen, 2010). Ostrom (2005, 2007, 2011)  conceives robust 
governance system to be polycentric and multi-layered nested enterprises representing the 
diversity and complexity of SESs; diversity and complexity should be recognised and not 
eliminated from institutional design (e.g. Toonen, 2010). 
Lack of community level involvement. Article 6 deals with identifying water-saving 
projects to implement the EMP but there is no guidance of how to coordinate and monitor 
water demand management programme. There is no mention of how to deal with existing 
informal abstraction in terms of its equitable re-allocation and provinces such as WA 
consider these as downstream water rights (Karimi, 2010). The absence of community level 
actors (farmers) can jeopardise the process as they are one of real game-changers in LUB. 
As with the land reforms narratives (Chapter IV), farmers have a strong political niche in 
the Iranian political system and they can exercise immense power in elections and 
especially local MPs will not disenfranchise these local constituents.  
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There are two main conclusions from above analysis of the rules. First, insertion of 
new rules as in the case of LUB (Figure 7.2 shown in yellow) without revamping existing 
laws and rules are going to produce confusion among actors. The legal frameworks need to 
be streamlined to make sure that any contradiction and duplication are removed. Secondly, 
creating position rules without considering the capacities required to fulfil the positional 
role is rendered useless. All of the actors have had many other responsibilities and 
basically, they had little free time to prepare for their new roles. Many could not reconcile 
their new position by breaking from their existing jobs and hence there was a conflict of 
interest between fulfilling their official duties and work for the new institutional setup. The 
financial costs of these rules were not considered and this threatens the long-term 
institutional sustainability of the multi-stakeholder participation platforms.  
Dynamic rule crafting. The 2010 NEC By-law gives an important legal mechanism 
to NEC with delegating presidential powers. This means that the NEC decisions have a 
legal stature same as the Council of Ministers By-laws. Law-making is a long process; it 
takes decades for an Act of Majlis to be ratified. Council of Minsters’ By-laws can take 
years to be endorsed. Therefore, to address immediate operational level needs, this 
mechanism can be very effective. Some of the issues which were missing from the 2010 
NEC By-law have been addressed by the third and 4th NEC meeting Directives which 
includes important choice, payoff, position and scope rules as shown in Table 7.2   
From Table 7.2, there are some important rulings: 
1. It gives MoE the power to reassess the water development plans in the 
provinces and asserts LU’s water rights by specifying any water allocated 
from dams to be deducted from surface water allocation given to provinces. 
2.  It allocates financial resources to the implementation of the projects and the 
establishment of a permanent secretariat for the management of the LUB. 
3. Recognising the need for political support for the RC, it implicitly calls for 
the merger of the RC and NEC.   
4. It recognises unauthorised abstraction as the one of the main issues but asks 
the provinces to manage informal abstractions without providing clear 
guidance of how this should be done. 
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A. 3
rd
 NEC Meeting Directive 
Article Rule Typology  Description  
1 Choice 3100 MCM  minimum environmental water rights of LU to maintain lake level at 1274.1 m asl 
 Choice   73 MCM water to be allocated to Satellite wetlands to be jointly agreed by MoE and DoE  
2 Payoff 47,000,000,000 Riyals for environmental projects to implement the EMP (equivalent to UD$5,000,000) 
3 Payoff Water use efficiencies projects to implemented; 50% of the cost of upgrading irrigation technology 
(20,000,000 Riyals= US$2000) per ha to be given to farmers;  bank loan facilities to provide the other 50% 
as incentive   
Choice Water saving from water demand management to be allocated to Lake Urmia 
Position/ Scope First Vice president delegates its power to Mr Aliabadi, Deputy Vice President for Coordination and 
Monitoring Public Organisation.  
4 Choice Provincial water shares to be reviewed and agreed within 10 days. (Sanandaj Agreement was finally 
endorsed  
 Choice and 
Scope 
In reassessing provincial water shares, MoE is given power to review the water allocated to the dams built 
in each province and how much provinces can use with the aim of increasing Lake Urmia’s water allocation 
i.e. volume of  existing allocated water from dams are deducted from their provincial shares 
5 Choice Due to limited water resources, further water resources development should be stopped and no more water 
rights should be given  
 Scope Kurdistan Province is exempted from the above rule to allow equitable development  
6 Choice All the projects as listed has been approved; NEC should review allocated budgets for these projects in the 
next meeting   
7 Position and 
Choice 
Unauthorised water abstraction should become an agenda and precisely monitored with greater control by 
MoE and MoAJ  
8 Position MoE and MOAJ reports every 6 months to the NEC on the issue of unauthorised abstraction   
B. 4th NEC and 1st RC meeting Directive 
1 Choice Shares are allocated as per 6th WAWG meeting in Sanandaj 
2 Position/Scope Provinces to establish a monitoring system and a plan to provide LU with water  
3 Position/Scope With the support of judicial and political actors, unauthorised abstractions to be managed 
4 Position/Scope ToR of the Working Groups agreed 
5 Payoff 3 Billion Rial to establish the Secretariat  
6 Scope Joint RC and NEC meetings Twice a year 
 Position/Scope WAWG to draw water allocation strategy (plan) 
Table 7.2:Typology of rules made by the 3rd NEC and 4th Joint NEC/RC meeting. 
 
Therefore, there are still gaps in these Directives which have to be filled. As IWRM 
is a “process and not a goal in itself” (see Chapter II), then it is understandable that this 
process is gradual and can be improved when the participatory process is refined through 
the process of social learning.  
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7.4 Interactions-Outcome Pathway: Socio-political context 
7.4.1 Understanding the ideological aspects behind decision-making  
The negotiations over provincial shares were overshadowed by the predicament of 
LU water level which has dropped considerably since 1999 (Figure 7.3). The actors 
appeared to agree with a sentimental narrative that “the lake is drying up and has to be 
saved and should be provided with water; we need urgent actions not talks” (Source: 
Appendix A1). On the other hand the actors maintained their rights to use and consume 
water resources in the basin due to socio-economic Driving forces. The deadlock was 
complicated by lack of adequate knowledge about the biophysical system and incoherent 
and scattered databanks and information.  
 
Figure 7.3: Historical account of lake levels (Jabbari, 2011). 
The controversy was heightened by the issue of water (re) allocation in LUB. The 
diabolical status of LU had made it into national agenda and the government increasingly 
became vocal about saving the Lake as a ‘national interest’. The actors in the WAWG were 
mainly chosen from the “technical and engineering offices” of the provincial departments. 
The whole process was under the influence of the so called “hidden actors” represented by 
experts in different departments and subsidiary organisations of the MoE and MoAJ 
including more than 50 research institutes and centres, consulting companies, irrigation 
design and manufacturing companies, water and agriculture associations, university 
Chapter 7 
 
236 
departments on water and agriculture and technical offices and lobbying groups (see e.g. 
Keshavarz and Dehghanisanji, 2007).  
Reverence for water. Almost all the meeting started with the recitation from Holy 
Quran on water: “We made from water every living thing” (21:30). This strong religious 
reverence for water is embedded in the development discourse i.e. the belief system of the 
community of actors. But also, there is a reverence for land and farming is considered as 
the noblest profession.  This has resulted in distinctive and dominant polices such as the 
populist agricultural polices of land reforms in the 1960s and the farmer -welfare oriented 
policy of the successive governments after the revolution in 1979 (Chapter IV); self-
sufficiency and food security polices and pro-development polices . The actors‘ 
perspectives (mental models) have been affected by the cultural and religious ethics in 
LUB. As mentioned in Section 2.3.5 (Chapter II), the religious ethics of environmental 
stewardship can be overridden by other meta-beliefs such as attaining basic human needs 
which is reiterated by the sustainable development concept and the idea of win-win 
solutions.  
Cultural and ethical factors. The evidence based decision-making stems from a 
tradition of strong esteem for knowledge and scientific deliberation in Iranian and Islamic 
culture. Knowledge is the way to enlightenment: it is the light or ‘Noor’ in terms of 
spiritual development of human capacity to make sound decisions (see e.g. Rosenthal, 
2007). This rational approach is firmly embedded in the cultural and religious values 
making knowledge or ‘ilm’, an essential part of narrative form of the discourses. These 
research and technical centres within the water sector organisations have an important role 
in shaping the narratives as well as providing alternative policy options.  
Role of hidden actors. Qolipour and Gholampour-Ahangar (2010) assert that 
experts employed by Iranian governmental organisation have a great role in drafting laws 
and policies but later their drafts are changed by the policymakers to an extent that it no 
longer addresses the policy problems due to the impact of “hidden” lobbying groups. Also, 
the religious organisation including their research bodies have a very instrumental role in 
policymaking and they contribute to the discourses on wider policy implications. We will 
come back to the theme of hidden actors later.  
Qolipour and Gholampour-Ahangar‘s (2010) work which was commissioned by the 
influential Majlis[i.e. Parliament] Research Centre (MRC) proposes a framework for public 
policy analysis which appreciates the role of “politics and political streams” and “interests” 
Chapter 7 
 
237 
associated with power relationships within the socio-political and religious arena i.e. policy 
discourses framed by these hidden actors play a vital role during information and 
knowledge sourcing, utilisation and application. .Therefore, they acknowledge that 
policymaking is not just based on rational choices but involves policy discourses within the 
political environment.  
The concept of ‘hidden actors’ was postulated by Kingdon (2002) describing the 
role of these actors in the policy making process. They play a far greater role after a policy 
issue (idea) gains an agenda status (see Chapter II) and the evidence-based decision-making 
pathway is initiated. Kingdon (2002) states that “visible participants (actors)” have a major 
role in agenda setting but “hidden participants” including academic researchers, 
consultants, career bureaucrats and official and advisors of governmental departments and 
so forth are influential in crafting alternative policies and proposing solutions to policy 
problems. The presence of these actors manifested in the presence of WPAC and IWRMC 
in the WAWG meetings dictating how information and knowledge is used in the decision-
making process as described earlier (Figure 7.4).  
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Figure 7.4: The role of ideological aspects of actors and the hidden actors on water 
allocation decision outcomes in LUB. 
 
Figure 7.4 refers to the perspectives (mental models) of actors involved in the 
WAWG knowledge-based decisions and the role of discourses and ideological aspects 
(cultural and religious values) on the actual water allocation outcomes based on “Shared 
Mental Model” (SMM)  developed by Denzau and North (1994, 2000).  Ideology is not 
uniquely defined in the political sciences but Jackson and Kingdon (1992) define ideology 
“whether unidimensional or multidimensional” as “a set of core beliefs that organize 
perceptions of political issues and that underlie individual preferences.” According to 
Denzau and North (1994) SMM are “internal representations that individual cognitive 
systems create to interpret the environment”. Thus ideologies are a framework of path-
dependent SMMs held by actors which process knowledge about the environment and 
prescribe “how the environment be structured” (Denzau and North, 1994).  SMMs are 
intertwined with history (path-dependency feature) and represent religious and cultural 
attributed of the community. 
Refereeing to Figure 7.4, the evidence-based pathway framework proposed by 
Bowsen and Zwi (2005) consists of three phases: sourcing the evidence, using the evidence 
and considering capacity to implement. These are related to three decision making factors 
(Figure7.4): adopt, adapt and act. According to Bowsen and Zwi (2005), once adopted, the 
evidence is adapted or changed by actors and then it will be implemented once certain 
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capacities are in entrusted in individuals or organisations.  The dominant anthropocentric 
perspective on water allocation in LUB stems from welfare-oriented cultural and religious 
ethics of fulfilling the basic human needs which were shaped by developmental and climate 
change discourses of the actors within the process and “hidden actors” in the water and 
agriculture sector as represented in Figure7.4.  
The 2008 WAC which provides guidelines on how evidences are acquired, used and 
applied is the brainchild of the WPAC. With reference to results from ISTA in Chapter VI, 
the actors involved in the WAWG rejected the evidence provided by the WPAC on 
dynamic modelling simulation which was based on the documented information provided 
by them; they rejected the proposition to keep the lake level at the minimum ecological 
level of 1274.1 m asl, LU has to be allocated 3900 MCM; instead, the actors endorsed the 
proposition of 3100 MCM which was made by Nazaridoust (2006) and Yekom (2005) as 
part of research work and promoted by CIWP through the synthesis report prepared by the 
author (Hashemi, 2008). A “window of opportunity”2was opened for WPAC to postulate a 
“hidden” discourse that there is no further potential for development in the basin after 
finishing the on-going dam projects and the idea of water requirement for the lake provided 
an opportunity for basin-wide planning and allocation. But, the actors rejected WPAC’s 
favourite strategy instead they chose to make a complete reallocation of water resources 
(see Figure 6.12). Also, provinces ascertained shared perspectives or SMMs based on the 
local needs in weighting the water allocation criteria. They formed blocks based on political 
boundaries and not sectoral affiliations. For example, Environmental Protection 
Organisations (EPOs) joined other organisations in their respective provinces.  
7.4.2 Loops of narrative behind policy discourses   
In the previous section, we shed some light on the interplay between information 
and knowledge utilisation processes and ideological attributes of the community shaping 
the policy discourses. The discourses will be discussed in the next subsection but there is a 
need to understand the stories (narratives) behind the argumentations provided behind these 
discourses to show the level of complexity which caused polarisation of opinions among 
the actors. The outcome of LU water allocation can be analysed based on narratives 
(stories) which were told by the participants reflecting a complex multi-layered mental 
maps or perspectives of actors. Media stories about LU drying up prompted ‘save the lake’ 
                                                 
2
This term is used to indicate a practical mechanism for institutional change or reform e.g. with respect to 
administrative changes in political office, Groenewegen and de Jong, 2008 note that “to shift the balance of 
power, a window of opportunity is required”.  
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as a policy meta-narrative. In the blame game, MoE was accused for not supplying the lake 
with enough water and MoE blamed mainly farmers for their unauthorised or informal 
abstractions. Droughts and climate change stories have also dominated the arguments.  
The negotiations began under a great deal of pressure from the government that a 
solution must be agreed by all the actors promoting an environmental discourse based on 
giving priority to LU as a demand site. The question was whether the actors accept the 
implication of implementing the EMP. 
The official position taken by the actors3 was that the lake should be saved. 
However, neither the causal relationship for the lake’s predicament was shared by everyone 
nor any clear cut solutions were offered. As a WARWC delegate noted “if all the water 
behind the dams are released, it will not solve the problem”.  The lake’s storage has 
decreased by nearly 18000 MCM in the last decade and there was less that 3000 MCM 
water stored in dam reservoirs. There was a sense of resignation by some actors that LU is 
beyond saving. Initially, most of the negotiations were about the symptoms rather than any 
solutions. CIWP facilitation was based on the meta-narrative: ‘we all agree to save the 
lake’. This phrase was used to break deadlocks and remind the actors that their position rule 
is sanctioned by this meta-narrative.  
Field works (Appendix A1) were undertaken to get a picture of how actors depict 
the problem and whether they support the aim of the EMP i.e. giving water rights to the 
lake. There was some confusion among provincial actors about what has to be done and 
what has caused the problem. They offered different perspectives of the problem.  
Generally, they could not describe very well the problem at the basin level.  
MoE understood very well what is happening on the ground using simulation 
modelling of the basin. Results from a climate change study has terrified MoE (See Chapter 
V) about the impact of climate change on river flows but was not prepared initially to share 
their discourse with the WAWG. They wanted to obtain the evidence through 
documentations of the baseline data and so WPAC was waiting for a chance to produce its 
work4. CIWP tried to gain knowledge about WPAC’s motives and found that the 
Commission is trying to validate their evidence through corroboration of the data from 
provinces. WPAC was waiting for a political mandate to review the allocation process in 
                                                 
3stakeholders and actors interchangeably used 
4 Referring to the idea of window of opportunity described by Denzau and North (1994)  
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Lake Urmia basin. IWRMC was critical of the WPAC’s inaction on provincial applications 
for water allocations. The tension between the MoE groups was evident.  
From the Problem Statements (PS) (described Chapter III, Roe, 1994), two distinct 
strategies (management options) have been considered in LUB: 
1. non-structural Responses i.e. to have irrigation water efficiency measures within a 
change in regional development (agricultural) policy (change in type of crops);  and 
2. structural interventions (Responses) i.e. continue with water resources development 
plans. 
Both of these policies were found to have loops or as described by Roe (1994) to 
have circular arguments. Loops in the policy narratives illustrate a high degree in 
complexities. One of the solutions mentioned in the negotiations was change in regional 
development policy i.e. changing crop types to deal with water scarcity problem in LU. The 
actors presented the following PSs: changing crop types 
Ø leads to irrigation efficiency i.e. more water saving; 
Ø leads to more irrigated land i.e. an incentive to farmers to own this extra water 
(explicitly stated in the Directive);i.e. less water saving  
Ø is financially unfeasible and cannot be controlled i.e. market forces will have a 
control; 
Ø requires subsidised help and incentives i.e. it has an economic burden; 
Ø leads to economic valuation of water i.e. more appreciation of water price; 
Ø should be based on socio-economic aspects of farmers i.e. it should be driven by 
anthropogenic pressures; 
Ø can cause less water for the Lake. 
Based on the above PSs, (a) water savings (if any) is mainly used to irrigate new 
lands rather than delivered to the lake; (b) it will cost more because incentives should be 
given to the farmer (usually financial incentives like price guarantees); and (c) 
consequently, changing crop type means less water for LU.  
Water development loop arises from regional agricultural policy which justifies 
dam-building and development of irrigation networks to maintain the environmental low 
flow of rivers in dry spells (i.e. drought conditions) and for irrigation. The PSs on dam-
building were: 
Ø Climate change and droughts necessitate to build dams to harness access to water 
Ø Climate change and droughts cause low flow  
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Ø Low flow causes LU water level to fall 
Ø LU water level is not helped by releasing all the volume of water behind the dam 
Ø Climate change (variability) and droughts has caused the lake to dry up 
Ø Dams are built to regulate low flow 
Ø Dams recharge groundwater tables 
Ø Dam reduce groundwater abstractions i.e. more surface water used  
Ø Dams use more water for irrigation (i.e. more water abstractions) 
Ø Dams cost money and over designed; i.e. partially full 
Ø Regulated water from dams to be given to the highest bidders  
Ø ‘Trading’ water as Virtual Water has to be considered and is not considered 
Ø Water markets have no place in this problem 
Ø Social unrest happens if to charge for modern dam facilities- people want free 
water 
Ø Social unrest will be caused by not building dams 
Ø Lack of environmental criteria has caused the Lake to dry up 
The fear of droughts and climate change is a dominant meta-narrative: dams will 
provide the means to control water resources in droughts and water scarce areas. Dam 
building seems to offer a solution to important socio-economic problems of water scarcity. 
So the main questions are: can the lake be given priority over the societal needs? And who 
pays to buy water for the Lake?  
As noticed, the social and political aspects dominated the narratives. It is noted that 
LU was not clearly on the mental map of the provincial actors. The only credible solution 
i.e. changing crop types and irrigation water use efficiencies were dismissed as non-
practical. With this in mind, WAWG meetings embarked on a difficult task to put Lake 
Urmia on the ‘issues map’ and making it central to any water allocation in the basin.  
Therefore, the momentum of the participatory process was kept by high political support 
for WAWG. It can be concluded that there are many loops in the arguments and the actors 
have no idea how to implement a win-win strategy to save the lake. In fact, saving the lake 
was not on their issues map despite paying a lips service to it as mentioned earlier. 
7.4.3 The discourses 
By analysing the narratives form of the main discourses in the LUB in the last 
section, it was demonstrated that provincial water resources planning did not consider LU 
as an environmental ‘demand site’. In this part, we want to show how LU dilemma shaped 
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the perspectives of the actors based on their discursive deliberation on the policy in 
question i.e. saving the lake by recognising its formal rights.  
Fostering environmental law-making.  MRC (1995) recognises that MoE lacks 
institutional capacity to protect the environment (rivers and wetlands) and hence, there is a 
need for water and land management paradigm shift towards environmental sustainability 
within the water sector and MoE in particular for any successful implementation of EMPs 
in Iranian river basins. There are no explicit provisions of environmental water allocation in 
the existing water legislation (1982 FWD Act). Therefore, according to Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat (2007), one of the options is to follow the path of law and policy-based 
decision-making5 : either to make the wetland a higher or equal priority than others uses.  
Under this option, “there is a need to remain realistic, especially where the short-term 
demands and economic development may be pressing, although the long-term requirement 
and for protection of ecosystems are recognised” (ibid). In LUB, the 2008 NEC provides 
the institutional basis for environmental sustainability by explicitly stating that the MoE has 
to deliver 3100 MCM to the lake. 
The environmental discourse has not been part of the mainstream polices and lacked 
political support. So, the development in LUB is a welcome sign for the environmentalists. 
Additionally, the environmental discourse been marred by ‘mixed-bag’ polices i.e. polices 
that endorse only some aspects of environmental sustainability and presented as IWRM 
policy. For example, Fadeifard (2009) is reconstructing the environmentalist discourse in 
this way: 
We ask them [i.e. environmentalists] to provide alternative options; these friends 
concentrate on three options and I can say with great confidence that they are pursued [by 
policy-makers] and the government fortunately has invested on these issues: for example: 
recycling water; water efficiency, use of gray water; more research on water management 
… use of desalinations… water cost recovery …[Fadaeifard, 2009]. 
 
Fadeifard (2009) capitalises on the environmentalists’ lack of politically acceptable 
alternative policy narrative. According to him much of the environmental discourse has 
been debated and approved by public policy-makers such as non-structural responses in 
terms of demand management and water efficiency measures and adaptive management 
policies. Also, environmentalists are portrayed as alarmists with no real alternative policy.  
                                                 
5 The other path is valuation-based process. 
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The environmentalists such as Muhammadi (2010) have used media to expose “the 
myths of dam buildings”.  Muhammadi (2010) acknowledges the weakness of the 
environmental voice but envision an activist approach to deal with the “catastrophes” 
caused by dams as he mentions some successes achieved by public protests resulted in e.g. 
lowering a dam height or stopping dam-building altogether. MoE had responded to some of 
the criticism through mass media. With regard to Lake Urmia, the environmental discourse 
is gaining momentum and there has been an urban show of protest in recent times. 
However, it is suggested that politicising the environmental discourse will further fuel 
ethnic tensions in both EA and WA. Since Lake Urmia water right has been established, it 
is time for independent objective technical re-evaluation and not political maundering on 
Lake Urmia. The blame game might not be effective to achieve the goal of the EMP.   
Most environmentalists believe that we have enough laws and polices but they are 
not implemented mainly due to DoE’s lack of logistical instruments to monitor the 
environment. Thus, there is a lack in data related to the environment.  Therefore, the impact 
of the policies cannot be completely assessed.  The environmental discourse relies upon the 
general public perception of environmental degradation which can polarise the policy issue 
and policymakers be made to defend their positions. There is a high level of risk that any 
future environmental meta-narrative is going to be rejected when the socio-economic 
interests and security (food, water, social welfare etc.) are balanced against environmental 
protection (i.e. the perspective of the actors may be modified during cost-benefit analysis of 
the action-outcome linkage). The 1974 Environment Protection Act needs to be updated 
and streamlined with water and land laws.  
More research on climate change needed. Climatic variability and change is 
neither well defined in Iran nor in Lake Urmia. There is some linguistic confusion in the 
Iranian (Persian) literature between changes in climatic parameters and climate change. 
However, the term “droughts” is used by provincial stakeholders to get extra revenue for 
developmental works or some of other programs (Appendix A1, Table A1.4). For Lake 
Urmia basin as an arid to semi-arid region, droughts are not unusual. The discrepancy in the 
WPAC’s climate change discourse (see e.g. Attarzadeh, 2009; MoE, 2010b) is that on the 
one hand it places a great weight on the “droughts” component but put less importance to 
the human induced impacts such as dam-building. On the other hand, in the water 
allocation process, it attributes 100% of the trend to the abstraction (see Chapter VI). 
Therefore, MoE is happy with building the dams since they attribute very little to the Lake 
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Urmia crisis (only 5%) and can provide a buffer for hard times such as droughts. Thus, 
MoE agrees to continue with the development but would like to restrict water allocation. 
However, it is politically very difficult to restrict water allocation once the infrastructure is 
built. For example, Tabriz mega city’s (Chapter V) urban and industrial water demands are 
rising and there are calls for more investments to transfer water from dams in WA. 
The prospect of dam decommissioning. Furthermore, the defenders of expanding 
irrigation development use the uncertainty of climatic parameters as shown in this 
statement by a member of Iran’s Committee on Large Dams (IRCOLD): 
Building a dam has a prime advantage in controlling waters which we could not previously 
control. They are collected in a place (reservoir) and we can ensure downstream water 
rights and even environmental requirements with a greater confidence……like controlling 
traffic in Tehran city; we control the waters during floods and prevent damage. The extra 
water available [behind the dams] can be used for our developmental needs and 
downstream water rights… (Fadaeifard, 2009) 
 
Therefore, there is need for more rigorous research on topic of climate change in 
LUB to deal with the knowledge uncertainty. Based on the results in Chapter VI (i.e. results 
from ISTA component); it is not possible to conclude that climate change has occurred. The 
3rd NEC meeting Bylaw-Article 5 (Table 7.2) calls for immediate halt to dam-building and 
so there is a hint of dam decommissioning. This paradigm will send shock waves to the 
quarters of those who call for more developments. The new environmental discourse is also 
hinging around the decommissioning of dams around the globe.  
Reconciling National vs. local interests. The hidden perspective of MoE is that 
local short-termism is not compatible with long term national interests. There is a need to 
reconcile this mismatch. Since 1940s and the implementation of the first SYDP (1948-
1955) (See Chapter IV), the Iranian policymakers have made water allocation a centralised 
‘national’ issue (MRC, 1995) and according to MRC
6 (1995) any change in policy will 
cause vulnerability and damage the national interest. The local needs can be met by 
allowing the regions to continue with the “desired local development” and this offers 
incentives for local aspirations. So for example in the 2nd post Revolution FYDP (1994-
1999), regional water resources development budgets were bigger than 50% of the national 
development plans of the 1st FYDP (MRC, 1995). MRC (1995) asserts that water allocation 
should be centrally managed by the state and should not be based on administrative 
divisions.  Small dams and irrigation projects can be used to satisfy local demands and the 
                                                 
6 Majlis Research Centre 
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water budget can be used to allocate water from groundwater resources for local demand 
sites (industrial, agricultural and so forth).  The recommendation made by the parliament in 
this report can explain the drive to over-exploit groundwater resources (See Chapter IV for 
a national picture). The legacy have come about because water allocation is seen a national 
security issue.  
The current decentralisation drive to give more fiscal powers to provincial 
governors have come into conflict with centralised water allocation practice as governors 
have been acting to protect the rights of their provincial constituents. The governors’ 
dilemma is that they represent central government and appointed by the Ministry of State 
(MoS)7 but they have to be faithful to their provincial constituents. Thus the three 
provincial governors in the LUB have pursued a local agenda for water and agricultural 
development. Therefore, the role of MoS in implementing the water allocation strategy is 
critical especially under climatic variability and droughts conditions. Droughts budgets are 
under the direct supervisions of the governors’ Office of Disaster Reconstruction. 
Harmonising cross-sectoral multiple perspectives. At collective choice level, MoE 
and MoAJ have different perspectives on major discourses. There are two distinct 
discourses within the agricultural sector shaping MoAJ’s perspective on irrigation 
perspective as noted by Keshavarz and Dehghanisanij (2007): (1) the agricultural water 
allocation is not enough to provide sufficient food for the growing population; thus there is 
a potential to increase irrigation water development by 11%; and (2) Increasing water use 
productivity is going to provide the basis for sustainable water allocation and food security. 
Water use productivity is defined as the amount of dry produce (in kg) produced by 1 m3 of 
water use. In Iran this figure is below 0.8 kg. Therefore, technological interventions can be 
applied to produce ‘more crops per drops of water’.   
The narrative behind the discourses is that agricultural sector plays a major role in 
the Iranian economy providing 18% of GDP, 25% of employment, 85% of food supply and 
90% of raw materials used in industry (Keshavarz and Dehghanisanij, 2007). Irrigation 
water is the blood life to keep the agriculture sector in a healthy state since Iran is 
characterised by Aridity “which is a non-avoidable fact” and “drought is also an important 
threat to agriculture in Iran” thus, optimal and efficient use of water is unavoidable (ibid).  
Therefore, MoAJ strategy is to secure more agriculture water in a water resource regime 
characterised by rivalry of different uses.  
                                                 
7 Same as Home Office in the UK 
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Mismatches in the IWRM Plan. Iran’s IWRM discourse has not been immune from 
the irrigation discourse: Iran’s IWRM Plan (2003 Strategic Water Resources Planning 
Bylaw) endorsees more surface water irrigation development e.g. Articles 1 and 2 state as 
follows:  
1. Increase of surface water use (currently more than 56% of total consumption 
and 70% of agriculture use is from groundwater) i.e. more developments for 
agriculture 
2. Agricultural water use to be reduced from 92% to 87% by 2020 through 
water efficiency measures only.  
The demand in real terms increases from 8520 MCM in 2005 to 9970 MCM in 
20208 which is contradictory to the IWRM approach. There is a need to issue Directives to 
rectify this imbalance in the IWRM Plan.  
In Lake Urmia, groundwater withdrawal is more than 2000 MCM. There are many 
aquifers with continuous lowering in water table (Chapter V). The issue of groundwater did 
not enter in the water allocation debate. Groundwater is controlled by private ownership 
and hence, MoE is not confident that this can be done at this stage but the scope exists to 
include groundwater is the strategy in the future. This can only be done if current 
agricultural policies on food security and self-sufficiency are revised. This is a major gap 
that has to be addressed in future.  
Evading responsibilities. The MoE has not delegated agricultural water allocation 
to MoAJ despite the assertion of the 1982 FWD Act (Etimad-Fard, 2007). Thus, the 
sticking point between these two ministries has been the fact that Article 11 and 13 of the 
1982 Act has been ignored by MoE giving power of water allocation to MoAJ (Zare, 2007). 
Accordingly, both ministries failed to act according to the 1982 FWD Act: 
On one hand, MoE has legally violated the rule on the formation of the water user 
associations (WUAs); instead of establishing WUAs with 25% shares from MoAJ, 24% 
shares of MoE and 51% people participation, 100% public WUAs have been formed….e.g. 
Qazvin network is 100% public (state owned). On the other hand, MoAJ legally had a duty 
to divide and distribute its water share. In practice it has not done this so far[Source: 
MoAJ, 2008] 
Also, MoAJ criticises MoE for lagging behind building the primary irrigation 
networks for the dams; the water companies have been engaged in dam-building since the 
developments are a lucrative business: 
                                                 
8 In percentage terms the water allocated decreased from 92.5% to 85.3 assuming the water behind reservoirs 
increases the potential renewable water resources by 30000 MCM. This does not consider climate change and 
variability as well   
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There is not volumetric allocation of water to the agricultural sector neither in the time nor 
in the place required……… (MoAJ, 2008) 
 
The concept of establishing water user associations (WUAs) has not gained any 
ground due to lack of users (mainly farmers) in being part of these associations which bring 
extra responsibilities and financial burden. So, MoE has embarked on establishing splinter 
companies owned by the provincial regional water companies (RWCs). On one hand, MoE 
has been moving to privatise the existing public WUAs to create a water market i.e. selling 
water to the customers through these companies (Appendix A1, Table A1.4). This is 
unlawful under the current FWD Act. On the other hand, MoAJ has evolved from an 
internal battle with its old adversaries Ministry of Jihad-e-Sazandegi (MJS) and has been 
ineffective in managing the agricultural water sector by evading its responsibilities to start 
farmer participation for sustainable water and land management. In order to implement the 
adaptive water allocation strategy in Lake Urmia, the role of informal institutions and 
WUAs need to be considered in further work.   
Reviving traditional water governance. MoAJ also criticises MoE for neglecting 
tradition water structures such as qanats and aab-bandans (natural water ponds in the 
north) and have made a great deal of efforts in reviving the traditional systems which 
became part of the Iran’s IWRM Plan (e.g. Dargahi, 2007 a, b): 
Major problem of the water [sector] is that 70% of the [available] agricultural water is 
from wells, qanats and springs and 30% from surface waters. Nevertheless, 95% of the 
governmental investment is on surface waters. Surface water consumption efficiency is far 
less than groundwater consumption rate 
 
40% of agricultural water is supplied through wells. The ownership of wells in Law is 
better clarified and people are willing to take out loans and banking facilities so they can 
use water saving measures such as piping systems –but the government provide little 
[financial] facilities to the well owners [ Source: MoAJ, 2008] 
 
MoAJ (2008) believes that traditional water and land governance system has been 
affected by large dams-building drives while not replacing it with a viable modern 
governance system. Thus, it has opted for more small scale dam-building projects which is 
less damaging and repair of old qanat and aab-bandans (natural or artificial ponds) which 
have been destroyed in the last five decades. 
Sayar-Irani and Muradinejad (2007) outline the deficiencies in the legislation on 
maintenance of traditional governance and hydraulic system including irrigation networks. 
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In Chapter VIII, we will return to the theme of bridging the gap between tradition and 
modern day governance of land and water resources.  
Sustainable agriculture. It is paramount that to implement adaptive water 
allocation, the concept of sustainable agriculture has to be explored in further work on Lake 
Urmia basin. To achieve sustainable agriculture, cross sectoral alliances are required. The 
mistrust between agriculture and water sectoral governance system as well as the mismatch 
between the sectoral policies have to be resolved. It seems that MoE and RWCs view the 
agricultural sector as a challenge rather than an opportunity. It is argued that MoE should 
link with MoAJ to develop a shared understanding of the challenges ahead and to better 
recognise the dynamics of cross sectoral interactions.  For example, MoAJ (2008) believes 
that there is little regards on behalf of MoE for many farmers who have invested thousands 
of dollars in new irrigation technologies and have faced investment insecurity by diverting 
water from agricultural use to urban drinking requirements (MoAJ, 2008). In LUB for 
instance, a second pipeline scheme to transfer water to provide drinking for EA capital, 
Tabriz, is underway which means less water for irrigation in WA and Kurdistan.  Business 
as Usual is no longer sustainable. If the allocations to Kurdistan materialise, then it is very 
difficult to foresee how the water transfer can go ahead.  
Small dams vs. large dams. The MoE’s paradigm shift towards IWRM and 
adaptive management has caused a friction with MoAJ on the construction of small water 
supply projects (small dams) by MoAJ.  MoAJ (2008) believes that concentrating on large 
dams is environmentally and socially damaging (MoAJ, 2008). The small dam discourse 
has evolved due to lack of progress in supplying water because of lag of construction 
irrigation networks of the large dams. This discourse is based on the environmental and 
socio-economic services offered by small dams: 
· alleviating water scarcity in droughts;  
· limiting flood risks;  
· providing groundwater recharge;  
· stopping erosion and sedimentation of large dams;  
· requiring much less investment; 
·  less technological complexity;  
· equitable distribution and allocation; 
·  ensuring local participation; and  
· reducing maintenance problems.  
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However, as illustrated in a Pakistani case study by Ashraf et al (2007), the full use of small 
dams are hindered by several challenges including “(i) unauthorised water cutting; (ii) non-
functional water user associations; (iii) improper maintenance of watercourses; (iv) broken 
outlets; (v) poorly maintained field channels; (vi) undulated fields; and (vii) lack of 
agricultural support services, etc.”.  Building small dams without overall assessment of the 
water resources in a river basin context is problematic to say the least and MoE has strongly 
opposed to such activity by MoAJ which has been limited in scope and size in recent years 
due to change of paradigm shift to river basin management.  
Water-Land-Food-Energy Nexus. MoAJ claims water for agriculture is inflated by 
the MoE.  For example: much of water used for hydropower is also considered as 
agricultural water; in fact, the water is released but is not used in agriculture:  
Water used for hydropower production is accounted as agricultural water but in practice it 
is not used for farming… [Source: MoAJ, 2008] 
 
The above statement reveals two dilemmas: first, the trade-offs between water for food and 
water for energy i.e. water used for hydropower production.  In LUB, there are no 
substantial hydropower dams. However, the issue of water-land-food-energy nexus is an 
important issue that need to be explored in further work. In late 2010, the 5th Five-Year 
Development Plan (FYDP: 2010-2015) was enacted with introduction of economic 
austerity measures centred on removing agricultural and energy subsidies. The cost of a 
litre of petrol has moved from $0.1 to $0.7 on average. The impact of the new energy 
policy on water allocation and use as well as agricultural productions needs to be 
thoroughly examined in re-evaluating the land and water resources plans. The financial 
viability of agricultural developments needs to be re-evaluated. 
The second dilemma is that both sides do not agree on basic facts about water for 
food. As shown in Chapter VI, driven by the mistrust between the actors, the level of 
abstraction  was overestimated and most of the errors came from almost doubling the 
abstraction in WA. This was also true for data on land use and potential irrigation area. 
Therefore, it is argued that without a shared data sets or scientific facts sustainable 
agriculture cannot be achieved.  
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
251 
7.4.4 Emerging water management paradigm in Iran: toward reflexive 
modernity? 
Allan (2005) describes the historical development of five water management 
paradigms in Europe (or North) from pre-modern to reflexive modernity9 or second 
modernity (Figure 7.5). Allan (2005) divides the reflexive modernity era into three 
paradigms: the 1980’s perspective on water allocation for the environment (3
rd Paradigm); 
the economic valuation of water in the 1990s (4th paradigm) and the IWRM paradigm 
which recognises the political processes as well as encompassing the other two paradigms. 
There are signs that Iran is moving towards reflexive modernity paradigm (Balali, 
2009). However, Iran’s route is somehow different form the North’s route as shown in 
Figure 7.5.  IWRM (5th paradigm) was adopted in 2003 (see Chapter IV) and in April 2008, 
the Council of Ministers has approved a By-Law which states that “the commercial value of 
water should be established” by MoE
10 (4th paradigm). Article 67 of the 2005 4th FYDP 
established the ecological needs of the river basins (3rd paradigm).  
It is argued that prescribing a similar North (European) route of paradigm change 
for the non-European (South) including Iran by Allan (2005) can be troublesome. To 
elaborate this point we consider the following concepts:  
· Modernity;  
· modern state; and  
· the Marxist theory on the development of ‘hydraulic’ despotism. 
The concepts of modernity and modern state which are both political in nature and 
Eurocentric associated with democracy and Western modern state ideals. Beck et al (2003) 
point out the South or non-European route to reflexive modernity can be distorted and need 
to be discovered:  
Naturally this European constellation must be enlarged and reassessed by studying the 
effects of second modernity on non-European constellations, where the dynamic of reflexive 
modernization displays its effects not on first modern societies but rather on the distorted 
constellations of postcolonialism. Different non-European [i.e. South] routes to and 
through second [i.e. reflexive] modernity still have to be described, discovered, compared 
and analysed.  
 
                                                 
9
Zinn (2007) states that Ulrich Beck coined the term reflexive modernity “by explicitly demarcating himself 
from postmodern approaches which would imply that current developments go beyond modernity: 
10Article 3 of the By-Law.  
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Figure 7.5: A comparison between European (North) and Iranian (South) routes to reflexive 
modernity water management paradigm.   
 
Colonialism has been an important factor in shaping the non-European (South) 
journey to modernity and reflexive modernity. There are historical gaps or breaks appear in 
the transformation which is described as transitional state in Figure 7.5. The influence of 
modern societies (the North) on the South route of water and land management has been 
remarkable in the Post-colonialism. The ‘hydraulic mission’ and welfare state have been 
the backbone of the modernisation efforts and political polices of the emerging modern 
societies helped by Northern polices based on creating markets and jobs in the North. The 
South has been inspired by the notion of nation-state and modernity to create full 
employment and provide a good standard of living. In Iran, there is a strong belief that 
modernisation is required to fill the historical gaps left by political instability in the post-
colonial era.  
As stated in Chapter IV, many scholars believe that the modern state in Iran began 
with the reign of Reza Shah who started a great deal of 'modernisation' of the army and 
administrative institutions of the government. There are several theories analysing the idea 
of the formation of the modern state and these are outside the scope of this study.  The start 
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of the modern state in the west initiated with the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 (Samiei, 2007). 
This meant an end to the political, social and economic subsidiaries of the feudalism 
system. However, the beginning of modern state in Iran does not fit the pattern of historical 
events that describes the idea of formation of the western modern state. For example, there 
was not a fully developed feudal system outside Europe so the idea of a modern state is 
essentially a European concept and cannot be easily compared to the rest of the world. 
Oriental Despotism theory is relevant to the modern state analysis of irrigational 
water use (our indication of hydraulic mission as postulated by Allan, 2005). The theory of 
the Asiatic Model of Production (AMP) of water deficient and scattered society which is 
given by Karl Marx in his book ‘Grundriesse’ (1858) was elaborated by Wittfogel's so 
called Eastern hydraulic (water-based) despotism in 1957 (Samiei, 2007). AMP suggests 
that the water scarcity conditions never allowed the formation of a true feudalist regime 
which is a prerequisite to the formation of the modern state by preventing the formation of 
autonomous economic units; instead networks of small, independent but scattered villages 
were formed. These required a strong central bureaucracy to provide water supply and 
irrigation to cities and villages in the deserts and arid/semi-arid region of the country.  
The oriental despotism theory is a good description for some of the historical 
periods of Iran but cannot represent a complete analysis. For example, in the Qajar Dynasty 
rule (1722-1925), there was neither a strong central bureaucracy nor a central irrigation 
administration. Qanats were constructed and serviced by the beneficiaries and not the state. 
Samiei (2007) reviews several critiques of the Marxist ideas by Iranian scholars11 whom 
assert that there is no strong evidence that a central Iranian State: 
1. controlled, supplied or allocated water,  
2. controlled or managed Iran's agricultural sector or production,  
3. had a large central irrigation bureaucracy, 
4. had serviced or drilled qanats-it was done by villagers, 
5. had owned all the land- there were other types of property land tenures 
6.  had a nation-wide irrigation plan-it did not consider economic advantages of 
irrigation. 
In addition, the Marxist theories did not consider the societal forces that influenced the 
power of states such as the weakening factor of nomadic lifestyle and the role of religious 
scholars. Despite criticisms of Allan’s unilinear depiction of institutional change (e.g. 
                                                 
11such as A.Wali, H. Katozian, Y .Abrahamian and M.A Khonji 
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Balali, 2009) and the deficiency of the Marxist theory on the formation of South’s modern 
state and the APM, these represent a partial description of the water and land governance in 
Iran.  
There is a cause for optimism:  as there are many signals illustrating that Iran has 
entered a transitional phase towards reflexive modernity as illustrated by the Lake Urmia 
case study. The institutional (policy, legislation and administration) evolution or changes 
have shown that since 1970s, Iran is moving towards sustainability in terms of water and 
land management (see chapter IV). Iran was actively involved in the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Environment. In 1974, DoE was established and the 1974 Environmental 
Protection Act was enacted. Environmental conversation and protection have been 
endorsed in the Article 50 of the 1979 Constitution. Since 1999s, the institutional fluxes 
have been driven by the IWRM paradigm.  
 
7.5 Revised Responses: institutional re-design for resilience and sustainability 
From the analysis in Section 7.4, it seems that a dual approach has been taken by 
simultaneously enforcing ‘top-down’ and participatory bottom-up approaches. This 
imbalance has to be redressed. The professionals and experts (hidden actors) within 
ministries have been instrumental in keeping the status quo i.e. top-down approach of 
management. According to Beck et al (2003) the first modernity has restructured social 
knowledge by (1) devaluing “experiential and occupational knowledge” and (2) enhancing 
the status of the theoretical and supervisory knowledge which has resulted in “the creation 
of a hierarchy between experts and laymen which was grounded on the monopoly of 
knowledge by professionals”. Therefore, participation of civil society is not yet welcomed. 
This has to change if participatory decision-making to be institutionalised in Iran.  
In this section, first, the factors which affect the interplay of the actors in the 
decision-making process are discussed to revise the design principles used in institutional 
reforms. Secondly, the implication of adaptive water allocation strategy is discussed.   
7.5.1 Rethinking design principles: 
As stated before, the design principles postulated by Ostrom (2005) are not 
blueprints and it should be able to deal with factors influencing the interplay of actors in the 
decision making arena. The Water allocation process described in Chapter VI points out to 
certain factors which have been influential in the decision-making. In the following part of 
this subsection these are introduced. 
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Mistrust. The community of stakeholders in the water sector has been characterised 
by mistrust. This was clearly illustrated by the lack of trust about data provided by the 
stakeholders. Data uncertainty and mistrust continued even after the decision made in the 
6th WAWG meeting. The process required arbitration in addition to the negotiation. The 
author for example has acted as an arbitrator to diffuse disagreements on specific issues 
related to the MCDA approach. Therefore, fostering trust among actors is of paramount 
importance to the long term sustainability of the MSPs. 
Lack of shared understanding. Knowledge uncertainty played an important role in 
shaping multiple and parallel discourses on water development policy, droughts and climate 
changes and the level of mistrust prevented the convergence of perspectives among the 
actors. Therefore, Lake Urmia issues were neither well defined nor well understood. Most 
of the actors have transposed and transformed a simple discourse into strongly held meta-
beliefs which has caused the polarisation of opinions.  
Lack of shared vision and mutual interest. There was a disparity in the provincial 
priorities e.g. EA was content with its level of development and have achieved most of its 
plans whereas WA and Kurdistan wanted to build more dams and catch up with “wasted 
opportunities”.  
Greater choice of management options. The participants were not just happy about 
saving the lake but wanted to have more policy options including implementing structural 
and non-structural Responses. For example, ‘saving the lake’ was considered as one of the 
management options. Therefore, the demand management proposal in the 2010 NEC Bylaw 
has to be streamlined with local development drives. The Bylaw offers incentives for water 
saving activates. For example nearly $US5,000,000 has been allocated for  Water use 
efficiency projects to be implemented; in the process 50% of the cost of upgrading 
irrigation technology (20,000,000 Riyals= US$2000) per ha to be given to farmers; and the 
other 50% to be provided by bank loan facilities. Based on the results from the ISTA 
component (Chapter VI), water demand management approach has to be a key to any 
strategy for sustainable water use in the basin.  
Equity and intrinsic rights. Actors wanted to safeguard the ’intrinsic rights’ of their 
respective provinces in allocating water shares. They wanted to secure the maximum 
possible share of water resources.  
Political support. The momentum of the meetings was kept by receiving the highest 
political support possible from the office of the President and First Vice President. The 
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political commitment to institutional change or the political temperature has to be kept 
high. Implementing IWRM in SESs requires a strong political well that starts the process. 
The implementation of the EMP in Lake Urmia was sanctioned by the 67th Article of the 4th 
FYDP without which the whole process would not have started.  
Ability to craft rules at local levels based on principle of capacity development is 
required. This entails empowerment of actors and the enabling Environment for 
cooperation and trust as well as education and knowledge acquisition. The tenacity of 
provincial actors in negotiating their way in the first ever experience of MSP in Iran, and 
their capacity to analyse a complex situation hearten and inspire those who support 
‘community-based or bottom up’ governance system. With a careful capacity development 
as described earlier, local actors were able to see a wider vision than their local interests. 
They did not question why 3100 MCM of freshwater should be delivered to a salt-lake. The 
disparity among the communities and the equalities in terms of sharing benefits were more 
controversial.  The actors who were involved in the WAWG process went through a 
learning curve and they become closer at the end. The process was hijacked by the outside 
actors who did not understand the process. They could not see the benefits of sharing godly 
given resources. Jabbari (2011) asks for a capacity development to introduce the process to 
the wider institutional sub-system of the water and land resources system. The political 
forces (MPs, governors and so forth) need to be educated about the process.  
It is argued that the re-design of the governance system in LUB is not a sign of total 
failure. After all, institutional designs and rule changing should be viewed as experiments 
(Ostrom, 2005) and since the socio-political and environmental and ecological setting are 
changing, we can assume that “no specific set of rules will produce the same distribution of 
benefits and costs over the time” (ibid, p.255). Ostrom makes a valid point that institutional 
design is not an absolute science as we have limited but growing knowledge of the complex 
interactions of various rules and policies to result in outcomes. However, we are not 
“hopeless” to design institutions to enhance the performance of complex ecological 
commons systems (or SESs).  
It is most interesting to note that the empirical findings of this research support what 
Imperial (2009) found in his study about IWRM and rational choice literature. Imperial 
notes that for large river basins (such as LUB) with complex resources systems additional 
design principles are required as follows: 
1. Development of trust across organisations 
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2. To Develop shared definition and understanding 
3. Recognising mutual interest 
4. Balance of power among stakeholders 
5. Wide range of policy instruments (management options) 
Finally, it is argued that we have to create structural mechanisms to bring in to the 
picture of the issue of unauthorised abstractions which will be discussed in the next sub-
section. Therefore, the new intuitional reform (revised Responses) should recognise all the 
factors mentioned in this section.   
7.5.2 Establishing adaptive water resources governance  
This part which deals with the implication of adaptive water allocation strategy on 
the institutional reform is complementary to the previous section. The effectiveness of the 
EMP might be enhanced by a strategy (i.e. revised Responses) which can have the 
following elements: 
(a) Collective Choice Arrangements. Most of the participants felt that community-
based water and land governance system can help to achieve the objectives of water 
allocation strategy (Appendix A, Table A1.4). There is little knowledge about the 
watershed and farm level management: e.g. water may not be delivered to the lake if it is 
consumed illegally (i.e. unauthorised use) or informally on the way to the lake.  Local 
political support is needed and so the representation should be enhanced by including civil 
society and NGOs. In addition to linking the current institutional setup to existing MSPs 
such as water user associations (WUAs), incorporating local nested enterprises by 
recognising the informal institutions and their knowledge systems seems to be necessary to 
implement the EMP. Bringing the informal institutions into the formal set up can be 
achieved gradually through the social learning processes and adaptive management 
practices.   
(b) Monitoring is non-existent. Monitoring system is required not just to monitor 
water inflow into the lake, but also to reflect the adaptive nature of water allocation under 
different climatic conditions. Monitoring system can be part of a Drought risk management 
(DRM) plan which is an integrated part of the EMP and should be seen as a major 
component which has a bearing on water allocation among provinces and different uses and 
sectors. Therefore, DRM plan is an IWRM plan in the condition of droughts and have five 
constituents: (1) a drought mitigation plan before the drought; (2) a crisis plan during the 
drought; (3) an emergency state plan during severe and long term drought; (4) monitoring 
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system and (5) forecasting and public information system which include education 
programmes as well as research 
In addition, the monitoring system requires investment and therefore, it has to be 
considered in the financial plans. Most of the participants felt that monitoring should be 
done by an independent organisation.  
(c) Revising the EMP. The EMP understandably concentrates on LU’s water rights 
and its management. However, EMP’s scope has to be widened to consider the whole basin 
based on river catchment governance.  The EMP has achieved its goal to put Lake Urmia’s 
water rights on water resources planning map. But now it has to be streamlined with river 
basin planning which require a wider vision.  
(d) Graduated Sanctions. Ostrom (2005) reports that many self-organising system 
use graduated sanctions against those who break rules. Involving farmers in the collective 
choice arrangements (i.e. decision-making process) may enhance mutual monitoring and 
better compliance. So far this element has been missing from the institutional reform. 
Informal or unauthorised abstractions have been highlighted in the 3rd and 4th NEC Meeting 
Directives. This level of monitoring is very difficult to police. Therefore, it is argued that 
smaller watershed units should be considered in the institutional design as there are about 
31 river catchments in the basin. This level of monitoring requires community based water 
and land governance. This theme will be discussed in Chapter VIII in which a revised 
Response is proposed by considering community culture and ethics as a basis for the 
governance system. It must be stressed that the revised Response will not be analysed and 
postulated for future research.   
 
7.6 Concluding remarks: towards Ethical decision-making    
Based on the detailed analysis, the major issue is to understand how community 
participation or community-based governance can help the adaptive land and water 
management in Lake Urmia basin i.e.(a) how to create a culture for the wise use of the 
limited and scarce resources? How to deal with the issue of informal and unauthorised 
abstractions and (b) how to ensure compliance? 
It has been argued that community belief systems and culture can be used in an 
institutional context to create a culture of self-organising governance system that not only 
use but also conserve the resources. It was shown that IWRM requires a high political 
support to be initiated but to implement the decisions, local informal institutions may play 
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an important role. Turner et al (1998) argue that the issue of environmental problems can 
not only have technical or technological solutions but require considering ethical systems. 
Therefore, it is required to consider how community belief systems can be used in this 
process.  
As an Islamic Republic, Iran takes its Constitution from the Islamic principles 
‘sharia’ as in Article 4 of the Constitution. Therefore, one of the important issues is to 
understand whether Islamic beliefs are compatible with IWRM.   
The political inquiry about Islam and democracy has been the subject of research 
and study by many researchers including Gudrun Kramer (1993) who makes some 
scholarly observations. Kramer (1993) concludes since government is a matter of 
convenience and mere technique, then democracy or elements of it such as pluralism 
(within the framework of Islam), political participation, government accountability, the rule 
of law and the protection of human rights can be adapted and even become mandatory. 
Water management reforms (i.e. water policy, law and administration) can take place from 
the Sharia perspective since it is part of transactions aspects of Islamic legal theory. Thus, 
As Kramer suggests, it can be reformed on different models outside the sphere of Islam and 
adapted even from non-Islamic concepts such as IWRM.  
Faruqi et al (2001) conclude that Islam relates to IWRM and sustainable 
development concept very well. Beaumont (2005) believes that it certainly includes all the 
concepts for a sustainable management of water. The new theory as put by Larijani (1993, 
1994) asserts that reaching postmodernism (reflexive modernity) state is a national goal or 
vision: “The Islamic society can be a comprehensive modern society fulfilling the criteria 
(e.g. authentic and technical rationality) of modernity” (ibid, p 41). ‘Islamic rationalism’ as 
postulated by Larijani (1995, 1998) can offer four bases for water and land governance: 
1. Legitimacy. It provides a framework for legitimacy. This element has been a 
problem in modern history of Iran. The framework has an ethical dimension: we can 
reach a goal not only with the best mean but it has to be legitimate (ethical).  
2. Transparency, accountability and distribution of power.  A community 
orientated government which adheres to Islamic rationalism- the government is 
recognised as a legal entity, its efficacy is the measure of its legitimacy.  
3. Participation. The formation of an organised civil society enhancing participatory 
approach or functional democracy as described by Larijani. 
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4. Environmental protection. Civil tolerance or freedom should be exercised with 
responsibility. The ‘no harm, no injury principles open the door for governmental 
intervention and to implement laws which might restrict peoples freedom of actions; 
especially with relation to the environmental issues.   
Community-based approach should not be a recipe for chaos but the community 
knowledge systems need to be bridged with modern principles of conservation and 
sustainability to facilitate the involvement of local actors by widening their perspective to 
move away from territorial thinking into a basin-wide thinking.    
Hanberger (2003) notes that (i) the erosion of public confidence together with (ii) 
complexity of the issues have made it difficult to actively address pressing social problems. 
Thus, according to Larijani’s theory, under Islamic guidance, water policymakers can 
legitimize their policy. Complexity is associated with implementation of legal codes 
(whether secular or Islamic) to resolve conflicts. The question of legitimacy is a profound 
issue and assertion of moral (Islamic) codes to agreed universal principles may create a new 
dimension in the implementation process.  
Participation which is the cornerstone of IWRM can be found in the Islamic 
Principle of  ‘shura’ (or consultation) which provides a strong basis for human participation 
based on ethical values. Prophet Muhammad is ordered in the Holy Quran to “consult them 
[i.e. the companions] in all the matters” (3:159)12. This clearly shows the fallacy of some 
opinions that associate Islam with allowing only the divine rules. The word ‘them’ means 
the whole community and cannot be narrowed to a particular group. Not just scholarly 
consensus is valued but community involvement is an essential prerequisite for any policy 
and law making as given by traditions from the Holy Prophet.”(Khallaf, 1977: 47; Keller, 
1997: 24-5):  
My community shall not agree on an error”; “Allah is not wont to make my community 
concur on misguidance”; “That which the Muslims consider good, Allah considers good” 
 
Based on the above argument, the role of cultural values and belief systems in 
attaining land and water good governance will be examined in Chapter VIII by proposing 
an Ethical legal framework for community- based land and water resources governance 
systems.  
                                                 
12 The community is also asked to consult each other: "their  affairs are conducted by consultation ‘shura’ 
among them" (42:38) 
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Chapter VIII. An Ethical Legal Framework Towards Good Governance: 
A Community-based Approach  
 
8.1 Introduction  
Lake Urmia case study is a classic example of common pool resources conflict 
which has resulted in overexploitation of natural (water and land) resources and 
subsequently created environmental degradation. As shown in previous chapters, to 
implement the Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP) in LUB, a strong political commitment 
is not enough to deliver water to Lake Urmia. Water allocation for the Lake will be only on 
paper if (1) the current development programs go ahead; (2) the current informal or illegal 
abstractions continue and (3) no water demand management is taken. The key to a 
successful implementation is getting on board the agriculture sector which consumes 94% 
of the total usage.   
The inter-provincial conflicts, diverse ethno-religious perspectives, politics of 
irrigation and the “hydraulic mission” have created an environment of mistrust. With no 
monitoring system and polarization of opinions among decision-makers at national and 
basin levels, delivering the required water to the Lake is almost impossible. The pace of the 
multitier participatory decision-making has been slow. The impacts of lobbying groups and 
hidden actors have been registered in the inability to reach agreement on time.  Despite 
fostering evidence-based decision-making, the empirical scientific evidences were ignored 
in the water allocation.  
The participation process has been inadequate for the following reasons:  
1. The real actors (i.e. farmers) have been overlooked: informal and 
unauthorised water users who made an informal rule of abstraction for 
generations. This has been acknowledged in the 2011 Directive of the 3rd 
and 4th NEC meetings. Farmers are not the only monsters of this 
environmental catastrophe. Perhaps they are a victim of a legacy of 
unsustainable land use polices. Most farmers have made a great deal of 
investments in pumping and irrigation technologies. They feel insecure 
and vulnerable and have a great deal of financial debts and little choice 
but to continue with irrigating and developing: 
Major problem of the water [sector] is that 70% of the [available] 
agricultural water is from wells, qanats and springs and 30% from 
Chapter 8 
 
262 
surface waters. Nevertheless, 95% of the governmental investment is on 
surface waters. Surface water consumption efficiency is far less than 
groundwater consumption rate (MoAJ, 2008) 
 
2. Provincial stakeholders have been elevated to basin-wide actors whom at 
most times could not break from their provincial ties. There was not a 
sense of belonging to the new multitier Multi-stakeholder Platforms 
(MPSs).  
There is a great of deal empirical evidence that community based approach to 
natural resources management has been effective in deal with common pool resources such 
as water and forests e.g. Ostrom (2005) make a summary of tens of case studies that self-
organising nested enterprises have been able to monitor resource use; thus the presumption 
is that the cultural and ethical values together with respect for informal institutions can 
bring about change in attitudes and cultures.  
In the water allocation process described in previous parts of this thesis, the 
importance of culture and belief systems have been acknowledged - In addition to socio-
economic and political realities, cultural and ethical discourses need to be considered in a 
strategy based on multi-stakeholder participation. Anthwal et al (2010, p.969) conclude 
that: 
Religion and belief should be respected before declaring them odious, as they have an 
important role toward the conservation of the natural resources that sustain the biospheric 
life support system  (ibid, p.969) 
 
Hence, institutional strengthening is not enough without considering the cultural and ethical 
perspectives in the capacity development. 
Therefore, the aim of the chapter is to bridge the gaps between tradition (religious, 
cultural, etc.) and modern land and water governance systems and to explore the potential 
role of belief systems in achieving good governance (see Chapter II for the definition of 
good governance). The intrinsic link between land and water has been acknowledged by 
many scholars such as Calder (2005) thus, the term ‘land and water’ is replaced by the term 
‘natural resources’. In this chapter, the Principles of Hima which is a traditional 
community-based natural resources (CBNR) governance system is used as an entry point to 
develop an Ethical legal framework for CBNR governance system for West Asia and North 
Africa (WANA) region including Iran.  
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WANA countries including Iran have a predominantly Islamic common heritage, 
culture and religion. Therefore, it is reasonable to consider Iran within WANA region as a 
case study to assess the application of predominately Islamic ethics by developing an 
Ethical legal framework. The Islamic legal theory describes land and water resources as 
natural wealth of the community.  
In the next section, the attributes of the case area is briefly described followed by 
the methodology in Section 8.3. Then, an overview of key Islamic concepts is given in 
Section 8.4. Next, the Islamic legal theory is outlined in Section 8.5. The principles for 
Hima CBNR governance system is described in Section 8.6 followed by the applications of 
the framework in LUB case study (Section 8.7). Finally conclusions are made in Section 
8.8 
 
8.2 Contextual setting 
WANA region (Figure 1.1, Chapter I) is characterised by environmental 
degradation and resource depletion. There is an emerging discourse that the destruction or 
depletion of the natural resources occurred by concentrating on economic developments 
and leaving cultural, ethical and institutional aspects behind (WANA, 2011; p26). The 
problem has been aggravated by lack of good governance and a gap between ruling elites 
and the people. Water scarcity is one of the major issues that threaten the security and the 
well-being of the region. There are trans-boundary resources (oil, water etc) that require 
regional policymaking mechanisms. For example in Iran, the implementation of  so called 
‘short term ‘Development Plans’ using revenues from oil and other non-renewable 
resources threatens the long term sustainability of the nations and will cause socio-
economic decline (Chapters IV and V).  
The WANA action arena is a complex system of nested enterprises within diverse 
communities and cultures and mainly characterised by disunity and fragmentation, lack of 
regional cooperation, social unrest, disintegration and segregation. The main assumption is 
that the ‘common good’ values can be the basis of a shared vision on natural resources 
sustainable use and conservation.  The new action situation is regional policymaking 
process on water scarcity and revival of an ethical CBNR governance system in WANA 
region. 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
264 
 
8.3 Methodological approach 
Basic definitions. In order to understand the institutional role of Islamic principles 
in natural resources governance, there is a need to define the meaning of Sharia and Fiqh 
and there is a need to differentiate between them. Sharia (which literally means a waterway 
or path) is the Islamic principles framework which is unchangeable and unquestionable in 
terms of religious enquiries. But Fiqh (literally meaning wisdom) is the human 
comprehension of the Sharia and is a collection of human opinions (fatwas) and judgments 
i.e. it is a set of legal codes. Islamic legal theory1or jurisprudence provides the mechanisms 
for drawing legal codes from Sharia. The word ‘Islamic principles (IP) and ‘Sharia’ are 
interchangeable throughout this chapter. The Objectives (Maqasid) of Sharia which we 
refer to it as the Maqasid model, is the Islamic vision of human development, prosperity 
and wellbeing. This describes the relationship of human with its environment.  
Referring to Chapter III, Islamic legal theory provides three categories of rules 
namely principles, norms and strategies. The instructions (directives and guidelines or 
operational rules) can be deduced based on the three main categories. In Chapter VIII, a 
proposal is made to use Ethical legal framework for Hima CBNR governance system as 
part of revised Responses based on the three levels of rules as shown in Figure 8.1. As 
noted on Figure 8.1, Chapter VIII describes the proposed Ethical legal framework; hence it 
is only a proposal and should be tested in future research.  
The approach. This chapter fulfils Objective 6 of the research (Chapter I) to use 
Islamic Ethics to develop the principles and legal framework for Hima CBNR Governance 
system. The assumptions and the rationale for this chapter are given in Chapter III. The 
methodological approach to achieve the above aim is as follows:  
 
                                                 
1 It is called Usulol-Fiqh or Principles of Fiqh 
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Figure 8.1: Optional Ethical component within the focal level of analysis 
 
1. To make a Historical analysis (evolution) of land and water management practices 
in Iran within a cultural context; the reason for taking Iran as a case study for the 
historical analysis is two folds: (1) looking at ancient history of Iran has an 
advantage since the ancient Persian empires ruled over a vast area of the WANA 
region maintaining laws and customs of those nations (e.g. Ravandi, 1975); thus, 
Iran’s cultural heritage is not extraneous to the region and (2) Iranians have greatly 
contributed to the Islamic civilisation and history. The historical analysis is from the 
start of Islam till 19092. 
2. To show the relevance of the Hima concept to contemporary CBNR systems by 
zooming into the evolution of the Hima concept and its chances for revival.   
3. The Maqasid model is outlined as basis for ethical principles of Hima governance. 
This will provide a vision and a strategic framework for Hima governance  
4. Principles of Islamic environmental ethics are outlined to form the basis for the 
Ethical legal framework for Hima governance  
5. Islamic legal theory will be described as a mechanism for policy/law-making 
appraisal.  
                                                 
2In Chapter IV, the evolution of modern water and land governance in Iran from 1909 till present day has 
been presented.  
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6. The framework for Hima governance will be outlined based on (1) to (4).  
7. Based on (6), a proposal is made to revive the Hima concept in WANA region. 
8. The potential application of Hima governance system for Lake Urmia basin is also 
assessed.  
 
8.4 An overview of key Islamic concepts 
8.4.1 Land and water inter-linkage: evolution of natural resources governance 
The rise of Islam started in 622 when Prophet Muhammad (d. 632) went to Madina 
(Yathrib as it was called) establishing a new Abrahamic religion and subsequently a simple 
administration. The administration was governed by ‘Al-Wathiqa’ or ‘Dastor’ [meaning the 
Document] and known as the first Islamic state Constitution outlining the relationship 
between different people in Madina (e.g. Berween, 2003; Ahmadian, 2002; Shalabi, 
2003).Al-Wathiqa  (Provision VI, clause 2)defines Yathrib as a sanctuary  (Hima) 
conservation zone. Hima is a land use zoning concept which literally means ‘protected 
zone’ and refers to a pre-Islamic practice in the Arabian Peninsula. However, Islamic 
principles revived the Hima concept to incorporate conservation and environmental 
protection principles as well as supporting sustainable livelihood and social justice (Section 
8.4.2). Later the Haram land use concept was introduced: haram (harim) sanctuaries are to 
be used for protection of groundwater sources and stop overexploitation and conflicts 
among well owners.  
The adaptability of Islamic doctrine and the pragmatism of its approach had been 
historically noted by Wilkinson (1990): “the Islamic State kept customary laws regarding 
water and land practices from earlier Byzantine, Roman, or Persian codes”. For example, 
the traditional "Tumar" code of water allocation based on pre-Islamic customary laws for 
irrigation on the River Zayandeh in Esfahan survived until the early 20th century (Lambton 
1998).   
Land reforms at the time of Umar bin Khatab(634-644), the second Caliph, 
revolutionised the economy of the emerging Islamic State by giving private land ownership 
to farmers based on the Islamic principle of Ihyaul-amowat (bringing life to dead land) 
converting neglected and dry lands to irrigated lands which brought about immense wealth 
and prosperity unknown during the pre-Islamic era. Water institutions and laws were 
established as a sub set of "the laws and practices subsumed under land management" 
(Wilkinson, 1990). Umar introduced the principle of cost recovery with a new tax: a 10% 
Chapter 8 
 
267 
tax was levied against agricultural products and established Tigris and Nile Irrigation 
Departments. Also, a 69 miles long navigation canal was built connecting Nile and Red Sea 
with the main purpose of irrigation.   
Umar also declared natural resources (grazing and forestry) as well as water as 
common property 3(Faruqi et al, 2001, Izzi Dien, 1990, 1997; Azmi, 2002). Also, private 
water ownership was recognised and limited to waters in containers, reservoirs,  wells, 
qanats (aflaj, Kariz etc) and small pools or ponds within private lands (Ahmadian, 2002).  
A new urban land use policy emerged at the time of Umar which had a bearing on 
water resources system.  For example, Ahmadian (2002) recalls that in 635, Umar ordered 
to build Basra City and to divert a canal from River Tigris for water supply of the city by 
employing Iranian architects and Roman engineers.   
Ali (656-661 AD), the 4th Caliph4, introduced a policy document5on governance 
issues including agricultural policy, land tax (kharaj) (Lambton, 1998; Rahbar, 1985, 1987). 
Ali envisaged that the taxation should be based on different land conditions and water 
availability. He wrote that the State can impose land taxes but can give incentives (tax 
reliefs) in certain cases: if the overall tax burden is high, crops suffer from disease, water 
shortages, drought conditions, flooded lands or water logging as well as land degradation. 
In fact, he refers in a way to sustainable development and links it with prosperity, social 
justice and eradication of poverty.  
During a stable period of the Caliphate Era (661-1258) many fiscal and 
administration literature were produced which contained consolidation of previous 
practices and cases of land and water resources development strategies (e.g. Azmi, 2002) 
which are given in Box8.1. Notably, institution of Iqta or land grants was legally 
established to promote agriculture in lands without owners (common pool resource). 
                                                 
3 This refers to a prophetic tradition narrated by Abo Dawood, tradition number 3470: Muslims have common 
share in three [things]: grass (pasture), water and fire (fuel) (Faruqui et al, 2001; p. 2).  
4 Ali is ideologically considered as the First Imam and the heir to Holy prophet by the Shiite branch of Islam; 
we take his legal status as the 4th Caliph which is accepted by both the Sunnis and Shiites.  
5 The famous ‘Letter’ to Malik Ashtar, the Governor of Egypt,.  
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The first ever book on 
groundwater hydrology appeared 
around 1017 written by Al-
Karaji, called ‘Withdrawal of 
Hidden Waters’ (Al Karaji 
,1966). He dedicated two 
chapters on legal boundary 
(haram) of qanants and wells: 
the first chapter is according to 
Islamic principles and the second 
chapter is according to geo-
morphological condition of the 
land (soil types). He has 
differentiated that some haram or 
boundary need to take into 
account not only Fiqh but also 
scientific considerations.  
During this period, three 
main intellectual lines of 
thinking about land-use policy 
(agriculture) were developed: (1) Nizam al Mulk ‘s social charter for the welfare of farmers 
based on equity and justice (Nizam al Mulk, 2002); (2) Ibn Khaldon’s a social cohesion and 
integrity policy based on eight-dimensional development model with general, historical 
heritage, geographical, social governance and governmental (political), economical 
(exploitation & consumption) and cultural (thought) aspects. (Ra’ad, 1993; p. 22); and (3)  
Najmaddin Razi’s (d.1247) spiritual (Sufi) discourse on ethics of farming:, in his famous 
book ‘Mirsad al Ibad’; narrating from Prophet Muhammad that a farmer who plants a seed 
or cultivates land will get a reward if creatures like birds and wild animals eat the by-
products. The farmers' main mission is to conserve God's bounties including the entrusted 
land (Razi, 1982). 
During Medieval Islam (1258-1500) which started after the Mogul attack and fall of 
Baghdad in 1258, the Islamic world went into a socio-economic and political recession. 
Feudal system of land ownership was widespread and continued till the land reforms in 
Box 8.1: Land and Water development 
strategies during 661-930  
· Leasing state lands with free holdings on water courses 
to generate revenue for the treasury 
· Private ownership of lands through Ihyaul-amowat , 
revival of dead land, policy 
· Hima land use system for sustainable resource use 
· Haram sanctuaries for groundwater protection  
· Promotion of agriculture through land grants or Iqta’ 
(un-claimed land). 
· Provide loans for land regeneration and cultivation 
· Taxation system based on fertility of land, types of 
crops and irrigation system; e.g. 10% tax on irrigated 
lands from canals  
· Tax relief or ‘zero tax’ for ‘infertile’ lands, flooded or 
drought conditions. 
· Dams and water locks to be built by the state:  tax for 
dam building projects are allowed if necessary.  
· Welfare tax is allowed to carry out social programmes 
according the economic climate. 
· Central treasury to pay for building canals and 
waterways 
· Central treasury to pay for embankments of rivers to 
avoid flooding 
· Help with famine victims and poverty eradication. 
· State responsible to remedy drinking facilities in the 
cities and water supply to urban dwellers 
· Private canals should be cleaned and maintained by the 
owners. 
· Voluntary sector to be involved in public finance e.g. 
waaqfs (endowments); public borrowing was allowed 
in water related projects. 
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1960s (see Chapter IV). However, there were some enlightened cases as Lambton (1998) 
recalls that at the time of Ghazan Khan (1295-1304) there was a distinct agricultural policy. 
One of the major reforms was to tax the farmers according to their ability to pay as well as 
introducing legislative reforms to stop bogus claims on lands by powerful elite (Razi, 1983; 
p. 326-7).   
The Safavid dynasty (1500-1722) was influenced by the Ottoman practices for their 
land property system (Sabbagh, 1999). The state lands were classified into four categories 
(Sabbagh, 1999): (1) Crown land known as Khassah; (2) Siuoghal lands (or 'Iqta’') was 
given to powerful families and crown court members; (3) Tiuol lands, a temporary 
allocation of land to state officials as part of their annual salary; and (4) Mamalik land: 
which was given to provincial service officials and local governors. There was an attempt 
to reform and change the land division practice which faced resistance from powerful elites 
(Sabbagh, 1999).  
During the Qajar Dynsty (1722-1925) traditional water resources management 
system, i.e. the qanat system, was in a desperate condition. Attempts to renew the qanat 
systems were hampered by mismanagement at all levels of government (Ettehadieh Nezam-
Mafi, 1993). Water rights were noted to be separate from land rights (Afary, 1991; quoting 
from Lambton, 1969). IRNCID (2005) shows purchase documents of water shares; these 
had been as part of land or individual water shares sold in the period 1790-1956 in Na’en 
City. Private water rights had been in practice without any religious or political hindrances.   
The Constitutionalists movement (1905-1909) tried to dismantle the feudal land and 
water property system. This is illustrated by buying the land and water rights of the 
Baharestan building which is the seat of Iranian Parliament (Majlis) during the second term 
of the Legislative council (1909-1911) from the heirs of Mirza Hussein khan Sepahsalar 
for 500 Toman with 10 Toman registration fee (Shahrokh, 2003). The reform succeeded to 
produce the Civic Code which was based on Islamic principles and was similar to the 
Ottoman’s Macelle
6. The Civic Code (was revised in 1989) contains implicit references to 
private water rights and an awareness of land and water relationship. 
8.3.2 Hima approach: community based natural resources governance system 
In the tribal power set up of the Arabia, Hima zones (as described earlier) were 
almost exclusively used by powerful tribes and elites within the tribal communes. Islam 
                                                 
6 In 1870, the Ottomans produced a Civil Law document called Macella (the Gazette). This was the first 
version of modern Islamic law.  
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brought an element of social justice to the Hima concept (Draz, 1969). Islam provided a 
legal and institutional framework to establish Himas. In Arabia, Himas were mainly used 
for pastoral activities and the new governance system encompassed conservation and 
biodiversity principles in terms of allowing for rangeland regeneration and water 
management during droughts (Bourn, 2003). Abu Izzedin (2004) asserts that Himas 
“played important roles in restoring rangelands, stabilising and controlling nomadic 
grazing, indicating rangeland potential, animal husbandry, the management of water 
catchment areas, and the protection of biological diversity”.  
In governance terms, Hima: 
· has to be institutionalised by a legitimate authority  
· is a common property which provides rights and benefits with no exclusive 
rights 
· is based on equal access to natural resources for sustainable livelihood 
· is a CBNR management approach that fosters shared responsibility among 
the community. 
· use rights can be prohibited or restricted if needed 
· can be used as a conservation zone; the first Hima sanctuary was declared 
was a “strip of 12 miles-wide around Madina City” (e.g. Muinul Islam, 
2004; Al-Mawardi, 2004) 
As a usufruct system of property, Hima institution had a broad legal mandate to 
promote beneficial use of the ‘protected zone’ (Abu Izzedin, 2004). A controlled 
(restricted) right use ensures conservation. Islamic legal framework also recognised that a 
social institution needs to apply socially accepted sanctions depending on the cultural 
context of the Hima community. So, for example, the meaning of equitable distribution or 
access was determined by the community (Abu Izzedin, 2004). This provided a flexible 
legal framework which allowed those who are affected to modify it according to local 
knowledge. For example, Hima communities were able to make boundary and position 
rules as required in time and place.  
Himas have been practiced throughout the Muslim World and sometimes under 
different local names (Kilani, et al, 2007; Abu Izzedin, 2004). Hima-style traditional natural 
resources management has been reported outside the Arabian peninsula and WANA region; 
for example in Kenya (Wishitemi and Okello, 2003). Tiwari et al (2010) report about a 
sophisticated Hima governance system in Northern India comprising of a territorial area, a 
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political local institution and a community of several villages. The Hima approach has been 
providing welfare for the community, management of natural resources and control over a 
territory. It is worth mentioning that Hima land system was part of the land taxonomy in the 
Sokoto Caliphate, Nigeria enacted in 1810 by Abdulahi dan Fodio (1766-1828), the Sultan 
of Eastern part of present Nigeria (Barau, 2009). In Indonesia, the Hima is commonly used 
in forestry resource management. (Bhagwat et al, 2011). 
The disintegration of traditional land rights in the last centuries and nationalisation 
of the natural resources by central governments have been a global trend. Since the 1950, 
there has been a decline in the number of Himas in WANA region (Bourn, 2003). For 
example, in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), there was 3000 Himas and this number has 
dramatically reduced (Abu Izzedin, 2004) ) bearing in mind that in 1953 the Hima system 
was abolished due to territorial conflicts among tribes and governmental settlement policy 
of the nomadic communities, technological changes and better living standards in the cities 
(Al-Hathlouland Edadan, 1993). Al-Shayaa et al (2007) asserts that creating protected areas 
in the KSA did not stop over utilisation of the resources. They note that there has been 
“confusion between the principles of the Hima systems and the laws of the reservation 
modern administration” (ibid, p.125). Al-Shayaa et al (2007) make an important 
observation: the participation process failed due to lack of a clear position rule to define the 
role of participation of the local people. In addition, they recommended that training is 
needed for conservationists of how to deal with local people. But, Sillitoe et al (2010) noted 
that there has been a problem to accommodate local views by policymakers and researchers 
and managers. 
The revival of these traditional knowledge systems to natural resource management 
has started in more recent times such as the 1990s HIMA project in Tanzania (Minja and 
East, 1996) which aimed to revive the community-based management of the natural 
resources. Gladstone (2000) describes a project based on Hima systems: he defined 6 types 
of Hima zones in the Red Sea marine protected area of Farasan Islands, KSA based on their 
biophysical characteristics and management objectives: sustainable resource use; 
biological, natural, special natural and recreational Hima zones. 
FAO (2009a) calls for the incorporation of Hima in the forestry management and 
noted the quasi-religious force of Hima prescriptions. In 2000, Mauritania enacted ‘Code 
Pastoral’ to revive nomadic rights to common property based on Islamic legal theory 
which has been described by Wabnitz (2009) as an adaptive, effective legislation. 
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According to Wabnitz (2009), the Code pastoral builds on Islamic law and has effective 
self-executing conflict resolution procedures and recognizes the Islamic Hima principle of 
use rights instead of exclusivity and ownership rights.  
The traditional communities have been much influenced by the of socio-economic 
Driving forces and so their outlook and knowledge has changed and so applying traditional 
knowledge systems is not as straightforward as it sounds (e.g. Sillitoe et al , 2010); the tide 
of modernity has change perceptions and Hima might not be wanted in younger generations 
in its primitive nomadic form. We need to understand the informal (traditional) institutions 
in order to be able to revive the concept in the modern settings. Institutional analysis is an 
important part of the strategy. It is interesting to note that Colding et al (2003) reports that 
Bennet (1990) argued early anthropologists did not believe that traditional (informal) 
institutions existed in traditional communities; nevertheless, the recognition of the 
importance of “informal institutions in sustainable resources and ecosystem management is 
on the rise”.  That is why the Himas seems to be relevant in modern times.  
8.3.3 Islamic Vision on human development: ‘Maqasid’ model  
The concept of human development is defined by HDR/UNDP (2006) as “first and 
foremost about allowing people to lead a life that they value and enabling them to realise 
their potential as human beings”. To achieve this goal, a visionary framework is set out in 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The objectives are to reduce “extreme 
poverty, extending gender equality, and advancing opportunities for health and education”.  
So this internationally agreed set of time bound goals centres around human wellbeing.  
The Islamic worldview (ethical principles) on development have five main 
components ( see Chapra, 2008, Ahmad, 1994, Khallaf, 1977 among others):  
· Unity of God ‘tawhid’ denotes both the divine relationship with humans 
andthe societal interactions 
· Message’ Risala’ of Prophets providing  guidance for interactions 
· Vicegerency’ Khilafa’ of humans which brings accountability to the 
positions held in all action situations   
· Refinement ‘Tazkiya’ of spirit which an indicator of human development 
· Day of Judgement ‘Akhira’ which is about how humans utilised the 
resources provided by God.    
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The Islamic version of human development  based on the above worldview is very 
much comparative and consists of five compulsory or essential Maqasid7as derived from 
Quranic and Prophetic sources by great Sufi and reformist scholar, Imam Ghazali (d. 505 
AH/1111 AD) and approved by other prominent scholars such as Imam Eshaq Al-Shatebi 
(d.790/1388) and Imam Fakhrad-din al Razi (d. 606/1209) (e.g. Chapra, 2008; Khallaf, 
1977; Al-Alwani, 2005; Al-Resoni, 2008): 
1. invigoration of the human self (nafs) 
2. enrichment  of human faith (din) 
3. enrichment of intellect (aql) 
4. enrichment of posterity (nasl) 
5. development and expansion of wealth (mal) 
Chapra (1996) and Ahmad (1994) provide a comprehensive review of the Islamic 
vision on economic and sustainable development in the light of the Maqasid model. The 
Islamic development vision  is based on social and economic justice and environmental 
integrity:  
· Optimal utilisation of the resources based on thankfulness ‘shukr’, i.e. no 
excessive use. 
· Equitable use and distribution based on Justice ‘adl’. 
· Environmental integrity based on condemning disvalues of ‘kufr’ (denial or 
rejection of God’s blessings) and ‘zulm
8
’ (aggression, harm, abuse) 
Chapra (2008) provides a detailed account of how to achieve the above essential 
Maqasid
9. The main need for human self-enrichment is: its dignity, self-respect, 
brotherhood and social equality. This can be achieved through justice and maintained by 
spiritual and moral uplift (see strengthening faith). Self-enrichment can be realised if the 
life, property and honour of individuals are secured by (1) creating a free environment for 
self-development; (2) providing affordable education; (3) strengthening good governance; 
(4) providing equal opportunities in employment and wealth creation and (5) supporting 
family and social solidarity (Chapra, 2008).  
Spiritual (non-material) needs of the community deal with the second criteria, 
enrichment of faith which is based on interpreting how self-interest of an individual is 
                                                 
7
Maqasid is the plural of a Maqsad 
8 Zulm is a set of acts that brings injustice and can vary within different contexts 
9 There are many other references in Arabic and Farsi on this subject; however, Chapra (2008) is one of the 
few good references in English.  
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matched with the individual’s responsibilities before the God and hence his worldview is 
constructed to accept values sustained by proper motivation and maintained by moral and 
material education. Chapra (2008) acknowledges that Maqasid model emphasises the role 
of State in providing good governance and providing enabling environment for the 
protection of self-dignity and establishment of freedom and justice and security. However, 
this role in enforcing laws and regulations will be lessened if there is uplift in moral 
standards motivated by high ethical ideals. This will increase the effectiveness of socio-
economic, judicial, financial, social, educational and cultural institutions.  
Enrichment of the intellect provides a basis for social integration and harmony. As a 
result, intolerances, fanaticism and conflicts will be avoided. According to Ghazali, 
intellect is the Driving force behind development and growth since it the “foundation of 
knowledge” and the “source of success in the world and hereafter” (Chapra, 2008). There 
must be an enabling environment for freedom of thought and expression as well as 
incentives and rewards for creative work. 
The strategy to attain Enrichment of the Posterity is to have clean and healthy 
environment and be free from fear of conflict and insecurity (see e.g. Chapra 2008). So 
there is a need for conflict resolution within an institutional and governance system. The 
environmental ethics are neglected by Islamist literature despite many indications of 
environmental protection in the Holy Quran. The depletion of natural resources and 
destruction of ecosystems are a threat to the community’s security and prosperity. Indeed, 
the other objectives will not be achieved if this objective is ignored. We will discuss this 
theme in the next sub-section 
For a community to be vibrant it has to be able to create wealth which is a trust 
(amana) from Allah. Wealth creation ability is paramount to the success of other 
objectives. The strategy to achieve this is to eradicate poverty, minimising inequalities of 
income by providing social support to those in need relying on redistributive mechanisms 
such as different forms of taxes (zakat10, sadaqa11, awqaf12 etc.). Therefore, the economic 
development should not be ignored in an overall strategy. Concentrating on economic 
developments alone will be beneficial in a short term but it might not be sustainable in a 
longer run due to the “rise in inequalities, family disintegration, juvenile delinquency, 
crime and social unrest (Chapra, 2008)”. 
                                                 
10 Income Tax 
11 Charity Gifts 
12 Benevolent Funds  
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8.3.4 Principles of Islamic environmental ethics  
The principles of Islamic environmental ethics (Figure 8.2a) have been discussed by 
many researchers e.g. Bagader et al, 2007, Izzi Dien, 1990, 1997; Khalid, 2002, Adam, 
2007; Schwarte, 2003, Faruqi et al, 2001; Jusoff and Abu Samah, 2011). The Islamic 
environmental ethics is comparable to the modern version defined by Des Jardins (2001) in 
Chapter II. 
The Islamic environmental ethics which are governed and guided by the Maqasid 
model, are compatible with the ecocentric ethics (Figure8.2b). Humans are considered as 
trustees of the earth and God’s vicegerents (Caliphs) and should not spoil (do mischief or 
fasaad), harm or damage the natural world and avoid excessive use of the resources. 
Islamic ethics considers both animal rights13 (e.g. Masri, 1989; Wescoat, 1995; Foltz, 2002) 
which Roman and Anglo-Saxson laws have ignored (Green, 2003) and there is clear 
indication to protect the ecosystem as a unit by not interfering with the balance and 
measured nature of the creation. Islamic ethics is pro afforestation and specify that wild 
plants and forests should not be cut. Furthermore, Islamic theory is more applicable to the 
ecological principles than the liberal and democratic theories as shown in Table 8.1. 
Water and Earth (land) are considered to be sacred. Water appears 63 times in the 
Quran “And His [i.e. God’s] Throne has been resting on water”. Paradise is described as” 
Gardens beneath which rivers flow” [47: 12]. Water is a source of life: “And Allah has sent 
down the water from the sky and therewith gives life to the earth after its death” [16:65]; 
“We made from water every living thing” [21:30]. Water is a source for purification and its 
quality has a special importance in Islam since before performing every prayer ablution is 
necessary and after each sexual contact, bathing is required. So water has a psychological 
dimension in Muslim’s daily life. Equitable right to water is entrenched in Islam including 
right of animals to drink (Quran, 26:155)14.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Reference to ‘haqq al-shurb’ or the right of thirst”  
14Referring to the verse: “He said: (Behold) this she-camel. She hath the right to drink (at the well), and ye 
have the right to drink, (each) on an appointed day”.  
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Quran mentions the word ‘earth’ in more than 400 occasions (Jusoff and Abu 
Samah, 2011). It considers land ‘earth’ as a medium for development in the context of 
better living standards and place for worship. Quran refers to the colonial nature of human 
Biocentric 
Ethics: 
Animal Rights: organisms 
have equal /proportionate 
rights to life 
No ecosystem: partially 
green 
Anthropocentric: 
Considering human beings 
and their existence as the 
most important and central 
fact in the universe 
Ecocentric 
Ethics: 
Biocentric plus the whole 
ecosystem as a unit of 
nature 
Green Ethics 
 
Environmental 
degradation 
Development driven 
Resource depletion 
 
Full environmental  
protection 
 
Basic inherent value of  
nature 
Weakness: no 
consideration 
for ecosystem 
 
 
(a) A historical Development: The Relationship between 
 Ethics (adopted from Proops and Wilkinson, 2000) 
Islamic Ethics for environmental sustainability  
· God as sustainer; Any damage to the Environment considered as going against 
God’s wil 
· Humans are trustee with responsibility 
· Humans are stewards and accountable 
· Holism of nature: All creatures (animal and plant species) are Nations like humans 
(possesses intrinsic value and rights for others in the ecosystem.  
· Ecosystem equilibrium: “Creation is a balance and measured way” 
· No harm and Fassad principles  
·  No excessive use 
· Hima(protected)zones for sustainable natural resource use and conservation 
· Haram (boundary) and environmental protection 
· Wild and planted trees and vegetation need to be conserved should be protected 
from deliberate fire or cuts (pro-afforestatio) 
· Respect for rule of law: the principle of Maintenance of Order ‘hefz-e-al-nizam’ 
 
(b)  Islamic Environmental Ethics  
Figure 8.2: A historical Development of Environmental Ethics and Islamic ‘environmental’ ethics  
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organisation and settlement and societal behaviour (Quran 11:61)15. The choice of word 
“colonised” refer to the human activities and developmental pressures as a result of 
demographic Drivers. But there is an explicit prohibition of land pollution (fassad ) or any 
other harm done to the environment. 
There is noticeable challenge in applying the Islamic environmental ethics despite 
the notion of stewardship because of the anthropocentric elements in the Islamic principles 
towards natural resources use: natural resources are bounties from God and it has created 
for the welfare of mankind. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter II, the conservation ethics 
propagated by the ideals of the Sustainable Development is centred on the human needs and 
the needs of future generations (WCED, 1987). This implies that humans are given priority 
in terms of their needs. The balance has been shifted towards anthropocentric ethics within 
both the Islamic and Sustainable Development discourses. The religious discourses centre 
on several themes: 
· The Earth belongs to God and we all have a share i.e. it may imply a non-
restrictive rights to the resources as described by Simmons (1993) as the 
ethic of “instrumentalism” or the “use of the environment“. 
· We have freedom to work and create wealth using God’s bounties. Holden 
(2003) reports that “Nash (1989) suggests, inherent within the concept of 
stewardship is the notion that God has given nature to humans”. 
· Humans are superior or masters of the world. This implies that human needs 
have greater priority over other creations.  
 In the past, the strong welferist and anthropogenic nature of religious teachings 
with regard to various aspects of human rights has been shaped by these dominant 
discourses which did not came into conflicts with Islamic environmental principles and the 
Maqasid model before the modern age. However, in modern times, with the overpopulation 
and expansion of human existence on earth, the overuse and over exploitation of resources 
are in direct conflict with the religious moral codes. Thus, these discourses cannot be 
supported by the Islamic legal criteria on environmental integrity.  Therefore, these intrinsic 
human developmental aspirations and needs have to be balanced with ecological needs of 
the universe and its sustainability. Jenkins (2005) calls for using Islamic legal theory 
(jurisprudence) to “envision an alternative practical strategy for Islamic environmental 
ethics”. On this basis, the ethical legal framework is developed for community based 
                                                 
15Reference to the verse:  “It is He Who hath produced you from the earth and colonised (settled) you therein” 
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natural resources governance. There are some examples for producing practical guidelines 
using Islamic environmental ethics; e.g.  in Philippine which depends heavily on forest and 
marine resources (dependence rate is more than 70%), the Islamic environmental 
governance has been successfully developed and promoted in the Muslim area as part of the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)s Philippine Environmental 
Governance 2 Project (EcoGov2, 2008). The document is called the Steward (Al- Khalifa) 
and sets governance rules on environmental protections.  
 
 
Criteria  Ecological Law Liberal Theory  Democratic theory Islamic theory 
Enforcement 
Of environmental 
morals 
Enforcement of 
environmental 
morals is implicit 
in the ethics to 
save the ecosystem 
Tenets of liberalism 
asserts that one 
should not interfere 
with matters of 
personal morality 
Popular support can 
approve non-
enforcement 
strategies such as 
short-term plans (e.g. 
development plans) 
Duty to preserve 
God’s Creature: so 
enforcement is 
implicit in the ethics 
Scope rules and 
right of access 
Based on what is 
right, good and 
virtue 
No interference 
except on the ground 
of harm 
Based on popular 
support ‘participation 
Based on what is 
right, good and virtue 
Boundary of enquiry Community as a 
unit 
individual Popular majority rule Community as a unit 
Table 8.1: The degree of applicability different dominant theories in conjunction with 
Ecological Law 
 
8.5 Islamic Legal Theory  
Islamic legal theory was founded by Imam Shafei (767-820) in the second century 
of Islam (Khallaf, 1977). It is a mechanism to transform the ethical principles into 
normative and strategic rules. In this section, the role of Islamic legal theory as an interface 
between the environmental ethics within the framework of Islamic developmental vision 
(Maqasid model) and the IWRM and sustainability science is discussed.  
Islamic legal theory is a powerful approach to translate Islamic environmental ethics 
into practical governance rules (Jenkins, 2005). Therefore, it is assumed that if we want to 
make a genuine attempt to deal with the environmental problems in the WANA region or 
Iran; the Islamic environmental ethics and the Maqasid model should be accommodated 
into the existing governance system. Ragab (1980) believes that this is also dictated by the 
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Box8.2: Some of the main Legal maxims from Islamic 
legal theory  
(Source: Khallaf, 1977; Kamali (2006) and Old Islamic texts) 
 
Action situations 
· Acts are judged by its goal and objectives (i.e.Maqasid) 
· Original Allowance Rule: the foundation of all things is 
allowance 
· Certainty is not overruled by doubt 
· Custom is the basis of judgment  
· Necessities should not be exaggerated (i.e. limited by a 
proportion)  
· Necessities permits prohibitions  
Public interest or Masalaha 
· Masalaha : entrustment of governance power over the 
citizens to the Head of the State (Imam) is dependent on 
serving public interest 
Repulsion of Harm 
· Harm must be eliminated  
· Repulsion of harm(spoil, corruption, damage) takes 
precedence over the acquisition of benefit 
· A harm cannot be eliminated by conflicting another harm  
· A greater harm can be avoided by accepting a smaller 
harm 
· Choosing the worst of two evils to avoid their full 
potentials 
Removal of difficulty  
· Hardship brings facilitation i.e. elimination of hardship 
brings satisfaction and wellbeing 
· Discomfiture is lawfully removed   
 
Islamic faith since in Islam the social and belief systems are seen as one entity (Ragab, 
1980).  
 
8.5.1 Linking to IWRM and Sustainability concepts 
Islamic legal theory needs to be benchmarked with the sustainability science to be 
harmonised and streamlined with modern day principles. Therefore, we need to establish 
how a belief system (in our case Islam) can be linked to non-religious concepts such as 
IWRM16. 
Islamic legal theory 
distinguishes between two sets of 
laws: (1) acts of worship (‘ibadat) 
which are a set of unchangeable 
religious values; and (2) transactions 
(mu’amalat) which are the way how a 
society is organised socially, 
economically and politically. Natural 
resources management reforms can 
take place from the Sharia perspective 
since it is part of the transactions 
aspects of Fiqh. As Kramer (1993) 
suggests it can be reformed on 
different models outside the sphere of 
Islam and adapted even from non-
Islamic concepts such as IWRM. 
Faruqi et al (2001) and Beaumont 
(2005) conclude that Islam relates to 
IWRM and sustainable development concept very well.  
8.5.2 Basis of policy appraisal and law making process 
The Maqasid science was ignored for centuries until late 19th century (e.g. Alwani, 
2005). Recently, there have been a huge movement towards rekindling the Maqasid model 
                                                 
16 The philosophical and theological arguments are not relevant as we take religion as a cultural attribute of 
the community.  
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into Islamic legal theory (e.g. Chapra, 2008; Al-Resoni, 2008; Alwani, 2005; al-Qardhawi, 
1998; Azmi, 2002). 
The Maqasid model provides the governing principles of the Islamic legal theory. 
The main aim of the Islamic legal theory is to serve public interest (Masalaha) by 
achieving two criteria: repulsion of harm ‘daf’e zarar’  and removal of difficulty ‘raf’e 
haraj’.A set of sophisticated legal maxims have been developed on these two criteria as 
given in Box8.2 (e.g. Khallaf, 1977; Kamali, 2006). The legal framework to achieve the 
criteria has three Maqasid levels (e.g. Alwani, 2005; p. 138; Khallaf, 1977): 
1.  The obligatory Maqasid level: the five necessities (Section 8.3) are considered to 
be high level governing objectives and form the basis of the source methodology in 
coming up with a ruling or a policy.  
2. The complementary necessary level: one of the main Islamic principles is to make 
the law easier to implement and remove any unnecessary restriction and difficulty to 
achieve the five main Maqasid. It can be considered as a refinement of legal 
application to deal with social and ecological vulnerabilities. At the time of 
droughts for example, additional rules can be enforced to reflect the new realities. 
Hence at this level, the benefits or costs of a ruling is distributed.   
3. The enhancement level: is a level in which the aim is to reach a desirable status in 
terms of moral conduct. 
8.5.3 Gathering data or evidence for the legal framework  
Data sources for the Ethical legal framework are based on three pillars: (1) divine 
revelation (texts), (2) intellect and (3) cultural experiences (customs) as shown in Figure 
8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3: The Pillars of Islamic legal theory. 
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The evidences can be divided into four classes17 (see e.g. Khallaf, 1977; Johnston, 
2004): 
1. First order evidence is taken from the revealed (divine) texts: 
a. the Holy Quran and 
b. Narratives (Hadith, traditions or Sunna) of the Holy Prophet; and 
2. Second order evidences from non-divine sources are: 
a. analogical reasoning of experts for the public interest ‘qiyas’or ‘reason’ 
b. Consensus on scientific evidences from experts 
3. Third order evidences: 
a. Customs and cultural experiences   
b. istihsan ("legal equity" or "preferential choice") 
c. istishab (presumption of continuity) 
4. Fourth order sources  
a. maslaha mursala (social welfare not mentioned in the texts) 
b. sadd-al-zaria (closing the gate to evil): necessity rules 
c. Shar' man qablana (revealed norms and principles from those before us-
cross-cultural experiences) 
d. Madhhab al-sahdba (the school, or juridical method of the companions of 
Prophet Muhammad). 
The authenticity of the sources is indicated by their order. Quran represents the most 
authentic source; first and second order sources are agreed among most scholars. Quranic 
texts (verses) are of two categories: 
1. explicit as evidence ‘muhkamat’ i.e. they are precise in their meaning and 
cannot be open to different interpretations  or 
2. probabilistic as evidence ‘mutashbehat’; which are open to different 
interpretations 
Most of the Quran is from the latter category as stated by Keller (1997). On the 
above bases, the dynamic nature of Islamic legal basis makes it adaptive to changing 
environments and circumstances. The idea of absolute divine rule is a misconception and 
there is a large degree of freedom with regard to interpreting even the divine ‘sacred’ 
sources and this is highlighted by the strong presence of human dimension in the policy/ 
law-making process.  
                                                 
17 Classification is made by the author 
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8.5.4 A framework for legitimacy: rules-obligation inter-linkage   
Fiqh provides a framework to understand the relationship between action-actor as a 
basis for legitimacy and enforcement of the rule of law. This is based on rule-obligation 
concept (e.g. Khallaf, 1977; Al-Alwani , 2003). A rule assigns a task (a human-induced act) 
to be performed and actors will respond according to their worldview. In the analysis of the 
dynamics of ‘act- actor’ relationship, there are certain criteria that should be met with 
regard to the ‘act’ and the process of ‘acting’. The dual analysis can be based on the 
following algorithm: 
1. The act (the actual task):  
a. the clarity of the act to the actors 
b. the ethical nature of the act- measure of its legitimacy based on the 
constitutional level decision-making principles 
c. degree of hardship associated with an act: how practical is the act: 
i. impossible acts are invalid 
ii. probable acts with absolute hardship is invalid 
iii. probable acts with a relative hardship (tolerable and 
acceptable level) is acceptable 
2.  Actors: 
a. their ability to understand the process of acting without any 
ambiguity 
b. are they fit to carry out the act? I.e. do they have the capacity to act? 
A legitimate rule should satisfy the above criteria of no hardship, ability to 
understand and capacity to perform according to the rule. Legitimacy is then a 
measure of the successful implementation of the CBNR management plans. This 
means that Islamic Fiqh should not be only about law making but it should take 
wider societal dimensions into consideration. Introducing a new rule might not be 
enough to ensure its implementation. Therefore, there might be a need for capacity 
development strategy. The participation of the community might need an 
adjustment to the socio-political setting and the community has to be empowered by 
creating boundary and positions rules.  
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8.6 Revised Responses: revival of Hima governance in WANA region 
The Hima governance system has been deduced based on Islamic environmental 
ethics, Maqasid model and legal theory. It can have three main elements 
1. The principles of Hima governance which refers to constitutional governance level  
2. The Ethical legal framework which refer to collective choice governance level  
3. Hima organisations (institutions) which refers to operational governance level  
The thesis provides a proposal on the first two elements.  The operational 
(procedural) level governance are not discussed since this depends on community based 
knowledge and scientific good practice principles which varies in time and place.  
8.6.1 Principles of Hima governance   
The principles of Hima governance are categorised into four broad categories which 
are not mutually exclusive and presented in Table 8.2.  
I. The Ethical principles which include the Hima development vision and 
describe the aims and objectives and the ethical dimension of Hima 
governance system. 
II. Environmental sustainability principles are based on reverence to natural 
resources and no harm and no fassad.  
III. Institutional principles recognise (a) the role of the State in providing basic 
needs; (b) the role of the voluntary sector to contribute to socio-economic 
and non-material development of the community and (c) the devolution of 
Hima management within the local community.  
IV. Good governance principles provide a framework for the adequate 
management of the natural resources in Hima zones.  
The specific principles deals with the three elements of Hima approach: 
1. Social cohesion and sustainable livelihood for Hima communities 
2. Criteria on property rights and resource use which is based on carrying 
capacity and regeneration of resources 
3. Environmental protection and conservation and adaptive management 
 
8.6.2 Ethical legal framework 
Islamic legal theory also provides an Ethical legal framework for Hima governance 
system. This describes the journey of translating the principles into strategies and 
normative rules. There are two important issues in contemporary CBNR that has to be well 
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defined: property rights and right of use. The proposed legal framework which is given in 
Table 8.3, deals specifically with these issues.  
We can conclude that Islam put a coherent set of principles for an equitable and 
sustainable use and management of natural resources and is comparable to 
· nine contemporary CBNR governance principles presented by Dudley 
(2008) representing IUCN’s guidelines on protected area and   
· twelve organisational principles based on a survey of latest research 
(Gruber, 2010). 
The comparison is shown in Table 8.4. 
However many WANA countries including Iran have been experiencing lack of 
implementation of these principles due to many factors including resistant to change, unfair 
distribution practices, lack of good governance as well as weak operational and financial 
management of the natural resource. Therefore, there has been a renewal of interest in 
traditional governance systems as an entry point for CBNR management programmes. The 
Islamic belief system provides a coherent governance system: principles, norms and legal 
frameworks. It is proposed that that the developed Hima governance system can be adopted 
in WANA region and beyond. But this has to be tested in case studies.  
The PhD work has been linked to international and regional initiatives (Source 
Appendix A1, Table A1.5) including  
· World Justice Forum (WJF) 
· WANA Forum  
· United Nations University- Institute for Water and Environmental Sciences (UNU-
IWES) in Dubai.  
The work will also be part of WANA Forum policy brief on ‘Hima CBNR 
Governance for WANA Region”. The work has already presented at a recent workshop in 
Istanbul (Appendix A1) and the third World Justice Forum (WJF) meeting, Barcelona, 
Spain. The work will also form the basis of ‘Hima Global Initiative’ to be launched in May 
2012. The author is involved currently in writing the proposal for this global initiative.  
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Table 8.2:  Principles of Hima (CBNR) governance based on Islamic principles 
Part I: Ethical principles 
(1) Hima development vision: based on the ethics and the Maqasid model, this outlines the 
aim and objectives of establishment of Hima zones: the aim is ‘fallah’ or human wellbeing 
which can be achieved at three Maqasid levels (criteria) which can be attained if justice, 
equity and public interest are established. 
(2) General policymaking criteria: are Justice, equity and public interest Justice can only 
be achieved if there is social solidarity or cohesion (e.g. Chapra, 2008a) 
(3) Integration and social cohesion: a multi-dimensional principle based on the notion of 
community as an integrative unit. We can have different communities as ‘holons’ that can 
be part of the whole or considered as a whole at the same time: 
(a)  Collective duty and responsibility: the notion of Umma provides individual rights for 
the community members but it also provides sense of collective duty and responsibility. 
(b) Hima zones should create no hardship for other communities around the zone. 
(c)  ‘Fraternizing’ principle: the level of associations and cooperation among Hima 
communities.  The social fabric of Hima communities is heterogeneous and hence The 
Fraternizing ‘Brotherhood’ principle creates a coalition alliance to implement Hima 
governance system.  
(d) Diversity principle: pluralism in the human society is a Quranic concept: “if Allah had 
so willed, He could have made them a single people”; ”And among His Signs is the 
creation of the heavens and the earth, and the variations in your languages and your 
colours: verily in that are Signs for those who know. 30: 22). 
(e) Integration and social cohesion require having a broader holistic and aesthetic 
worldview about the nature: “Indeed, God is beautiful and loves beauty1” as a prophetic 
narration. Therefore, the splendours of nature and its equilibrium should be acknowledged.   
(4) Holism principals are based on the followings principles which describe human 
rights within the greater environment: humans are part of the holistic system: 
(a)All creatures (plants, animals and inanimate) are signs of God. 
(b) All creatures are nations like human with intrinsic rights. 
(5) No excessive use principle: right to use for sustainable livelihoods based on these 
principles: 
(a) Allah is the definite and factual Proprietor:  “…to Allah doth belong the dominion of 
the heavens and the earth and all that is therein…” (5: 17 and 120). 
(b) Humans are beneficiaries of the creation: “It is He Who hath created for you all things 
that are on earth (2: 29); “It is He Who has made the earth manageable for you, so 
traverse ye through its tracts and enjoy of the Sustenance which He furnishes: but unto 
Him is the Resurrection” (67:15). 
(c) Original allowance rule (Box 8.2) can be restricted if required. 
(6) Respect for international treaties and conventions:  This is based on Al-Wathiqa 
Constitution (e.g. Berween, 2003). This can provide a linkage to principles from other 
CBNR paradigms which are either mutual or complementary.  . 
Part II:  Environmental sustainability principles   
(7) Reverence for natural resources: God is the sustainer: Any damage to the 
Environment considered as a going against God’s will 
(8) Environmental equilibrium : “Creation is a balance and measured way” 
(9)No Harm principle– psychological, opportunities, environmental etc 
(10) No Fassad (spoil, corruption or damage) to the Environment  
Part III:  Institutional principles  
 
Continue on next page 
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Table 8.2:  Principles of Hima governance…..  continue 
 
(11) Devolution to local community  by recognising  informal institutions  and local 
traditional knowledge systems 
(12) Collective action Principle as basis for the role of the State and voluntary sector:  
Fulfilment of the needs Principle- everyone in the community should have enough of 
basic goods and services. This are collective (socially- obligatory) duties that has to be 
fulfilled by the state.“Allocative and re-distributive role of voluntary sector” (Sediqqi, 
1988) to be enhanced in achieving socially obligatory duties 
 (13) Financial sustainability principle is based on  
(a) Upkeep of social welfare of the vulnerable members of the Hima community such as 
establishing Child Welfare Fund, Zakat Wealth Fund, reduction of tax burden and so 
forth.  
(b) Economic efficiency: e.g. extra taxes on goods and service to recover costs and 
enhance community accountability 
(c)Payoffs for efficiency targets and penalties for non-compliance 
(14) Conflict resolutions based on  
(a) Acknowledging and understanding  rights of each other in terms of nationality (i.e. 
ethnic, cultural), loyalty and kinship,  gender : “Created you from nations and tribes, men 
and women to acknowledge [rights of] each other” 
(b) Peaceful existence as Quran calls for Home of Peace: "….and God calls to the Home 
of Peace.." [ 10:25] 
(c)Mutual consultation process: “who (conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation 
(42:38)”. 
(d) Conflict resolution should lead to Eslah which can have several meaning: 
i. Reform: I only desire reform to the best of my ability. And my guidance cannot come 
except from Allâh, in Him I trust and unto Him I repent. (11: 88) 
ii. Betterment of conditions: The best thing to do is what is for their good 2: 220 
iii. reconciliation between people’ (4:14) 
Part IV- Good governance Principles: 
(15) Responsive :  principle of humans are Trustees. 
(16) Accountable: principle of humans are Stewards; participation in decision-making; “It 
is He who hath made you (His) agents, inheritors [stewards] of the earth “(6:165) 
(17) Consensus oriented: Principle of Consensus or Ijma of experts  
(18)Participatory based  Principle of shura or consultation and community participation:  
“and consult them in affairs of moment)”(3:159) 
(19) Proclaiming the clear message: transparency and clarity in information 
dissemination and policymaking.    
(20)Follow rule of law: principle of Maintenance of the Order is to avoid chaos and 
injustice. Sanctions can be enforced as well as incentives to achieve environmental 
sustainability principles.    
(21)Legitimacy and capacity development: effectiveness and efficiency of the 
governance system is a measure of its legitimacy; capacity development and 
empowerment ethical and moral obligations provide a basis for the legitimacy of the 
governance system.  
(22) Exercise of Knowledge and intellect: knowledge is more than acquiring information; 
knowledge can be considered as a societal force embracing theory (belief system i.e. 
Islam), enlightenment (Spiritual), thought (philosophical and scientific), and society 
(educational), Rosenthal (2007). Therefore, knowledge system is vital to any governance 
system  
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Table 8.3: Proposed Hima (CBNR) legal framework based on Islamic principles 
 
Part I: Preamble:  
This includes an introduction, goals and objectives of Hima governance system for sustainable 
livelihood and based on the Principles in Table 8.2  
Part II: Definitions 
(a) Natural resources are considered to be public and owned by the State or the legitimate 
authority. 
(b) Natural resources include 
1. Water resources (surface and groundwater) 
2. Sources of Energy and 
3. Land resources including minerals, wastelands rangelands, woodlands and forests etc. 
 
Part II: Provisions for Right to use 
(a) Non-exclusive (open) and equitable access rights to public and common properties such as 
Hima land allocation for development system 
(b) Right to use natural resources can be given to individuals or legal entities. 
(c) Right in (b) is a restrictive right to use in accordance with public interest criterion 
 
Part III: General provisions for Private ownership 
(a) Private property right can be achieved by 8 mechanisms (al-Dibani, 1998): p.53): 
inheritance, compensations and trade-offs, gifts, will, benevolent, charity, war bounties and 
regenerated or revived (ihya) lands. Revived Lands can be owned after their allocation. 
(b) Chattel (movable) properties can be owned within Hima zones. 
(b) Private ownership of natural resources is limited by 
1. No waste/ conservation principle: Verily spendthrifts are brothers of the Evil Ones (17:27). 
2. It can be accumulated but spend it the way of Allah: “and those who treasure up gold and 
silver and expend them not in the way of Allah -announce thou unto them a torment afflictive 
(9:34) 
3. Taxes can be introduced on wealth accumulated by use of natural resources. 
 
Part IV: Provisions for Water use and ownership  
(a) Water is the source of life and equitable water rights for all (humans, animals and the 
environment) should be ensured. 
(b) Right of drink is recognised for humans and animals 
(b) Customary water rights are recognised including groundwater resources system. 
(d)Riparian water rights are recognised as priority of use. 
(e) Private groundwater rights to groundwater by owners  of private wells 
(f) Return river (excess) flows is publically owned and should not be stored and should be 
directed back to the river 
(h) Private water are water in private containers, treatment plants, distribution systems, and 
reservoirs (Kadori, 2001; Sabeq, 1981; Zohaili, 1997) 
(i) Private waters can be traded. Pricing is decided by market forces. No fix pricing except for 
the public interest criterion. 
(J) Right to thirst clause (b) implies that public drinking water installations for human and 
animal consumption can be built in Hima zones. 
(k) Aesthetics water needs should be established: three things bring joy to the eye sight: 
greenery, flowing streams and good looking humans (prophetic tradition,  e.g. al-Khashin, 
2004): 
1. Water for Green belts and parks 
2. Enough Water for rivers to keep their aesthetics or basic functions 
 
Next page continue 
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Table 8.3:  Proposed Hima Ethical legal framework  continue 
 
Part V. Provisions for Land use and ownership 
(a) publically owned land allocation system are: 
1.  Hima zone land allocation system is for sustainable development and conversation 
2.  Haram (boundary) sanctuaries can be established for source protection including rivers and 
wells 
3. Green spaces around populated areas in Hima zones  
 
(b) Privately owned land use systems are 
1.  Irrigated and dry farmland can be owned privately.  Sustainable agriculture is encouraged 
including farming and fruit growing: “Agriculture is the greatest treasure”  
2.  Ihaul-Mowat land allocation system is for development and the regenerated land can be 
owned privately.  
3. the provision in (2) is a restricted private ownership and is only provided if it is not 
neglected  
 
Part VI: Provisions for Environmental protections 
(a) Land resources  
1. Hima zones can be assigned as conservation zone if necessary and use rights can be 
restricted or prohibited for a prescribed time in exceptional circumstances such as droughts or i 
2.  During Easement and restricted right to use in Hima conservation zones is only established 
if there is no hardship to local community and general public and extensive damage to the 
environment.  
3.Haram (boundary) sanctuaries can be established for source protection including surface and 
groundwater resources. Landfills and sewage should be kept out of the sanctuaries. 
4.  Wild and planted trees and vegetation need to be conserved should be protected from 
deliberate fire or cuts. 
(b) Water resource  
1. No sewage should be dumped in streams, rivers and water bodies.  
2. No poisonous chemical should enter water resources 
3. Polluted water should not be used  as it is potentially a health hazard 
4. Groundwater resources to be protected from sewage and dumping sites 
5. River and sea coasts to be protected from human and animal sewage 
 
Part VII: Provisions for Natural resources management  
(a) Hima zones are managed by community based local institutions which are non- rigid self-
governing entities. The devolution is based on good governance principles.   
(b) Informal local institutions are nested within the institutional system to ascertain local needs 
and provide traditional and local knowledge systems for an effective management. 
(c) Research and development are undertaken to understand both local and scientific 
knowledge about Hima zones  
(c) Recognising adaptive (and demand) management: Principle of ‘Necessity’ Rules: new rules 
can be made according to new conditions 
(d) Management of the Hima zones are based on no hardship clause to allow for Social justice 
in addition to the conservation and protection of the natural resources.  
(e) International good practices and standards from conventions and treaties can be 
incorporated into Hima governance system. 
 (f) Monitoring Hima zones are supervised by the relevant authorities in cooperation with local 
administration. 
(h) Sanctions are based on Environmental sustainability and good governance principles 
should reflect local realties and social justice principles.    
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IUCN ‘s protected 
area 
Principles  (Dudley, 
2008) 
Contemporary CBNR 
Principles (Gruber, 2010) 
Some of the relevant Hima Governance 
principles  
1. Legitimacy and 
voice 
 
1. Public trust and legitimacy 1. Legitimacy and capacity development  
2. Subsidiarity 
 
2. Public participation and 
mobilization 
3. Devolution and 
empowerment 
4. Adaptive leadership and co-
management 
5. Participatory decision 
making 
2. consultation and community participation 
3. Devolution by recognition of the informal 
local institutions 
4. Recognising adaptive management: 
Principle of ‘Necessity’ Rules 
5. Consensus oriented 
3. Fairness 
 
6. Resources and equity 6. Principles of  policymaking ( Justice and 
equity and public interest 
4. Do no harm 
 
 7. No harm Principles  
8. No fassad (damage, corruption, pollution) 
5. Direction- clear 
vision  
 9. Hima Development Vision  
6. Performance 7.Social capital and 
collaborative partnerships 
10. Principles of  Integration and social 
cohesion 
7. Accountability 
 
8. Monitoring, feedback, and 
accountability 
11. Principle of Humans are Stewards 
8. Transparency 
 
9. Cmmunication and 
information dissemination 
12. Proclaiming the clear Message Principle 
9. Human rights 
 
 13. Holism principles 
14. No excessive use 
 10. Research and information 
development 
15. Principles of Exercise of Intellect 
(Knowledge acquisition) 
 11.Enabling environment: 
optimal preconditions or early 
conditions 
16. Collective action Principle 
17. Financial Sustainability Principle 
 12. Conflict resolution and 
cooperation 
18. Principles of reform, betterment of 
conditions and reconciliations and cooperation  
Table 8.4: Comparison of contemporary CBNR governance principles with Hima 
Governance system 
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8.6  Sustainable CBNR governance for Lake Urmia basin  
In Lake Urmia basin (LUB) case study, resource regime and property rights, 
monitoring system and environmental ethics are the determinant factors on the path to 
sustainability.  
It is proposed that the Hima governance system:  
· can directly deal with the use right issues; referring to Table 8.2, Hima legal 
framework provisions recognise a mixture of public-private water rights 
and use rights as shown in Table 8.3; 
· will foster collective choice arrangements which is also advocated as one of 
the eight design principles by Ostrom (2005) as a basis for establishing a 
viable monitoring system which is owned by local community and 
regulated by relevant authorities; and 
· can provide robust environmental ethics which have to be strengthened in 
LUB to bring about changes in attitudes and cultures.  
8.6.1 Strengthening environmental ethics 
Environmental policy debates are more or less about morality and ethics. Therefore, 
ethical consideration in land and water resources (natural resources) use and conservation 
(i.e. the environment as a whole) is vital for attaining sustainability criteria. This is 
important in persuading general public to comply with management strategies and create a 
basis for a participatory involvement of stakeholders which either have to be restricted or 
asked to pay for the upkeep of natural resources.  
The Islamic ‘green’ credential has earlier been demonstrated by noticing a close 
match between ecological laws and Islamic environmental ethics. Some Scholars such as 
Ibn Khaldon acknowledged that sustainable development is a condition for developmental 
needs in addition to advocating social harmony principles (e.g. Ra’ad, 1993). However, 
historically, sustainability has been overlooked by Muslim policymakers because political 
thinkers dominated the policy debate and they thought of political stability as a result of 
developmental works within equity principles. So the ethical approach to environment 
advocated by some Sufi writers such as Najmadin Razi was overlooked18. As shown in 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3, Hima governance framework represents a strong environmental ethics 
                                                 
18. As mentioned, Razi (1982) introduces the idea of ethics into activities such as farming and allowing a 
share for other creatures.  
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which is based on community’s belief systems and this can be used to strengthen 
environmental ethics in LUB within a capacity development strategy. 
8.6.2 Fostering collective choice arrangements and nested enterprises  
Referring to rule-obligation concept; rules-actors relationship can be visualised as a  
Rules-Actors Mesh (RAM) : the cells of a mesh are spatial representations of human’s 
action in space (action situations) and the threads represent the boundary and position rules 
that define human’s relationship with other action situations. The dynamics of the RAM 
process can be assessed by relating rules to the nature of the act (task, duty, obligation) 
itself which is prescribed to be sanctioned. In terms of community participation (i.e. 
farmers or their representative), it is not enough just to create a simple position rule of 
membership. In order to create the new position rules, a set of other rules has to be 
changed. With regard to the position rule, the fitness or the capacity of the actors is 
important as well the information that controls the action-outcome path.  
The RAM concept suggests three main interventions: (1) an information rule has to 
be created to increase the understanding about the underlying principles of the CBNR 
management process; (2) a payoff rule is needed to monitor the resource use and (3) a 
scope rule is needed to recognise the role of community of users including informal users. 
Giving a legal mandate to the community to participate in decisions about resource regime 
and property rights implies that actors who are affected by a resource regime can participate 
in modifying their rules. They are empowered to enter a decision making process (boundary 
rule) and decide on the resource regime (choice rules) and can monitor by applying the 
payoff rules.  
In terms of institutional design; the scale (boundary rule) of LUB with an area of 
52,000 Km2 is a very large action arena to coordinate a community-based management. 
Therefore, there are inter-boundary rules that have to be recognised: provinces, river 
watersheds, local village level and so forth. Lake Urima is engulfed by these boundaries as 
it lies to the downstream of each of the watersheds. This is advantageous since LU can 
become a central node on the RAM. As was shown in Chapter V, LU is a good 
environmental State/Impact indicator and hence can be the central theme for a monitoring 
system which is needed in any institutional design. Based on the RAM concept, the LUB 
Hima governance can have three levels of decision making: 
1. LUB Hima authority to oversee 31 watershed zones in LUB (17 permanent rivers and 
14 seasonal rivers ) 
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2. Catchment Hima authority to be managed collectively by representatives the 
communities in a river catchment  
3. local community Hima authorities are managed directly by the users  
There would be inter-boundary Himas and so there is a need for a LUB basin 
authority that sanctions rules on the allocation (choice) rules at watershed levels.  
Fostering water demand management and resource conservation. In Iran, every 
village has a council. Village Councils which are elected by the villagers can provide the 
legal base for local Hima authorities. A local Hima authority can be made up of several 
villages depending on the biophysical conditions of the natural resources system. Each of 
the local Hima will be responsible for the management of the area and accountable and 
have to monitor the status of the natural resources in accordance with the Lake Urmia as an 
ultimate criterion. Water demand management and resource conservation will be an 
important element in the strategy of Hima institutions. A network of smaller nested 
enterprises then will be able to deliver the plan of the EMP.  
 
8.7 Concluding remarks 
Contradictory to some popular belief, the hallmark of the Islamic legislative process 
has been its human dimension. A wealth of opinions has been reordered in different schools 
of thoughts. Azmi (2002) points out that the most important feature of Islamic law making 
is innovation or legal reasoning (Ijtihad). It can be concluded that Islamic principles are 
compatible with CBNR management and IWRM paradigms and provide a viable ethical 
governance framework.  
According to the rule-obligation theory in Fiqh, environmental policymakers can 
legitimise water demand policy based on the tolerable hardship criteria. Therefore, careful 
capacity development and empowerment is needed at community level to achieve the 
sustainability criteria.  
Hima governance seems to have a wide application in sustainable resource use 
based on demand management and conservation of natural resources in LUB, WANA 
region and beyond. This theoretical treatise should be tested in case studies and the scope of 
the research can be widened by considering other belief systems as all religions have 
similar value-laden principles. 
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Chapter IX. Lessons Learned, Conclusions and Recommendations for Further 
Research 
 
Figure 9.1: The environmental discourse is gaining more ground; the figure shows graphic 
designs by local artists to save LU (Source: Barzakh Cyber Magazine; available from  
http://www.barzakhmag.com/?p=1369) 
 
9.1 Introduction: restating the Aim and Objectives  
The scope of the PhD programme has focussed on developing a socio-technical 
framework for implementing the IWRM paradigm in general, and in Iran specifically, by 
considering the water allocation decision-making in Lake Urmia basin.  
Bearing in mind the financial and time constraints, eight objectives were identified as 
follows:   
1. To assess the applicability of IWRM through a critical analysis of the underlying 
principles, and to assess progress made with implementation (Chapter II); 
2. To develop an integrated methodological framework which can be used to 
implement the IWRM paradigm by integrating the elements of social and technical 
assessment (Chapter III); 
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3. To assess the status of progress towards implementing IWRM in Iran (Chapter IV); 
4. To assess the status of  water resources planning, management and allocation in the 
Lake Urmia Basin  (Chapter V); 
5. To make an integrated socio-technical assessment of the water resources availability 
for sustainable water allocation management in the Lake Urmia Basin, Iran (Chapter 
VI); 
6. To make a re-assessment of the institutional sustainability of the water allocation 
strategy in Lake Urmia basin. (Chapter VII); 
7. To develop an ethical and cultural framework that can provide a basis for good 
governance based on Islamic principles (Chapter VIII); 
8. To demonstrate the applicability of the overall framework through the Lake Urmia 
case study approach (Chapters VI - VIII)  
Chapter IX describes how each of the objectives have been realised which can be 
considered as a contribution to the advancement of IWRM theory and practice. In Section 
9.2, major conclusions and recommendations are outlined. The applicability of the overall 
Framework is discussed in Section 9.3 together with contributions of the work to scientific 
knowledge as well as dissemination of the research findings. Further work is discussed in 
Section 9.4 
 
9.2 Summary of major conclusions and recommendations 
9.2.1 Objective 1: Evolving the IWRM paradigm 
Need for socio-technical approach. It is argued that the IWRM normative package 
has very little to offer on implementation. New methodological frameworks are needed to 
enable the implementation of IWRM. The neglect of the institutional (socio-political) 
dimension has created a huge drawback in implementing the IWRM paradigm worldwide. 
Lack of implementation has been attributed to the gap between technical outcomes and 
policy decisions. Hence, there is a need to move from a technical to a socio-technical 
approach to bridge this gap.  
Need for paradigm shift. Chapter II shows that implementing sustainable land and 
water resources management poses five main challenges: (1) the integration of the complex 
and overlapping dimensions of water resource system; (2) dealing with the dynamism of 
the system; (3) measuring sustainability; (4) dealing with various levels of decision-making 
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(institutional levels) and ethics and values held by decision-makers; and (5) creating 
mechanisms for gaining participatory consensus.  
To deal with the above challenges, many scholars have called for a paradigm shift 
towards: 
· Consideration of full water cycle in IWRM i.e. Green Water and Grey 
Water concepts should be considered in IWRM plans (e.g. Falkenmark et al 
(2004), Falkenmark and Rockström (2006).  
· Virtual Water Trading (Zeiton et al 2010) can offer real alternative policy 
instruments to deal with water security (and scarcity).   
· Inter-linkage with land use management (e.g. Calder, 2004, 2005; 
Amezaga, 2005) 
· Adaptive management (e.g. Pahl-Wostl, 2007; 2009, Merrey, 2008)  
· A more politicised IWRM (e.g. Allan, 2003a; Merrey, 2008). 
· Mapping institutional elements beyond hydrological boundaries such as 
influential actors in the decision-making process (e.g. Merrey, 2008) 
· Social learning processes and multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) for 
effective engagement and participation of actors in the IWRM process (e.g. 
Warner, 2007) 
· Greater emphasis on culture and ethics ( e.g. Daniels and Endfield, 2009)  
However, it is argued that despite these conceptual constraints, IWRM is a relevant 
concept for addressing the ever increasing water management problems.  
9.2.2 Objective 2: developing an integrated methodological framework 
In Chapter III, an Integrated Socio-technical Framework has been developed to deal 
with the complexity of water resources systems and capture the diverse dimensions of 
Social-Ecological Systems. The adopted research design moves away from 
multidisciplinarity to interdisciplinarity by working at the interface of the physical and 
social sciences.  The Framework uses the Drivers-Pressures- States-Impacts-Responses 
(DPSIR) component as a platform for socio-technical analysis. The Outcomes of the 
DPSIR strategic assessment i.e. the Responses are then analysed using the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) and Integrated Socio-technical Assessment (ISTA) 
components comprising of modelling systems and Multi-Criteria Decision-Making 
(MCDA) tools.  
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The IAD component is the engine or the ‘motherboard’ which provides the linkages 
or points of interaction for different components of the Framework. While DPSIR provides 
a wider approach for analysing changes in the system, IAD provides the focal level for 
socio-technical analysis; thus presenting a robust and rigorous analytical component for 
implementing IWRM.  
Politicising IWRM through institutional analysis. There has been a call for 
politicising IWRM (e.g. Allan, 2003; Merrey, 2008). This has been done through the use of 
a politicised IAD approach. IAD has also been criticised for the inadequate handling of 
power issues and political interests within the institutional design (Clement, 2009). IAD has 
been used as the core institutional analytical tool in the Integrated Socio-technical 
Framework but complemented with the discourses and narratives behind the discourses that 
shape actors’ beliefs and mental models or perspectives. These Socio-political variables i.e. 
linguistic parameters have been incorporated since they are central to policy analysis and 
they emphasise the need for participatory decision-making involving all the three main 
participatory domains: citizens (or civil society), analysts (e.g. researchers) and decision-
makers (actors) to seek solutions outside the “water box” (WWAP, 2009).  
To deal with highly complex and polarised issues, narrative analysis (Roe , 1994) is 
used to provide a structured approach to establishing the problems or “Problem Statements” 
(PSs) and their causal relationships. This demonstrates how uncertain or how complex the 
issues are (Chapter VII) and how an alternative narrative policy is formed to enable us to 
understand better how arguments are articulated within a participatory decision-making 
process. 
Highlighting the role of Ethics. In addition to the contextual use of discourses in 
the institutional analysis, societal values and culture are taken into consideration by 
incorporating the Ethics component to provide perspectives or a mental model of actors 
shaped by the discourses. Ethics, which form part of the community attributes, are usually 
overlooked in the institutional analysis. This theme is highlighted through the work on 
Objective 7.  
Integrating synthesis. Unlike multidisciplinary research, the thesis aims to achieve 
interdisciplinarity by producing an “integrating synthesis” (Max-Neef, 2005) of the 
assessments. Therefore, we have to overcome language barriers between the physical and 
social sciences. It is not desirable to omit well-established terminologies used by the 
different disciplines but it is reasonable that they can be conceptualised so as to be 
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complementary to each other. The integrated synthesis of the assessments is presented 
within a contextual setting i.e. a unit of analysis which describes the relatively unchanged 
attributes of the water resources system including: 
· The geopolitical characteristics of the action arena  
· Actors or stakeholders 
· Community attributes  
· Socio-economic conditions 
· Biophysical conditions as an element in the IAD approach are enhanced to 
include not only institutional attributes but ecological, hydrological and 
hydraulic attributes of the water resources system.  
The interface between the four analytical components of the Framework is achieved by 
considering the Interaction-Outcome pathway in the action situation.  
9.2.3. Objective 3: Implementation of IWRM in Iran  
Chapter IV describes the move towards IWRM since the establishment of water 
governance in the 1940s. Iran has formally adopted IWRM since 2003 but the 
implementations have lagged behind. An overwhelming majority of water managers 
believe that there is a need for institutional reform but there is no consensus about the 
nature of the reforms (Source: Questionnaire Survey, Appendix A1). 
The DPSIR analysis at the national level has shown that, as a result of the 
historical economic growth Drivers, there are great pressures on the water resources both in 
terms of quality and quantity. Informal unauthorised abstractions for agricultural use have 
become an important common practice and account for nearly 11% of the total water use 
(nearly 10 BCM) of groundwater and about 50% of the surface waters. The use of water 
cannot easily be policed.   
Lack of consideration for environmental concerns has been noticed. The 1974 
Environmental Protection Act has not been updated and clearly, this cannot satisfy the 
environmental sector. A major shift occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s where the 
question of sustainability was highlighted, but the war-torn Iran embarked on more 
developments, and since 1989, has implemented four Five Year Development Plans 
(FYDPs).  
The institutional changes have been dramatic and progressive but have failed to 
completely tackle private water rights and enforce water laws. The evolving nature of water 
sector institutions shows that institutional equilibrium has not been reached. Since the 
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1990s, Iranian policymakers have been aware of climatic change as a major Driver and so 
embarked on a policy of executing basin-wide planning exercises. Water allocation has 
been a source of conflicts between different provinces. So the Iranian Ministry of Energy 
(MoE) has been trying to implement the 2003 Water Allocation Directive (WAD) which is 
based on basin-wide planning. The idea has not been welcomed at provincial level.   
Sign of paradigm shift. Senior managers and experts in the Office of Macro- 
Planning at MoE have come to the conclusion that dam-building as a Response to the 
Drivers in years gone by, has created unsustainable Pressures on the resources, as has 
happened in many other countries; hence the need for revised Responses based on IWRM 
principles to make a reassessment of the development programs. However, these decisions 
are solely political and the socio-political Pressures such as lobbying MPs, provincial 
governors and farmers have created a two tier discourse within MoE: the regional 
development discourse is favoured by Regional Water Companies and IWRMC, and the 
IWRM discourse is strongly advocated by some sections of MoE.  
Emergence of centralised water resources governance. There has been some 
success with regards to the control of groundwater resources. The 1982 Act required well 
owners to register their wells to provide them with permits. However, this controlling 
measure has been marred with over subscription of permits which has caused a great deal 
of problems. Groundwater resources are literally managed by farmers and well owners 
(Memari, 2006). MoE’s policy has been to bring some order to surface water management 
through the enactment of the 1982 Act. MoE overlooked groundwater and concentrated on 
controlling surface water by investing in dam-building and irrigation network projects. 
Some 90% of the investments has gone towards the projects (MoAJ, 2008), but, in the 
process, they have created more water rights, much tension among upstream and 
downstream stakeholders and lost some control to socio-political forces (MoE, 2010a).   
Need for reform. There is a consensus that there is a need for a better institutional 
design to cater for complex governance systems which exist within multilevel smaller 
nested agricultural enterprises. A community-based participatory water resources 
management approach has been advocated by most of the stakeholders in Lake Urmia basin 
(LUB) based on the social research conducted by the author.  
Data uncertainty. Lack of information about abstraction from rivers and streams 
and data uncertainty and lack of cooperation between provincial water companies have led 
to a lull in the progress of enforcing the IWRM strategy.  
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Water allocation is central to the implementation of IWRM. Therefore, Lake Urmia 
basin has been taken as a case study to show the applicability of the proposed Integrated 
Socio-technical Framework (Chapters V-VII). 
9.2.4. Objective 4: Towards Implementation of IWRM in Lake Urmia basin 
DPSR analysis 
In Chapter V, the DPSIR analysis has shown that, in Lake Urmia basin, most of the 
Pressures come from the agricultural sector in terms of increased agricultural demand 
driven by land use policy and the politics of irrigation. The developmental discourse is 
dominant and has had far reaching consequences for environmental degradation in terms of 
poorer water quality of rivers and loss of wetland areas as well as a huge drop in Lake 
Urmia’s water level. Informal and unauthorised abstractions have become an important 
norm with virtually no monitoring systems. Thus, a better institutional design is needed to 
cater for complex governance systems which exist within multilevel smaller nested farming 
enterprises. 
The institutional analysis has shown that the formal rules (1982 Act, 2003 WAD) 
have not been implemented in LUB due to several important factors including: 
· Lack of cooperation between Regional Water Companies (RWCs) and MoE 
on the one hand and MoE and IWRMC on the other hand i.e. internal 
conflicts within water resources organisations; 
· Lack of mechanisms to bridge the gap between 2003 Water Allocation 
Directive and established water allocation practices (pre 2003 era); 
· Lack of capacity building to institutionalise the new rules in RWCs; 
· Lack of inter-provincial cooperation in terms of water planning; 
· The impact of non-water legislations such as Five Year Development Plans 
(FYDPs) and provincial Development Directives on water resources 
planning  i.e. an FYDP is a project-driven plan and is different from an 
IWRM Plan. 
It can be concluded that the integrated analysis has shown that the present 
institutional set up has failed because it could not deal properly with an increased water 
demand from the agricultural sector. There is a need for re-orientation of the Lake Urmia 
basin water sector institutions so that it can deal with the pressures exerted on the system. 
However, any institutional design should consider the informal rules in use which have 
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been long practiced in Lake Urmia Basin. Therefore, a participatory water allocation 
process has been recommended. 
IWRM plan for Lake Urmia Basin. Article 67 of the fourth Five Year Development 
Plan (FYDP) initiated a move towards implementing an integrated ecosystem management 
plan for Lake Urmia. The Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP) was agreed by the 
stakeholders through the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Lake Urmia 
management. Earlier, in November 2007, a new institutional design was undertaken by 
creating several Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) i.e. working groups on water 
resources and agricultural management, biodiversity and public awareness issues. 
Window of opportunity. In March 2009, the author officially became the IWRM 
National Consultant for the Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project (CIWP) to facilitate 
the agreement on water allocation through the formation of the Water and Agriculture 
Working Group (WAWG). He has been given specific tasks in facilitating the Water and 
Agriculture Working Group meetings and the water allocation process. The new 
participatory approach to water allocation based on a new institutional design as provided a 
window of opportunity to apply the proposed Integrated Socio-technical Framework.   
9.2.5 Objective 5: Integrated socio-technical assessment (ISTA) for sustainable 
water allocation in Lake Urmia basin 
Chapter VI describes the new water allocation governance system in Lake Urmia 
basin based on the agreement among stakeholders to implement the Ecosystem 
Management Plan (EMP) through the establishment of multitier Multi-stakeholder 
Platforms (MSPs). The aim was to agree on a water allocation strategy for all the provinces 
and on allocating water to Lake Urmia. By using the ISTA component of the Integrated 
Socio-technical Framework comprising of two main elements, the author carried out an 
analysis of:  
a. the process whereby the actors made water allocation decisions; and 
b. the sustainability of the water allocation decisions.  
 The main conclusions are as follows: 
1. Environmental water rights. The new governance system provided water rights to 
Lake Urmia which can be considered as a considerable achievement for the 
environmental movement in Iran. 
2. Water availability is less than that adopted by actors using trend analysis. By 
establishing a regression relationship between runoff and rainfall over the period 
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1969 – 1994 when the influence of abstractions was minimal, average annual 
natural runoff over the period 1969 – 2010 was found to be approximately 5000 
MCM  whereas MoE (2010b) produced a value of 6927 MCM using a highly 
questionable Detrending Method. 
3. Unsustainable water allocation. In achieving Objective 5, it was concluded that 
the participatory process which has produced unsustainable water allocation 
outcome decisions has been marred by data uncertainty and ambiguity about 
scientific methodology. However, it has to be noted that the governance system 
and structure is in place for a re-evaluation of the decisions. 
4. Although the efficacy of the governance system has improved, the effectiveness of 
the EMP i.e. achieving long term sustainability of Lake Urmia , is in doubt, 
considering the agreement on a target water allocation of 3700 MCM, and what 
has emerged from the re-evaluation of overall water availability.  
5. Ignoring scientific knowledge. It seems that both sides of the water allocation 
equation have not fully considered a basin-wide planning approach that requires 
rigorous hydrological assessments of water availability and potential for water use. 
The implications of the water allocation decisions have not been foreseen by the 
actors. On the one hand, the user water allocation ceiling of 3700 MCM/year lacks 
rigorous scientific assessment, and on the other hand, the minimum ecological 
requirement of the lake has become a legal right which ignores the hydrological 
and climatic variability and persistence.   
6. No scope for further development. The current level of abstraction has been 
estimated to be approximately 2045 MCM/year, so, since the average annual 
natural runoff has been estimated as 5000 MCM there is no scope for further 
development/ abstraction if the lake is to receive its allocation of 3100MCM/year. 
7. The results support the concept of a minimum water requirement for Lake Urmia 
of about 3000 MCM. Given that the annual average natural runoff available is 
5000 MCM, and assuming that no further abstraction above 2045 MCM/year is 
allowed, this leaves about 3000 MCM/year for the Lake. 
8. Proposing adaptive water allocations based on stochastic modelling. Due to 
climatic variability, fixed allocations cannot be sustained, and so a risk analysis of 
a number of management scenarios was carried out using a stochastic ARMA (1,1) 
rainfall model to generate multiple realisations of future rainfall for different levels 
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of persistence/variability. The management scenarios were based on fixed target 
allocations of 3700 MCM and 2900 MCM so an adaptive allocation strategy (a 
form of demand management) was explored whereby sliding scale reductions to 
abstractions were made when the lake levels fell below warning and critical levels. 
Mild, moderate and strong levels of reduction were explored under different levels 
of rainfall variability. The results of the risk-based analysis showed that the 
moderate and strong adaptive options can initiate Lake Urmia recovery but only if 
the abstraction target is much lower than 3700 MCM. It was shown that, at a target 
abstraction rate of 2900 MCM, the moderate management option is effective in 
delivering the amount of water to the lake needed to maintain the minimum 
ecological requirement (3100 MCM/year) based on the vision stated in the EMP 
Independent scientific assessment needed. The results of the reassessment 
highlight three main issues: (a) the need for independent scientific assessment based on 
rigorous reliable data; (b) the revision of the existing water allocation rules i.e. the 2008 
WAC; although, the 2008 WAC has introduced basin-wide planning, it has a rigid scientific 
approach and uses highly unreliable methodology in assessing water availability and (c) the 
outcome of the WAC process is unrealistic as it ignores demand management which is one 
of the cornerstones of IWRM. To redress this, the reassessment calls for an adaptive water 
allocation strategy which is a form of demand management which, together with basin- 
wide water use efficiency measures, is required to achieve long term sustainability.  
Therefore, the following recommendations are made: 
1. A thorough review of the hydrological and climatic baseline data to remove much 
of the uncertainty about the water allocation governance.  
2. Modification of the 2008 Water Allocation Code by (a) by removing the Detrending 
Method in the estimation of the water availability for the basin since it produces a 
highly overestimated value of natural runoff; (b) allowing other MCDA approaches 
other than AHP to minimise the inconsistency about weighting water allocation 
criteria; and (c) using a stochastic approach in the water allocation strategy since 
trend analysis is highly unreliable and cannot account for the persistence and 
variability of rainfall records. 
3. Vensim dynamic simulation has to be calibrated with more sophisticated generic 
water resources modelling systems such as WEAP, Mike Basin or RIBASIM. 
4. Implementation of water use efficiency measures.  
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9.2.6 Objective 6: Institutional sustainability of water resource governance   
Chapter VII makes (a) an analysis of the institutional sustainability of the new 
governance system i.e. the MSPs; (b) evaluates the implications of adopting the adaptive 
water allocation approach and (c) proposes revised Responses for sustainable management 
of water resources in Lake Urmia basin.  
In Chapter VII, first, the efficacy of new operational level rules in use is assessed. 
It is concluded that the successful conclusion of the WAWG meetings can be attributed to 
the ability and the flexibility to craft new rules at the local level (operational level) 
entrusted in the 2010 NEC bylaw. Law-making is a long process; an Act of Majlis can take 
decades to be ratified. Council of Ministers’ By-laws can take years to be approved. 
Therefore, to address immediate operational level needs, this mechanism can be very 
effective. 
Secondly the mental models and perspectives of the actors within the evidence-
based decision-making process were analysed. This provides an understanding of how 
discursive deliberations are used by the actors. There is a strong evidence of the influence 
of “invisible” or ‘hidden’ actors (mainly career bureaucrats, and officials and advisors of 
governmental departments) in crafting alternative policies and proposing solutions to policy 
problems. The presence of these actors was manifested in the presence of Water Policy and 
Allocation Commission (WPAC) and the Iran Water Resources Management Company 
(IWRMC) in the Working Group (i.e. WAWG) meetings dictating how information and 
knowledge is used in the decision-making process 
Thirdly, by examining the narratives told by the actors and participants, it is noted 
that Lake Urmia is not clearly on the mental map of the provincial actors and some of 
national actors. Therefore, the Working Group (i.e. WAWG) meetings embarked on a 
difficult task to put Lake Urmia on the ‘issues map’ and making it central to any water 
allocation in the basin. The momentum of the participatory process was maintained by high 
political support. It can be concluded that there are many loops in the arguments and the 
actors have no idea how to implement a win-win strategy to save the lake.  
Fourthly, discourse analysis shows how different discourses made actors to have 
multiple perspectives with regards to the issues of concern or solutions to stop the demise 
of Lake Urmia. The diverging cross-sectoral multiple perspectives need to be harmonised 
to establish a common understanding between national and provincial actors.  
Based on the discourse analysis, major recommendations are as follows: 
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· To incorporate  environmentally friendly clauses in a revised water law since  
there are no explicit provisions of environmental water allocation in the existing 
water Act (i.e.1982 FWD Act) 
· To strengthen the environmental discourse (Figure 9.1) by scientific arguments 
rather than alarmist activism which has characterised Iranian environmental 
movement; this will help to gain political support and provide an alternative 
meta-narrative on the environment.  
· Reconciling national vs. local interests. The hidden perspective of MoE is that 
local short-termism is not compatible with long term national interests. There is 
a need to reconcile this mismatch. The Iranian policymakers have made water 
allocation a centralised ‘national’ issue (MRC, 1995) and, according to MRC 
(1995), any change in policy will create vulnerability and cause damage to the 
national interest. The local needs can be met by allowing the regions to continue 
with the “desired local development” and this offers incentives for local 
aspirations. Small dams and irrigation projects can be used to satisfy local 
demands and the water budget can be used to allocate water from groundwater 
resources for local demand sites (industrial, agricultural and so forth). The 
recommendation made by the parliament in this report (i.e. MRC, 1995) can 
explain the drive to over-exploit groundwater resources (See Chapter IV for a 
national picture). The legacy has come about because water allocation is 
detached from local attributes and seen as a national security issue.  
· To rectify mismatches in the national IWRM Plan which is based on more 
surface water for irrigation i.e. the 2003 Strategic Water Resources Planning 
Bylaw endorsees more surface water irrigation development so there is a need to 
rectify this imbalance  
· Reviving traditional water governance such as the qanat system has been 
identified as a key management option for the future 
Towards modernity. Next, we have demonstrated that there has been a paradigm shift in 
Iran and there are signs that Iran is moving towards a reflexive modernity paradigm as 
illustrated by the Lake Urmia case study. Iran’s route is somehow different form the 
North’s route depicted by Allan (2005).Political instability and short term interests of 
political actors are instrumental in striving toward sustainability. These will hamper any 
attempts towards implementing IWRM in Iran. 
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Institutional analysis. Finally, the institutional sustainability of the governance 
system has been analysed and some recommendations have been made i.e. new Responses 
have been suggested. First, the design principles have been reviewed; then 
recommendations have been made for the adoption of adaptive water allocation. 
Re-thinking design principles. One of the major findings is that the empirical 
evidence from the Lake Urmia basin case study showed that the original eight design 
principles developed by Ostrom (2005; 2011) and verified by Cox et al (2009) are not 
enough for the institutional sustainability of large river basins with complex Social- 
Ecological Systems. The findings support Imperial’s (2009) suggestion to include 
additional principles to attain institutional robustness. It is recommended to include new 
design principles including: 
1. To develop trust across organisations 
2. To develop shared definition and understanding 
3. To recognise mutual interests 
4. To maintain  the balance of power among stakeholders 
5. To employ a wide range of policy instruments (management options) 
6. it is argued that we have to create structural mechanisms to bring into the 
picture the issue of unauthorised abstractions  
 The implication of adaptive water resource governance. Adaptive water resources 
governance may be established as part of proposed revised Responses that may have the 
following elements: 
(a) Collective Choice Arrangements: most of the participants felt that community-
based water and land governance system can help to achieve the objectives of water 
allocation strategy as there is a high level of informal and unauthorised abstractions i.e. 
without community support, the adaptive management approach cannot be put into practice 
(Appendix A, Table A1.4). Local political support is vital and so the community level 
representations should be enhanced by including civil society and NGOs. Incorporating 
local nested enterprises by recognising the informal institutions and their knowledge 
systems seems to be necessary to implement the EMP. Bringing the informal institutions 
into the formal set up can be achieved gradually through the social learning processes and 
adaptive management practices.   
(b) Monitoring: is non-existent. Most of the participants felt that monitoring should 
be done by an independent organisation. Monitoring system is required not just to monitor 
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water inflow into the lake, but also to reflect the adaptive nature of water allocation under 
different climatic conditions. Monitoring system can be part of a Drought Risk 
Management (DRM) plan which is an integral part of the EMP and should be seen as a 
major component which has a bearing on water allocation among provinces and different 
uses and sectors. However, the cost of monitoring has to be taken into account. 
(c) Revising the Ecosystem Management Plan (EMP). The EMP understandably 
concentrates on Lake Urmia water rights and its management. However, the EMP’s scope 
has to be widened to consider the whole basin based on river catchment governance. The 
EMP has achieved its goal to put Lake Urmia’s water rights on the water resources 
planning map. But now it has to be streamlined with river basin planning which requires a 
wider vision. The effectiveness of the EMP is in doubt if the recommendations in Chapter 
VI are not dealt with (see Objective 5) 
(d) Incorporating demand management within wider management options. The 
participants were not just happy about saving the lake but wanted to have more policy 
options including implementing structural and non-structural responses. For example, 
‘saving the lake’ was considered as one of the management options.  Therefore, the demand 
management proposal in the 2010 NEC Bylaw has to be streamlined with local 
development drives. The Bylaw offers incentives for water saving activities. For example, 
nearly $US5,000,000 has been allocated for implementing water use efficiency projects, in 
the process 50% of the cost of upgrading irrigation technology (20,000,000 Riyals= 
US$2000) per ha to be given to farmers; and the other 50% is to be provided by bank loan 
facilities. Based on the results from the ISTA component (Chapter VI), a water demand 
management approach has to be a key to any strategy for sustainable water use in the basin. 
(e) Graduated sanctions. Ostrom (2005) reports that many self-organising systems 
use graduated sanctions against those who break rules. Involving farmers in the collective 
choice arrangements (i.e. decision-making process) may enhance mutual monitoring and 
better compliance. So far this element has been missing from the institutional reform. 
Informal or unauthorised abstractions have been highlighted in the 3rd and 4th NEC Meeting 
Directives. This level of monitoring is very difficult to police. Therefore, it is argued that 
smaller watershed units should be considered in the institutional design as there are about 
31 river catchments in the basin. This level of monitoring requires community based water 
and land governance. This theme has been dealt with in Objective 7 (Chapter VIII). 
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9.2.7 Objective 7: an Ethical legal framework for good governance   
In Chapter VIII we established a clear link between land and water resources and 
thus the term natural resources has replaced the term land and water. This chapter fulfils 
Objective 7 of the research by using Islamic environmental Ethics to develop the principles 
and legal framework for a Hima community-based natural resources (CBNR) governance 
system.  
The analysis in Chapters IV-VII has shown that there is paradigm shift towards 
community based governance and this has been recommended by many participants since 
the livelihood issues need to be considered. A general consensus was that ethical and 
cultural aspects of the community have to be considered. The normative format of ethics is 
not enough. These norms and principles have to be translated into practical rules in use.  
Chapter VIII highlights that Islamic legal theory is a powerful approach to translate 
Islamic environmental ethics into practical governance rules (Jenkins, 2005). Some 
examples of the use of Islamic environmental ethics have been noted in parts of Africa and 
Asia. Therefore, it is argued that the Hima concept is relevant in modern times.  
Islamic legal theory provides a framework for understanding  the action-actor 
relationship as a basis for legitimacy and enforcement of the rule of law. A legitimate rule 
should satisfy the criteria of no hardship, ability to understand and capacity to perform 
according to the rule. Legitimacy is then a measure of the successful implementation of the 
CBNR management plans i.e. the efficacy of a governance system is a measure of its 
legitimacy. Therefore, careful capacity development and empowerment is needed at the 
lowest level of decision-making (i.e. community-based) to achieve institutional efficacy i.e. 
community based governance will foster legitimacy by improving the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of the administrations.   
The proposed Hima governance system consists of: 
1. The principles of Hima governance which refer to the constitutional governance 
level are divided into four broad categories fulfilling the three objectives of the 
Hima approach: social cohesion, sustainable resource use and environmental 
protection. It is concluded that Islam provide a coherent set of principles for an 
equitable and sustainable use and management of natural resources and is 
comparable to (a) the nine contemporary CBNR governance principles presented by 
Dudley (2008) representing IUCN’s guidelines on protected areas and (b) twelve 
organisational principles based on a survey of latest research (Gruber, 2010). 
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2. The Ethical legal framework for a Hima governance system which refers to a 
collective choice governance level is derived from Islamic legal theory. This 
describes the journey of translating the principles into strategies and normative 
rules. 
On Islamic environmental ethics, it is postulated that   
· Environmental policy debates are more or less about morality and ethics. 
Therefore, ethical consideration in land and water resources use and 
conservation (i.e. the environment as a whole) is vital for attaining 
sustainability criteria.  
· The Islamic ‘green’ credential has earlier been demonstrated by noticing a 
close match between ecological laws and Islamic environmental ethics. 
· The Hima governance framework represents a strong approach to 
environmental ethics which is based on the community’s belief systems and 
this can be used to strengthen environmental ethics in Lake Urmia basin 
within a capacity development strategy.      
· the Hima concept will foster collective choice arrangements and nested 
enterprises based on the legitimacy framework provided by Islamic legal 
theory 
Proposed Responses for Lake Urmia basin. There are two important issues in 
contemporary CBNR that have to be well defined: property rights and right of use. In Lake 
Urmia basin, resource regime and property rights, a monitoring system, and environmental 
ethics are the determinant factors on the path to sustainability.  
It is proposed that the Hima governance system:  
· can directly deal with the right of use issues; the Hima legal framework 
provisions recognise a mixture of public-private water rights and use rights  
· will foster collective choice arrangements which are also advocated as one 
of the eight design principles by Ostrom (2005) as a basis for establishing a 
viable monitoring system which is owned by the local community and 
regulated by relevant authorities; and  
· can provide robust environmental ethics which have to be strengthened in 
LUB to bring about changes in the attitudes and cultures.    
Hima governance which is based on ethical community -based natural resources 
management seems to have a wide application in sustainable resource use and the 
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conservation of natural resources in LUB, the WANA region and beyond. This theoretical 
treatise should be tested in case studies and the scope of the research can be widened by 
considering other belief systems as all religions have similar value-laden principles. 
 
9.3  Applications of the Framework 
9.3.1 A reflection 
The integrated methodological approach provides an innovative analytical 
framework to understand the discursive deliberations in a complex Social-Ecological 
system heightened by (1) scientific uncertainty over climate variability and change and (2) 
dynamic institutional transformation and evolution. 
To work at the interface of social and physical sciences, the linguistic attributes and 
language barriers have to be well understood in order to be able to navigate through 
multiple approaches and concepts. The social-physical discipline divide and critical 
inquires about the nature of the epistemological1 aspect of the interdisciplinary research 
should be treated with care and due diligence and should not be treated as naïve 
expectations from single discipline research. The points of interaction and linkage have to 
be found to present a coherent integrating synthesis as well as preserving the internal 
consistency of the methodological framework.  
The proposed Framework is characterised by coherency and internal consistency to 
make it a powerful analytical approach to resolving water resources problems. For example, 
IWRM as a conceptual framework has a strong institutional (decision-making) orientation; 
the DPSIR component provides logical sequential linkage to the issues and problems facing 
a water resources system and can be used to describe the institutional change and evolution 
over time; and IAD component is used to make an ex-post analysis of the Responses 
element of the DPSIR.  
Although the methodological approach has been useful in integrating the complex 
and overlapping dimensions of the water resource system and the dynamics of the evolution 
of non-structural Responses (policy options) i.e. providing a study of change and 
institutional dynamism, it can be further improved. The combined DPSIR-IAD approach 
can be considered as the core analytical framework. There is a possibility to incorporate 
different analytical tools in the proposed Framework.  
                                                 
1 Epistemology is the branch of philosophy of science that study the nature of knowledge, its scope and 
validity i.e. how we find reality  
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Although the Framework has captured certain characteristics of the Interaction-
Outcome pathway, it could not provide a thorough basis for analysis. With reference to the 
Lake Urmia basin, for example, the results have shown the interplay of various policy-
making actors, the presence of hidden actors as well as group formation and coalition 
buildings in the negotiations. Therefore, it is suggested that other institutional and policy 
analysis tools can be considered to capture different aspects of the multi-level complex 
action situation. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999) 
may be used to assess the inter-personal competitions and group formations by provincial 
actors which showed a degree of aggregation in decision-making patterns. Similarly, the 
Multiple-Streams Framework (Kingdon, 2003) can give an insight into how different 
streams of actors work together if a window of opportunity arises in the form of MSPs. 
Also, the ISTA component may also be modified to accommodate the requirement of 
different action situations.  Therefore, as a pioneering work, the Framework has to be tested 
in different action situations to develop a more robust theoretical basis.  
Also, we have to recognise the limitations of the different components used in the 
analysis. In Chapter III we have dealt with the criticisms made on the use of the DPSIR for 
not being “a tool for generating neutral knowledge” (Svarstad et al , 2008). However, in 
Chapter III, the ontological and epistemological approach of the research design has been 
clearly outlined.   
The IWRM is a global concept. Therefore, the developed Integrated Socio-technical 
Framework has a universal dimension, and it could be applied in any developing or even 
developed countries. Hence, the degree of transferability of the methodological framework 
is very high. However, due to the physical and financial limitations, only an Iranian case 
study has been considered. The Framework has to be refined and tested in more case 
studies.   
9.3.2 Contribution of the research: from research to policy briefs 
Researchers as facilitators. In Iran and worldwide, numerous researchers are 
involved in a variety of IWRM research themes, but their efforts are dispersed and there is 
a lack of communication between different research groups as well as between policy -
makers and the research communities. A dialogue between the research communities and 
stakeholders is essential to create a platform for a wider dialogue among policy makers, the 
scientific community and the public at large (Hashemi and O’Connell, 2011). This work 
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has contributed to the notion that researchers can become facilitators in difficult public 
policy debates and create a foundation for participatory decision-making processes.    
The PhD work contributes to greater understanding of real world action research 
on water allocation governance through the work on the Lake Urmia case study led by the  
UNDP/GEF Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project (CIWP). In the context of this PhD 
work, the real world research is concerned with (a) involvement in, improvement and 
broadened understanding of the water allocation decision-making process; (b) evaluating 
the outcome of the decisions using analytical components; and (c) studying change where 
there is concern for actions. 
The author was involved in the consultation and implementation of multitier Multi-
Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) which opened unique windows of opportunity to test the 
innovative methodological framework. Also, the author has experienced a transformation in 
his role and status by holding multiple positions as a researcher, facilitator, actor and 
advisor. 
Development of methods for institutional analysis. In addition to developing a 
pioneering work towards the implementation of IWRM, the research has contributed to the 
Newcastle Institute for Research on Environmental Sustainability’s (NIReS) and the School 
of Civil Engineering and Geosciences’ line of research on methods for institutional analysis 
which has previously been applied in the land and water policy process in India, Vietnam 
and Spain. This thesis has developed further the methodological innovation produced by 
Clement (2009). This work was presented in the 6th International conference of 
Environmental Futures session led by Professor Elinor Ostrom (2005, 2011) who won a 
Nobel Prize for economic sciences in 2009 on her works related to the IAD namely “"for 
her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons"
2. 
Policy briefs for regional and global initiatives.  The PhD work has been linked to 
international and regional initiatives including  
· United Nations University- Institute for Water and Environmental Sciences (UNU-
IWES) in Dubai.  
· WANA Forum, Jordan 
· World Justice Forum (WJF), New York 
                                                 
2 Deatails can be found on the official site of  the Swedish Academy of Sciences: 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/press.html 
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The author has made several contributions on water scarcity policy and Hima 
governance for the West Asia and North Africa (WANA) Forum. Furthermore, a proposal 
was presented at the Third World Justice Forum meeting in Barcelona to foster community- 
based governance with an emphasis on Rule of Law. The work will also form the basis of 
the  Hima Global Initiative to be launched in May 2012. The author is involved currently in 
writing the proposal for this Global Hima Initiative.  
Contribution to the national IWRM project in Iran. The author has been involved 
on an informal basis with Updating the Water Master Plan-IWRM Project at the Office of 
Macro Planning at the Ministry of Energy. The office of Applied Research at IWRMC has 
also supported the PhD work and the author has worked with its various departments. 
Additionally, the author organised four workshops (8 days in total as described in 
Appendix A1) to introduce IWRM and institutional aspects to senior water sector 
managers. He also contributed to three national conferences on the theme of IWRM and its 
implementation in Iran which is described in the next sub-section.  
9. 3.3  Disseminations of the results  
Research findings and results were disseminated through international and national 
conferences and workshops as well the publication of two chapters in a book. The details 
are as follows:  
Two chapters in the Handbook of Research in Hydroinformatics 
1. Hashemi, M. and O’Connell, P.E. (2011a). Historical perspectives: from hydrological 
models to decision support systems (DSSs). In. Gasmelseid, T. (ed.). Handbook of 
Research on Hydroinformatics: Technologies, Theories and Applications, 
USA/Hershey PA: IGI Global. 
2. Hashemi, M. and O’Connell, P.E. (2011b). Science and Water Policy Interface: An 
Integrated Methodological Framework for Developing Decision Support Systems 
(DSSs). In. Gasmelseid, T. (ed.). Handbook of Research on Hydroinformatics: 
Technologies, Theories and Applications, USA/Hershey PA: IGI Global. 
Seven international conference papers (oral presentation with the papers or abstracts 
being published in the proceedings or available online) 
3.  2011: An Integrated Socio-technical and Institutional Framework for Sustainable 
Water Allocation Decisions in Lake Urmia Basin (LUB). Paper presented at 6th 
International Conference on Environmental Futures 18 - 22 July 2011 Newcastle 
University, England. 
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4. 2010:  A Socio-technical Framework for Implementing the Integrated Water 
Resources Management (IWRM) Plan in Lake Urmia Basin, Iran. Paper presented 
at the International Symposium of BHS, 19-23 July, Newcastle upon Tyne, England 
5. 2009: A Strategic Framework for Institutional Capacity Building in the MENA 
Region: Cultural and Ethical Context. Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Capacity Building in Urban Water Management Under Water 
Scarcity Condition, 13 - 15 December Muscat, Sultanate of Oman.  
6. 2007:  Sustainable Water Policy in Arid regions: Ethical Dimension. The 4th 
UNESCO International Conference on Wadi Hydrology, Muscat Oman December 
2007.    
7.  2007: Urban Water Management: need for institutional reforms. UNESCO 
International Symposium on New Direction in Urban Water Management, Paris, 
France, September 2007.    
8. 2007:  Water Policy in Iran: an ethical Dimension. UNESCO/ISESCO/ UWMRC 
International Conference on Water Resources management in the Islamic Countries, 
Tehran Feb 2007.  
9. 2006: Institutional Aspects of Integrated Coastal Zones Management: Case study 
Lake Urmia. 7th International Conference on Coasts, Ports and marine Structures 
ICOPMAS, Nov 2006, Tehran.   
Three papers at National Conferences 
10. 2010: A Framework for Re-assessing the IWRM Paradigm: A New National 
Strategy for Research. Paper presented at the 1st National Conference on Natural 
Resources, September 2010. 
11. 2010:  A New Hydroinformatics paradigm to Attain Science and Water Policy 
Interface. Paper presented at the 1st Iranian national Conference on Applied 
Research in Water Resources, Kermanshah, 13-15 May 2010 
12. 2006: The Importance of Institutional Dimension in Integrated Urban Water 
Management and Urbanization in the Lake Uromiyeh Basin: The Role of 
Stakeholder participation. 1st National Conference on Urban development, 
Sanandaj, Iran, December 2006.  
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Five contributions to Policy briefs for West Asia and North Africa (WANA) Forum and 
World Justice Forum workshops 
13. Evolving the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) Paradigm: 
Reassessing  the underline policy assumption 
14. Science-Water Policy Interface: An integrated methodological framework to deal 
with water scarcity in WANA region 
15. Allocating Environmental Water requirements of Lake Urmia, Iran: an 
Ecohydrological Approach 
16. Principles of Hima Governance: a Community-Based Natural Resources 
Management (CBNRM) System 
17. A Social Model towards WANA Union: An Islamic Governance Perspective on 
Non-sectarian  policy for Social Cohesion 
Six discussion and resource papers for Conservation of Iranian Wetlands project (CIWP) 
18. Discussion paper series 1: Sustainable Agriculture: true or myth 
19. Discussion paper series 2:Analysis report: Comparative study of Salt lakes: putting 
more salt into the Lake 
20. Discussion paper series 3: Irrigation Pricing 
21. Discussion paper series 4: Droughts in the LU basin: concepts, Issues, challenges 
and methodologies: to develop Drought Risk Management (DRM) Plan 
22. Resource paper 1: Principles of Designing & Developing an Integrated Modelling 
System (Decision Support System, DSS) for Lake Urmia Basin 
23. Resource paper 2: Lake Urmia Basin DSS( LUB DSS): Design and Development 
Plan 
 
9.4      Further works  
There has been a call for a paradigm shift and this necessitates a call for an 
integrated international strategy for research into IWRM that can cater for the required 
paradigm shift and the change of boundaries of research inquiries. For example, the 
inclusion of Green Water (Objective 1, Chapter II) requires better understanding of the 
physical processes. Therefore, much greater emphasis should be placed on our 
understanding of the physical processes. As shown by the controversy over water 
availability in Lake Urmia, there is a need to come up with technical methods that can 
accurately reflect the physical processes (Hashemi and O’Connell, 2011b).  
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With reference to Lake Urmia basin, more research on climate change is needed 
since natural climatic variability and human-induced climate change and their interaction 
are not well defined. Therefore, this theme requires much more attention since higher 
climatic variability is expected in future climates. The climate change discourse which 
dominates the MoE perspective (see e.g. Attarzadeh, 2009; MoE, 2010b) is misleading 
since it overemphasise ‘natural’ droughts as the main cause of Lake Urmia’s demise and in 
the process giving a wrong signal to the provincial stakeholders about the importance of the 
human induced impacts such as water utilisation and abstraction and global warming. For 
example, many politicians in the provinces easily dismiss the importance of the impact of 
dam-building and abstractions on the Lake. Therefore, there is a need for more rigorous 
research on topic of climate change in Lake Urmia basin to deal with the knowledge 
uncertainty. Furthermore, groundwater resources did not enter the debate and this represent 
a major gap in the water allocation governance system in LUB. Chapters VII provides a 
detailed proposal for institutional design (i.e.revised Responses) to be considered in further 
works. Chapter VIII present a proposal for Hima CBNR governance system. Also, further 
work is needed on: 
· How the water-food-energy nexus will affect the water sector after the introduction of 
economic reforms set out by the 5th FYDP (2011-2015)? 
· How to establish a monitoring system which is needed to monitor outcomes and to re-
evaluate the water allocation process? 
· How to design an institutional mechanism to make a proper independent technical 
review or re-evaluation of water allocation decisions? 
· How to prepare a strategic plan to assess baseline data as a prerequisite for further 
work since publically available reliable data are the backbone of any further research? 
· How to establish a viable water allocation governance system by considering water 
user associations (WUA) and other informal local institutions i.e. how to formulate 
community based governance systems? 
· How to link water allocation and sustainable water use to the provincial land and water 
planning process i.e. how to achieve sustainable agriculture by applying water saving 
and water use efficiency measures? 
· How can water allocation go through the politics of the decentralisation process e.g. 
how to bring local actors into the formal institutional set up?  
References 
 
316 
REFERENCES 
Abbaspour, M. and Nazaridoust, A. (2007). Determination of environmental water requirement of Lake 
Urmia, Iran: an ecological approach. International Journal of Envirnmental studies, 64(2), 161-169. 
Abbasi-Shavazi, M.J. (2002). Recent changes and the future of fertility in Iran. Paper presented at the Expert 
Group Meeting on Completing the Fertility Transition, at United Nations Headquarters in New York, from 
11-14 March 2002, the United Nations Population Division (UNPD).  
Abbott, G.C. (1971). A Re-examination of the 1929 Colonial Development Act. The Economic History 
Review, 24 (1), 68–81. 
Abbott, M. B. (1991). Hydroinformatics. UK /Aldershot: Avebury Technical. 
Abderrahman, W.A. (2002). Water Demand Management and Islamic Water management Principles: A case 
study. Water Resources Development, 16 (4), 465-473. 
Abu-Izzedin, F. (2004).Traditional Systems of Land-Use in the Middle East: The Hima System and Mountain 
Terraces. In: de Merode, E., Smeets, R. and Westrik, C. (eds.). Linking Universal and Local Values: 
Managing a Sustainable Future for World Heritage (pp.99-90), World heritage papers: 13UNESCO, Paris 
Adam, B.(2007). The Creation of an Environmental Conscience. Retrieved December 1, 2007, from 
http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/366/viewall. 
Afary, J. (1991). Peasant Rebellions of the Caspian Region during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 
1906-1909. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23 (2), 137-161. 
Agyemang, I.,McDonald, A. and Carver, S. (2008). Application of the DPSIR framework to environmental 
degradation assessment in northern Ghana. Natural Resources Forum, 31(3), 212-225. 
Ahmad, K. (1994). Economic development in an Islamic framework. Leicester/UK: The Islamic Foundation. 
Ahmadian, A. (2002). The Character of the second Caliph of Islam: Omar Bin Khatab. Saqez/ Iran 
Mohammadi Publishing Institute [in Persian]. 
Ahmadipour, Z. and Mansorian, A.R. (2006). Admistrative divisions and political instability in Iran 1906- 
1978. Geopolitics Quarterly, 2(1), 62-89 [In Persian]. 
Alaerts, G.J. & Kaspersma J.M. (2009). Progress and challenges in knowledge and capacity development. In 
Blokland, M.W., Alaerts, G.J. Kaspersma, J.M. and Hare, M. (eds.).Capacity development for improved water 
management (pp. 3-30), UNESCO-IHE & UNW-DPC.  
Allan, J.A. (1997). Virtual Water: A long term solution for water short Middle Eastern economies?  Water 
Issues Group, School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London. 
Allan, J.A. (2003a). Integrated Water Resources Management is more a Political than a Technical Challenge. 
In: Alsharhan, A.S. and Wood W.W. (eds.). Water Resources Perspectives: Evaluation, Management and 
Policy, (pp. 9-23), Netherlands/Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Allan, J.A. (2003b). Virtual water - the water, food and trade nexus: useful concept or misleading metaphor? 
Water International, 28, 4-11. 
Allan, J.A. (2005). Water in the environment/socio-economic development discourse: sustainability, changing 
management paradigms and policy responses in a global system. Government and Opposition, 40 (2), 181-
199. 
Almasvandi, A. (2010). Challenges of the country’s water sector. Iran/Tehran: Water Resources Management 
Company [in Persian].  
Al-Alwani, T.J. (2003). Source methodology in Islamic jurisprudence. Third edition, UK/London: The 
International Institute of Islamic Thought. 
Al-Alwani, T.J. (2005). Objectives ‘Maqasid’ of Sharia. Lebanon/ Beirut: Daralhadi Publishing and 
Distribution [in Arabic]. 
Ammentorp, H.C. (2001). Application of MIKE BASIN to Nakanbé Catchment. Paper presented at the 4th 
DHI Software Conference, 6-8 June 2001, Helsingør, Denmark. 
References 
 
317 
Amezaga, J.M. (2005). Inter-Institutional links in land and water management. In Anderson, M.G.and 
McDonnell, J.J (eds.).Encyclopaedia of Hydrological Sciences (pp. 3003-3012), 5-Volume Set. England/ 
West Sussex: John Wiley and Sons.  
Amjad, U.Q. (2006). A System of Innovation? Integrated Water Resources Management complemented with 
coevolution: examples from Palestine and Israeli joint water management. World Futures- Journal of General 
Evolution, 62, 157-170. 
Ananda, J. and Herath, G. (2009). Methods: A critical review of multi-criteria decision making methods with 
special reference to forest management and planning. Ecological Economics, 68, 2535–2548. 
Andreu, J., Capilla, J. and Sanchis, E. (1991). AQUATOOL. A computer assisted support system for water 
resources research management including conjunctive use. In: Loucks, D.P. and da Costa, J.R. (eds.). 
Decision Support Systems (pp. 333–55). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Anthwal, A. Gupta, N., Sharma, A., Anthwal, S. and Kim K.H. (2010).Conserving biodiversity through 
traditional beliefs in sacred groves in Uttarakhand Himalaya, India. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 
54(11), 962-971. 
Archibugi, D., Howells J., and Michie J. (ed.). (1999). Innovation Systems and Policy in a Global Economy. 
In: Innovation Policy in a Global Economy(pp.1-18), UK: Cambridge University Press 
Ardakanian, R. (2005). Overview of water management in Iran. In: Policies and strategic options for water 
management in the Islamic countries (pp98-110), Proceedings of the Symposium organised by RCUWM-
Tehran, Dec. 2003, UNESCO-IHP-VI Technical Documents in Hydrology, No. 73,Paris: UNESCO. 
Armitage, D., (2004). Nature-society dynamics, policy narratives and ecosystem management: Integrating 
perspective on upland change and complexity in central Sulawesi, Indonesia. Ecosystems, 7, 717-728. 
Armstrong, A.C. (2009). Viewpoint:  Further ideas towards a water ethic. Water Alternatives, 2(1), 138-147. 
ASCE (1998). Sustainability Criteria for Water Resources Systems. UNESCO/IHP Project M-4.3, 
Reston/Virginia: ASCE. 
Ashraf, M., Kahlown, M.A. and AshfaqA. (2007).Impact of small dams on agriculture and groundwater 
development: A case study from Pakistan. Agricultural Water Management, 92 (1/2), 90-98. 
Attari, J. and Salehzadeh, F. (2009). Professional Training: an Integral Part of Capacity Development for 
Water & Wastewater Companies in Iran. Paper presented at the7th International Science Conference on 
Human Dimension Program on Global Environmental Change, April 2009, Bonn Germany. 
Azmi, S. (2002). Islamic economics. New Delhi: Goodword Books. 
Bagader, A., El-Sabbagh A., Al-Glayand M., and Samarrai M. (2007). Environmental Protection in Islam. 
Retrieved December1, 2007 from http://www.islamreligion.com/articles/312/viewall. 
Bahrainy, H. (2003). Natural disaster management in Iran during the 1990s-Need for a New Structure. 
Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 129 (3), 140-160. 
Balali, M.R. (2009). Towards Reflexive Land and Water Management in Iran: Linking Technology, 
Governance and Culture. PhD Dissertation, Netherlands: Wageningen University.  
Bandaragoda, D.J. (2000). A Framework for institutional Analysis for water resources management in a river 
basin context. Working Paper 5. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute, IWMI. 
Bandura, A. (1977). Social learning theory. New York: General Learning Press. 
Barau, A. S. (2009). Shari'ah Framework for land resources management: A sustainability opportunity for 
Muslim States? Paper presented at the IHDP Open Meeting 2009, Bonn, Germany. 
Barr, S. (2008). Environment and Society: sustainability, policy and citizen. England: Ashgate Studies in 
Environmental Policy and Practice. 
Basson, M.S., Allen, R.B., Pegram, G.G.S., van Rooyen, J.A. (1994). Probabilistic Management of Water 
Resource and Hydropower Systems. USA /Colorado: Water Resources Publications. 
References 
 
318 
Basurto, X., and Ostrom, E. (2009). Beyond the tragedy of the commons. Economia delle fonti di energia e 
dell'ambiente, 52(1), 35-60.  
Beaumont, P. (1974). Water resource development in Iran. The Geographical Journal, 140 (3), 418-431. 
Beaumont P. (2005). Water Institutions in the Middle East. In Gopalakrishnan, C., Tortajada, C. and  Biswas, 
A.K.(eds.) Water institutions,polices performance and prospects (pp. 131-153), Berlin:Springer-Berlag. 
Beck, U. Bonss, W. and Lau, C. (2003). The theory of Reflexive Modernization: problematic, hypotheses and 
research programme. Theory, Culture & Society, 20(2), 1–33.  
Berween, M. (2003). Al-Wathiqa: The First Islamic State Constitution. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 
23 (1), 103-120. 
Best, J. (ed.), (1995). Images of Issues. 2nd Edition, New York: Aldine de Gruyter. 
Behnam, D. (1973). Cultural policy in Iran. Paris, UNESCO. 
Bhagwat, S.A., Dudley, N. and Harrop, S.R. (2011). Religious following in biodiversity hotspots: challenges 
and opportunities for conservation and development. Conservation Letters, 4 (3),234–240. 
Bharier, J. (1968). A note on the population of Iran. Population Studies, 22, 273-279. 
Biswas, A.K. (1974). Modelling of Water Resources Systems. (ed.). I and II. Canada/ Montreal: Harvest 
House. 
Biswas, A.K. (2004). Integrated Water Resources Management: A Reassessment of Water Forum 
Contibution. Water International, 29(2), 248- 256. 
Biggs, H. C., Breen, C. M. and Palmer, C. G. (2008). Engaging a window of opportunity: Synchronicity 
between a regional river conservation initiative and broader water law reform in South Africa.International 
Journal of Water Resources Development, 24(3), 329-343.  
Black, M. (1962). Models and metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Blau, P.M. and Meyer, M.W. (1956). Bureaucracy in Modern Society. New York: Random House. 
Borja, A., Galparsoro, I., Solaun, O., Muxika, I., Tello, E.M., Uriarte, U and Valencia, V. (2006). The 
European Water Framework Directive and the DPSIR, a methodological approach to assess the risk of failing 
to achieve good ecological status. Estuarine, Coastal and Shelf Science, 66, 84-96 
Bourn, D. (2003). Livestock dynamics in the Arabian Peninsula: A regional review of national livestock 
resources and international livestock trade. UK: Environmental Research Group Oxford Limited. 
Bowen, S. and Zwi, A.B (2005).Pathways to“evidence-informed” policy and practice: A framework for 
action. PLoS Medicine, 2(7), e166 
Box, G.E.P. and Jenkins, G.M., 1970. Time series analysis: forecasting and control. San Francisco, Calif: 
Holden-Day. 
Boughton, W. (2005) Catchment water balance modelling in Australia 1960–2004. Agricultural Water 
Management, 71(2, 2), 91-116. 
Boughton, W. and Droop, O. (2003). Continuous simulation for design flood estimation—a review. 
Environmental Modelling & Software, 18 (4), 309-318. 
Breisinger, C., van Rheenen, T., Ringler, C., Nin Pratt, A., Minot, N., Aragon, C., Bingxin, Y., Ecker, O. and, 
Zhu, T., (2010). Food security and economic development in the Middle East and North Africa:Current state 
and future perspectives. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00985.  
Braga, B. P. F. (2001). Integrated Urban Water Resources Management: A Challenge into the 21st Century. 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 17(4), 581-599. 
Brooks, D.B. 2007. Human rights to water in North Africa and the Middle East: What is new and what is not; 
what is Important and what is Not. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 23(2), 227 – 241. 
Brown, R. R. (2005). Impediments to Integrated Urban Stormwater Management: The Need for Institutional 
Reform, Environmental Management, 36(3), 455-468. 
References 
 
319 
Buchholz, T., Rametsteiner, E., Volk, T.A. and Luzadis, V.A. (2009). Multi Criteria Analysis for bioenergy 
systems assessments.Energy Policy, 37, 484- 495. 
Calder, I.R. (2004). Forests and water-closing the gap between public and science perceptions. Water Science 
Technology, 49 (7), 39-53. 
Calder .I.R (2005). Blue Revolution: Integrated Land and Water Resources Management. 2nd edition,  
London: Earthscan. 
Campbell John L. (2004). Institutional change and Globalization. USA: PrincetonPaperbacks. 
Cap-Net (2005). IWRM Training Manual and Operational Guide. Retrived July 1, 2011, fromhttp://www.cap-
net.org/TMUploadedFiles/FileFor67/IWRM_Plan.doc 
Cap-Net (2008). IWRM for river basin organization traininag manual. Retrived July 1, 2011, 
fromhttp://www.cap-net.org/sites/cap-net.org/files/RBO%20Manual.pdf 
Chapin Metz, H. (ed.). (1987). Iran: Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress.  
Chapra, M.U. (1996). Objectives of the Islamic economic order. Leicester/UK: The Islamic Foundation. 
Chapra, M. U. 2008. The Islamic Vision of Development in the Light of Maqasid al-Shariah. Occasional Paper 
Series 15, UK/London: The International Institute of Islamic Thought. 
Checkland, P and Scholes, J. (1990). Soft systems methodology in action. Chichester: John Wiley. 
CIWP (2010). Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project internal documentations. Tehran: CIWP. 
Clement, F.C. (2008). A multilevel Analysis of Forest Polices in Northern Vietnam: Uplands, People, 
Institutions and Discourses. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, UK. 
Clement, F.C. (2009). Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for a “politicised” 
institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Sceinces, 43(2),129-156 
Colding, J., Folke, C. and Elmqvist, T. (2003). Social institutions in ecosystem management and biodiversity 
conservation. Tropical Ecology, 44(1): 25-41 
Cosgrove, D. M., Johnson, G. S., and Tuthill, D. R. (2008). The Role of uncertainty in the use of ground 
water Models for administration of water rights. Journal of Contemporary Water research & Education, 140, 
24-29. 
Cottam, R. (1999). Nationalism in Iran. Translated by M. Tadayon; 2nd edition, Kavir Publications, Tehran, 
Iran [Persian].  
Courtney, J.F. (2001). Decision making and knowledge management in inquiring organizations: toward a new 
decision-making paradigm for DSS. Journal of Decision Support Systems, 31, 17-38. 
Cowen, M. (1984). Early years of the colonial development corporation: British State enterprise overseas 
during late colonialism. African Affaris (Lond), 83(330), 63-75. 
Cowie, G. M. and Borrett, S. R., (2005). Institutional perspectives on participation and information in water 
management.Environmental Modelling and Software, 20, 469-483. 
Crawford, N.H., Linsley, R.K. (1966). Digital simulation in hydrology: Stanford Watershed Model IV. 
Department of Civil Engineering, Technical Report 39, California: Stanford University. 
Cox, M., Arnold, G.and Villamayor Tomás, S. (2010). A review of design principles for community-based 
natural resource management. Ecology and Society, 15(4), 38. 
Daniels S & Endfield G.H. (2009). Narratives of Climate change: an introduction. Journal of Historical 
Geography, 35(2), 215-222.  
Danish Hydraulic Institute, DHI (2003). MIKE BASIN: operating manual and description. Denmark: 
Hørsholm. 
Dargahi, B. (2007a). Ab-bandan and its influence in agricultural water consumption management to increase 
productivity in the north of Iran. Mehr-e-aAb, 40, 24-25. 
References 
 
320 
Dargahi, B. (2007b). Assessment of approaches to increase the performance of qanats. Mehr-e-aAb, 41, 12-
14. 
Delli Perscoli, J. (2003). Participation, consensus building and conflict management training couese. 
Technical documents in Hydrology, Report No. 22, Paris: UNESCO-IHP. 
Denzau, A.T, North, D.C (1994). Shared mental models: ideologies andinstitutions. Kyklos, 47(1), 3–31 
Denzau, A.T. and North, D.C. (2000). Chapter 2: Shared mental models: ideologues and institutions. In: 
Lupia, A., McCubbins, M.D. and Popkin, S.L.(eds.). Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds 
of Rationality (pp23-46),UK/ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Iran Economics (2009). Iran at a glance- economic developments: imports of wheat in 2008. Iran Economics 
Magazine, 11(123), 9.  
DoE (2003). Iran’s Initial communication to the UNFCCC. Iran/ Tehran: Iran National Climate Change 
Office, Department of Environment (DoE). 
DoE (2008). The Ecosystem Managemet Plan (EMP) for Lake Urmia Basin. Tehran: Depertement of 
Environment and Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project (CIWP).  
Dudley, N. (ed.). (2008). Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories. Gland, 
Switzerland: IUCN 
Draz, O. (1969). The Hima system of range reserves in the Arabian Peninsula: its possibilities in range 
improvement and conservation projects in the Middle East. FAO/PL:PFC/13.11, Rome: FAO. 
Duda, A. M. (2003).  Integrated management of land and water resources based on a collective approach to 
fragmented international conventions. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B, 358, 2051–2062. 
Dzurik, A. A. (2003). Water resources planning. 3rdedition, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Earthtrends (2003). Population, Health and Human Well-Being- Islamic Republic of Iran, Retreived 
December 1, 2009, fromhttp://earthtrends.wri.org.  
EcoGov2. (2008). Al Khalifa (The Steward) What Every Muslim Needs to Know About His Role in 
Environmental Governance. Philippine Environmental Governance 2 Project (EcoGov2), U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID).  
EEA (1998). Guidelines for Data Collection and Processing - EU State of the EnvironmentReport. Annex 3. , 
Copenhagen: EEA. 
EEA (1999). Environmental indicators: Typology and overview. Technical report No 25, Copenhagen: EEA 
EEA (2003).  An inventory of biodiversity indicators in Europe, 2002.  Technical report 92, Copenhagen: 
EEA. 
EEA (2011). EEA Glossary. Retrieved August 11, 2011 from 
http://glossary.eea.europa.eu/terminology/concept_html?term=dpsir. 
Engineer A.A. (1980).The Islamic State. New York: Advent Books. 
Eslahi, H., Qazaqi, H and Ahmadi-Muhammadnia, M., (2002). Training martial on Land Reform Legislation. 
Land Affairs Organistion, MoAJ, Tehran. 
Etemad-Fard, R. (2007). Establishment of MoAJ Act and its role in integrated water management in Iran. 
Mehr-e-aAb, 39, 26-27. 
Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi, M. (1993). The Khalisah of Varamin. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 
25(1), 5-15,  
European Commission (2006). Evaluation of Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Europe. Final 
Report Prepared by International Ocean Institute and Rupprecht Consult- Forschung & Beratung GmbH. 
Ewen, J. Parkin G. & O’Connell P.E. (2000). SHETRAN: Distributed River Basin Flow and Transport 
Modelling System. Journal of Hydrologic Engineering, 5(3), 250-258. 
References 
 
321 
Fadeifard, M. (2009). In defense of dam-building. Transcript of a radio interview with Radio Javan 
Tehran: Radio Javan.  
Falkenmark, M., (1997). Water Scarcity- Challenges for the Future. In:Brans, E.H.P., de Haan, E.J., Rinzema, 
J and Nollkaemper, A. (eds.). The Scarcity of Water Emerging Legal and Policy Responses. London: Kluwer 
Law International. 
Falkenmark, M., Gottschalk L., Lundqvist J. and Wouters P. (2004). Towards Integrated Catchment 
Management: Increasing the dialogue between scientists, policymakers and stakeholders. Water Resources 
Development, 20(3), 297-309. 
Falkenmark, M, Lundquist, J. and Widstrand, C. (1989). Macro-scale water scarcity requires micro-scale 
approaches: Aspects of vulnerability in semi-arid development. Natural Resources Forum,13 (4), 258-267. 
Falkenmark, M. and Rockstörm, J. (2006). The New Blue and Green Water Paradigm: Breaking New Ground 
for Water Resources Planning and Management. J. Water Resources Planning and management, 132(3), 129-
132. 
Falkenmark, M. 2001. The greatest water problem: The inability to link environmental security, water 
security and food security.  International Journal of Water Resources Development 17(4):539-554. 
Fanni, Z. (2006). Cities and urbanization in Iran after the Islamic revolution. Cities, 23 (6), 407- 411. 
FAO (2009). Irrigation in the Middle East region in figures AQUASTAT Survey– 2008. FAO Water Report 
34, Italy/Rome: the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. 
FAO. (2009a). Guidelines for good forestry and range practices in arid and semi-arid zones of the Near East. 
Cairo, FAO Regional Office for the Near East. 
Faramarzi, M., Abbaspour, K. C., Schulinand and Yang, R. H. (2009). Modelling blue and green water 
resources availability in Iran. Hydrol. Process. 23, 486-501. 
Farman-Farmaian M. and Farman-Farmaian, R. (2002). Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince. Trans. 
by M. Haqiqatkhah, Iran, Qaqnos Publications), [In Persian]. 
Faruqui N. I, Biswas A.K., and Bino M.J. (eds.). (2001). Water Management in Islam. United Nations 
University Press. 
Farzanegan, M. (2001). A legal assessmenet of adminstratuive divions in Iran. MA thesis, Tehran: Tehran 
Central Azad Islamic University.  
Figueira, J., Salvatore, G., Ehrgott, M. (eds.). (2005). Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art 
Surveys. New York: Springer. 
Firouz, E., Hassinger, J. and Ferguson, D.A., (1970). The Wildlife Parks and Protected Regions of Iran. 
Biological Conservation, 3 (1), 37-45.  
Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices. UK/Oxfrod: 
Oxford University Press. 
Foltz R.C. (2002). Iran’s Water Crisis: Cultural, Political and Ethical Dimensions. Journal of Agriculture and 
Environmental Ethics, 15, 357-380. 
Fortmann, L., Roe E., and van Eeten M., (2001). At the threshold between governance and management: 
community based management in Southern Africa. Public Administration and Development, 21, 171-185 
Freedom House (2010). Freedom in the world in 2011: the authoritarian challenge to democracy. Selected 
data from Freedom. House’s annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, New York: Freedom House. 
Freehafer, P. (2008). Foreword: Science and Watershed Management: A View from the Chesapeake Bay 
Program. Journal of Contemporary Water research & Education, 138, 1-2. 
Gasparatos, A., El-Haram, M. and Horner, M. (2008). A critical review of reductionist approaches for 
assessing the progress towards sustainability. Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 28, 286–311. 
Giddings B, Hopwood B, O'Brien G. (2002). Environment, Economy and Society: Fitting Them Together 
Into Sustainable Development. Sustainable Development, 10, 187-196. 
References 
 
322 
Gilbar, Gad G, (1979). The Persian Economy in the Mid-19th Century. Die Welt des Islams, New Ser., 19 
(1/4), 177-211. 
Giupponi, C., Mysiak, J., Fassio, A and Cogan, V. (2004). MULINO-DSS: a computer tool for sustainable 
use of water resources at the catchment scale. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 64 (1), 13-24.  
Gladstone, W. (2000). The ecological and social basis for management of a Red Sea marine-protected area. 
Ocean & Coastal Management, 43, 1015-1032 
Gomide, F.L.S., (1978). Markovian inputs and the Hurst phenomenon. J. Hydrol., 37, 23-45. 
Gouder de Beauregard, A.C., Torres , G., Malaisse, F. (2002). Ecohydrology: a new paradigm for 
bioengineers ? Biotechnol. Agron. Soc. Environ, 6 (1), 17- 27. 
Gowdy Wygant, C. (2004). United Nation Conference on the Human Environment: formation, significance 
and politvical challenges. Masters of Art Thesis, USA: Texas Technical University. 
Graham, D.N. Butts M.B. (2005). Chapter 10: Flexible Watershed Modelling with MIKE SHE. In Singh V. P. 
And  Frevert D. K. (eds.). Watershed Models (pp. 245-272). Denver/ Colorado, USA: CRC Press. 
Grey, D. and Sadoff, C. W. (2007). Sink or Swim? Water security for growth and development. Water Policy, 
9 (6), 545–571. 
Groenfeldt, D. (2010). Viewpoint – The next nexus? Environmental ethics, water policies, and climate 
change. Water Alternatives, 3(3), 575-586. 
Gruber, J.S. (2010). Key Principles of Community-Based Natural Resource Management: A synthesis and 
interpretation of identified effective approaches for managing the commons. Environmental Management, 
45:52–66. 
Guio-Torres, D.M. (2006). Sustainability indicators for assessment of urban water systems: the need for a 
common ground. Paper presented at the 1st SWITCH Scientific meeting, 9-10 Jan, 2006, University of 
Birmingham, UK. 
Green, C. (2003). Handbook of Water Economics: Principles and Practices. Chichester, John Wiley and 
Sons. 
Groenewegen, J. and de Jong, M. (2008).Assessing the potential of new institutional economics to explain 
institutional change: the case of road management liberalization in the Nordic countries. Journal of 
Institutional Economics, 4. 1, 51- 71. 
GWP (2000). Integrated water Resources Management. Technical Advisory Committee Background Paper 
No 4. Global Water Partnership (GWP), Stockholm: Sweden.  
Hajer, M. Versteeg, W. (2005). A decade of discourse analysis of environmental politics: achievements, 
challenges and perspectives. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 7(3), 175-184. 
Hajkowicz , S. and Higgins, A. (2008). A comparison of multiple criteria analysis techniques for water 
resource management. European Journal of Operational Research, 184, 255- 265. 
Halalsheh, M, Dalahmeh, S., Sayed, M., Suleiman, W., Shareef, M., Mansour, M. and Safi, M. (2008). Grey 
water characteristics and treatment options for rural areas in Jordan. Bioresource Technology, 99, 6635- 6641. 
Hall, D.J. (2008). Chapter 5: Decision makers and their need for support. In Burstein, F. and  Holsapple, C. 
W. (Eds.), Handbook on Decision Support System 1: Basic Themes, Series: International Handbooks on 
Information Systems (pp 83-102). Berlin: Springer.  
Hall, D.J. and Davis R.A. (2007). Engaging multiple perspectives: A value-based decision-making model 
Decision Support Systems. Decision Support Systems, Special Issue Clusters, 43(4), 1588-1604. 
Hall, D.J., Y. Guo and Davis R.A. (2003). Developing a value-based decision-making model for inquiring 
organizations. Paper presented at the36th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences 
(HICSS'03) — track 4, Hawaii: Big Island. 
References 
 
323 
Halsnaes K. and  Traerup, S. (2009). Development and Climate Change: A Mainstreaming Approach for 
Assessing Economic, Social, and Environmental Impacts of Adaptation Measures. Environmental 
Management, 43, 765- 778. 
Hampton, G.(2004). Enhancing public participation through narrative analysis. Policy Sciences 37, 267-276. 
Hanberger A. (2003). Public Policy and Legitimacy: A historical policy analysis of interplay of public policy 
and legitimacy. Policy Sciences, 36, 257-278. 
Hashemi, M. (2008). An Independent Review: The Status of Water Resources in the Lake Urmia Basin. A 
Synthesis Report for the GEF/UNDP Conservation of Iranian Wetlands Project.   
Hashemi, (2008a). A Report on the Development of the Sirvan River Basin DSS. Tehran/ Iran: Mahab Ghods 
Consulting Company.  
Hashemi, M. Amezaga, J.M., O'Connell, P.E., Parkin, G and Attari. (2007a). Sustainable Water Policy for 
Wadi Regions: An Ethical Dimension. Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Wadi 
Hydrology, 2-4 December, Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. 
Hashemi, M., Attari, J., Amezaga J.M. and O'Connell, P.E. (2007b). Iran’s urban water management: Need 
for Institutional Reform. Paper presented at the International Symposium on New Directions in Urban Water 
Management, UNESCO, Parsi12-14 September 2007, Paris. 
Hashemi, M and O’Connell. P.E. (2009). A Strategic Framework for Institutional Capacity Building within 
the Water Sector in the MENA Region: Cultural and Ethical Context”, Paper presented at the International 
Conference on Urban Water Capacity, Muscat Oman. 
Hashemi, M. and O’Connell, P.E. (2011 a). Historical perspectives: from hydrological models to decision 
support systems (DSSs). In. Gasmelseid, T. (ed.). Handbook of Research on Hydroinformatics: Technologies, 
Theories and Applications, USA/Hershey PA: IGI Global 
Hashemi, M. and O’Connell, P.E. (2011b). Science and water policy: An integrated methodological 
framework for developing decision support systems (DSSs). In. Gasmelseid, T. (ed.). Handbook of Research 
on Hydroinformatics: Technologies, Theories and Applications, USA/Hershey PA: IGI Global. 
Hashimoto, T.; Stedinger, J. R.; Loucks, D. P. 1982. Reliability, resilience and vulnerability criteria for water 
resource system performance evaluation. Water Resources Research 18(1): 14-20. 
Al-Hathloul, S. and Edadan, N. (1993). Evolution of settelement pattterens in Saudi Arabia. Habitat 
International, 17: 4, 31-46. 
Hayashi, K. (2000). Multicriteria analysis for agricultural resource management: A critical survey and future 
perspectives. European Journal of Operational Research, 122, 486-500. 
Heck, N., Dearden, P. and McDonald. A. (2011). Stakeholders’ expectations towards a proposed marine 
protected area: A multi-criteria analysis of MPA performance criteria. Ocean & Coastal Management, 54 
687- 695. 
Hediger, W. (2000) ANALYSIS: Sustainable development and social welfare. Ecological Economics 32(3), 
481-492.   
Heikkila, T., Schlager, E.and Davis, M.W. (2011). The role of cross-scale institutional linkages in common 
pool resource management: assessing interstate river compacts. The Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 121-145. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162 (3859), 1243-1248. 
Harremoës, P. and Turner, R.K. (2001). Methods of integrated assessment. Regional Environmental Change, 
2, 57-65. 
Hendriks C.M., (2005). Participatory storylines and their influence on deliberative forums. Policy Sciences, 
38, 1-20. 
Hess, G.R. (1974). The Iranian crisis of 1945-46 and the Cold War. Politcal Sceince Quartetly, 89 (1), 117-
146. 
Hipel, K.W. and McLeod, A.I. (1994). Time Series Modelling of Water Resources and Environmental 
Systems. Amsterdam: Elsevier,  
References 
 
324 
Hurst, H.E., (1951). Long-term storage capacity of reservoirs. Transactions ASCE., 16, 770- 808. 
Hurst, H.E (1956). Methods of using long-term storage in reservoirs. Proceedings of Institute of Civil 
Engineers, Paper 6059, 519-543. 
HDR (2006). Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the global water crisis.  USA/ NY: United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). 
HDR (2010). The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development. Human Development. Report 
2010 —20th Anniversary Edition, USA/ NY: United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 
Healy, P., and Shaw T. (1994). Changing Meaning of ‘Environment’ in the British Planning System. 
Transactions of the Institute of the British Geographers, New Series, 19(4). 425-438. 
Helsel, D.R. and Hirsch, R. M. (2002). Statistical Methods in Water Resources Techniques of Water 
Resources Investigations. Book 4, chapter A3. U.S. Geological Survey. 
Holden, A. (2003). In a Need of New Environmental Ethics For Tourism? Annals of Tourism Research, 30 
(1), 94-108. 
Holling, C. S. (ed.) (1978). Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management. Chichester: John Wiley 
Howe, K.R. (1988). Against the quantitative- qualitative incompatibility thesis: or dogmas die hard. 
Educational Researcher, 19, 10-16.  
Imperial, M. T. (1999). Analyzing Institutional Arrangements for Ecosystem-Based Management: Lessons 
from the Rhode Island Salt Ponds SAM Plan, Coastal Management, 27, 1- 31. 
Imperial, M. T. (2009). Paradoxes, possibilities, and the obstacles to IWRM: lessons from the institutional 
Rational Choice literature. Paper presented at the International Symposium on Society and Resource 
Management (ISSRM), July 5- 8, 2009, Vienna, Austria. 
Ioris, A.A.R., Colin Hunter, C. and Walker, S. (2008). The development and application of water 
management sustainability indicators in Brazil and Scotland. Journal of Environmental Management, 88 
1190–1201. 
IPCC (1997).The Regional Impacts of Climate Change: An Assessment of Vulnerability. A special Report of 
IPCC Working Group II, WMO/UNEP: IPCC.  
IRNCID (2005). Conventional Irrigation System in Na’en City. Safinejad J. (ed.), Publication no. 94 Tehran: 
Iranian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage (IRNCID) Publishing.  
Ivey, J.L., de Loë R., Kreutzwiser R., and Ferreira C., (2006). An institutional perspective of local capacity 
for source water protection. Geoforum, 37(6),  944-957. 
IWRMC (2004). Long Term Development Strategies for Iran’s Water Resources. Iran Water Resources 
Management Company (IWRMC), Iran/ Tehran: Ministry of Energy. 
IWRMC(2005). An Overview of Water Demand & Supply Management in Iran. Water Planning Bureau, 
Water Resources Management Company, Iran/ Tehran: Ministry of Energy. 
IWRMC (2009/2011). Interactive online database on dams and irrigation networks. Development Projects 
Office, IWRMC, MoE, available from http://daminfo.wrm.ir/dam-fa.html 
Izzi Dien, M. (1990) Islamic environmental ethics, law and society.In: Engel J.R. and Engel J.G. (eds).Ethics 
of Environment and Development (pp.189-198), UK/ London: Belhaven. 
Izzi Dien, M. (1997) Islam and the Environment, theory, and practice. Journal of Beliefs & Values, 1, 
Carfax.available fromhttp://www.lamp.ac.uk/trs/staffgallery/mawil_paper.html 
Jabbari, H. (2011). Introducing National Executive Council and Regional Council for the management of 
LUB: opportunities and challenges. Paper Presented at the Drought Risk Management Workshop, Feburary, 
2011. Kish Island. Tehran: Conservation of Iranian wetlands Project (CIWP).  
Jackson, E. and Kingdon, J.W. (1992). Ideology, Interest Group Scores, and Legislative Votes. American 
Journal of Political Science, 36 (3), 805-823. 
References 
 
325 
Jain, S. K. and Bhunya, P. K. (2008). Reliability, resilience and vulnerability of a multipurpose storage 
reservoir.Hydrological Sciences Journal, 53 (2), 434- 447.  
Jain, S.K. and Singh, V.P. (2003). Water Resources Systems Planning and Management.  Developments in 
Water Science, Amsterdam/Netherlands: Elsevier Science. 
Jamab (1998). National Water Master Plans. Iran/ Tehran:Jamab Consulting  Enginenering Comapany. 
Jamab (2007). A Master Plan studied for Arid/semi-arid Climate of Iran. : Equipoise of Consumption and 
Available Resources in the Iranian Basins. Iran/ Tehran:Jamab Consulting  Enginenering Comapany/ MPO.  
Jamieson, D.G. and Fedra, K. (1996). The WaterWare decision-support system for river basin planning: I. 
Conceptual Design. Journal of Hydrology, 177(3/4), 163-175. 
Des Jardins, J. R. (2001).Envoropnmental Ethics: an introduction to environmental philosophy. Third edition, 
Canada: Wadsworth/Thomas Learning.  
Jenkins, W. (2005). Islamic law and environmental ethics: how juripredeince (usul al Fiqh) mobilises 
practical reform. Worldviews, 9 (3), 338-364. 
Jenkins, W. (2008). Ecologies of Grace: Environmental Ethics andChristian Theology. UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
Jewitt, G. (2002). Can Integrated Water Resources Management sustain the provision of ecosystem goods and 
services? Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 27, 887- 895. 
Jewitt, G (2006). Integrating blue and green water flows for water resources management and 
planning.Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 31, 753- 762. 
Johnston, D. (2004). A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Twentieth Century Uṣ ūl al-Fiqh. 
Islamic Law and Society, 11(2), 233-282. 
Jønch-Clausen, T. and Fugl, J.  (2001). Firming up the Conceptual Basis of Integrated Water Resources 
Management. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 17(4), 501-510. 
Jusoff, K. and Abu Samah, S.A. (2011).Environmental Sustainability: What Islam Propagates? Special Issue 
on Creating Knowledge Based Society, World Applied Sciences Journal, 12, 46-53. 
Kamali, M.H. (2006). Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. Third edition, UK: Islamic Texts society.  
Karageorgis A.P., Skourtos M.S., Kapsimalis V., Kontogianni A.D., Skoulikidis N.Th., Pagou K., Nikolaidis 
N.P., Drakopoulou P., Zanou B., Karamanos H., Levkov Z., Anagnostou Ch., (2005). An integrated approach 
to watershed management within the DPSIR Framework: Axios River catchment and Thermaikos Gulf. 
Regional Environmental Change, 5, 138-160. 
Al-Karaji, A.M.H.H. (1966). Withdrawal of Hidden Waters. (Trans. By H.K. Jam), Bonyad-e- Farhang, old 
masterpieces series: 8, Tehran, Iran [in Persian]. 
Karimi, N. (2010). Letter to Deputy Minister, MoE on Lake Urmia water allocations. Letter reference no. 
24138/123[in Persian] 
Keiner, C. (2004). Modelling Neptune’s Garden: The Chesapeake Bay Hydraulic Model, 1965-1984. In: 
Rozwadowski, H.M. and van Keuren D.K. (eds.). The Machine in Neptune’s Garden: Historical Perspectives 
on Technology and the Marine Environment (pp.273-314), USA: Science History Publications. 
Keller, N.H.M., (1997). [Commentary, appendices edited and translated by] Reliance of the Traveller: A 
Classic Manual of Islamic Sacred Law by Ahmed ibn Naqib al-Misri. Maryland: Amana Publications. 
Keshavarz, A. and Dehghanisanjid (2007). Agricultural Water Scarcity, Water Supply and Water Demand in 
Iran. Paper presented at the International Conference on Water Management in the Islamic Countries, 19 - 21 
Feb., 2007- Tehran, Iran.  
Khadivi, A. and Kalantari, R. (2010). Bilingualism in Iran: Challenges, Perspectives and Solutions. Paper 
presented at International Conference on Minority and Majority: Language, Culture and Identity. November 
23rd and 24th, 2010, Hilton Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia; available online at: 
http://www.mymla.org/files/icmm2010_papers/ICMM2010_p14.pdf.  
References 
 
326 
Al-Khafif, A. (1990). Islamic Property Rights and a comparison with Arabic legal Codes. Beirut: Lebanon, 
Dalalnahza Al-Arabia Publishing and Distribution [in Arabic]. 
Khalid, F. M., (2002). Islam and the Environment. In: Timmerman, P. (Ed.).Encyclopedia of Global 
Environmental Change: Volume 5, Social and economic dimensions of global environmental change (pp 332–
339). Chichester/UK: John Wiley & Sons.  
Khallaf, A. (1977). The Science of Source Methodology in Islamic Jurisprudence ‘elm usul al fiqh’. 11th 
edition, Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam [in Arabic]. 
Khan, A.M. (1995). Sustainable development: the key concepts, issues and implications. Sustainable 
Development, 3, 63-9. 
Al-Khashn, H. (2004). Islam and the Environment. Towards an Environmental Jurisprudence. Book Series: 
Modern Islamic Issues at the Philosophical Research Centre in Baghdad, Lebanon/ Beirut: Daralhadi 
Publishing and Distribution [in Arabic]. 
Kidane-Mariam T., (2003). Environmental and Habitat Management: The Case of Ethiopia and Ghana. 
Environmental Management,  31(3), 313-327. 
Kilani, H., Serhal, A. and Llewlyn, O. (2007). Al-Hima: A way of life. IUCN West Asia regional Office, 
Amman Jordan – SPNL Beirut, Lebanon. 
Kingdon, J.W. (2002). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. 2nd Edition, New York: Longman Classics 
Edition.  
Kjeldsen, T.R. and Rosbjerg, D. (2004). Choice of reliability, resilience and vulnerabilityestimators for risk 
assessments of water resourcessystems. Hydrological Sciences–Journal–des Sciences Hydrologiques, 49(5), 
755-767. 
Kohsaka, R. (2010). Developing biodiversity indicators for cities: applying the DPSIR model to Nagoya and 
integrating social and ecological aspects.  Ecological Research, 25(5), 925-936  
Kramer, G. (1993). Islamist Notions of Democracy. Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam. (Jul. - Aug., 
1993), 2-8. 
Labadie, J.W. (2004). Optimal operation of multireservoir systems: state-of-the-art review. Journal of Water 
Resources Planning and Management, 130: 93-111. 
Labadie, J.W., Pineda, A.M. and Bode, D.A. (1984). Network Analysis of Raw Supplies UnderComplex Water 
Rights and Exchanges: Documentation for Program MODSIM3. Fort Collins, Colorado:  Colorado Water 
Resources Institute. 
Lambton, A.K.S. (1998). Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A study of land tenure and land revenue 
administration. Translated by M Amiri; Scientific and cultural Publishing company, Tehranbased on the 
Englishedition published in 1991 by I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London [ in Persian]. 
Lankford, B. A.; Merrey, D. J.; Cour, J.; Hepworth, N. (2007). From integrated to expedient: An adaptive 
framework for river basin management in developing countries.IWMI ResearchReport 110, Colombo, Sri 
Lanka: International Water Management Institute.  
Lankford, B. and Hepworth, N. (2010). The cathedral and the bazaar: Monocentric and polycentric river basin 
management. Water Alternatives 3(1), 82-101. 
Landwehr, J.M. and Matalas, N.C. (1986). On the nature of persistence in dendrochronologic records with 
implications for hydrology. J. Hydrol., 86, 239-277. 
Langsdale, S. (2008). Communication of Climate Change Uncertainty to Stakeholders Using the Scenario 
Approach. Journal of Contemporary Water research & Education, 140, 24-29. 
Larijani, M.J. (1993). From Modernism to Postmodernism. Journal of Parliament & Research. 5(1), 33-48. 
Larijani, M.J. (1994). Government and Effectiveness and Efficiency. Journal of Parliament & Research, 
10(2), 13-42. 
Larijani, M.J. (1995). Islamic Rationality. Journal of Parliament & Research, 17(3), 11-23. 
References 
 
327 
Larijani, M.J. (1998). The limit of Civil Tolerance ‘freedom’ in Islamic Rule. Journal of Parliament & 
Research. 24(5), 8-20. 
Larson, S. (2006). Analysis of the water planning process in the Georgina and Diamantina catchment: An 
application of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework.  CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, 
Townsville and Desert Knowledge CRC, Alice Springs. 
Liu, Y., Gupta H., Springer, E. and Wagener T. (2008). Linking science with environmental decision making: 
Experiences from an integrated modelling approach to supporting sustainable water resources management.  
Environmental Modelling & Software, 23, 846-858. 
Llamas, M.R. and Martinez-Santos, P. (2005). Editorial: Intensive groundwater use: Silent Revolution and 
Potrential Source of Social Conflicts. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 131, 337-341. 
Lord Selborne (2000). The ethics of freshwater use. Retrieved July 1, 2009 from http: 
//www.unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001220/122049e.pdf. 
Leopold, A.  (1949). A Sand County almanac. Oxford  Univ. Press. New York, N.Y. 226pp. 
Loucks, D. P. and van Beek E. (2005). Water Resources Systems Planning and Management: An Introduction 
to Methods, Models and Applications. Paris: UNESCO. 
Loucks, D.P., Stedinger, J.R. and Haith, D.A. (1981). Water Resources Systems Planning and Analysis. USA: 
Prentice Hall. 
Loucks, D.P.; Stedinger, J.R. and Shamir, U. (1985). Modelling water resources systems: issues and 
experiences. Civil Engineering Systems, 2, 223–31. 
Ludwig, R., Mauser, W., Niemeyer, S., Colgan, A., Stolz, R., Escher-Vetter, H., Kuhn, M., Reichstein, M., 
Tenhunen, J., Kraus, A., Ludwig, M., Barth, M. and Hennicke, R. (2003). Web-based modelling of energy, 
water and matter fluxes to support decision making in mesoscale catchments––the integrative perspective of 
GLOWA-Danube. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, Parts A/B/C, 28 (14-15), 621-634. 
MA (2005). Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Synthesis. Washington DC: Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MA) Island Press 
Maass, A. , Hufschmidt, M. M., Dorfman,R., Thomas Jr., H.A., Marglin, S. A. and Fair G. M. (1962). Design 
of Water-Resource Systems: New Techniques for Relating Economic Objectives, Engineering Analysis, and 
Governmental Planning. USA: Harvard University Press. 
Mahab (2011). Updatig the Water Master Plan for Lake Urmia Basin. Draft report. Tehran: Mahab Ghods 
Consulting Company.   
Mahmoudi, S. (2006). Supply and Consumption Management in Megacities: Experiences Related to Megacity 
of Tehran. In: Practices and experiences of water and wastewater technology, Proceedings of the Seminar 
organised by RCUWM-Tehran, Oct. 2004, Sultanate of Oman UNESCO-IHP-VI Technical Documents in 
Hydrology, No. 79. UNESCO Paris, pp92-101. 
Mahmoudi, S. (2009). Water Resources: Revitalizing Resources. Paper presented at the 13th Joint Seminar of 
Senior Managers of water resources and water and wastewater sectors on 7 April 2009, Tehran. 
Mailhot, A., Rousseau, A.N., Massicotte, S., Dupont, J., Villeneuve, J.P. (1997). A Watershed –Based System 
for the Integrated Management of Surface Water Quality: the GIBSI System. Water Science and Technology, 
36(5), 381-387. 
Marttunen M. and Suomalainen A. (2005). Participatory and Multi-objective Development of Water Course 
Regulation- Creation of Regulation Alternatives from Stakeholders’ Preferences. Journal of Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis, 13 (29), 29-49. 
Maru, Y.M and La Flamme. M. (2008). Institutions for allocating water resources in desert towns: The Alice 
Springs water resource strategy, DKCRC Research Report 32, Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research 
Centre, Alice Springs   
Masri, B. A. (1989). Animals in Islam. Ehson, Malaysia: University Kebongsoon Malaysia 
References 
 
328 
al-Mawardi, Abul-Hasan A.M.H. 2004. The Governmental Precepts (Al-ahkam al-Sultaniya). Translated into 
Persian: S. Hosseini, Iran/Tehran: Scientific and Cultural Publishing Company.  
Max-Neef, M.A. (2005). COMMENTARY: foundations of transdisciplinarity. Ecological Economics 53 
(2005) 5– 16. 
McKinney, D.C. (2004). International survey of decision support systems for integrated water management. 
Technical Report. SEPIC/IRG PROJECT NO: 1673-000. Romania/Bucharest: Ministry of Agriculture 
Forestry Water and Environment Protection (MAFWEP).  
McLachlan K. S. (1986). Food Supply and Agricultural Self-Sufficiency in Contemporary Iran. Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 49,No. 1, In Honour of Ann K. S. 
Lambton (1986), pp. 148-162 
McLachlan K. S., (1988). The Neglected Garden: Politics, Ecology and Agriculture in Iran. London: I.B. 
Tauris.  
Mehrgan, N. and Nessabian, S. (2010). Agricultural growth and income distribution in Iran. American-
Eurasian J. Agric. & Environ. Sci., 7(6): 6337-643. 
Memari A., (2006). Interview: with the Advisor to the Deputy Minister for Water affairs on 28 Nov 2006. 
Ministry of Energy, Iran 
Menahem G., (1998). Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Water Policy in Israel. Journal of Public 
Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp 283-310. 
Mendoza, G.A., H. Martins b Multi-criteria decision analysis in natural resource management: A critical 
review of methods and new modelling paradigms. Forest Ecology and Management, 230 (2006) 1–22. 
Merrett. S. (2003). Virtual Water and Ocean’s Razor. Water International 28(1). 
Merrey, J.D (2008). Is normative integrated water resources management implementable? Charting a practical 
course with lessons from Southern Africa. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 33, 899- 905. 
Merrey, J.D. (2009). African models for transnational river basin organisations in Africa: An unexplored 
dimension. Water Alternatives, 2(2), 183-204 
Mitchell, B. (2007). Integrated catchment management and MSPs: pulling in different directions. In Warner J 
(ed.) Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for integrated water management (pp. 49-67), UK: Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Miller, S.N., Semmens, D.J., Goodrich, D.C., Mariano Hernandez, M., Miller, R.C. Kepner, W.G. and D. 
Phillip Guertin, P. (2007). The Automated Geospatial Watershed Assessment (AGWA) Tool. Environmental 
Modelling & Software, 22, -365-377. 
Minja, R. and East, R.M. (1996).The HIMA Program: Adopting a farming systems perspective to facilitate 
successful participatory forestry. Proceedings of the UNEP-World Bank Africa Forest Policy Forum 
Conference, 29-30 August, Nairobi, Kenya. 
MoAJ (2008). Transcript: Forum on water for food at the Ministry of Agricultural Jihad (MoAJ). Meeting 
held in July 2008 at the Water and Land Office, MOAJ, Karaj, Iran  
MoE (2010a). Fifth Development Plan: Proposals for water resources management. Ministry of Energy, 
Tehran.  
MoE. (2010b). Water availability and demands in Lake Urmia basin. Office of Macro Planning for Water 
Resources and Water and wastewater. Ministry of Energy, Tehran. 
Moench, M. (2010). Responding to climate and other change processes in complex contexts: Challenges 
facing development of adaptive policy frameworks in the Ganga Basin.  Technological Forecasting & Social 
Change, 77, 975- 986. 
Molle, F., (2006). Planning and managing water resources at the river-basin level: Emergence and evolution 
of a concept. Comprehensive Assessment Research Report 16, Colombo, Sri Lanka: IWMI.  
Molle, F; Mollinga, P.P and Meinzen-Dick. (2008). Water, politics and development: Introducing Water 
Alternatives,Water Alternatives 1(1), 1-6. 
References 
 
329 
Mollinga, P. P. 2008. Water, politics and development: Framing a political sociology of water resources 
management. Water Alternatives 1(1), 7-23. 
Montz, B. E. (2008). Introduction to the Issue: The Role of Science in Watershed Management. Journal of 
Contemporary Water research & Education, 138, 3-6. 
MPO/UN (2004). The First Millennium Development Goals Report Islamic Republic of Iran. Co-Published by 
the Management and Planning Organisation and the United Nations Tehran, Iran.  
MPO (2005).Law of the Fourth Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran: 2004-2009, enacted 1 September 2004. Management and Planning Organisation (IMPO), Deputy for 
Administrative, Financial and Human Resources Affairs, (Tehran, Centre for Documentation, Museum and 
Publications). 
Moqimi, (2006). Report on Cultural Engineering Forum by H. Damchi. Biweekly Gazette of Cultural 
Engineering, 1(3), 20-22. 
Moriarty, P.B.; Batchelor, C.H.; Laban, P. and Fahmy, H. (2010). Developing a practical approach to 'light 
IWRM' in the Middle East. Water Alternatives 3(1), 122-136. 
Morrison T.H., McDonald G.T. and Lane M.B. (2004). Integrating Natural Resources Management for Better 
Environmental Outcomes. Australian Geographer, 35(3), 243-258. 
Motagh, M., Walter, T. R., Sharifi, M. A., Fielding, E., Schenk, A., Anderssohn, J., Zschau, J. (2008). Land 
subsidence in Iran caused by widespread water reservoir overexploitation. Geophysical Research Letters, 35, 
L1640. 
MRC (1995). The institutional framework for water resources in Iran. Report No. 2500735, Tehran Reseach 
Directorate:Majlis Research Centre [in Persian]. 
MRC (2007). Introducing water sector to People’s Representatives in the 8th Majlis. Research Paper 8762, 
Infrastructural Studies Bureau, Majlis Research Centre, Tehran.  
MRC (2008). Clarifying the relationship between inflation and economic growth in Iran. Economic Studeis 
Bureau, MRC, Tehran.  
Muhammadi, A. (2010) Myths of dam-building. Available on: http: // www .iranboom.ir/didehban/zistboom 
/1344-afsaneh-sad-sazi.html. 
Muinul Islam, M. (2004). Towards a green Earth: an Islamic perspective. Asian Affairs, 26(4), 44-89. 
Munda, G. (2005). Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis and Sustainable Development. In: Figueira, J., 
Salvatore, G., Ehrgott, M. (eds.), Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys(pp 953-988), 
Springer, New York. 
Mushtaq, S., Moghaddasi, M., (2011). Evaluating the potentials of deficit irrigation as an adaptive response to 
climate change and environmental demand. Environ. Sci. Policy, doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.07.007. 
Namjo, M.  (2009). Minster for Energy’s letter to the governor of East Azerbijan on Lake Urmia basin. Letter 
no. 100/31/85218, Tehran: MoE.  
Nazaridoust, A. (2006).A Methodological Framework, Guidelines and DSS Model to Calculate the Minimal 
Ecosystem Water Requirements for Wetlands: A Case Study of the International Wetlands in the Lake Urmia 
Basin. Unpublished Doctroal dissertation, Science Research Directorate, Azad Islamic University. 
Newson, M. (2007). Contrasting UK experiences with partccipatory appraoces to integrated river basin 
management. In Warner J (ed.)  Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for integrated water management (pp. 69-94), 
UK: Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Niemeijer, D. and de Groot, D.S. (2008). A conceptual framework for selecting environmental Indicator sets. 
Ecological Indicators, 8, 14– 25. 
Nizamul-Mulk (2002). The book of government, or, Rules for kings: the Siyar al-Muluk, or, Siyasat Nameh. 
Trans. By Hubert Darke. UK/London: Persian Heritage Foundation 
O’Callaghan, J.R. (1995). NELUP: an introduction, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 38 
(1), 5–20. 
References 
 
330 
O'Connell, P.E. (1971). A simple stochastic modelling of Hurst's law. In: Mathematical Models in Hydrology. 
Symp., Warsaw (Int. Assoc. Sci. Hydrol., Publ. 100, 1974), 1:169--187. 
O'Connell, P.E. (1974). Stochastic modelling of long-term persistence in streamflow sequences. Unpublished 
Doctoral dissertation, Imperial College, University of London. 
O’Connell, P. E. (1976). Skew inputs ands the Hurst effect- a comment. Journal of Hydrology, 31 (1976) 185-
191.  
Oppenheimer, L. (2006). The belief in a just world and subjective perceptions of society: a developmental 
perspective. Journal of Adolescence, 29, 655–669 
Ostrom, E. (1999). Institutional Rational choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development Framework. In: Sabatier, P.A (ed.) Theories of the Policy Processes. Westview Press: Boulder. 
Ostrom, E. (2005). Understanding Institutional Diversity. USA: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (2007). Going Beyond Panaceas Special Feature: A diagnostic approach for going beyond 
panaceas. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(39): 15181-15187 
Ostrom, E. ( 2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. 
Global Environ. Change, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2010.07.004. 
Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. The Policy 
Studies Journal, 39(1), 6-26. 
Ostrom, E. and Crawford, S. (2005). Classifying rules. In Understanding Institutional Diversity, ed. Elinor 
Ostrom, (pp.186-216). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ostrom, V., and Ostrom. E. (1977). Public Goods and Public Choices. In E. S. Savas, ed., Alternatives for 
Delivering Public Services: Toward Improved Performance, 7–49. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
OTA (1982). Use of models for water resources management, planning, and policy. USA: DIANE 
Publishing. 
Pahlavi, M.R. (1998) Respond to History. Comments by S Makan. Tehran: Paykan Publications [in Persian]. 
Pahl-Wostl, C.(2002). Participative and Stakeholder-Based Policy Design, Evaluation and Modeling 
Processes. Integrated Assessment, 3, 1-3 
Pahl-Wostl, C. (2007). The implications of complexity for integrated resources management. Environmental 
Modelling & Software, 22, 561-569. 
Panu, U.S. and Unny, T.E., 1980. Stochastic synthesis of hydrologic data based on concepts of pattern 
recognition, I. General methodology of the approach. J. Hydrol., 46, 5-34. 
Parker, J. (2011). Special Report: The 9 billion-people question. The Economist, 24 Feb, 2011, available 
fromhttp://www.economist.com/node/18200618\ 
Pearce D. (1988). Economics, Equity and Sustainable Development. Futures, 20(6), 598-605. 
Pearce D. (2000) Public Policy and Natural Resources Management: A Framework for integrating concepts 
and methodologies for policy evaluation. DGXI European Commission, University College, London 
Pearce D.W, Markandya A, Barbier EB. (1989). Blueprint for a Green Economy. London: Earthscan. 
Pirrone, N., Trombino, G. , Cinnirella, S. , Algieri, A., Bendoricchio, G. and Palmeri, L. (2005). The Driver-
Pressure-State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) approach for integrated catchment-coastal zone management: 
preliminary application to the Po catchment-Adriatic Sea coastal zone system. Reg Environ Change, 5, 111-
137. 
Pohekar, S.D.  and Ramachandran, M. (2004). Application of multi-criteria decision making to sustainable 
energy planning-A review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 8,365–381. 
ProGea (2004). Deliverable 11: WaterStrategyMan Integrated Decision Support System applicable to the 
paradigms, Italy: ProGea s.r.l. 
References 
 
331 
Proops J., and Wilkinson D., (2000). Sustainabilty, Knowledge, Ethics and Law. In: Michael Redclift (ed.) 
Sustainability: life chances and livelihood, London:  Routledge.  
Al-Qardhawi, Y. (1998). Prophetic traditions as a Source of Knowledge and Civilisation. 2nd Edition. Egypt/ 
Cairo: Daralshroq. [in Arabic]. 
Qolipour, R. and Gholampour-Ahangar, I. (2010). Public policy process in Iran. Tehran, Majlis Research 
Centre, Tehran, MRC [in Persian].  
Ra’ad, S.M. (1993) Development in the ‘Al-Muqqadema ‘of Ibn Khaldun. Third edition, Syria/Damascus: 
Talas Publications [in Arabic]. 
Ragab, I.A. (1980). Islam and development. World Developmemt, 8, 513-521. 
Roy, B. (2005). Paradigms and Challenges In: Figueira, J., Salvatore, G., Ehrgott, M. (Eds.), Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys (pp.3-18), USA/ NY: Springer. 
Rahbar, M.T. (1985) Political lessons from Imam Ali's 'Nahjul Balaghah'. Tehran: Islamic Propagation 
Organisation Publications [In Persian]. 
Rahbar, M.T. (1987) Imam Ali's Approach to Politics and Management. Tehran: Islamic Propagation 
Organisation Publications [In Persian]. 
Raskin, P.; Sieber, J. and Huber-Lee, A. (2001). Water evaluation and planning system: user guide for 
WEAP21. Boston-Mass: Tellus Institute.  
Ravandi M., (1975) Social History of Iran. First Volume, Amir Kabir Publishing Organisation [In Persian]. 
Razi A. (1983).The Comprehensive History of Iran. Fifth Edition, revised by Kazim Kazimzadeh Iranshahr, 
Tehran: Eqbal Publications [in Persian]. 
Razi, Najm al-Din (1982). Mirsad al-‘ibad The Path of God’s Bondsmen. Trans. H. Algar, Delmar, NY: 
Caravan Books. 
Al-Resoni, A. (2008). Reasoning and Objective Jurisprudence. In: Al-Refaei. A (ed.). Objective 
Jurisprudence: from Sharia Objectives to religion’s Objectives, Beirut: Lebanon, Daralhadi Publishing and 
Distribution [in Arabic]. 
Refsgaard, J. C., and Storm, B. (1995). Chapter 23: MIKE SHE. In V. P. Singh (Ed.) Computer models of 
watershed hydrology (pp 809-847). Littleton/Colorado: Water Resources Publications.  
Refsgaard, J. C., van der Sujis, J.P., Hojberg, A.L. and Vanrolleghem, P.A. (2007). Uncertainty in the 
environmental modelling process- a framework and guidance. Environmental Modelling and software, 22 
(11), 1543-1556. 
Reuss, M. (1989). Water resources people and Issues: Interview with Professor Arthur Maass. Office of 
History, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O. (Fort Belvoir, Va, Washington, D.C). 
Reuss, M. (2003). Is it time to resurrect the Harvard Water Program? Journal of Water Resources Planning 
andManagement, 129 (5): 357-360. 
Rivers-Moore, N.A. Jewitt G.P.W. (2007). Adaptive management and water temperature variability within a 
South African river system: What are the management options? Journal of Environmental Management, 82, 
39- 50. 
Robson, A. Bardossy, A. Jones, D. and Kundzewicz, Z. W. (2000). Statistical methods for testing for change. 
In: Kundzewicz, Z. W. and Robson, A. (eds.). Detecting trend and other changes in hydrological data (pp. 
46-64), World Climate Programme-Water, WMO/TD-No.1013, WCDMP-45, Geneva: WMO. 
Robson, C. (2011) Real world research. Third edition, Chichester: John Wiley. 
Walsh, C.L, Kilsby C.G. (2007) Implications of climate change on flow regime affecting Atlantic salmon. 
Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 2007, 11(3), 1127-1143. 
Roe, E.  (1994). Narrative Policy Analysis Theory and Practice. USA: Durham,North Carlolina: Duke 
University Press. 
References 
 
332 
Rogers, P.R., Jalal, K.F. and Boyd, J.A. (2006). An introduction to sustainable development. The continuing 
Education Division, Harvard University and Glen Educational Foundation.  
Rosenthal, F. (2007). Knowledge triumphant: the concept of knowledge in medieval Islam. Netherlands: Brill.  
Rounsevell, M.D.A., Dawson, T. P. and Harrison, P. A. (2010). A conceptual framework to assess the effects 
of environmental change on ecosystem services. Biodiversity and Conservation, 19 (10), 2823-2842. 
Saaty, T.L. (2005) The Analytic Hierarchy and Analytic Network Processes for the Measurement of 
Intangible Criteria and for Decision-Making In: Figueira, J., Salvatore, G., Ehrgott, M. (eds.), Multiple 
Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys (pp.354-408), New York: Springer.  
Sabbagh, A.I. (1999).The History of Ottoman Iranian Relationships: War and Peace between Ottomans and 
Safavids. First edition, Beirut: Dar An-Nafaès Publications [in Arabic].  
Sabatier, P.A (ed.). (1999). Theories of the Policy Processes. Westview Press: Boulder. 
Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (1999). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: an assessment. In: 
Sabatier, P.A (Ed.) Theories of the Policy Processes. Westview Press: Boulder. 
Salas, J.D. Boes, D.C, Vevjevich, V., and Pegram, G.G.S. (1979). Hurst Phenomenon as a pre-asymmetric 
behavior. Journal of Hydrology, 44, 1-15. 
Salas, J. D. and Smith, R. A. (1981). Physical basis of stochastic models of annual flows. Water Resources 
Research, 17(2), 428-430. 
Saleth, R.M., and Dinar, A., (2004). The Institutional Economics of Water. Cheltenham/UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Salewicz, K.A., Loucks, D.P and Gandolfi, C. (1991). IRIS: Interactive River Simulation program, 
Environmental Software, 6(1) March, 5-10. 
Samiei, A.R. (2007). The Modern Absolutist State and the economic and institutional regenerations 1925-
1998. in R Afzali(ed.) Modern State in Iran, Political Science Series 2, Qom: Mofid University Press [in 
Persian]. 
Sayar-Irani, K. and Dargahi, B. (2007).IWRM with participation of agricultural water users. Mehr-e-Ab, 43, 
p.27[in Persian]. 
Sayar-Irani, K. and Muradinejad, A. (2007). Necessities and Legal inadequeses in the operational and 
manteance of water utitilris, Mehr-e-aAb, 39, 20-22 [in Persian]. 
SCI (2007/2010). Estimated Update of Population of counties (based for the period upto September 2010). 
Report Code 07.03.89, Statistical Centre of Iran, Tehran  [in Persian]. 
Schlager, E. (2007). Community Management of Groundwater. In: M. Giordano and K.G. Villholth (eds.)The 
Agricultural Groundwater Revolution: Opportunities and Threats to Development (pp.131-151), 
Wallingford/UK:  CAB International. 
Schlager E., and Blomquist W., (1996). A comparison of three emerging theories of the policy process. 
Political Research Quarterly, 49(3), 651-672 
Schulze, R., Horan M., Seetal A. and E. Schmidt. (2004) Roles and perspectives of the policy-maker, affected 
water sector and scientist in integratedwaterresourcesmanagement: a case study from South Africa, 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 20(3), 325-344 
Schwarte, C., (2003). Environmental protection in Islamic Law: an overview on potential influences for legal 
development in Iraq. Local Environment: the International Journal of Justice and Sustainability, 8:5, 567-
576.  
Searle, J.R. (2005). What is an institution? Journal of Institutional Economics, 1(1), 1-22. 
Shackley S., and Wynne B.  (1996). Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: 
Boundary Ordering Devices and Authority. Journal of Science, Technology and Human Values, 21(3), 275-
302. 
References 
 
333 
Shahrokh, A.K. (2003) The memoirs of Keikhosrow Shahrokh. S. Shahrokh & R. Writer (ed.) G.M.Saleh 
[translated by], Tehran, Maziar Publishing [in Persian]. 
Shalabi, M (2003) Umar's Socialism. M.S. Majidi (Translated by), Sanandaj: Kurdistan Publishing [in 
Persian]. 
Sharifi, M.A. (2003) Integrated Planning and Decision Support Systems for sustainable water resources 
management: Concepts, Potentials and Limitations. Paper presented at the Seminar on Water Process 
Management for Sustainable Agricultural Productivity, Asian Productivity Organization, Lahore, Pakistan.  
Al-Shayaa, M.S., El Hag, E.H.A. and Muneer, S.E. (2007).The Role of People’s Knowledge and Attitudes in 
Conservation of Wildlife in the Natural Reservations: A Case Study of the Ibex Reservation in AL-Riyadh 
Region, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Journal of Biological Sciences 14 (1) 123-135. 
Siadat, H. (1999). Iranian Agriculture and Salinity. Proceedings of the International Symposium on New 
Technologies to Combat Desertificationheld in Tehran, Iran 12–15 October 1998 (pp. 9-14),  United Nations 
University, Tokyo, Japan.  
Siddiqi, A. and Diaz Anadon, L. (2011). The water energy nexus in Middle East and North Africa. Energy 
Policy, 39, 4529-4540. 
Siddiqi, M. N. (1996). Role of the State in the economy: an Islamic perspective. Leicester/UK: The Islamic 
Foundation. 
Siddiqi, M.N. (1988). Muslim Economic Thinking: a survey of contemporary literature. Leicester, The 
Islamic Foundation. 
Silberstein, R.P. (2006). Hydrological models are so good, do we still need data? Environmental Modelling & 
Software, 21, 1340-1352. 
Sillitoe, P., Alshawi, A.A. and Hassan, A.B.A., (2010). Challenges to conservation: land use change and local 
participation in the Al Reem Biosphere Reserve, West Qatar. Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine, 
6:28.  
Simmons, I. (1993). Interpreting Nature: Cultural Constructions of the Environment. London: Routledge. 
Simonovic S.P. and Bender M.J. (1996) Collaborative planning-support system: an approach determining 
evaluation criteria. Journal of Hydrology, 177, 237-251. 
Simons, M., Podger, G. & Cooke, R. (1996). IQQM—a hydrologic modelling tool for water resource and 
salinity management. Environmental Software, 11(1-3), 185-192. 
Smajgl, A., Brown, D.G., Valbuena, D. and Huigen M.G.A. (2011). Empirical characterisation of agent 
behaviours in socio-ecological systems. Environmental Modelling & Software, 26, 837-844 
Smithers, J. and Smit, B. (1997). Human adaptation to climatic variability and change. Global Environmental 
Change, 7(2): 129-146. 
Sohail, M., Cavill S. (2006). Ethics: making it the heart of water supply. Civil Engineering, 159, 11-15. 
Somlyody, L. (1997). Use of Optimization Models in River Basin Water Quality Modelling.Water Science 
and Technology, 36(5), 209-218. 
Sorkhab (2010). After years of dealy: the operaitional work of the second pipeline from Zarinarud to Tabriz is 
underway. Sorkhan Daily Newspaper, 4 (936):p.1.  
Spranger, E.,(1928/1966). Types of men: the psychology and ethics of personality/auth. transl. of the 5th 
German ed. By Paul J.W. Pigors. New York, N.Y., Johnson Reprint Corp, Repr. from the ed. 1928. (Original 
work published 1914 under the title Lebensformen: Geisteswissenschaftliche Psychologie und Ethik drr 
Personlichkeit). 
Stave K.A., (2002). Using system dynamics to improve public participation in environmental decisions. 
System Dynamics Review, 18(2), 139-167. 
References 
 
334 
Steiguer, J.E, Duberstein, J and Lopes V. (2003). The Analytic Hierarchy Process as a Means for Integrated 
Watershed Management. Proceedings of the First Interagency Conference on Research in the Watersheds, 
USA, 736-740 Uzoka, F.M.E & Akinyokun, O.C. 
Steyaert, P. and Jiggins, J. (2007). Governance of complex environmental situations through social learning: a 
synthesis of SLIM’s lessons for research, policy and practice. Environmental Science and Policy, 10, 575- 
586. 
Sugumaran, R., Davis, C., Meyer, J., Prato, T. & Fulcher, C. (2000). Web-based decision support tool for 
floodplain management using high-resolution DEM. Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing, 
66(10), 1261-1265. 
SUSMAQ (2003). Rainfall Variability and Change in the West Bank. Report No. SUSMAQ- RAIN # 13 V 
1.0, Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Aquifers, Palestinian Water Authority (Palestine) 
and University of Newcastle upon Tyne (UK). 
SUSMAQ (2006). Sustainable Management of the West Bank and Gaza Aquifers. Summary Report, UK: 
Newcastle University 
Sutcliffe, J.V. (2004) Hydrology: A question of Balance. Wallingford/ England: IAHS Press. 
Svarstad, H., Peterson, K.L., Rothman, D., Siepel, H., and Wätzold F., (2008). Discursive biases of the 
environmental research framework DPSIR, Land Use Policy, 25(1), 116-125. 
Swatuk, Larry A., 2005, Political challenges to implementing IWRM in Southern Africa, Physics and 
Chemistry of the Earth, 30 (11/16): 872-880.  
Tamas, P. (2003). Water Resource Scarcity and Conflict: Review of Applicable Indicators and Systems of 
Reference. Technical documents in Hudrology, Report No. 21, Paris: UNESCO-IHP. 
Tiwari, B.K.,  Tynsong. H. and  & Lynser, M.B, (2010). Forest Management Practices ofthe Tribal People of 
Meghalaya, North-East India. Journal of Tropical Forest Science 22(3): 329–342.  
Todini, E, Schumann, A. and Assimacopoulos, D. (2006). WaterStrategyMan Decision Support System. In. 
Koundouri, P., Karousakis, K., Assimacopoulos, D., Jeffrey, P. and Lange, M. (eds.). Water Management in 
Arid and Semi-Arid Regions: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp.13-40), Gloucestershire/UK: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Toonen, T. (2010). Resilience in Public Administration: The Work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom from a 
Public Administration Perspective.Public Administration Review, 70(2): 193- 202. 
Turner, R.K. (2000). Integrating natural and socio-economic science in coastal management. Journal of 
Marine Systems , 25, 447–460 
Turner, R. K., Lorenzoni, I., Beaumont, N., Bateman, I. J., Langford, I. H. and McDonald, A. L. (1998) 
Coastal management for sustainable development: analysing environmental and socioeconomic changes on 
the UK coast. The Geographical Journal,164 (3), 269-281. 
UNCED (1992). Agenda 21: The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Earth Summit, United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992. Retrieved 
on 11 September 2011 from http://habitat.igc.org/agenda21/index.htm.  
UNESCAP (undated). What is good governance? Retrieved August 12, 2011, from http://www .unescap.org/ 
pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 
UN-Water (2008). Status Report on IWRM and Water Efficiency Plans for CSD16. NU-Water. 
Vali-Khodjeni, A. (1995). Human impacts on groundwater resources in Iran. IAHS Publ. no. 230, 
Proceedings of the Symposium on Man's Influence on Freshwater Ecosystems and Water Boulder, 141-146.  
Ventana Systems (2007). Vensim® Ventana® Simulation Environment Users’ Guide Manual. USA:Ventana 
Systems Inc. 
Verhallen, V. Warner, J and Santbergen, L., (2007). Towards evaluating MSPs for integrated catchment 
management. In Warner J (ed.) Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for integrated water management (pp. 259-271),  
UK: Hampshire: Ashgate. 
References 
 
335 
Wabnitz, H.W.  (2009). Return to the Sources: Revival of Traditional Nomads’ Rights to Common Property 
Resources in the Code Pastoral of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Natural Resources Journal, 49, 91-218 
Walton, T. (1980). COMMENTARY: Economic development and revolutionary upheavals in Iran. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 4, 271-272. 
Walmsley, J.J. (2002). Framework for measuring sustainable development in Catchment systems. 
Environmental Management, 29 (2), 195- 206. 
WANA (2011). Region in transition. WANA Forum 2011Annual meeting Report, Jordan/Amman: WANA 
Forum. 
Warner, J. (2007). The beauty and the beast: Multi-Stakeholder Participation for integrated catchment 
management.  In Warner J (ed.) Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for integrated water management (pp. 1-20),  
UK: Hampshire: Ashgate. 
Warner, J., Lulofs, K. and Bressers, H. (2010). The fine art of boundary spanning: Making space for water in 
the East Netherlands. Water Alternatives, 3(1), 137-153. 
Watkins, D.W. Jr, and Mckinney, D.C. (1995). Recent developments associated with decision support 
systems in water resources. Reviews of Geophysics (July Supplement), 941-948. 
Watson, R. T. (2005). Turning science into policy: challenges and experiences from the science–policy 
interface. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 360, 471- 477. 
Wattage, P.and Mardle, S. (2005). Stakeholder preferences towards conservation versus development for a 
wetland in Sri Lanka. Journal of Environmental Management, 77,122–132 
WCED (1987). Our Common Future (The Bruntland Report). World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), UK/Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weistroffer, H.R., Smith, C.H., Narula, S.C. (2005). MCDM Software. In: Figueira, J., Salvatore, G., Ehrgott, 
M. (Eds.), Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis: State of the Art Surveys (pp.989-1019), Springer, New York.  
Wescoat, J. L. Jr, (1995). The 'right of thirst' for animals in Islamic law: a comparative approach. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 13(6), 637- 654. 
Williams, W.D. (2002). Environmental threats to salt lakes and the likely status of inland saline ecosystems in 
2025.Environmental Conservation 29 (2), 154–167. 
Wilkinson, J.C., (1990). Muslim Land and Water Law. Journal of Islamic Studies, 1, 54-72. 
Wishitemi, B. E. L. and M. M. Okello (2003). Application of the Protected Landscape Model in 
SouthernKenya. Parks 13(2), 12-21. 
WL| Delft Hydraulics (2005). RIBASIM Documentation.  Retrieved July, 20, 2009, from 
http://www.wldelft.nl/soft/ribasim/doc/index.html 
World Bank (2004). Assessing the economic value of ecosystem conservation. Environmental Department 
paper No. 101, Washington D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ the World Bank. 
World Bank (2005). Islamic Republic of Iran Cost Assessment of Environmental Degradation. Report No. 
32043-IR, Rural Development, Water and Environment Department, Middle East and North Africa Region.  
World Bank (2007). Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in 
theMiddle East and North Africa.  MENA DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Washington D.C.: International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development/ the World Bank. 
Word Bank/WGI (2010). World Governance Indicators (WGI). Online database in Microsfot Excel format for 
1996-2010 avaiable from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.  
World Bank /WDI (2010). 2010 World development indicators. Washington D.C.: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development/ the World Bank. 
WRI (2005).Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) for Lake Urmia Basin, Iran Project (PvW-
02.048), Reports (4 volumes); Tehran: Water Research Institute, Ministry of Energy 
References 
 
336 
Wurbs, R. A (1997). Computer Models for Water-Resources Planning and Management: National Study of 
Water Management during Drought.  USA: DIANE Publishing. 
Wurbs, R.A. (2005). Comparative Evaluation of Generalized Reservoir/River System Models. Technical 
Report No. 282, USA: Texas: Department of Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University System College 
Station. 
WWDR (2009). Water in a changing world. The United Nations World Water Development Report 3, 
UNESCO, London: Earthscan 
WWF (2006). Implementing Integrated Water Resources Management: The Inclusion of IWRM in National 
Plans.4th World Water Forum Theme Report United Nations 
Yekom (2002). The lake Urmia Environmental Management project. Irrigation Improvement Project (IBRD 
Loan 3570 IRN), Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Tehran: Yekom Consulting Engineers.  
Yekom (2005): The Environmental Impact Assessment and study (quality and quantity) of the Development 
Projects in the Lake Urmia Basin, The West Azerbaijan Water Authority (WWA), Ministry of Energy (MoE), 
Tehran: Yekom Consulting Engineers.  
van der Zaag, Pieter, (2005). Integrated Water Resources Management: Relevant concept or irrelevant 
buzzword? A capacity building and research agenda for Southern Africa. Physics and Chemistry of the Earth, 
30 (11/16) – 867-871.  
Zagona, E.A., Fulp, T.J., Shane, R., Magee, T. and Goranflo, H.M. (2001). RiverWare; a generalized tool for 
complex reservoir system modelling. Journal of the American Water Resources Association, 37(4): 913-929. 
Zalewski, M. (undated). European Regional Centre for Ecohydrology under the auspices of UNESCO. 
Brochure. 
Zapatero‚ E.G., Smith‚ C.H. and Weistroffer, H.R. (1997). Evaluating multiple-attribute decision support 
systems. Journal of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis‚ 6, 201–214‚ 1997. 
Zare, A. (2007). Interview: MoE and MoAJ will collaborate instead disagreeing if a shared vision for water 
and agriculture sector is defined. Mehr-e-aAb, 39, 61-62. 
Zeitoun, M., J.A. Allan and Mohieldeen, Y. (2010). Virtual water ‘flows’ of the Nile Basin, 1998–2004: A 
first approximation and implications for water security. Global Environmental Change, 20 (2): 229-242. 
Zekavat, S.M., (1997). The State of the Environment in Iran. Journal of Developing Societies, June issue, 
13(1): 49-71. 
Zinn, Jens. Reflexive Modernization. Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Ritzer, George (ed). Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007. Blackwell Reference Online. 09 April 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
337 
Appendix A1. Data collection sources  
The data collection methods and sources are arranged two parts: Part I is arranged in 
explanatory table format and Part II is arranged in a diary format. In the main text of the 
thesis, the data source is mentioned with reference to the Appendix number or Table 
number or both e.g. (Appendix A1, Table A1.1). The acronyms are given in  the 
nomenclature list. 
Part I: List of workshops, working group meetings with key stakeholders 
Activity/ Date/ Location Outcome of 
activities  
Participants (organisations) 
Lake Urmia Second 
Integrated Management 
Plan Workshop, 17-18 
November 2007,  Tabriz, 
EA 
Draft EMP 51 people from national stakeholders (MoAJ, MoE,); 
academic centres in EA and WA; NGOs from EA and 
WA; Governor’s office (EA and WA); provincial 
departments of RWCs, AJOs, EPOs (EA and WA); 
Kurdistan representative from EPO.   
Wetland Monitoring 
Training Workshop, 29 
April- 1 May 2008, Urmia 
City , WA 
Monitoring 
Protocol  
40 people: 51 people from national stakeholders (MoAJ, 
MoE,); academic centres in EA and WA; NGOs from EA 
and WA; Governor’s office (EA and WA); provincial 
governmental departments (RWCs, AJO, EPOs) from EA 
and WA; Kurdistan representative from EPO.   
Urmia Zoning for 
Sustainable Management 
Workshop, 26-27 May 
2008, Urmia City, WA 
Lake Urmia 
Zoning map 
57 people: 51 people from national stakeholders (MoE, 
MoAJ,); academic centres in EA and WA; NGOs from EA 
and WA; Governor’s office (EA and WA); provincial 
governmental departments of RWCs, AJO and EPOs (EA 
and WA); Kurdistan  representative from EPO.   
Notes: 
My role was participant and facilitator. Data collection methods used are: (1) qualitative survey including 
many informal interviews and 78 fully completed questionnaires based on European Commission (2006) 
and Saleth and Dinar (2004); (2) observational data including stakeholder meetings and discussions; (3) 
secondary data analysis including major past work reports; (4) baseline data on Lake Urmia basin. 
Table A1.1: Main interactive stakeholder consulting workshops (2007-2008)  
 
Activity/ Date/ Location Participants (organisations) 
Institutional Building Capacity to 
Implement IWRM, 25 April 2007 
Kermanshah City 
31 people mainly senior executive water managers from regional 
water companies in 4 western provinces: Kermanshah, Kurdistan, 
Lurestan and Ilam; IWRMC, Tehran University academic and 
consulting companies.  
Implementing IWRM- Conflict 
resolutionWorkshop; 2-3 March 2008, 
Sanandaj, Kurdistan 
24 people mainly  senior executive mangers of regional water 
companies of Kurdistan and WA as well as participants from the 
Sanandaj city Municipality, city planning office and local 
consulting company  
Institutional Aspect of Water 
Management (Open event), 7th May 
2008 Karaj, School of Water and 
Land, Tehran University 
Nearly 60 people representatives from MoAJ as well as academics 
and postgraduate students from the Faculty of Agriculture: 
Department of Land and Water, Tehran University 
Note: 
My role was trainer; I organised these interactive workshops providing (1) qualitative survey and (2) 
observational data as in Table A1.1. 
Table A1.2: Main interactive capacity building workshops (2007-2008)  
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Reference used 
in the thesis 
Interview/ forum Participant (s) 
Memari (2006) Interview with Advisor to Deputy 
Minister for Water Affairs, 
November 2006 
Mr Memari 
Kashfi (2007) Interview with the World Bank Co-
ordinator of the Iran Water and 
Wastewater Company, Feb 2007 
Mr Kashfi 
MoAJ (2008) Forum at the Agricultural Water 
Productivity Management 
Department, MoAJ, Karaj, 30 June 
2008 
Mr Janbaz (deputy director); Mr Bijan Dargahi 
(wetlands and irrigation networks); Mr Sayar Irani 
(Institutional ); Mr Bahri (Agricultural Water use) 
Mr Kiamars Nazarpor I (Agricultural Water use); 
Mr Riazi (water economics); Mr Etrmadfar (Lake 
Urmia)  
Notes: 
The transcripts of these forums have been approved and can be quoted as data in the thesis. 
Table A1.3a: Formal interviews and forums (2006-2008)  
 
 
 
Participant  Position   
Mr Ali Daemi Director General, Office of Macro Planning, MoE 
Dr Hedayt Fahmi Director, Water Resources Planning  
Dr Sedegha Torabi,  Director, , WAPC, MoE 
Mr Kakahaji Deputy Manager, Office of Lake Urmia and Caspian Sea Basins IWRMC 
Mr Tehrani  Manager, Office of Lake Urmia and Caspian Sea Basins, IWRMC 
Dr Ali Nazaridoust National manager, CIWP 
Mr Esfandiari Manager, Water Economics section, IWRMC 
Mr Mustafa Qadri Director General, MoE ParliamentaryAffairs Office; Advisor to the Minister for 
Energy 
Mr sayari Director of Planning, IWRMC 
MR Rozbeh 
Javaheri 
Director, Applied Research Office, IWRM 
Mr Mustafa 
Fedaeifard 
Manager, Updating Master Plan - IWRM project, Office of Macro Planning, MoE 
Mr Bijan Dargahi  Wetlands and Qanats Expert,  Agricultural Water Productivity Management 
Department, MoAJ 
Note: 
I had a number of informal meetings and discussions with key stakeholders in MoAJ, MoE and IWRMC 
during the PhD work. They have contributed to my understanding about the issues in Iran’s water sector.  
 
Table A1.3b:List of Key national stakeholders (2007-2011).   
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1. Water and Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) meetings  
Date  Place  Activity  Type of data MoM 
23-4 Nov 2007 Urmia 1st WAWG meeting  Notes on the meeting  ü 
26 May 2009 Urmia  2nd WAWG meeting Observation data: 8 hours audio 
tape 
ü 
26 Sept. 2009 Sanandaj 3rd WAWG 
meeting 
Observation data: 9 hours video 
tape 
ü 
16 Nov 2009 Tabriz 4th WAWG meeting Observation data: 9 hours video 
tape; Mission Report by Eelco 
van Beek, International IWRM 
Consultant  
ü 
8-9 May Urmia 5th WAWG meeting Observation data: 12 hours 
video tape 
ü 
3 July 2010 Sanandaj 6th WAWG meeting Observation data: 8 hours video 
tape 
ü 
2. Drought Taskforce meetings and Droughts Risk Management Workshop 
4 July 2010 Sanandaj 1st Taskforce 
meeting 
Observation data: 4 hours of 
video tape 
ü 
9 Aug 2010 Tabriz 2nd Taskforce 
meeting 
Personal Notes on the meeting - 
6-12 Feb 2011 Kish 
Island, 
Persian 
Gulf 
Droughts Risk 
Management DRM 
Workshop 
6 Draft consultancy reports on 
different aspects of  droughts 
including hydrological, climatic 
and drought management plan 
Summary of Qualitative 
questionnaires  
- 
Notes: 
Minute of Meeting (MoM) contained a detailed transcript of the proceedings of the meetings. All the 
meetings were documented either by audio or video recorders and the MoM was sent to stakeholders for 
approval.  
1st meeting was attended by 21 people EA:AJO, Governor’s Office, EPO, RWC, HTO, NRWMO and an 
Environmental NGO; WA: AJO, Governor’s Office, EPO, RWC, HTO, NRWMO; Kurdistan: EPO 
Other meetings the numbers and participants varied from meeting to meeting but a core of people 
attended the meeting including; national: WAPC (MoE); CIWP consultant and project co-predicators in 
Tehran as well as provincial co-ordinators in EA and WA. I played the role of Kurdistan project 
coordinator as well as the facilitator and organiser of the meetings. Between 38 to58 people attended the 
remaining 5 meetings. Permanent members for all three provinces include representatives from: RWC, 
AJOs, Governor’s office and EPOs.   
Members who attended all the meetings: 
I am indebted to the permanent WAWG members who have engaged with me with respect and trust: 
National stakeholders: Dr Sedegha Torabi, WPAC 
CIWP team:, MoE, Dr Ali Nazaridoust, Mr Saber Masomi, Mr Najafi (EA CIWP office), Dr Qureshi 
(WA CIWP Office) 
EA: Mr Husseinlar and Mr Torabi (EARWC); Mr Musavi (MoAJ);   
Kurdistan: Mr Khaleqpanah and Mr (KRWC); Mr Amerifar (KEPO), Mr Zulfaqarnejad and Mr Saeidi 
(KAJO), Mr Husseini (Governor’s Office) 
WA: Mr Torabi, Mr Rezaei and Mr Rajabi (WARWC); Mr Hafezi (WAAJO) and Dr Hojat Jabbari ( 
WAEPO and unofficial Secretariat of the Regional Council who has also provide some of the photos of 
Lake Urmia) 
Table A1.4: Working group meetings, Droughts Taskforce meetings and Droughts Risk 
Management Workshop (2007-2010);  
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Part II: Diary of the main Official Fact- finding Missions and meetings 
Date  Mission Activity  
8 April 2009 Tehran - meeting with CIWP management team and consultants  
17 May 2009  Sanandaj - provincial Water and Agriculture Commission meeting 
21 May 2009 Sanandaj - provincial Water and Agriculture Commission meeting 
25 May 2009 Satellite Wetlands - field visits to different satellite wetlands in the Gadarchai and Mahabad chi river basin 
27 May 2009 Urmia - meeting with provincial stakeholders in WA: AJO and RWC  
15 June 2009 Sanandaj - meeting with provincial stakeholders in Kurdistan: AJO and RWC  
17 June 2009 Tabriz -meeting with provincial stakeholders in EA: AJO and RWC 
18 July 2009 Sanandaj - meeting with Deputy Governor  for Development , Kurdistan  
25 July 2009  Tehran - MoE and DoE’s joint working group meeting on LU 
27 July 2009 Tehran - IWRMC: meeting with Director of newly established north and LU river basin organization 
(Eng. Tehrani) and Water allocation unit of the Water Resources  Planning Office 
28 July 2009 Tehran - meeting with CIWP management team and consultants 
5 Sept. 2009 Sanandaj - meeting at Farmer’s Association (NGO) and governor’s office  
 6 Sept. 2009 Sanandaj - meeting with RWC  
9 Sept2009 Sanandaj - Water and Agriculture Commission meeting 
14 Sept.2009 Sanandaj - meeting with Planning and Budget Deputy Governor  
16 Sept 2009 Sanandaj - meeting with major stakeholders at KRWC 
24 Sept 2009 Sanandaj meeting with KRWC & Governor’s office  
18 Oct 2009 Tehran - meeting with CIWP management team and consultants 
13 Oct 2009  Sanandaj - meeting: Agricultural Engineering Council of Kurdistan and Deputy Governor of Kurdistan 
for Development 
17 Oct2009  Sanandanj - meeting: Director general of Kurdistan Natural Resources Organisation introducing IWRM 
into Land and Water Plans  
13-20 Nov 
2009 
Tehran, Tabriz 
and Urmia 
· meeting with staff and international consultants, Eelco van Beek 
· Stakeholder meetings with provincial representatives of EA, WA and Kurdistan 
· meeting with Dr Mnihaj and his team on their proposal for monitoring system 
23 Feb 2010 Tehran - meeting with CIWP management team and consultants  
19 April 2010 Tehran -  CIWP seminar 
20 April 2010 Tehran - meetings with Dr Riahi, Director of Water Research Institute WRI; 
Dr Fahmi (MoE) and Mr Pourzand (Mahab Ghodss); 
Mr KakaHaji, Deputy Manager, Office of Lake Urmia and Caspean Sea Basins 
21 April 2010 Tehran - meeting Dr Minhaj on Monitoring DSS 
- Mr Ferdosi, UNDP 
5 May 2010 Sanandaj - meeting Kurdistan governor's Office 
10 May 2010 Urmia - WARWC data collection  
30 May 2010 Sanandaj - stakeholder meeting at KRWC 
3 June 2010 Sanandaj - meeting at KAJO- Potential irrigation report 
13 June 2010 Sanandaj - stakeholder meetings at KRWC 
26-29 June 
2010 
Tehran - several Meetings with international consultant; MoE, MoAj, Mahab Ghods 
8-9 Aug 2010 Tabriz - Stakeholder meetings and Drought Risk management Taskforce meeting 
23-26 Aug 
2010 
Tehran - various National stakeholder meetings  
9 Oct 2010  Sanandaj - meeting Mr Azhari Deputy Governor and his staff 
11Oct 2010 Sanandaj - meeting with Mr Khaleqpanah and KRWC staff 
14 Oct 2010; Sanandaj - attending Water & Agriculture Commission  
16 Oct 2010 
 
Sanandaj - meeting Deputy Governor of Kurdistan for Development with regards to 6th WAWG 
outcomes 
3 Jan 2011 Tehran - meetings at MoE with key stakeholders  
24 Jan 2011 Sanandaj - attending Water & Agriculture Commission  
6-12 Feb 2011 Kish  Island, 
Persian Gulf 
-stakeholder meetings during Droughts Risk Management DRM Workshop 
14 March 2011 Sanandaj - meeting Deputy Governor of Kurdistan for Development  
Notes: 
I had several positions: (1) National IWRM Consultant to CIWP project; (2) unofficial Kurdistan co-coordinator for CIWP; and (3) 
researcher as PhD candidate.  
As a, my role was facilitator and advisor, I was invited to many stakeholder meetings on fact finding missions as listed below. I had to 
liaise with many organisations on various matters related to the Lake Urmia case study.  Types of data are: notes on these stakeholder 
meetings; Mission and Quarterly Work Progress Reports written for CIWP; and several analytical and discussion papers for CIWP 
analysing stakeholder narratives and discourse by the author. 
 
Table A1.5: Diary of main Official Fact- finding Missions and stakeholder meetings (2009-
2011) 
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Activity/ Date/ Location contribution Type of data Participants 
(organisations) 
Workshop on Towards 
Supernational 
Mechanisms  in 
Addressing the Challenges 
of Water Scarcity in 
WANA, 22-24 Feb 2011 
atKempinski Hotel, 
Amman- Jordan 
 
 
Three contributions 
to Policy brief on 
water scarcity  
MoM 
Concept Note 
Perspectives of 
regional actors 
17 people from various 
universities and 
professional bodies 
Mediterranean in 
WANA region 
* Workshop on Hybrid 
Hima Approach to 
Community based 
Resources Management: 
Bridging the gap between 
tradition and modern-day 
governance, 14-16 April 
2011 at IRCICA, Istanbul- 
Turkey 
 
 
** Policy brief 
paper on Principles 
on Hima 
Governance  
MoM 
Concept Note 
Feedback on 
research results 
Perspectives  
About 40 people 
attended from different 
parts of WANA, the 
Principles of Hima 
Governance was 
presented at this 
meeting 
WANA FORUM Annual 
Meeting, 9-10 May 2011 
at Kempinski Hotel, 
Amman- Jordan 
 
 
Keynote speech on 
the issue of 
integration towards 
creation of 
supernational 
mechanisms for 
cooperation in 
WANA 
Concept Note 
Feedback on 
results of PhD;  
Perspectives on 
various policy 
issues 
An audience of 100 
people from WANA 
region, UN agencies, 
European and American 
academic and policy 
institutes 
Notes: 
* This workshop was sponsored by World Justice Forum (WJF) and co-organised by Society for 
the Protection of Nature in Lebanon (SPNL) 
** a paper based on the research and the feed from this workshop was presented at the 3rd 
meeting of World Justice Forum in Barcelona in July 18-21, 2011.  
 
Table A1.6: WANA Forum workshops and meeting (2011)  
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Appendix A2: ToR of National IWRM Consultant (i.e. the author) 
Specific tasks with reference to water allocation process in Lake Urmia are as follows:  
 
(a) Water Allocation between provinces 
a. Facilitate agreement provincial water shares - normal conditions 
b. Facilitate development water allocation protocol by WAWG 
c. Development of monitoring protocol by WAWW 
d. Decision making on water allocation by Regional Basin Council 
e. Implementation of monitoring system 
 
(b) Supporting studies  
f. Support provinces to develop provincial IWRM plans 
g. Study/awareness on relative importance drought / development 
h. Workshop and awareness material on drought and climate change including 
Drought conference and Taskforce 
i. Develop ToR for bathymetry study of LU 
j. Support study on options for reducing evaporation from LU 
k. Support study to determine full cost of water for agriculture 
(c) Water & Agriculture Working Group (WAWG) meetings 
l. Supporting and participating Lake Urmia WAWG meetings  
 
